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Changing times require changes to the ways in which lawyers, define,
approach, and address complex problems. Legal education reform is
needed to properly equip tomorrow's lawyers with the knowledge and
skills necessary to address twenty-first century issues. This Article pro-
poses that the legal academy foster the development of competencies in
preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engage-
ment to prepare lawyers adequately for the practice of law. The Article
offers one model for so doing-a law school-based medical-legal partner-
ship clinic-and discusses the benefits, challenges, and lessons learned
from the author's own experience teaching in such a program. However,
the Article proposes that the clinic model is merely a starting point, and
that law schools should integrate instruction in preventive law, interdisci-
plinary collaboration, and community engagement hroughout the curric-
ulum in a carefully designed progression to achieve the curricular reform
needed to properly prepare tomorrow's lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the throes of a health and social justice crisis.
Proposed cuts to federal funding for vital safety nets-such as public
health insurance, low-income home energy assistance, and food assistance
programs-significantly endanger the health and well-being of our na-
tion's marginalized populations, namely the indigent, low-income, and
working poor. Suggested (and actual) dismantling of environmental pro-
tections, the public education system, housing and urban development pro-
1. See Pam Fessler, Advocates Say Trump Budget Cuts Will Hurt Country's Most Vulnerable,
NPR (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:27 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/17/520467050/advocates-say-trump-
budget-cuts-will-hurt-countrys-most-vulnerable; Alana Semuels, How Trump's Budget Would Impact




grams, and community development block grants will exacerbate the ad-
verse effects of structural and social determinants on these populations.2
Potential reductions in federal financial support for Legal Services Corpo-
ration, on top of two decades' worth of diminished funding, will worsen
long-existing access to justice issues. These proposals further jeopardize
the lives and livelihoods of 100 million Americans who are low-income,
approximately thirty percent of the nation's total population and forty-
three percent of all U.S. children.
Changing times mandate changes to the ways in which lawyers de-
fine, approach, and address complex problems. There never will be enough
social justice attorneys to address the legal needs of those who are low
income or poor.6 Moreover, society increasingly has acknowledged that
complex individual and social problems require multidimensional, com-
munity-engaged problem solving aimed at addressing root causes and their
adverse effects, and at preventing them from arising in the first place.7
Tomorrow's lawyers must be equipped with the tools and skill sets needed
to resolve twenty-first century issues. This requires legal education re-
form.
2. See Stephenie Johnson et al., The Trump-DeVos Budget Would Dismantle Public Educa-
tion, Hurting Vulnerable Kids, Working Families, and Teachers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 17,
2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/educa-
tion/news/2017/03/17/428598/trump-devos-budget-dismantle-public-education-hurting-vulnerable-
kids-working-families-teachers; Anya Kamenetz, Trump 's Budget Blueprint Pinches Pennies for Ed-
ucation, NPR (Mar. 16, 2017, 11:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/ed/2017/03/16/520261978/trumps-budget-blueprint-pinches-pennies-for-education; Science
News Staff, NIH, DOE Office ofScience Face Deep Cuts in Trump's First Budget, SCIENCE (Mar. 16,
2017, 12:15 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/nih-doe-office-science-face-deep-cuts-
trumps-first-budget.
3. See Matt Ford, What Will Happen to Americans Who Can't Afford an Attorney?, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/legal-services-corpora-
tion/520083.
4. See Basic Statistics, TALK POVERTY, https://talkpoverty.org/basics (last visited Feb. 10,
2018); see also Child Poverty, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILD. POVERTY, http://www.nccp.org/top-
ics/childpoverty.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2018) (defining low-income as income less than or equal
to twice the federal poverty threshold).
5. Child Poverty, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN. AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2009); LEGAL SERVS. OF N.J.,
NEW JERSEY'S CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE GAP: NECESSARY STEPS TO PROVIDE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AND SECURE EQUAL JUSTICE FOR PEOPLE WITH LIMITED MEANS 1 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Ellen M. Lawton & Megan Sandel, Investing in Legal Prevention: Connecting
Access to Civil Justice and Healthcare Through Medical-Legal Partnership, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 29, 33
(2014) (stating medical-legal partnership's success as a healthcare delivery model "lies in its cross-dis-
ciplinary, leveraging nature, which aligns the legal community with a range of stakeholders and pro-
fessions that are unified in seeking to improve health conditions and systems for vulnerable popula-
tions"); Jane R. Wettach, The Law School Clinic as a Partner in a Medical-Legal Partnership, 75
TENN. L. REV. 305, 305 (2008) ("In today's complex and interconnected society, lawyers undeniably
must possess the ability to solve problems in an interdisciplinary context.").
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Given these concerns, the time is ripe to revisit not only what law
schools teach and how but also what they do not teach.8 Recent amend-
ments to the American Bar Association's (ABA) accreditation standards
mandate two significant changes to legal education that support educa-
tional reform. First, law schools must develop learning outcomes that in-
clude competency in substantive and procedural law; legal analysis, prob-
lem solving, and communication; professional responsibility and ethics;
and "other professional skills" needed for a student to become a "compe-
tent and ethical . .. member of the legal profession."9 Second, law schools
must ensure that each student completes at least six credit hours of expe-
riential courses, which include simulation courses, law clinics, or field
placements.'0 These revisions are the result of decades of legal education
critique and repeated calls for law schools to better prepare their students
for the legal profession." They also pave the way for the addition of three
new competencies essential to twenty-first century law practice: preven-
tive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engagement.12
The benefits of education and training in these areas have been evident to
some for years.13 Yet, few law schools intentionally include instruction in
all three competency areas throughout their curricula.14
Since their inception, law school clinics have taken the lead in edu-
cating students in areas absent from or inadequately emphasized by class-
8. See Karen Tokarz et al., Legal Education at a Crossroads: Innovation, Integration, and
Pluralism Required!, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 56 (2013) ("Legal education is at a crossroads.
Much more remains to be done by law schools to meet the challenge of preparing competent, ethical
practitioners who are ready to become professionals.").
9. AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2015-2016, at 15-16 (2015).
10. Id. at 16-17.
11. See Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. JUST.
247, 250 (2012) (referencing "almost a century of critique" of the legal education system); see also
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 327-38 (1992) (setting forth recommen-
dations to improve legal education, including that law schools adopt more skills and values instruction
in their curricula); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A
ROADMAP 13, 15-19 (2007) (arguing that law schools' focus on legal reasoning and legal principles
is insufficient and they must expand their "educational goals" and commit to prepare students for law
practice); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 3, 8 (2007) (finding that law schools should more fully
integrate knowledge, skills and values into legal education); Cynthia Batt, A Practice Continuum:
Integrating Experiential Education into the Curriculum, 7 ELON L. REV. 119, 120 (2015) (noting that
the struggle over how best to educate law students is far from new); Tokarz et al., supra note 8, at 11-
12 (asserting that "[t]he clamor for reform in legal education is precipitated by a confluence of factors,"
including changes in the nature of legal practice, a decrease in legal jobs, changes in economics, a
drop in law school applications and admissions, and higher demand for "practice-ready" new attor-
neys).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
14. This conclusion is based on the author's research.
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room instruction that focuses predominantly on the legal analysis of sub-
stantive law.' 5 For more than half a century, clinics have bridged the
worlds of theory and doctrine with live practice, provided law students
with instruction in lawyering skills, instilled in students social justice val-
ues, and promoted the development of a positive professional identity.1 6
As a result, many legal scholars regard clinical legal education as the
"most significant reform in American legal education since Langdell's
case method approach."'7 Some U.S. law schools have developed innova-
tive programs of instruction that integrate legal theory, doctrine, skills, and
values across the entire curriculum.'8 However, the majority continue to
rely on clinics and, to a lesser extent, externships to develop students'
competencies in the application of legal doctrine to real-life situations, in
practical lawyering skills with live clients, and in advancing the pursuit of
social justice.'9
Law school clinics can and should continue to serve at the forefront
in educating students in the ever-evolving proficiency standards needed,
for twenty-first century practice by fostering the development of compe-
tencies in preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community
15. See Tokarz et al., supra note 8, at 14 ("[T]he arrival of experiential and clinical educa-
tion ... was a corrective intervention in response to perceived deficiencies in the casebook method.");
see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 56-59 (calling attention to the vital role of clinics in
educating students in competencies largely absent from traditional classroom courses, e.g., client ex-
perience and ethical matters); Barry, supra note 11, at 251 ("Many schools have looked to clinical and
experiential offerings . . . to address pesky critiques about professional relevance . . . . Clinical pro-
grams have given form to consideration of broader competencies . . . ."); Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey
Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57, 61 (2009) ("[C]linical legal education developed
in response to legal education's deficits.").
16. See Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 15 (describing clinics as "the law school sites within
which the cognitive, skills and civic dimensions [of legal education] are purportedly iterative and in-
tegrated, where students learn and deploy legal skills and encounter the real-life ethical challenges of
working directly with clients to diagnose and treat their legal problems"); see also Margaret Martin
Barry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 12-15
(2000) (discussing clinical legal education's dual aims of lawyering skills training and provision of
access to justice); Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests ofJustice,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1929-30 (2002) (arguing clinics are "the primary place in the law school
where students can learn to be competent, ethical, socially responsible lawyers").
17. Douglas L. Colbert, Clinical Professors' Professional Responsibility: Preparing Law Stu-
dents to Embrace Pro Bono, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 309, 323 (2011) (citing JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 269-70
(1976)).
18. See, e.g., Tokarz et al., supra note 8, at 45-51 (discussing long-existing clinical legal edu-
cation requirements for law students attending University of Puerto Rico, University of New Mexico,
City University of New York, University of District of Columbia, and University of Maryland law
schools and noting that twenty-three law schools reported clinic or externship requirements for all
students as of October 2013); see also Barry, supra note 11, at 256-63 (discussing innovation in legal
education at Boston College, Cardozo, Harvard, Stanford, Washington & Lee, U.C. Irvine, and oth-
ers); Sheldon Krantz & Michael Millemann, Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Impli-
cations, 94 NEB. L. REV. 1, 10-41 (2015) (reviewing innovative legal education programs at Harvard,
U.C. Irvine, University of Montana, and Georgetown, among others).
19. See Linda F. Smith, Fostering Justice Throughout he Curriculum, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 427, 427 (2011) ("[C]linics are the primary way in which law schools foster justice and
public service .... ); see also William M. Sullivan, Align Preparation and Assessment with Practice:
A New Direction for the Bar Examination, 85 N.Y. ST. B.J. 41, 42 (2013) (critiquing legal education
for "providing an unbalanced curriculum" that ill-prepares students for the practice of law).
DENVER LAW REVIEW
engagement. This Article proposes that a law school-based medical-legal
partnership (MLP) clinic offers a viable means for so doing. Over the last
two decades, the MLP has emerged as a model of collaboration across dis-
ciplines (e.g., medicine and health, law, social work, and public health)
and with communities, in addressing the health-harming social and legal
needs of individuals and populations.20 The MLP's adoption of a preven-
tive law approach and examination of health issues at the micro and macro
levels across multiple discipline perspectives raise fascinating questions
about the way we define problems; craft and implement solutions; advance
human rights and social justice proactively; and collaborate with clients
and communities in the process.
But while the law school-based MLP clinic is a natural starting point
for developing students' knowledge and skills in preventive law, interdis-
ciplinary collaboration, and community engagement, law students must
have opportunities to learn about and use these approaches outside the
clinical program as well. To maximize students' development of these
twenty-first century competencies, along with myriad other problem-solv-
ing, practical lawyering, and professionalism skills typically taught in law
school clinics, the legal academy should integrate instruction in them
throughout the curriculum.2 1 This includes doctrinal courses, skills
22courses, and clinics, in a carefully designed progression. Only then will
the legal academy achieve the curricular reform needed to properly pre-
pare twenty-first century law students for practice.
20. See Aleah Gathings, MFY Legal Services, Inc. 's Medical Legal Partnership with Bellevue
Hospital Center: Providing Legal Care to Children with Psychiatric Disabilities, 1 8 CUNY L. REV.
1, 6 (2014) (describing MLPs as striving "to identify and address ... health-harming legal needs early
on, before those needs become a crisis that may require litigation or have an adverse effect on health");
see also Wettach, supra note 7, at 312 (highlighting the interdisciplinary benefit of the MLP model).
21. The development of these competencies should not come at the expense of proper training
in legal analysis; however, many legal educators agree that too much time is spent in law school learn-
ing this one isolated skill resulting in insufficient education in other areas. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra
note I1, at 4, 9; see also Lisa Penland, The Hypothetical Lawyer: Warrior, Wiseman or Hybrid?, 6
APPALACHIAN J.L. 73, 79 (2006) (contending the case method approach "teaches a single litigation
skill to the exclusion of most others"); Nancy B. Rapoport, Is "Thinking Like a Lawyer" Really What
We Want to Teach?, J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS, Fall 2002, at 91, 103 ("How many courses
does a law student need in order to master case analysis? One? Two? Surely, no law student needs
nine or ten courses to master this skill."); Krista Riddick Rogers, Comment, Promoting a Paradigm
of Collaboration in an Adversarial Legal System: An Integrated Problem Solving Perspective for
Shifting Prevailing Attitudes from Competition to Cooperation Within the Legal Profession, 6 BARRY
L. REV. 137, 155-56 (2006) (noting that while legal analysis is a crucial skill for effective legal prac-
tice, other competencies must be integrated into a comprehensive legal education curriculum). Reduc-
ing the amount of instructional time spent on case method will allow time to be spent on other com-
petency areas.
22. For a detailed discussion of different models for bridging instruction in competencies across
law school curricula, see Anthony Niedwiecki, Prepared for Practice? Developing a Comprehensive
Assessment Plan for a Law School Professional Skills Program, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 245, 247-48
(2016); Batt, supra note I1, at 122; Krantz & Millemann, supra note 18, at 2-4. See also Susan Swaim
Daicoff, Expanding the Lawyer's Toolkit of Skills and Competencies: Synthesizing Leadership, Pro-
fessionalism, Emotional Intelligence, Conflict Resolution, and Comprehensive Law, 52 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 795, 865 (2012) ("[T]he development of a comprehensive set of lawyering skills in law school
should not be left to chance. It should be intentional, purposeful, orderly, obvious, and successful.").
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This Article begins with a brief history and description of recent
shifts in the legal academy's views on legal education outcomes, compe-
tencies, and "professional skills" instruction, setting the stage for curricu-
lar review and redesign. Part II provides an introduction to preventive law,
interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engagement methodolo-
gies and discusses their importance to contemporary law practice.23 Sec-
tion III offers an overview of the MLP model and describes H.E.A.L. Col-
laborative® (Health, Education, Advocacy, and Law) (H.E.A.L. Collabo-
rative or H.E.A.L.), a law school-based medical-legal-social work partner-
ship clinic at Rutgers University School of Law. H.E.A.L. Collaborative
integrates these methodologies throughout its work addressing the adverse
effects of social determinants on the health and well-being of children and
families. Section IV describes some of the ways in which H.E.A.L. Col-
laborative develops law students' competencies in preventive law, inter-
disciplinary collaboration, and community engagement, and examines the
benefits and challenges of integrating these approaches in legal educa-
tion.24 Section V concludes with recommendations for incorporating in-
struction in these competencies beyond clinics and throughout the law
school curriculum. Although this Article showcases a specific type of
clinic-i.e., the MLP-the need for new lawyers to be competent in pre-
ventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engagement
extends far beyond this venue to diverse areas of law.25 Furthermore, the
benefits, challenges, and lessons learned from our MLP experience apply
broadly to other types of law school clinics addressing complex social and
23. Although the literature abounds with articles on clinical legal education, and includes many
articles on preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engagement, no one, to
date, has examined in detail the intersection of all four methods in one clinical program. For articles
regarding the integration of multiple methodologies in a law school clinic, see, for example, Bruce J.
Winick & David H. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education:
Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006) (integrating thera-
peutic jurisprudence, preventive law, and clinical legal education). See also Susan L. Brooks & Rachel
E. Lopez, Designing a Clinic Model for a Restorative Community Justice Partnership, 48 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 139, 140-41 (2015) (bridging community lawyering with deliberative democracy and
relational lawyering (which has its roots in therapeutic jurisprudence, preventive law, restorative jus-
tice, and mediation)); Linda F. Smith, Why Clinical Programs Should Embrace Civic Engagement,
Service Learning and Community-Based Research, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 723, 723-24 (2004) (inte-
grating civic engagement, which includes service learning and community-based research, with clini-
cal legal education); Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 18-20 (1997)
(merging preventive law and therapeutic jurisprudence with clinical legal education).
24. The integration of preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engage-
ment in a law school-based MLP benefits students of all disciplines who participate, as well as the
community. It also poses several challenges. For purposes of this Article, I focus on the benefits and
challenges for law students only.
25. See, e.g., Louis M. Brown Program in Preventive Law, CAL. W. SCH. L.: NAT'LCTR. FOR
PREVENTIVE L., http://www.preventivelawyer.org/main/default.asp?pid=brown_program.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018) ("Virtually any forum setting with avoidable legal problems has room for the
practice of preventive law."). For a series of essays on the application of principles of preventive law
to different areas of law, see Essays, CAL. W. SCH. L.: NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE L.,
http://www.preventivelawyer.org/main/default.asp?pid=essays.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
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legal issues, and offer some valuable insights for the legal academy as it
engages in twenty-first century curricular redesign.
I. CALLS FOR CURRICULAR REVIEW AND REFORM: THE 2014
AMENDMENTS TO THE ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
APPROVAL OF LA wSCHOOLS
The legal academy long has lagged behind other professionals in this
26 27country,26 and legal educators abroad, in using outcome measures to as-
sess the effectiveness of legal education. Outcome measures assess
whether an institution has succeeded in "imparting certain types of
knowledge and enabling students to attain certain types of capacities"
while advancing the institution's mission.28 Historically, the legal acad-
emy has relied predominantly on input measures, such as investment in
resources (e.g., the number of faculty or the library budget) in its accredi-
tation standards, and examined only two outcome measures-bar passage
and job placement.29 In contrast, higher education institutions began artic-
ulating student learning goals (i.e., outcomes) in the early 1970s," with
most professional fields having adopted outcome-measures ystems by the
1990s.3 1
It was not until 2007 that the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar Accreditation Committee created a committee to
examine "whether and how [the ABA] can use output measures, other than
bar passage and job placement, in the accreditation process."32 The Car-
negie Report33 and the Best Practices Report,34 both well-known for their
critiques of legal education for inadequately preparing students for the pro-
fession, and for their support of clinical legal education, propelled the legal
26. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF
THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE 20-22 (2008) [hereinafter OUTCOME MEASURES REPORT];
see also Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center of Legal Education: How an Emphasis on
Outcome Measures in the ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools Might Transform the Educa-
tional Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 225, 227 (2011) (noting the legal academy has
been slow to join the "assessment movement").
27. See OUTCOMES MEASURES REPORT, supra note 26, at 11-13.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See id at 3, 5.
30. See Fisher, supra note 26 (describing undergraduate institutions' early use of assessment to
reshape their curricula).
31. See OUTCOMES MEASURES REPORT, supra note 26, at 20; see also Fisher, supra note 26, at
228 (stating that "[a]ssessment is well-established in other fields of professional education," and that
accrediting bodies for most professional schools have adopted outcome measures in their standards).
Notably, this timeline coincides with the U.S. Department of Education's 1988 order that all approved
accrediting bodies "include 'evidence of institutional outcomes' in their standards." Id at 227-28
(quoting CATHERINE A. PALOMBA & TRUDY W. BANTA, ASSESSMENT ESSENTIALS: PLANNING,
IMPLEMENTING, AND IMPROVING ASSESSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (1st ed. 1999)).
32. OUTCOMES MEASURES REPORT, supra note 26, at 1. The Special Committee on Output
Measures was charged to "consider methods to measure whether a program is accomplishing its stated
mission and goals[,] ... define appropriate output measures[,] and make specific recommendations as
to whether the Section should adopt those measures as part of the Standards." Id.
33. SULLIVAN ET AL, supra note 11.
34. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 1-4.
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academy to consider a move to outcomes-based assessment.35 These re-
ports highlighted the importance of competency-based outcome measures
by urging law schools to use ongoing assessments to evaluate student de-
velopment; shift focus from the assessment of students' "conceptual
knowledge" to their "practical competencies ... and the development of
professional identity"; and develop a "unified set of teaching goals" to re-
place the "ad hoc goal setting by individual faculty." 36
The Committee's 2008 report recommended that the ABA move to
an "outcome-oriented approach," finding that such a shift was consistent
with the "latest and best thinking of U.S. legal educators,"3 legal educa-
tors abroad, and accrediting bodies in other professional fields.3 However,
another six years passed before the ABA, in 2014, finally approved revi-
sions to the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law
Schools (ABA Accreditation Standards) that incorporate the Committee's
recommendations.39 These revisions call for a "quantum shift" 40 in the le-
gal academy that "put[s] students at the center of education."4 1 By
"plac[ing] new responsibilities on law schools to better prepare students
for practice," the revisions offer some hope that the legal academy finally
will respond to decades of calls for legal education reform.42
Relevant here, the revisions require an increase in instruction in pro-
fessional skills and values for law students; the development of measura-
ble learning outcomes that foster student achievement in the competencies
needed to practice law; and evaluation of student learning and legal edu-
cation program.4 3 These amendments align with a major conclusion of the
ABA's report of the Task Force on the Future of Legal Education (2014)
regarding the role of law schools in society:
A given law school can have multiple purposes. But the core purpose
common to all law schools is to prepare individuals to provide legal
and related services in a professionally responsible fashion. This ele-
mentary fact is often minimized. The calls for more attention to skills
training, experiential learning, and the development of practice-related
competencies have been heard.. . .Yet, there is need to do much more.
The balance between doctrinal instruction and focused preparation for
35. See OUTCOME MEASURES REPORT, supra note 26, at 6.
36. Id. at 8.
37. See id at 2, 54 (referring to the Carnegie Report and Best Practices Report as reflecting the
"latest and best thinking").
38. See id.
39. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 9, at vii.
40. See OUTCOME MEASURES REPORT, supra note 26, at 61.
41. See Fisher, supra note 26, at 228.
42. Krantz & Millemann, supra note 18, at 6-8.
43. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 9, at 15-17, 23-24; see also Roy Stuckey, The American
Bar Association s New Mandates for Teaching Professional Skills and Values: Impact, Human Re-




the delivery of legal services needs to shift still further toward devel-
oping the competencies and professionalism required of people who
will deliver services to clients.44
For example, ABA Standard 303 provides that students must com-
plete six credit hours of experiential coursework as compared to the one
credit hour required by the 2012 amendments.45 The ABA defines "expe-
riential course[work]" liberally to include clinics, simulation courses, or
field placements that merge the study of theory and doctrine with skills
and ethics, and provide students frequent occasions to practice the profes-
sional skills being taught while engaging in self-reflection and evalua-
tion.46 Standard 302 mandates that law schools develop learning outcomes
that include competencies in procedural and substantive law; legal re-
search, reasoning, analysis, problem solving, and communication; profes-
sionalism and legal ethics; and "other professional skills needed for com-
petent and ethical participation as a member of the legal profession."47
Comments to the standards define "other professional skills" broadly, and
each law school determines which additional skill areas to include.4 8
Some legal scholars believe the amendments to the ABA's accredi-
tation standards will result in a "fundamental shift in legal education, both
as it relates to the substance of what is taught in law school and to the way
schools develop their curriculum." 4 9 Others remain more skeptical about
the new mandates' impact.50 While the future remains uncertain, the revi-
sions provide a unique opportunity for law schools to engage in thoughtful
and comprehensive curriculum review, revision, and redesign to ensure
44. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2014).
45. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 9, at 16.
46. See id.
47. Id at 15.
48. See id. at 16 ("Other professional skills are determined by the law school and may include
skills such as, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, fact development and analysis, trial practice, doc-
ument drafting, conflict resolution, organization and management of legal work, collaboration, cul-
tural competency, and self-evaluation.").
49. Niedwiecki, supra note 22, at 247; see id at 249 (noting the change in the ABA Accredita-
tion Standards' focus from input measures to output measures is a "fundamental change").
50. See, e.g., Stuckey, supra note 43, at 261-62 (arguing the ABA's failure to require law
schools to organize their programs of instruction into a structured and coordinated curriculum and law
schools' inability to define "competence" weaken the potential impact of the amendments to the ABA
Accreditation Standards). Many scholars believe the six-credit hour experiential education minimum
is insufficient and that at least fifteen-credit hours are needed to produce an impact on students' expe-
riential skill development. See id. at 260. Still others argue that simulations and field placements are
not comparable to clinical experiences for they cannot replace the benefits of live client experiences
and the opportunities for performance and reflection gained through clinical legal education. See id.
at 267; see also Tokarz et al., supra note 8, at 13-14 ("[O]nly clinical courses, where students learn in
role with real clients who have complex, real-world problems, present the indeterminate situations
necessary for students to develop judgment; to incorporate professional knowledge, skills, and values;
to internalize the attorney role; to comprehend client responsibility; and to learn how to learn from
experience."). For additional discussion comparing the pros and cons of in-house clinics, externships,
and simulation/skills instruction, see, for example, Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice
Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1464 n.10, 1469 n.44 (1998).
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that students develop the competencies needed for twenty-first century le-
gal practice.5 ' In so doing, law schools should consider the range of skills
that lawyering requires so that students are properly equipped with the
tools needed both to prevent and to resolve today's social and legal prob-
lems. To best match learning outcomes with essential competencies for
legal practice, one must examine the current foundations needed for en-
try-level lawyers to succeed and distill the educational competencies that
form the basis for those foundations.52
II.PREVENTIVE LAW, INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATION, AND
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT: DEFINING THE METHODOLOGIES AND
THEIR IMPORT TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LAW PRACTICE
Legal practice in the twenty-first century requires a wider range of
skills and competencies than typically taught in most law schools.53 A re-
cent study on new attorneys' preparation for effective practice reported
that fewer than twenty-five percent of legal practitioners believe recent
graduates have the skills needed to practice law.54 Another reported that
ninety-five percent of hiring partners and associates believe new graduates
"lack key practical skills at the time of hiring."55 Still others have exam-
ined the competencies needed for effective legal practice and found that
law schools commonly fail to instruct students in many key areas, includ-
ing strategic planning, providing advice and counsel, and working with
others.56 Such findings led the authors of one study to conclude that new
lawyers are most likely to succeed in practice when "they come to the job
with a much broader blend of legal skills, professional competencies, and
characteristics that comprise the whole lawyer."57
51. Many clinical programs, separate and apart from the law schools in which they are housed,
have developed outcomes-focused assessments of student learning following critiques in the Carnegie
Report and Best Practices Report. See Smith, supra note 19, at 436-37; Sandefur & Selbin, supra note
15, at 70-71. In this manner, clinics once again are at the forefront in implementing best practices for
legal education. See Douglas A. Blaze, Deja Vu All over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years ofClinical
Education, 64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 942-43 (1997). But see Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: De-
fining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law Courses, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 807, 807-08
(2007) (criticizing clinical legal educators for "fail[ing] to articulate and demonstrate the important
learning that occurs uniquely or can be accomplished best in clinical courses").
52. See ALLI GERKMAN & LOGAN CORNETT, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL Sys., FOUNDATIONS FOR PRACTICE: THE WHOLE LAWYER AND THE CHARACTER QUOTIENT 1
(2016); see also Barry, supra note 11, at 276 ("Choices about what to teach, when to teach, and how
to teach must be tied to clear goals. These goals should have the primary effect of preparing students
for the profession they are entering.").
53. See Herb D. Vest, Felling the Giant: Breaking the ABA's Stranglehold on Legal Education
in America, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 494, 496 (2000) ("[M]odem legal practice demands an increasingly
wide array of skills-some of them 'practical,' but many of them ranging beyond the law to encompass
business, technological, problem-solving, and other skills.").
54. See GERKMAN & CORNETT, supra note 52, at4 (citing 2014 State ofthe Field Legal Survey,
BARBRI (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.thebarbrigroup.com/2014-state-of-the-legal-field-survey).
55. See id. (citing LEXISNEXIS, WHITE PAPER: HIRING PARTNERS REVEAL NEW ATTORNEY
READINESS FOR REAL WORLD PRACTICE 1 (2015)).
56. See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 22, at 822-24.
57. GERKMAN & CORNETT, supra note 52, at 5.
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In 2016, the ABA's Commission on the Future of Legal Services re-
ported on the results of a two-year study on "meaningful access to legal
services" in the United States.58 The report sheds light on the competencies
needed for current and future law practice.59 Guided by the legal profes-
sion's core values of "serving the interests of the public and ensuring jus-
tice for all," the commission sought to determine why so many Americans
are unable to obtain meaningful legal assistance. Among its findings, the
commission reaffirmed what legal services lawyers long have known: the
legal needs of most people living in poverty, and a majority of those living
in moderate-income households, go unmet;61 people frequently do not re-
ceive help due to insufficient financial resources or inadequate knowledge
that they have a legal problem and need legal assistance to resolve it; 6 2 and
the legal profession's tendency to resist change creates barriers to innova-
tion.63 It issued twelve recommendations to improve access to and delivery
of legal assistance, at least six of which may be advanced by the legal
academy.64 Three such recommendations incorporate principles of preven-
tive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engagement,
yet law students seldom receive deliberate instruction in or exposure to
these approaches. A description of each of these competency areas and
their significance to contemporary legal practice follows. To avoid repeti-
tion, I will use the term "twenty-first century competencies" interchange-
ably with "preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community
engagement" when referencing these three competency areas together.
A. Preventive Law
The origins of preventive law date back to the 1950s when Louis
Brown, Professor of Law at University of Southern California, proposed
58. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON THE FUTURE
OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2016) [hereinafter FLS REPORT].
59. See id
60. Id.
61. Id at 11.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 17.
64. Id. at 37-57 (describing twelve recommendations for improving access to and delivery of
legal services). Recommendations that may be advanced by law schools include: (1) "The legal pro-
fession should support the goal of providing some form of effective assistance for essential civil legal
needs to all persons otherwise unable to afford a lawyer"; (3) "All members of the legal profession
should keep abreast of relevant technologies"; (4) "Individuals should have regular legal checkups,
and the ABA should create guidelines for lawyers, bar associations, and others who develop and ad-
minister such checkups"; (7) "The legal profession should partner with other disciplines and the public
for insights about innovating the delivery of legal services"; (10) "Resources should be vastly ex-
panded to support long-standing efforts that have proven successful in addressing the public's unmet
needs for legal services"; and (11) "Outcomes derived from any established or new models for the
delivery of legal services must be measured to evaluate effectiveness in fulfilling regulatory objec-
tives." Id. at 37, 43, 49, 54, 56.
65. See id. at 43-45, 49-50, 56 (describing recommendation (4) incorporating principles of
preventive law, recommendation (7) incorporating principles of interdisciplinary collaboration, and
recommendation (11) incorporating principles of community engagement).
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that lawyers better serve clients through consultation and planning as op-
posed to relying on litigation as the primary vehicle to address legal prob-
lems.66 Brown recognized that while litigation is an essential tool in the
lawyering toolkit, "the fact that one ends up in an adversarial proceeding
may be evidence of a lack of planning or communication."6 7 Since that
time, preventive law has evolved into a proactive method of legal practice
that seeks to minimize legal disputes and litigation risks, to "secure more
certainty as to legal rights and duties,"68 and to "increase life opportuni-
ties" through legal planning.6 9
The preventive lawyer's primary role as "planner" and "counselor"
is analogous to a physician's role in preventive health.70 "Just as preven-
tive medicine [originates] from the premise that keeping people healthy
constitutes a better allocation of resources than treating people who be-
come sick, preventive law [derives] from the premise that preventing legal
disputes is less costly than litigation."7 1 Thus, in preventive law, lawyers
aim "to 'fast forward' client situations to predict and foresee 'legal soft
spots' or situations which may lead to future litigation" and then "strate-
gically plan ahead" to prevent disputes from arising.72 Despite the im-
portance of prevention in both medicine and law, "[t]he health sector is
decades ahead of the legal profession in terms of thinking about preven-
tion."73 American society largely continues to treat symptoms (i.e., legal
problems) instead of proactively stopping the underlying disease (i.e., root
causes) from arising in the first place.74 The prioritization of addressing
66. J. Kim Wright & Dolly M. Garlo, Law as a Healing Profession, OR. ST. B. BULL., Apr.
2003, at 9, 12; see Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preven-
tive Law: A Combined Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice ofLaw, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25,
27 (1997) (describing preventive law as a "practice that seeks to minimize and avoid legal disputes
and to increase life opportunities through legal planning"). For additional information on preventive
law, see generally Louis M. BROWN & EDWARD A. DAUER, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAWYER AS
PLANNER (1978); Louis M. BROWN & EDWARD A. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON
A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS (1978); Louis M. Brown & Edward A. Dauer, A Synopsis ofthe
Theory and Practice of Preventive Law, in AM. BAR ASS'N, THE LAWYERS HANDBOOK, at A3-1
(Garth C. Grissom.et al. eds., rev. ed. 1975).
67. Wright & Gario, supra note 66 (describing the premise of preventive law).
68. Stolle et al., supra note 23, at 16 (quoting Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the
Prevention ofLitigation, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1982)).
69. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling ofLegal Services and the Family Law-
yer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421, 440 (1994)).
70. Id. at 16-17, 23.
71. Id. at 16.
72. Daicoff, supra note 22, at 859 (quoting Thomas D. Barton & James M. Cooper, Preventive
Law and Creative Problem Solving: Multi-Dimensional Lawyering, CAL. W. SCH. L.: NAT'L CTR. FOR
PREVENTATIVE L. 3, 20-21, http://preventivelawyer.com/content/pdfs/MultiDimensional_Law-
yer.pdf (last visited April 11, 2018)).
73. Lawton & Sandel, supra note 7, at 37; see also Ritchie Eppink, A Case for Public Legal
Health: Are We Missing Something?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jun. 2009, at 38, 39-40 (noting that lawyers
never have "tackled 'preventive law' the way that the health professions have tackled preventive med-
icine").
74. Thomas H. Gonser & Forrest S. Mosten, The Case for a National Legal Health Strategy,
PREVENTIVE L. REP., Fall 1993, at 31, 31 ("[O]ur preoccupation with addressing a litany of seemingly
unrelated individual 'crises' in our legal environment has precluded our ability to focus on the root
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legal problems over preventing them is no surprise as legal professionals
and the public commonly perceive the law as reactive and employ it reac-
tively.7 5 As a result, we fail to "use common legal sense to prevent legal
problems the way most of us already use common health sense to prevent
colds and [the] flu." 76
Preventive lawyers use the "legal checkup" as their principal tool.7 7
Proponents of the legal checkup posit that the breadth of solutions broad-
ens as client consultation explores "updates on a client's life events"78 and
other areas of client need and purpose, examining not only the legal risks
but also the client's "total welfare" including well-being.79 This explora-
tion of the client in context prevents lawyers from mislabeling problems
as legal when they are not, thereby avoiding the situation where: "If the
only thing you have is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail."80 It
also enables lawyers to identify potential nonlegal solutions with clients
and guide them accordingly.8 ' The challenge in preventive lawyering is
that, "incipient legal problems-as opposed to existing litigation-are
very often non-symptomatic .... It is [the preventive lawyer's] job to help
clients identify the symptoms of legal risks in time to deal with them."82
causes."); see Lawton & Sandel, supra note 7, at 37 ("Both surgery and litigation always will be nec-
essary in some cases, but prevention can ensure that reliance on surgery or litigation is lessened by
reallocating resources toward prevention activities.").
75. Thomas D. Barton, Preventive Law for Multi-Dimensional Lawyers, PREVENTIVE L. REP.,
Spring 2001, at 29 (asserting lawyers and the legal system are reactively oriented to the past-
"what ... happened, and who is to blame"-and the adversary process serves to reconstruct past
events, evidencing a "traditional rewind mentality"). For example, the public typically seeks legal
assistance after a legal problem has arisen, less so before. Lawton & Sandel, supra note 7, at 38 ("[I]t
is an axiom of civil legal aid service provision that by the time clients realize that they have a legal
problem, it is likely so far along that prevention is impossible."). Further, the law mandates that legal
issues cannot be heard unless ripe. See Nat'l Park Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
804-08 (2003) ("Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed 'to prevent the courts, through avoid-
ance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over adminis-
trative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative de-
cision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."' (quoting
Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 14849 (1967)). Thus lawyers seldom have the impetus to
devote time and energy to problems unless they are full-blown legal problems.
76. Eppink, supra note 73, at 41 (describing Canada's success in resolving the public's legal
concerns by applying common-sense legal strategies to prevent problems in the same manner as com-
mon sense health strategies are used to prevent simple illnesses).
77. Stolle et al., supra note 23, at 27.
78. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Mosten, supra note 69).
79. Id. at 36.




To date, the preventive law movement has failed to generate a large
following,83 at least overtly. Interestingly, many practicing attorneys "un-
knowingly use" preventive law every day but are "unaware" of so doing.84
Instances include corporate in-house counsel who strive to identify and
address potential legal issues before they become legal problems; estate
attorneys who ensure that executors follow the probate code when admin-
istering an estate to avoid liability; and transactional attorneys who, when
developing contracts, seek to limit potential liability for the represented
party. Countless examples exist of attorneys engaging in the planning and
counseling functions of preventive law across a wide variety of legal spe-
cialties, such as corporate and transactional law,85 family law,86 employ-
ment law,87 alternative dispute resolution,88 and poverty law (i.e., legal
services practice).89 Moreover, due to "the expenditure of vast amounts of
time and money on litigation and the enormous backlog of cases in the
judicial system, the need for 'preventive-lawyering' techniques is more
crucial than ever."90
The benefits of preventive law in the private sector extend to the pub-
lic sector as well.9 1 Changes in consumer demand for legal assistance, in-
cluding more accessible, low-cost, user-friendly legal services,92 coincide
with and are advanced by preventive law's focus on careful front-end plan-
ning to prevent back-end disputes. The ABA's Commission on the Future
83. See id. at 17 ("Preventive law has generated considerable interest .... Yet the movement
has its critics, and it has failed to convert large numbers of lawyers."). Some critics argue preventive
law is "impossible" to do while adding, "I already do it anyway," whereas others disparage it as an
"improper solicitation[] of business" or for causing clients to pay the lawyer "more than was antici-
pated to deal with problems that they didn't know they had." Id. Even some supporters contend that
its application is limited because routine legal checkups typically are unavailable to persons of limited
means. See Mary Jo Eyster, Preventive Law in the Emergency Room: Poor People Don't Get
Check-ups, CAL. W. SCH. L.: NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE L., http://www.preventivelaw-
yer.org/main/default.asp?pid=essays/eyster.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
84. John J. Copelan, Jr. & Barbara S. Monahan, Preventive Law: A Strategy for Local Govern-
ments in the Nineties, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 957, 958 (1993).
85. See, e.g., Z. Jill Barclift, Preventive Law: A Strategy for Internal Corporate Lawyers to
Advise Managers of Their Ethical Obligations, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 32 (2008) (highlighting the
importance of competency in preventive law for in-house corporate lawyers).
86. See, e.g., Mosten, supra note 69, at 422 (discussing the benefit of preventive law in the
family law context to minimize the risk of future disputes).
87. See, e.g., Stolle & Wexler, supra note 66, at 30 (stating that "discrimination and other em-
ployment-related problems could, with planning, be 'lessened dramatically[]' with the preventive law
(quoting MARK S. SENAK, HIV, AIDS, AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO OUR RIGHTS AND CHALLENGES
Ill (1996))).
88. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Pre-
ventive Law, andAlternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1084, 1095-96 (1999)
(discussing the integration of preventive law with alternative dispute resolution to promote therapeutic
outcomes for clients).
89. See, e.g., FLS REPORT, supra note 58, at 43-45.
90. Copelan & Monahan, supra note 84, at 966.
91. See id.
92. Mosten, supra note 69, at 449.
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of Legal Services recently recommended the use of periodic "legal check-
ups," preventive law's principal tool, to improve access to legal services.93
The commission concluded: "Legal checkups are an underused resource
to help solve individuals' problems and expand access to legal services";
and that, since many people do not know that they have civil legal prob-
lems, the checkups will "help to inform people of their legal needs and to
identify needed legal assistance," as well as serve as a "prophylactic meas-
ure[]" to prevent legal problems from arising.94 Thus, just as the American
College of Physicians recommends that all adults receive periodic preven-
tive health checkups by a physician,9 5 so too should one receive periodic
legal checkups.
Significantly, legal checkups need not be performed by attorneys
alone. Providers of free and low-cost legal services should build preven-
tive law screenings into their regular practice as well as collaborate with
agencies and professionals with whom low-income persons routinely
come into contact (e.g., health clinics, soup kitchens/food pantries, home-
less shelters) on the performance of preventive checkups.96 Preventive law
partnerships with other disciplines and communities enable attorneys to
help those in legal crisis now, while actively working to reduce the chances
of future crises for those same persons and others who may not even rec-
ognize they have a legal problem or a social problem that could result in a
legal one.97
Despite the critical societal functions of lawyer as planner and coun-
selor, and the need for a national strategy of legal reform that focuses on
preventing disputes from arising, the study of preventive law is largely
93. See FLS REPORT, supra note 58, at 6, 43 ("Recommendation 4: Individuals should have
regular legal checkups, and the ABA should create guidelines for lawyers, bar associations, and others
who develop and administer such checkups.").
94. Id. at 43-45.
95. See Yul D. Ejnes, The Annual Visit: What's the Evidence?, AM. C. PHYSICIANS,
https://www.acponline.org/system/files/documents/about-acp/chapters/ri/14mtg/ejnes.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2018); see also MASS. HEALTH QUALITY PARTNERS, ADULT PREVENTIVE CARE
GUIDELINES 1 (2016) (recommending periodic health evaluations for adults every one to three years
depending upon age).
96. Lawyers can educate agency personnel on screening for social and legal needs, triaging
matters, providing information and guidance, and making referrals to legal services where needed.
See, e.g., Bharath Krishnamurthy et al., What We Know and Need to Know About Medical-Legal Part-
nership, 67 S.C. L. REV. 377, 380 (2016) (discussing collaboration between health care and civil legal
aid that allows for clinical health staff to screen for health-harming legal needs and make referrals to
legal aid).
97. See Lawton & Sandel, supra note 7, at 37 ("Both surgery and litigation always will be
necessary in some cases, but prevention can ensure that reliance on surgery or litigation is lessened by
reallocating resources toward prevention activities."); see also Eppink, supra note 73, at 40-41 (stating
that "[o]ver and over, research on meeting the public's legal needs has identified community legal
education as a key strategy and a giant missing piece" to improve public health, and describing Can-
ada's creation of a "nationwide network of government-funded nonprofit organizations devoted ex-
clusively to preventive, public legal education" to help the public resolve many legal questions without
direct attorney assistance); FLS REPORT, supra note 58, at 43-45.
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absent from law school curricula.98 The legal academy's continued reli-
ance on the Langdellian case method as the dominant form of instruction
denies law students the opportunity to gain the analytical and problem-
solving skills needed to help clients identify and prevent future problems,
and arrange their future affairs where facts, situations, and even the law,
are dynamic.99 Edward A. Dauer, former Dean of the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law and President of the National Center for Preventive
Law, bemoaned the legal academy's failure to focus on prevention and
planning in favor of substantive legal subjects and litigation/advocacy
more than twenty-five years ago.o0 0 Arguing that the Langedellian method
"makes all law [school] look like advocacy," Dauer concluded: "Advo-
cacy, it would seem, is regarded as an activity amenable to description by
a set of general theories. But in our curricula, planning and prevention are
apparently not."1 o'
Although far more attorneys function as "counselors-at-law" rather
than litigators,102 law schools' "skills" curricula continue to "skew[] to-
ward litigation practice and give short shrift to transactional practice."',
03
Similarly, clinical law programs seldom offer direct instruction in preven-
tive law.104 Just as with doctrinal legal education, clinical legal education
tends to subordinate the planning and counseling functions of lawyers in
98. This conclusion is based on the author's research. But see, e.g., Welcome to the NCPL, CAL.
W. SCH. L.: NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE L., http://www.preventivelawyer.org/main/default.asp (last
visited Feb.10, 2018).
99. See Paul Brest, The Responsibility ofLaw Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and
Problem Solvers, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 5, 7; see also id at 5 (noting legal
education has failed to change "to meet the needs of a changing society").
100. See Center for Public Resources, Put Preventive Law Courses in Curriculum, Scholar Says,
9 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 18, 18 (1991).
101. Id.
102. See Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65
EMORY L.J. 1491, 1492 (2016) (noting an exodus from resolving claims in litigation to resolving them
in alternative dispute resolution).
103. Katherine R. Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and Misconceptions
About Theory and Practice, 45 McGEORGE L. REV. 7, 22 (2013) (quoting Eric J. Gouvin, Teaching
Business Lawyering in Law Schools: A Candid Assessment of the Challenges and Some Suggestions
for Moving Ahead, 78 UMKC L. REV. 429, 430 (2009)).
104. Even with the merger of preventive law with therapeutic jurisprudence, few clinicians in-
tentionally instruct students in this methodology. Therapeutic jurisprudence, introduced by Professor
David Wexler in the late 1980s, is the study of law as a therapeutic agent, i.e., "the study of law's
impact on the mental and physical health of the people it affects." Mary Berkheiser, Frasier Meets
CLEA: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Law School Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1147, 1149
(1999). Some believe that therapeutic jurisprudence provides preventive law with a needed framework
and foundation to promote its usage. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Expanding Scope ofPreventive
Law, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 189, 190 (2002) ("Preventive law offered therapeutic jurisprudence practi-
cal law office procedures and client counseling approaches that would help to achieve therapeutic
jurisprudence's mission of increasing psychological wellbeing through law and provide an existing
structure through which the law could be applied more therapeutically. Therapeutic jurisprudence of-
fered preventive law an analytical framework for justifying emotional wellbeing as an important pri-
ority in legal planning and could provide it with a much-needed interdisciplinary perspective and a
firmer empirical and theoretical foundation grounded in an already rich body of social science and law
research.").
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favor of a reactive litigation focus.0 5 Even with the growth of transactional
law clinics in recent years, few clinicians intentionally'06 educate students
in preventive law.'07
Preventive law enables lawyers to serve as both "creative problem
solvers" and creative "problem avoider[s],"'0 8 and thus is an essential
competency for twenty-first century law practice that must be taught. Pri-
marily used in the context of individual and corporate client representa-
tion,109 it is also a useful tool for work with communities to prevent and
address large-scale, complex conditions and problems that cannot be re-
solved through advocacy on behalf of individual clients alone.110 The
"[i]ndividual cases ... serve as diagnostic tools for failed policies," which
can be addressed preventatively on a macro scale by an integrated team.'i
For example, in a Georgia MLP, pediatricians expressed concern that chil-
dren (ages six to nine) were experiencing severe seat belt related injuries;
their partnering attorneys discovered that state law on child restraints did
not comport with national safety advisories.12 Together they engaged in
joint preventive legislative advocacy, which resulted in a statutory change
to the age requirement for using booster seats that protects all of Georgia's
young children." 3 Because individual and societal problems are frequently
interdisciplinary in nature, new law graduates require competency in in-
terdisciplinary collaboration as well.
105. See Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooper-
ative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 445, 493-94
(2002).
106. "Intentional" is defined as where a professor deliberately includes the competency as a
learning or practice goal for students.
107. This is not to say that no preventive practice occurs in law school clinics. See supra note 98
and accompanying text. However, the lack of instruction in preventive law illustrates that law schools
typically do not consider prevention an important competency.
108. See Winick, supra note 104, at 202, 204 ("If we can transform law into a helping profession
in these ways, one that values the lawyer's role as wise counselor, problem solver and problem avoider,
and peacemaker and healer, we can do much to transform the lives of our clients and ourselves and
the society in which we live.").
109. See, e.g., Barclift, supra note 85; Mosten, supra note 69, at 427; Schneider, supra note 88,
at 1087; Stolle & Wexler, supra note 66.
110. See Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 96, at 386 ("Preventive law presents an opportunity to
help move from individual legal interventions to broader systemic impact at the institutional and com-
munity levels.").
111. Id.
112. Robert Pettignano et al., The Health Law Partnership: A Medical-Legal Partnership Stra-
tegically Designed to Provide a Coordinated Approach to Public Health Legal Services, Education,
Advocacy, Evaluation, Research and Scholarship, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 57, 73-75 (2014).
113. Id. In another example, attorneys and doctors provided joint testimony at a hearing regard-
ing overly burdensome documentation required of chronically ill patients to prevent utility shutoffs;
the testimony resulted in a macro-level population health change that included a reduction in recerti-
fication frequency and permission for nonphysician health professionals to provide the needed docu-
mentation. See MLP in Action: A Utilities Case Study, NAT'L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP,
http://medical-legalpartnership.org/response/utilities-case-study (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
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B. Interdisciplinary Collaboration
Complex individual and societal problems, such as achieving change
in public education or community health, require multidimensional explo-
ration, insight, and resolution.14 The wide range of knowledge and skills
needed to address complex problems can be achieved only with collabo-
ration among professionals and across disciplines, as well as with the af-
fected individuals and communities."5 Different perspectives broaden the
understanding of conditions and widen the problem-solving lens.i"6 Thus,
lawyers must "expand their traditional approaches to problem solving if
they are to be of real service to their clients."'
Collaboration' is a methodology that relies on the use of difference
to improve both work process and product." 9 It comprises a sharing of
knowledge, expertise, experiences, perspectives, and shared decision mak-
ing to achieve a common goal.120 Elements of a successful collaboration
typically include a common purpose, investment or buy in by involved
parties, open communication, an understanding of group process, an
114. See Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisfying and Productive Pro-
cess for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REv. 459, 474 (1993) ("The collaborative learning literature
confirms that complex tasks that require higher thinking benefit the most from collaborative work.");
John Kania & Mark Kramer, Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2011, at 36,
39 ("Social problems arise from the interplay of governmental and commercial activities, not only
from the behavior of social sector organizations. As a result, complex problems can be solved only by
cross-sector coalitions that engage those outside the nonprofit sector."); Elizabeth Tobin Tyler, Allies
Not Adversaries: Teaching Collaboration to the Next Generation ofDoctors and Lawyers to Address
Social Inequality, II J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 249, 271 (2008) ("[I]nterdisciplinary training [i]s
critical to preparing professionals for the increasingly complex legal and health care systems in which
they will practice."); Wettach, supra note 7 ("In today's complex and interconnected society, lawyers
undeniably must possess the ability to solve problems in an interdisciplinary context.").
115. See V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who's Listening? Introducing Students to Cli-
ent-Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 83, 84 (2002) ("Clients dealing with complex and multidimensional problems need
service providers who approach problem-solving in a way that is client-centered, client-empowering,
and incorporates multidisciplinary and community-based solutions and resources."); see also Linda
Morton et al., Teaching Interdisciplinary Collaboration: Theory, Practice, and Assessment, 13
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 175, 175 (2010) (noting lawyers increasingly recognize the need to collab-
orate with other professionals to solve complex problems).
116. See Bryant, supra note 14, at 472.
117. Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary Educa-
tion in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 319, 319 (1999); see also Thomas D. Morgan, Economic
Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV. 625, 634 (1994) ("Skills of lawyering will
more and more become skills of problem-solving and will call upon what we now describe as inter-
disciplinary training.").
118. "Collaboration" here connotes moving beyond the twentieth century lawyer-expert witness
paradigm to true interdisciplinary problem solving, which requires a level playing field where lawyers
recognize that not all problems are purely legal in nature; that even if they are legal, solutions in law
may not be in the client's best interest; that one single problem may be defined in multiple ways and
require input from multiple disciplines and the client/community to best resolve; and that lawyers have
valuable skills and insights to contribute to this process. See Bryant, supra note 114, at 460-61.
119. Id. at 462.
120. See id. at 460.
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awareness of self and others, accountability, and leadership skills.121 Stud-
ies of collaboration have revealed enhanced productivity, problem solving,
and creativity.122 Reasons for improvements in work product as a result of
collaboration include: "the people who are closest to the facts and the
problems are involved in the decision making; ... people with a variety of
perspectives have made the decisions; and ... the people who must imple-
ment the decisions have participated in making them."l2 3
While collaboration and teamwork among those with the same or
similar knowledge base and experience is hard, interdisciplinary collabo-
ration is even harder, particularly for those studying or engaged in the
practice of law.' 24 Here, I adopt Professor Janet Weinstein's definition of
"interdisciplinary" as requiring consideration or inclusion of two or more
disciplines and encompassing "communication and understanding
among . . . team members."25 One professional's knowledge and use of
other disciplines when problem solving is not enough to constitute inter-
disciplinary collaboration.126 Rather, the term embraces the "teamwork
spirit"-namely "the understanding that no one discipline has the
knowledge or skills to provide single-handedly the most effective assis-
tance to the client." 27
Collaboration is a skill that does not come automatically for many,
and thus must be taught.128 Yet unlike schools of nursing, business, and
social work,12 9 law schools typically do not offer instruction in collabora-
tion, an opportunity to learn or work collaboratively, or time to reflect on
the success or failure of collaborative work.130 Professor Weinstein attrib-
utes this lack of instruction to the study of law's "emphasis on competition,
121. See Weinstein, supra note 117, at 327; see also Morton et al., supra note 115, at 185-86;
Diane R. Bridges et al., Interprofessional Collaboration: Three Best Practice Models ofInterprofes-
sional Education, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE: MED. EDUC. ONLINE (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/meo.vl6iO.6035.
122. Bryant, supra note 114, at 472.
123. Id.
124. See Alan M. Lerner & Erin Talati, Teaching Law and Educating Lawyers: Closing the Gap
Through Multidisciplinary Experimental Learning, 9 INT'L J. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 96, 103
(2006) ("Compared to other . . . disciplines, historically, the legal academy has not been considered
the collaborative type.").
125. Weinstein, supra note 117, at 352-53.
126. See id. at 322.
127. Id. at 327-28.
128. Bryant, supra note 114, at 461; see Weinstein, supra note 117, at 327.
129. See Janet Weinstein et al., Teaching Teamwork to Law Students, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 36, 43
(2013) (explaining that several types of professional schools explicitly teach teamwork to students).
130. Brest, supra note 99, at 15 (explaining that while collaboration is a skill that students can
learn, "law schools have not traditionally offered students many opportunities to work collaboratively,
let alone to reflect systematically on their success and failures in team efforts"); see Anita Weinberg
& Carol Harding, Interdisciplinary Teaching and Collaboration in Higher Education: A Concept
Whose Time Has Come, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 15, 18-21 (2004) (arguing that law schools have
been reluctant to collaborate across disciplines); Weinstein et al., supra note 129, at 44-45 (noting that
while the last decade has witnessed an increase in faculty teaching teamwork and a proliferation of
teamwork-related articles that "invoke the platitudes of collaborative education," few have "de-
velop[ed] methodology for implementation").
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its solitary learning experience, its lack of emphasis on communication
skills, and its narrow focus on linear thinking."1 31 She adds that law
schools encourage the development of negative interpersonal characteris-
tics in students that form barriers to collaboration, including a focus on
individual success, inflexibility, aggressiveness, and poor self-aware-
ness.132
The professional socialization process, through which one learns the
norms, values, and role of a profession,133 occurs outside the law school as
well. Law students often witness lawyers who presume professional supe-
riority and believe there is no need for collaboration, thereby creating the
"illusion that every client problem can be" resolved via "knowledge
of ... law and procedure."'34 As a result, students develop a "narrow con-
ception of the lawyer as the lone problem-solver" who is limited to legal
interventions, which prevents them from working with those in other dis-
ciplines and with clients to identify nonlegal solutions.' 3  The client-cen-
tered lawyering movement, adopted by many, if not most, clinical law pro-
grams, has served as a counter to the traditional lawyer-as-all-knower and
client-as-passive-follower legal representation model by ensuring that cli-
ents are empowered, their stories are told, their voices are heard, and they
actively engage and participate in the problem-solving and decision-mak-
ing processes.136 Yet the collaborative skill set gained through the cli-
ent-centered model has not translated to collaborative work with other dis-
ciplines, and thus students' (mis)perception of the law and legal skills as
superior to other disciplines in problem solving persists.137 Incorporating
interdisciplinary collaboration as a legal education competency can rem-
edy this deficiency.
131. Morton et al., supra note 115, at 183; see Bryant, supra note 114, at 463 (suggesting that
the professional norms of lawyers imparted by the legal academy are based on an outdated "atomistic
image" of the "solo practitioner representing individual clients").
132. Morton et al., supra note 115, at 183.
133. John O. Calmore, "Chasing the Wind": Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal Mis-ed-
ucation, and Engaging in Professional Re-socialization, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (2004) (de-
fining professional socialization as "a process by which we learn to become members of our profession
through internalizing the norms and values of the profession, and also by learning what our roles are
and how to perform those roles").
134. Enos & Kanter, supra note 115, at 86-87.
135. Id. at 87.
136. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement,
32 ARIz. L. REV. 501, 507-10 (1990) (comparing and contrasting the traditional legal counseling and
client-centered counseling models); see also Stolle et al., supra note 23, at 16-17 (explaining that, in
client-centered lawyering, updates on a client's "life events (not limited to disputes)" enables the law-
yer to "assist the client to improve decision making and planning to prevent problems" and "engage
in a joint decision making process . . . [that] contemplates the client's long term goals and interests
and how best to achieve them while minimizing exposure to the risk of legal difficulties" (quoting
Mosten, supra note 69)).
137. This conclusion is based on the author's experience working with students in an interdisci-
plinary collaborative environment for the last decade. See Bryant, supra note I14, at 485-86; Enos &




Despite the significant time it has taken for the legal academy to
begin to accept interdisciplinary collaboration as an appropriate method-
ology for use in law schools, let alone recognize it as a necessary skill set
for law students to learn, the concepts of cross-disciplinary teaching and
collaboration are not new to the field of law.1 38 In the early 1900s, legal
educators such as Roscoe Pound and Dean Harlan Fisk Stone of Columbia
Law School understood the importance of social and economic conditions,
and by extension the study of social science and economics, to the law.' 39
However, as with clinical legal education,140 interdisciplinary collabora-
tion in law was an idea that came well before its time. Attempts to merge
other disciplines into legal education have come in a variety of forms:
"adding social scientists to the law school faculty," supporting collabora-
tion across university schools and departments, offering joint seminars
open to students of more than one discipline, and creating dual degree pro-
grams in law and other disciplines.141 Not until the mid-1990s, however,
did a number of interdisciplinary law school-based clinics emerge, accom-
panied by a large body of scholarship on the topic.142 Although focus on
interdisciplinary collaboration has increased in recent years, the method-
ology remains on the periphery of law school curricula.143
In contemporary legal practice, however, interdisciplinary collabora-
tion is a critical skill. While "[s]ociety cannot expect lawyers to have the
knowledge or skills that would allow them to identify each aspect of,
and ... solve, problems from a multi-dimensional perspective[,] ... it can
expect lawyers to know how to work with people who together have the
knowledge and skills required to assist a client in this way."l44 For exam-
ple, lawyers and social workers routinely collaborate in diverse areas of
138. Weinberg & Harding, supra note 130, at 18-19 ("[A]s far back as 1907, American legal
educators postulated about the importance of interdisciplinary understanding and the challenges faced
when seeking knowledge and information outside the law.").
139. See id. at 19.
140. See Amy M. Colton, Eyes to the Future, Yet Remembering the Past: Reconciling Tradition
with the Future ofLegal Education, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 963, 973-74, 977-78 (1994) (describing
how 1930s legal realist, Jerome Frank, posited that every law school should have a clinic where stu-
dents learn the true relationship between casebooks and practice, yet clinics did not begin to emerge
until the 1960s).
141. Weinberg & Harding, supra note 130, at 20-21.
142. See, e.g., Kathleen Coulborn Faller & Frank E. Vandervort, Interdisciplinary Clinical
Teaching of Child Welfare Practice to Law and Social Work Students: When World Views Collide, 41
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 121, 121-23, 128 (2007) (arguing that social work students and law students
"should be trained together, both in the classroom and in clinical settings" and discussing the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School's Child Advocacy Law Clinic); Spencer Rand, Teaching Law Students
to Practice Social Justice: An Interdisciplinary Search for Help Through Social Work's Empowerment
Approach, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 459, 459-60 (2006) (discussing the author's disability clinic and dis-
cussing the use of clinic work to introduce students to social justice issues); Rose Voyvodic & Mary
Medcalf, Advancing Social Justice Through an Interdisciplinary Approach to Clinical Legal Educa-
tion: The Case ofLegal Assistance of Windsor, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 101, 101, 103, 114, 131-
32 (2004) (discussing the University of Windsor's Clinical Law Program at Legal Assistance of Wind-
sor and the importance of social justice in clinical work).
143. Weinberg & Harding, supra note 130, at 21.
144. Weinstein, supra note 117, at 320.
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law such as criminal law, juvenile justice, and child advocacy;14 5 lawyers
and business professionals work together in corporate and transactional
law matters;146 and lawyers and healthcare professionals partner in a vari-
ety of civil legal areas through the MLP model.147 Comments to the revised
ABA Accreditation Standards pecifically name collaboration when listing
other "professional skills" that law schools may include in their learning
outcomes and competencies. 148 One study on the competencies needed for
legal practice identified "working with others" as a key area needed for
effective practice.149 Another study found, "nearly three in four respond-
ents (73%) indicated that the ability to work collaboratively as part of a
team was necessary in the short term," for a new lawyer to succeed, defin-
ing "new lawyer" as one who is "embarking on their first year of law-re-
lated work."150
Furthermore, the ABA's Commission on the Future of Legal Services
identified interdisciplinary collaboration as necessary to address insuffi-
cient access to legal services in the United States.'5 ' Finding that "[o]ther
disciplines ... have important insights to share on improving access to and
the delivery of legal services," the commission concluded "lawyers will
achieve greater innovation and increased efficiencies if they embrace in-
terdisciplinary collaborations and work closely with people from other
fields."1 52 The commission went so far as to recommend that law schools
offer students greater opportunity to study other disciplines, deeming in-
terdisciplinary knowledge "critical" to areas of legal practice such as crim-
inal law.'53
145. See Frank P. Cervone & Linda M. Mauro, Ethics, Cultures, and Professions in the Repre-
sentation ofChildren, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1975 (1996) (discussing recommendations uch as
lawyers cooperating with social workers to assist the lawyer's relationship with a child client); Faller
& Vandervort, supra note 142, at 121-22 (describing how child welfare cases require interdisciplinary
collaboration between lawyers and social workers); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Taking It to the Streets,
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 153, 166 (2004) (noting that defense attorneys collaborate with
social workers to understand the criminal issues their clients' face).
146. See Jill I. Gross & Ronald W. Filante, Developing a Law/Business Collaboration Through
Pace's Securities Arbitration Clinic, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 74 (2005); see also Schnei-
der, supra note 88, at 1088 (discussing the benefits of preventive law).
147. See Lisa Pilnik, Practicing Preventative Law: A Day in the Life of a Medical-Legal Part-
nership Attorney, 27 CHILD L. PRAC. 14, 14 (2008); Elizabeth Tobin Tyler, Teaching Social Justice
and Health: Professionalism, Ethics, and Problem-Solving in the Medical-Legal Classroom, 38 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 701, 701, 704 (2010); see also Pettignano et al., supra note 112, at 57-58.
148. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 9.
149. Daicoff, supra note 22, at 823 (quoting Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting
Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 620, 625 (2011)).
150. GERKMAN & CORNETT, supra note 52, at 6, 20.
151. See FLS REPORT, supra note 58, at 6-7,49-50 ("Recommendation 7[:] The legal profession
should partner with other disciplines and the public for insights about innovating the delivery of legal
services."); see also Michael A. Cooper et al., Round Table Discussion, Delivery ofLegal Services to
the Poor in the Twenty-first Century, 3 CUNY L. REV. 191, 191 (2000) (stating that "there is an in-
creasingly pressing need for collaboration and for cooperation" regarding delivery of legal services to
the poor).
152. FLS REPORT, supra note 58, at 49.
153. Id. at 49-50.
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Lawyering in the twenty-first century requires "changes in forms of
law practice" that include "more interdisciplinary and broad-ranging com-
petencies among lawyers."'54 As with preventive law, a mismatch exists
between the curricula offered in most law schools and the interdisciplinary
collaboration skills needed for legal practice. The legal academy's failure
to develop in new law graduates competency in interdisciplinary collabo-
ration affects their ability to problem solve with other disciplines as well
as with their clients, be they individuals or communities. "[A]chieving ef-
fective social and economic change in partnership with community mem-
bers almost always requires collaboration with individuals of different ed-
ucational backgrounds who share a common purpose."15 5 In this manner,
proficiency in interdisciplinary collaboration dovetails well with the third
competency needed for problem solving in today's legal world-commu-
nity engagement.
C. Community Engagement
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching defines
community engagement as the "collaboration between institutions of
higher education and their larger communities (local, regional/state, na-
tional, global) for the mutually beneficial exchange of knowledge and re-
sources in a context of partnership and reciprocity."' "6 This definition rec-
ognizes that knowledge and expertise are found not only in the academic
setting but also in the community, and that community knowledge is crit-
ical to resolution of the complex, multidisciplinary societal problems we
face today.15 7 Traditional higher education institutions view faculty as
teachers, students as learners, and the community as a laboratory or a set
of needs requiring exploration and resolution.58 In contrast, commu-
nity-engaged campuses recognize faculty, students, and the community all
"as learners and teachers in shared efforts to seek solution-focused out-
comes to society's intractable 'wicked' problems." 5 9
The application of community engagement methodology to the prac-
tice of law has its roots in the "second wave" of clinical legal education
scholarship that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s.'6 0 Professors Gerald
154. Daicoff, supra note 22, at 818.
1 55. Karen Tokarz et al., Conversations on "Community Lawyering ": The Newest (Oldest) Wave
in Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 359, 379-80 (2008).
156. How Is "Community Engagement" Defined?, NEw ENG. RESOURCE CTR. FOR HIGHER
EDUC., http://nerche.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=341&Itemid=92#CEdef
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
157. Hiram E. Fitzgerald et al., The Centrality ofEngagement in Higher Education, J. HIGHER
EDUC. OUTREACH & ENGAGEMENT, Sept. 2012, at 7, 10-11, 17-18.
158. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Barbara A. Holland, Reflections on Community-Campus Partner-
ships: What Has Been Learned? What Are the Next Challenges?, in HIGHER EDUCATION
COLLABORATIVE FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND IMPROVEMENT 10, 11 (Penny A. Pasque et al.
eds., 2005)).
159. Id. (quoting Holland, supra note 158, at 11).
160. See Barry et al., supra note 16, at 30-31.
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Lopez and Lucy White began to argue for a shift in clinical legal educa-
tion's focus from "regnant lawyer[ing]"l61 to the "egalitarian collaboration
between attorneys and lower-income clients."'62 Lopez, White, and others
contended that "regnant" lawyering practices disserve low-income clients
through power differentials and by perpetuating views of the poor as "sub-
ordinate, dependent, and helpless."'63 Instead, they argued for a more col-
laborative, cooperative, and empowering forms of lawyering'64 to maxim-
ize opportunities for collective action. "Social change can only be lasting
when it is led and directed by the people most affected." 6 5
These "non-regnant" lawyering approaches have come to be known
by several names, including "rebellious . . . lawyering,"l 66 "collaborative
lawyering,"167 "community lawyering,"l68 ,civic engagement,"l69 and
161. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 23-24 (1992) (describing the "regnant lawyer[]" as focused on litiga-
tion, detached from the community, viewing him/herself as the preeminent problem solver, and be-
lieving that subordination can be fought with lawyers at the helm).
162. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427,432
(2000).
163. Id. at 439.
164. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 161, at 37 ("In this idea-what I call the rebellious idea of
lawyering against subordination-lawyers must know how to work with (not just on behalf of) women,
low-income people, people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled and the elderly. They must know
how to collaborate with other professional and lay allies rather than ignoring the help that these other
problem-solvers may provide in a given situation. They must understand how to educate those with
whom they work . . . and, at the same time, they must open themselves up to being educated by all
those with whom they come in contact, particularly about the traditions and experiences of life on the
bottom and at the margins.").
165. Charles Elsesser, Community Lawyering-The Role ofLawyers in the Social Justice Move-
ment, 14 LOy. J. PUB. INT. L. 375, 384 (2013).
166. See LOPEZ, supra note 161, at 37.
167. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from
Rhetoric to Practice, I CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 157-58 (1994) (defining "collaborative lawyering" as
"third dimension[] lawyering" that is "focused on poor people's own political consciousness" and has
as its goal enabling "poor people to see themselves and their social situation in ways that enhance their
world-changing powers," while seeking to "change the attitudes and self-concepts of lawyers them-
selves," so that lawyering no longer is viewed as a "unidirectional 'professional service,"' but rather
as a "collaborative communicative practice"); see also Piomelli, supra note 162, at 441, 447-48 (de-
fining "collaborative lawyering" as lawyering that emphasizes "a joint problem-solving partnership
with clients," whereby "lawyers and clients will learn from each other and teach each other,
and . . . will work together to develop and carry out persuasive strategies").
168. See Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyer-
ing in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REv. 333, 339 (2009)
(defining "community lawyering" as "a social justice lawyering practice that places commitment to
something called 'community' (a term, of course, easy to contest) at its core"); see also Michael Dia-
mond, Community Lawyering: Introductory Thoughts on Theory and Practice, 22 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 395, 395, 397 (2015) (describing "community lawyering" as including: "an
expansive view of the role of a lawyer; a particular type of relationship with the client; a knowledge
of the community in which the lawyer works, and of its leadership; and a theory of action, which has
both legal and political features, with a goal of improving for its residents the physical and social
environment of the community").
169. See Smith, supra note 23, at 734 (quoting Thomas Ehrlich, Preface to CIVIC
RESPONSIBILITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION, at v, vi (Thomas Ehrlich ed., 2000)) (defining "civic en-
gagement" as "working to make a difference in the civic life of our communities and developing the
combination of knowledge, skills, values, and motivation to make that difference" (quoting Ehrlich,
supra)).
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"collective mobilization."1 7 0 While each approach has nuances, all rely on
principles of community engagement. For purposes of this Article, I draw
on the similarities in these approaches along with higher education's com-
munity engagement definition when using the term "community-engaged
lawyering." Thus, community-engaged lawyering is an approach that en-
compasses: collaboration and partnership with individuals and communi-
ties in the problem-solving process, from identifying and defining prob-
lems to development and implementation of strategies and solutions;'7 '
sharing of knowledge by participants who learn from and teach each
other;172 recognition that people and problems are inherently intertwined
with context and cannot be considered in isolation;173 active engagement
of individuals and communities to their capacity in self-help, self-determi-
nation, and collective action aimed at promoting social justice and
change;174 and ongoing evaluation and analysis to evaluate and improve
upon the collaborative process and outcomes. 175
Generally speaking, law schools have "failed to connect to essential
theories about the mission of higher education in service to the commu-
nity."'7 6 The legal academy typically pigeonholes community engagement
work in the public service realm of the tripartite mission,177 which fre-
quently translates into clinical legal education and public interest program-
ming. In the nonclinical classroom setting, law students traditionally focus
on legal and textual analysis, rather than social context, in problem solv-
ing." As a result, legal education "unconsciously indoctrinates students
into faith in the current fairness of the law" and the "apparent neutrality"
of the legal process.17 9 Law schools largely ignore the adverse effects of
social, political, and economic structures on context and access to justice,
the legal system's inherent unfairness for the "have-nots," and the need for
170. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355,
405-08 (2008) (defining "collective mobilization" as lawyering that fosters the "[c]onstruction of cli-
ents in solidarity," embraces race and resistance, focuses on politics not therapeutics, and "support[s]
resistance movements and .. . help[s] build the power of poor people's collectives").
171. See Piomelli, supra note 162, at 440-41, 476 (discussing the work of Gerald Lopez on
rebellious lawyering and Lucy White on collaborative lawyering).
172. See id. at 447-48 (defining collaborative lawyering).
173. See id. at 488-90 (discussing the need to put "a problem in its full context" to solve it, for
context enables one "to draw connections to other bodies of knowledge, other ways of interpreting a
situation," requires historical context, mapping "web of relationships" in which problem arises, and
exploration of "structural and institutional dimensions" and "societal structures of power").
174. See id. at 477 (discussing the benefits that collaboration provides when applied to problems
facing low-income people).
175. See Smith, supra note 23, at 732-39 (discussing the importance of research in civic engage-
ment).
176. Id. at 725.
177. See Margaret Martin Barry et al., Teaching Social Justice Lawyering: Systematically In-
cluding Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 453 (2012).
178. Smith, supra note 19, at 433-34.
179. Id. at 434 (quoting ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO
"THINK LIKE A LAWYER" 213 (2007)).
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reform.o80 While many, if not all, have as part of their mission the pursuit
of social justice or the common good, beyond clinics and public interest
programs this aim "has rarely translated into strategies for collaboration
with those struggling to gain footing in our society."'8 ' Notwithstanding
the proliferation of literature since the late 1980s on rebellious lawyering,
collaborative lawyering, community lawyering, and the like, little guid-
ance exists on how to teach community-engaged lawyering, especially
outside of clinics.' 82 Consequently, students "lack the legal background
and lawyering experience [needed to] help . . . conceptualize problems
more broadly .... [Yet] grappling with bigger social problems may be the
best way to position [students] to be[come more] responsible members of
the legal profession."'83
Clinical law programs often do little better in developing students'
competency in community engagement. Many programs restrict the teach-
ing and practice of community-engaged lawyering to certain types of clin-
ics (e.g., community law or community development) and fail to recognize
that community engagement principles extend far beyond traditional
"community lawyering" work.1 84 Those clinics that engage in rebellious
lawyering or community lawyering typically focus on responding to situ-
ations of crisis and crisis response.'85 Examples of such "reactive" com-
munity engagement include law schools' responses to the Newark riots,
which gave birth to the clinical legal education social justice movement;'86
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and other natural disasters; 187 and, more
180. Id. Integration of legal realism and critical legal theory in doctrinal courses helps expose
students to the idea that law is not fair or neutral for all and enhances student learning and participatory
learning experiences (i.e., live client experiences that expose students to the unfairness of law firsthand
are essential to student learning). See, e.g., Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal
Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 330-31 (1982) (explaining that andragogy, or adult learning theory,
favors experiential and participatory learning).
181. Barry et al., supra note 177, at 453.
182. Elsesser, supra note 165, at 377 (adding that this may result from practitioners' humility,
as they are "painfully aware how far their practice strays from ideal community lawyering").
183. Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in
Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405, 432 (2002).
184. This conclusion is based on the author's review of the literature.
185. See, e.g., Judith Fox, Consumer Law Clinics: Community-Based Lawyering-A Social Jus-
tice Response to the Financial Crisis, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 517, 521-27 (2013) (dis-
cussing various law school clinics' responses to the foreclosure crisis caused by the Great Recession);
Janine Sisak, Ifthe Shoe Doesn't Fit ... Reformulating Rebellious Lawyering to Encompass Commu-
nity Group Representation, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 880 (1998) (providing examples ofnonprofits
engaging in collaboration to solve community issues).
186. See MARY JO PATTERSON, ON THE FRONTLINES OF FREEDOM: A CHRONICLE OF THE FIRST
50 YEARS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY 46-47 (2012) (stating that New-
ark's Rutgers School of Law "curriculum offered clinics that allowed students to address important
societal needs while studying the law: the Urban Legal Clinic [was] created in response to the Newark
riots").
187. See, e.g., Pro Bono and Volunteer Opportunities: Disaster Relief Projects, CARDOZO L.,
https://cardozo.yu.edu/academics/public-service-law/pro-bono-and-volunteer-opportunities (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2017); Storm Relief Student Support Victims of Hurricane Sandy, SETON HALL L.,
http://law.shu.edu/About/NewsEvents/ProgramHighlight/program-highlight-spotlight.cfm?cus-
tomel_datapageid 4661=313240 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); Touro Law Center's Disaster Relief
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recently, the well-publicized deaths of Freddie Gray, Philando Castile, and
Alton Sterling at the hands of police.'88 Less frequent are examples of law
school clinics proactively collaborating with communities to identify and
address conditions before they become legal problems.'89 Thus, it appears
that few clinical programs have integrated community engagement with
preventive law to effect social change.
Also largely absent from the community engagement work of clinical
programs and law schools at large is the evaluation of process and out-
comes to measure engagement efforts, efficiency, and effectiveness. This
is not surprising, as most attorneys and law professors are neither educated
nor experienced in performing nontraditional forms of legal research, such
as studies using the scientific method and empirical (i.e., quantitative and
qualitative) analysis. Community-based research, defined as "a partner-
ship of students, faculty and community members who collaboratively en-
gage in research with the purpose of solving a pressing community prob-
lem or effecting social change," is a key component of community engage-
ment.19 0 The research enables community-engaged lawyers to ensure that
the concerns of the community are heard and identified, that remedial in-
terventions are properly tailored, and that the community partakes in all
stages of the problem-solving process.
The concept of community engagement applies far beyond the con-
fines of higher education institutions. The ABA's Commission on the Fu-
ture of Legal Services highlighted the importance of assessment by rec-
ommending the development and measurement of outcomes for improving
access to justice and the delivery of legal services.'91 Acknowledging the
scarcity of empirical evidence to demonstrate which legal innovations suc-
ceed and which do not, the commission urged law schools and other legal
entities to "collaborate to measure the outcomes, impact, and effectiveness
of ongoing and emerging models of delivering legal services, and identify
the potential improvement to those models."'92 Thus, if lawyers are to have
any success in helping to remedy complex social problems of individuals,
Clinic, TOURO C.: JACOB D. FUCHSBERG L. CTR.., http://www.tourolaw.edultlcheart/de-
fault.aspx?pageid=710 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
188. See, e.g., New Maryland Carey Law Course Examines Causes of and Solutions to Balti-
more's Recent Civil Unrest, U. MD.: FRANCIS KING CARY SCH. OF L., http://www.law.umary-
land.edulabout/features/featuredetails.html?feature=41 I (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
189. Examples include performance of community social and legal needs assessments, listening
tours, etc. But see Brooks & Lopez, supra note 23, at 148-49 (discussing the success of an open house
community outreach by Drexel University's law school).
190. See Smith, supra note 19, at 438 (quoting KERRY STRAND ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED
RESEARCH AND HIGHER EDUCATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 3 (2003)); id at 438-39 (providing
examples of community based research, including action research, participatory research, and partic-
ipatory action research).
191. FLS REPORT, supra note 58, at 7, 56 ("Recommendation 11 [:] Outcomes derived from any
established or new models for the delivery of legal services must be measured to evaluate the effec-
tiveness in fulfilling regulatory objectives.").
192. See id. at 56.
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communities and populations in the twenty-first century, they must de-
velop the skills needed to evaluate their engagement of and collaboration
with clients and communities in the problem-solving process as well as the
outcomes of such engagement.
Many practitioners call for an increase in community engagement in
legal work as well, particularly with poor and low-income communities.193
Community-engaged practice requires involving clients more in lawyer-
ingl 94-if the community is "the locale of the problem," then it should be
"an integral part of the development and implementation of the solu-
tions." 95 This principle applies not only to work with community clients
but also to work with individuals; for example, an individual's definition
of their own health problem and buy-in to proposed solutions is critical to
the success of the problem-solving processl96 just as is community input
into a population health issue.
The legal academy must better prepare twenty-first century lawyers
to assume the many roles required to address the multidimensional needs
of clients and communities, including the nonlegal "social, political, and
economic aspects of community action." 97 Community engagement ena-
bles attorneys to better understand the client and community narrative, and
problem definition within the context of the economic and political frame-
work.'98 Skills of collaboration are a critical component of community-en-
gaged lawyering when working with individuals, communities, and pro-
fessionals in the same and other disciplines who have different perspec-
tives on problem definition and problem solving.' 99 So, too, is competency
in preventive law, for the ultimate goal in community engagement is not
to "fix" problems, but to work together to prevent them from arising in the
first place.200 Together, these twenty-first century competencies enable
193. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-first Century, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673, 678 (1998) (describing the goal and benefit of community lawyering as
helping poor communities to increase their power and gain a voice in society); William P. Quigley,
Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 455-56 (1994) (identifying community organizing as "the essential element
of empowering organizational advocacy" for the "poor and powerless" (emphasis omitted)).
194. See Cooper et al., supra note 151, at 204, 208-09 (discussing the importance of engaging
with communities as a civil rights and human rights issue, and noting that this requires the legal pro-
fession to better understand the community's needs and "translate" the community's understanding of
their needs in a way that the larger mainstream can understand).
195. Robin S. Golden, Collaborative as Client: Lawyering for Effective Change, 56 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 393, 405 (2011/12) (quoting Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community
Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2000)).
196. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 1-3 (1977) (describing the importance of client ownership of prob-
lems and solutions); see also Dinerstein, supra note 136, at 523.
197. Diamond, supra note 168, at 131 (describing the roles, skills, and knowledge base of an
activist lawyer).
198. See Seielstad, supra note 105, at 450 (describing the relevance of community and culture
to lawyering).
199. See Kruse, supra note 183, at 438-39.
200. See Smith, supra note 23, at 734, 738 (citing Barbara A. Holland, From Murky to Mean-
ingful: The Role ofMission in Institutional Change, in COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES AS CITIZENS 48,
48-72 (Robert Bringle et al. eds., 1999)).
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lawyers to collaborate with clients, the community, and other profession-
als to develop legal and nonlegal enduring solutions to problems of the
present and those that may arise in the future. Thus, the benefits of devel-
oping law students' proficiencies in all three areas become eminently
clear.
III. THE MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP AND H.E.A.L.
COLLABORATIVE@ AS A MODEL FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COMPETENCIES IN A CLINICAL LAW
PROGRAM
The MLP model, as implemented by H.E.A.L. Collaborative, pro-
vides a vehicle for demonstrating the integration of twenty-first century
competencies in a clinical law program. Descriptions of the MLP model
and H.E.A.L. Collaborative serve to contextualize this Article's subse-
quent discussion of examples of, and pros and cons resulting from, this
integration.
A. The Medical-Legal Partnership Model
The MLP is an interprofessional20' healthcare delivery model that
aims to address the nonmedical causes of health problems by integrating
"legal care" into the health care toolkit.2 0 2 The model promotes early de-
tection and treatment of "health-harming legal need[s],"203 and thereby in-
corporates a preventive law approach. Health-harming legal needs are so-
cial or legal conditions that adversely affect patient health or patient access
to health care, and are better addressed through joint medical, legal, and
204social care as opposed to through clinical medical treatment alone.
These needs typically derive from social determinants of health, which
Healthy People 2020 explains as follows:
[H]ealth is . . . determined in part by access to social and economic
opportunities; the resources and supports available in our homes,
neighborhoods, and communities; the quality of our schooling; the
safety of our workplaces; the cleanliness of our water, food, and air;
and the nature of our social interactions and relationships. The condi-
201. See Emily A. Benfer, Educating the Next Generation of Health Leaders: Medical-Legal
Partnership and Interprofessional Graduate Education, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 113-14 (2014).
Health fields typically use the term "interprofessional" when discussing programs of education and
collaborative work that are interdisciplinary; as a health-based program, the MLP uses this term. Id.
202. Gathings, supra note 20, at 4 (describing MLPs as a "health care delivery model that inte-
grates the expertise of health and legal professionals to identify, address, and avert a health-harming
legal need"); Lawton & Sandel, supra note 7 (describing MLPs as "a healthcare delivery model that
integrates legal assistance as a vital component of healthcare").
203. Gathings, supra note 20, at 5-6.
204. Id. at 4 (stating examples of health-harming legal needs include, "food insecurity, housing
instability, unhealthy housing, insufficient income, and lack of access to health insurance").
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tions in which we live explain in part why some Americans are health-
ier than others and why Americans more generally are not as healthy
as they could be.205
Significantly, as much as sixty percent of health is shaped by social,
environmental, and behavioral determinants.206 "Health and health equity
might not be the aim of all social and economic policies, but they will be
a fundamental result."207
The MLP model grew out of recognition that although healthcare pro-
fessionals are on the front lines and thus well-positioned to screen for so-
cial determinants of health, they often are ill-equipped to address the so-
cial, economic, environmental, and legal needs of patients.208 In the 1990s,
Dr. Barry Zuckerman, a former Chair of Pediatrics at Boston University
Medical Center, aware of and frustrated by his inability to address the non-
medical, health-harming needs of his patient population, set the stage for
the MLP model by hiring an attorney to provide "specialized treatment."209
Since that time, more than 300 healthcare institutions in forty-two states
have adopted some form of MLP model.210 The MLP evolved into a move-
ment with the establishment of the National Center for Medical-Legal
Partnership in 2006. The center aims to lead those in the fields of health,
public health, and law in an integrated and "upstream"2 11 approach to ad-
dress health-harming social and legal conditions, and thereby improve
212
health and well-being.
205. Social Determinants of Health, HEALTHi PEOPLE 2020, https://www.healthypeo-
ple.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/social-determinants-of-health (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
206. See Steven A. Schroeder, We Can Do Better-Improving the Health of the American Peo-
ple, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1221, 1222 (2007).
207. Michael Marmot et al., Comm'n on Soc. Determinants of Health, Closing the Gap in a
Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants ofHealth, 372 LANCET 1661,
1661 (2008).
208. See Barry Zuckerman et al., Why Pediatricians Need Lawyers to Keep Children Healthy,
PEDIATRICS, July 2004, at 224, 225.
209. See id at 225-26 (discussing the benefits of"on-site legal services" and providing examples
from Boston University Medical Center).
210. See Partnerships Across the U.S., NAT'L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP, http://med-
ical-legalpartnership.org/partnerships (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
211. "Upstream" health interventions focus on "policy approaches that can affect large popula-
tions" by improving social and economic conditions in which people live, access to health care, and
health care quality and delivery. Ross C. Brownson et al., Measuring the Impact of Public Health
Policy, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, July 2010, at 1.
212. See National Center Co-Director Appointed to Health People 2030 Advisory Committee,
NAT'L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP, http://medical-legalpartnership.org/national-center (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018). Led by a team of experts in health care, public health, law, evaluation, and
communications, the Center provides technical assistance to MLPs, fosters the development and shar-
ing of best practices, develops and implements performance measures, and engages in systemic policy
and fundraising initiatives. See id.
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Both the ABA and the American Medical Association have passed
resolutions in support of MLPs.2 13 The ABA resolution specifically en-
courages partnerships between lawyers and health care professionals "to
help identify and resolve diverse legal issues that affect patients' health
and well-being."2 14 The health section notes that through MLPs "the legal
profession can advance a 'preventive law' strategy for addressing clients'
social and economic problems and thereby improve clients' health and
well-being, especially those from low-income and other under-served
communities."21 5 This position aligns closely with that expressed in the
ABA Commission's 2016 Report on the Future of Legal Services in the
216United States (discussed supra). Moreover, the health section's report
identifies law schools as offering a "good opportunity" to promote this
type of partnership because the ABA Accreditation Standards require them
to provide "real-life practice" opportunities and pro bono service.217 "By
partnering with health care providers and thereby offering a holistic ap-
proach to clients' problems, law schools can increase the effectiveness of
their clinical programs as well as foster a spirit of interdisciplinary coop-
,,218eration among the professions.
An MLP typically has three core components: provision of legal ad-
vice and assistance to patients (i.e., treatment); implementation of internal
improvements within health care systems to promote early detection and
response to legal and social needs that adversely impact patient health (i.e.,
training and transformation of clinical practice); and promotion of sys-
temic change outside the health care system to improve the overall health
and well-being of vulnerable populations (i.e., prevention).2 19 The compo-
sition of MLP partners varies in the different programs across the country
with hospitals, federally qualified health centers, and outpatient clinics
serving as the health care partner; legal services, pro bono legal counsel,
and law schools serving as the legal partner; and a mix of other disciplines
including nursing, social work, and public health. Moreover, the profes-
sional makeup of MLP teams and the focus, methods, and delivery of ser-
vices can vary greatly depending upon the needs and circumstances of the
213. See PAUL R. DEMURO, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 120A, at 1
(2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/probonopublicservice/ts/med-
legal/120a.pdf; REBECCA J. PATCHIN, AM. MED. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 15-A-
10: MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIPS TO IMPROVE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING (RESOLUTION 7,1-09)
(2009), http://medical-legalpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/American-Medical-Associa-
tion-MLP-Resolution.pdf.
214. DEMURO, supra note 213.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Compare id. at 4 ("[T]he legal profession can advance a 'preventive law' strategy for ad-
dressing clients' social and economic problems and thereby improve clients' health and well-being,
especially those from low-income and other under-served communities."), with FLS REPORT, supra
note 58, at 11-13 (advocating for increased legal assistance for low-income individuals).
217. DEMURO, supra note 213, at 4.
218. Id.
219. See Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 96, at 379; see also The Response, NAT'L CTR. FOR
MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP, http://medical-legalpartnership.org/mlp-response (last visited Feb. 10,
2018) (providing scenarios illustrating the benefits ofmedical-legal partnerships).
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partners and community.220 A description of H.E.A.L. Collaborative, Rut-
gers University's version of the MLP model, follows.
B. H.E.A.L. Collaborative®
H.E.A.L. Collaborative@ is a joint project of Rutgers Law School's
Education and Health Law Clinic and the Pediatrics Primary Care Clinic
at Rutgers-New Jersey Medical School.222 The project is situated in the
center of the City of Newark, New Jersey, and serves the greater Newark
community.223
1. Neighborhood Context: The City of Newark, New Jersey
The City of Newark is the largest in New Jersey with a population of
280,000.224 According to 2014 data, approximately fifty-one percent of all
Newark children are African-American and forty-one percent are His-
222panic;225 nearly twenty-six percent of Newark residents, or 72,000, are un-
der age eighteen.226 It is estimated that 24,000 undocumented immigrants
227
reside in Newark. Nearly seventy percent of Newark children under age
eighteen live in low-income households, defined as having a gross income
at or below two hundred percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL); forty
percent of all Newark children under age eighteen live in poverty (with a
household income that is less than or equal to 100% FPL defined, in 2014,
as annual income of no more than $23,850 for a family of four), and eight-
een percent live in extreme poverty, defined as earning less than or equal
to one-half the FPL.2 2 8 The median income of Newark families is $31,000
per year, compared with a median of $89,000 for the state of New Jer-
229
sey.
220. See Partnerships Across the U.S., NAT'L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP, http://med-
ical-legalpartnership.org/partnerships (last visited May 16, 2018) (demonstrating the different
makeups of the various MLP teams).
221. Rutgers Law School's Education and Health Law Clinic was formerly known as the Special
Education Clinic. See Catalogs, RUTGERS: ST. U.N.J., http://catalogs.rutgers.edu/generated/law_cur-
rent/pg226.html (last visited Apr. I1, 2018).
222. H.E.A.L. Collaborative, Education and Health Law Clinic, RUTGERS HELPS NJ RESOURCE
GUIDE, https://www.rutgershelpsnj.org/organization.528114-
HEALCollaborative Education and Health Law ClinicRutgers U_SchoolofLaw (last visited
Apr. 8, 2018). Rutgers-New Jersey Medical School was formerly known as the New Jersey College
of Medicine and Dentistry. See Timeline, RUTGERS N.J. MED. SCH., http://njms.rut-
gers.edulabout njms/timeline.cfm (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
223. See H.E.A.L. Collaborative, Education and Health Law Clinic, supra note 222.
224. See Quick Facts: Newark City, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.cen-
sus.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/3451000 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); see also ADVOCATES FOR
CHILDREN OF N.J., NEWARK KIDS COUNT: A CITY PROFILE OF CHILD WELL-BEING 5 (2016),
http://acnj.org/downloads/2016_080 lnewarkkids count.pdf.
225. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 224.
226. Id.
227. RAUL HINOJOSA-OJEDA, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF EXPANDING THE DREAM: DAPA
AND DACA IMPACTS ON HUDSON COUNTY, ESSEX COUNTY, THE CITY OF NEWARK AND THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY 9 (2015), http://www.naid.ucla.edu/uploads/4/2/1/9/4219226/newjersey final.pdf.
228. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 224, at 9.
229. See id. at 11.
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Over sixty percent of Newark households are headed by one par-
ent.230 Approximately one-half of all Newark children receive food stamps
through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.231 Newark resi-
dents struggle to find affordable housing,232 and chronic absenteeism
plagues the city's schools.233 In 2014-2015, only seventeen percent of
public, non-charter school, third grade students met or exceeded expecta-
tions on the statewide Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College
and Careers exam (PARCC exam) for English/language arts, and twenty-
two percent met or exceeded expectations in math, compared to rates of
forty-five percent and forty-four percent for the state.234 In 2013, twenty-
seven percent of Newark adults had no high school diploma, and thirty-
235
eight percent had obtained no education beyond a high school diploma.
Nearly eighteen percent of Newark school-age.children receive special ed-
ucation services.236
Health statistics for Newark residents present an equally troublesome
picture. According to 2012 data, forty percent of Newark mothers received
no or late prenatal care237 and ten percent of children were born with low
birthweight.2 38 In 2014, almost 5,400 children, or seven percent, had no
health insurance;239 the uninsured rate for adults hovers around twenty per-
cent.240 Rates of cardiovascular disease, heart attack, and diabetes among
Newark adults are double the county rate; HIV/AIDS prevalence in New-
ark is twice the county rate and three times the state rate; and violent crime
in Newark is two times the state rate and ten times the national bench-
mark.24 Approximately forty-five percent of children ages three to five in
Newark are overweight or obese, versus twenty-one percent nationally,
230. Id. at 6.
231. See id. at 15.
232. See id. at 13 (noting the majority spend more than the recommended thirty percent of annual
income on shelter).
233. See id. at 29 (finding chronic absence rates of nineteen percent for elementary (K-8) stu-
dents and thirty-nine percent for high school students).
234. Id. at 30, 32.
235. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., NEWARK KIDS COUNT: A CITY PROFILE OF CHILD
WELL-BEING 43-46 (2015), http://acnj.org/downloads/2015_03_10_newarkkids count.pdf (adding
that while Newark boasts a median graduation rate of sixty-nine percent, the rate varies from eighty
percent to forty-three percent depending upon high school).
236. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 224, at 28.
237. See id at 6, 18.
238. See id. at 19.
239. Id. at 20.
240. KATHY OPROMOLLO, AMBULATORY CARE SERVS., UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL COMMUNITY





and only thirty percent of children ages three to eighteen meet recommen-
dations for daily activity.242 The prevalence of asthma in Newark children
is significantly higher than for children across the state as well.2 4 3
Newark residents endure a high degree of fragmentation in healthcare
organization and service delivery.2 44 The same holds true for residents ac-
cessing social services and supports, as they often must visit multiple lo-
cations on multiple occasions, where they wait in line for hours to access
and correct deficiencies in the distribution of resources to meet their basic
245
human needs for food, shelter, and financial assistance. Scant free legal
aid exists; at current legal services funding rates, there is one legal aid
attorney for every 11,000 New Jersey residents who are eligible for ser-
vices.2 4 6 "[M]ore than 460,000 low-income adults in New Jersey have at
least one serious civil legal problem each year . . .. [Yet,] fewer than one
in six receive [legal] help . . . ."247 Thus, while the need for assistance for
poor and low-income residents of Newark is great, the availability of as-
sistance is woefully inadequate.
2. H.E.A.L. Collaborative®
Rutgers Law School's Newark campus has a long history of advanc-
ing social justice and was one of the pioneering sites of clinical legal edu-
24
cation.248 The Education and Health Law Clinic, in which H.E.A.L. Col-
laborative is housed, was created in 1995 as the Special Education Clinic
to address the critical shortage of free legal representation available to par-
ents of children with disabilities in special education matters while edu-
cating law students in this substantive area and lawyering skills. The Pe-
diatric Primary Care Clinic is a substantial provider of pediatric primary
care in the City of Newark with approximately 17,000 patient visits per
year. Located within one mile of the law school, the two clinics serve the
242. KRISTEN LLOYD ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, NEW JERSEY
CHILDHOOD OBESITY STUDY 46 (2011), http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/Downloads/8800.pdf; PUNAM
OHRI-VACHASPATI ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, THE NEW JERSEY CHILDHOOD
OBESITY STUDY: NEWARK SCHOOL BMI DATA 7 (2010), http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/Down-
loads/8410.pdf
243. Compare Anthony Johnson, Study: I in 4 Newark Children has Asthma; EPA Steps in for
Air Quality Testing, ABC 7: EYE WITNESS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2015), http://abc7ny.com/health/study-1-
in-4-newark-children-has-asthma;-epa-steps-in-for-air-quality-testing/569501 (stating 25% of New-
ark children have asthma), with N.J. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ASTHMA IN NEW JERSEY: ESSEX COUNTY
ASTHMA PROFILE 1 (2014), http://www.nj.gov/health/fhs/chronic/documents/asthmaprofiles/es-
sex.pdf (stating 8.7% of New Jersey children have asthma).
244. See N.J. HEALTH CARE FACILITIES FIN. AUTH., FINAL REPORT FOR: GREATER NEWARK
HEALTHCARE SERVICES EVALUATION 84-86 (2015),
http://www.nj.gov/njhcffa/what/pdfs/NJHCFFA%20Final%20Report.pdf.
,245. The information is based on the author's experience assisting nearly 300 families through
H.E.A.L. Collaborative since 2013, and hundreds of others the author has helped through the Educa-
tion and Health Law Clinic since 2001.
246. LEGAL SERVS. OF N.J., THE NEW JERSEY LEGAL SERVICES SYSTEM AT A GLANCE (2015),
https://www.1snj.org/PDFs/Glance.pdf.
247. Id.
248. See PAUL TRACTENBERG, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL IN NEWARK:
OPENING A THOUSAND DOORS 1-2 (2010).
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same patient/client population. In 2010, they joined forces in an effort to
address the health-harming social and legal needs of Newark children with
disabilities and their families. Together, they formed H.E.A.L. Collabora-
tive.24 9
H.E.A.L. Collaborative officially opened doors to the community in
March 2013. The program is rooted in the following principles:
1. All members of society have a right to live in healthy environments
with ready access to quality programs and services to treat health
problems and address the sources of health issues;
2. Many members of society living in poverty or low-income house-
holds never will achieve this outcome due to social, legal, and eco-
nomic conditions adversely affecting health;
3. Social justice principles mandate that society address the nonmed-
ical causes of health problems and inequity through both preven-
tion and treatment; and
4. An integrated, interdisciplinary, community-engaged, multilevel
approach is critical to the problem-solving process to achieve last-
ing, beneficial social change.
Given these principles, H.E.A.L. Collaborative's mission is to reduce
poverty's adverse effects on the health and well-being of Newark children
and their families.250 To advance the mission in a manner consistent with
the MLP model, H.E.A.L. uses a three-pronged approach. First, H.E.A.L.
provides free legal representation, consultation, and social work case man-
agement services to children with disabilities and their families who live
in households with incomes <200% FPL using a preventive, interdiscipli-
nary, community-engaged approach.25' Second, H.E.A.L. educates front-
line health and medical professionals on the identification of social issues
with legal remedies that adversely affect child health and family well-be-
ing, and methods for resolving these issues without resorting to legal in-
volvement. And third, H.E.A.L. enhances the educational experiences,
professional development, knowledge, and skills of those studying and
working in the fields of law, medicine, and social work through collabo-
ration in an interdisciplinary setting.252
Supplemental office space in the Pediatric Primary Care Clinic per-
mits graduate students in law and social work and H.E.A.L. faculty to in-
teract regularly with pediatric patients, their families, medical and health
students, and professionals. Co-location improves access to and quality of
care by offering "one-stop" service provision to children and their families
249. A program description of H.E.A.L. Collaborative is on file with the author.
250. H.E.A.L. Collaborative, Education and Health Law Clinic, supra note 222.
251. Seeid.
252. See infra Section IV.A.L.
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in the community. It also enhances opportunities for interdisciplinary col-
laboration and the development of positive working relationships, and en-
riches the knowledge, skill sets, and experiences of students and profes-
sionals participating in H.E.A.L.
Following the premise that "health status should be of concern to
[all,] ... not merely those within the health sector,"253 the current H.E.A.L.
interdisciplinary team is comprised of faculty and staff from Rutgers
Schools of law, medicine, social work, public affairs and administration,
public health, and business, and still expanding. H.E.A.L. serves as a se-
mester-long clinical legal education program for law students; a year-long
field placement for master's level social work students; and a mandatory,
month-long rotation for second-year pediatric and medicine-pediatric res-
idents. Graduate students from the schools of medicine, business, and
other disciplines participate in H.E.A.L. on specific projects as volunteers
or for credit.
H.E.A.L.'s subject matter focus was determined from the results of a
Rutgers Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved needs assessment that
examined the range of social determinants of health affecting the commu-
nity, namely the child patients of the primary care clinic and their fami-
lies.254 Respondents identified public benefits as the primary concern; ed-
ucation/child development, finances and safety/housing nearly tied as sec-
255ondary concerns. We cross-checked existing community resources with
areas of patient need to identify resource gaps. From this analysis,
H.E.A.L. opted to provide assistance in the areas of education, special ed-
ucation, early intervention, and public benefits. Thus, community input
from individual families and local area organizations determined the
framework for H.E.A.L. Collaborative's work.
Despite the selection of a subject-matter focus, we did not want to
leave families with current or potential future issues in other areas without
assistance. Therefore, H.E.A.L. deliberately casts a wide net when work-
ing with individual clients and the community so as not to "edit[] out the
client's story that is not relevant to the specialty."256 Where a family has
additional concerns, H.E.A.L. tries to assist and if H.E.A.L. cannot help
directly, we offer supportive assistance (e.g., help families to identify and
address social determinants of health concerns before they become legal
253. Michael Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 LANCET 1099, 1099
(2005).
254. The twelve-question anonymous survey, written in English and Spanish, screened par-
ents/caregivers for their levels of concern regarding a variety of social determinants, ranging from
food, housing and finances, to education and transportation, among others. The survey was worded
carefully so as not to limit the questions to legal needs (employing an interdisciplinary lens) or to
current issues (incorporating preventive law principles).
255. Community resources include other in-house clinics at Rutgers to which H.E.A.L. could
refer matters, local area advocacy groups, and nonprofit organizations.
256. Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a Clinical Setting: The Effect of
Specialization on Social Justice and Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 307, 322 (2001).
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problems, or assist families to gather evidence for claims in legal law in
which we do not practice) and facilitate targeted referrals257 (i.e., we make
initial contact with referrals to ensure the referral is appropriate and avail-
able). In so doing, H.E.A.L. adopts a "take what walks in the door" ap-
proach.25 8
To achieve its mission, H.E.A.L. engages in a variety of education,
service, and research activities. In all activities, H.E.A.L. actively and in-
tentionally incorporates principles of preventive law, interdisciplinary col-
laboration, and community engagement. Therefore, H.E.A.L. Collabora-
tive is best described as an "integrated" clinic as it "provides the oppor-
tunity for law students to identify and to address the underlying social jus-
tice problems facing individual clients and communities, to engage in so-
cial change advocacy in multiple forums, and to develop skills in multiple
areas."259 As a result of law students' participation "in different models of
social change lawyering simultaneously,"26 0 and employment of multiple
strategies and methodologies in their work, they develop the tools needed
for multidimensional, collaborative problem solving required for effective
health and social justice advocacy.26 1
IV. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATING PREVENTIVE LAW,
INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATION, AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
IN H.E.A.L. COLLABORATIVE
H.E.A.L. Collaborative's employment of twenty-first century com-
petencies throughout its work results in invaluable experiences and lessons
for students and professionals in law and other disciplines; improved prob-
lem prevention and problem solving through collaboration across disci-
plines, and with clients and communities; and greater collective impact
while advancing a social justice mission. However, the model also poses
some challenges. The following are just some examples of the ways in
which H.E.A.L. integrates twenty-first century competencies into its ac-
tivities, and the pros and cons of this endeavor.262
257. H.E.A.L. tries to refer families first to other in-house clinics and then to local organizations.
258. Since opening doors in March 2013, H.E.A.L. Collaborative has helped nearly 300 children
and families to address over 800 legal and social needs including special education, public benefits,
guardianship, and health insurance appeals, among others. (Data on file with H.E.A.L.'s research
team.)
259. Marcy L. Karin & Robin R. Runge, Toward Integrated Law Clinics that Train Social
Change Advocates, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 563, 568, 570 (2011) (explaining that integrated clinics in-
corporate a variety of strategies and approaches in advancing social change, such as individual repre-
sentation, community organization, education and advocacy, and policy initiatives, based on the needs
identified by their clients and the community); see Brodie, supra note 168, at 337, 354-84 (discussing
the benefits ofadopting a "middle ground" clinical approach that "hovers between the two archetypical
visions (service and impact) of social justice lawyering").
260. Karin & Runge, supra note 259, at 567.
261. See id
262. For purposes of this Article, the author limits discussion to law students' experiences only.
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A. Examples ofIntegration ofApproaches in Education, Service, and Re-
search, and Resultant Benefits to Law Students
1. Education of Law Students
The education of law students in H.E.A.L. Collaborative occurs in
multiple ways, including direct instruction in the classroom; group exer-
cises; large and small group instruction; simulations; case rounds; team
supervision meetings; and guided and supervised direct client and com-
munity work. This section focuses on non-live client learning experiences;
learning from live client work is discussed in the section on service below.
Throughout these education activities, H.E.A.L. develops law students'
twenty-first century competencies.
Some activities seem silly on their face (e.g., drawing pictures and
solving puzzles in teams);263 yet they build rapport among participants
from the same and different disciplines, and require good communication
and collaboration among participants to succeed. These exercises expose
students to different problem-solving approaches, and require students to
reflect on the effects of disciplinary language, norms, and values on com-
munication, collaboration, and the problem-solving process. Other exer-
cises are more serious. A simulation based on a former client places par-
ticipants in the role of a single parent with two children living in poverty.
Students develop a monthly budget; they compare and contrast their finan-
cial allocations and the rationales for their decisions and discuss the influ-
ence of personal and professional norms, values, and biases on these deci-
sions.264 The exercise encourages students to be empathetic and view the
situation from the parent's context,265 demonstrating the importance of cli-
ent input and narrative into all aspects of the problem-solving process. It
also requires students to explore the family's current concerns as well as
potential future issues, thereby taking on the preventive lawyer's role of
"anticipator" and "planner." Another exercise provides a "bare bones"
summary of a child with a chronic medical condition and asks participants
to brainstorm the myriad potential causes of the illness and trace each
cause back to its possible roots. Through this process, students learn that
problems can be defined and categorized in multiple ways; that problem
263. For example, in one exercise on communication and collaboration, students are grouped
into sets of three with a representative from each of the three disciplines. One person receives a child's
drawing that the person must then describe to another under timed conditions so that the second person
can reproduce it with crayons on paper. The third person serves as notetaker. Dialogue between the
describer and artist is restricted in a different manner each time the exercise is repeated: First, only the
describer may speak; then, the artist may ask only closed-ended questions that elicit a yes or no re-
sponse; and finally, the participants may engage in a dialogue.
264. Participants answer questions such as: Did you forego formula in favor of breast milk for
medical or personal reasons? How did you determine whether to pay for cable television? Did you
consider the risk of losing your job or child-welfare involvement when you refused to leave work to
get your child whom the school had suspended for behavior reasons? Was money for and/or access to
transportation a factor in your decision?
265. Using fundamental social work concepts such as systems theory and the ecological ap-
proach, law students begin to view individuals and their community, i.e., environment, as multifaceted
and recognize that individuals can only be understood fully in the context of their relationships.
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definition and categorization directly affect the choice of intervention; that
identifying and addressing a problem's root cause(s) offers the best oppor-
tunity to prevent recurrence; and that client and community input, insight,
and involvement in the process are critical.
To gain a better understanding of the context in which H.E.A.L.'s
target population resides, students go out into the community and observe
and reflect on the experience: for example, by riding a public bus from one
end of Newark to the other, or spending two hours in a waiting room at a
local public benefits office, courthouse, or emergency room/health care
clinic. These experiences expose students to the importance of contextu-
alizing individual and community concerns, and incorporating commu-
nity-engaged lawyering in this process. Law students also receive skills
training and attend didactic sessions to better understand substantive laws
and relevant systems. They study topics such as the intersection of poverty
and health; cultural competence; relevant federal, state, and local educa-
tion, public benefits, and social service programs; laws, policies, and sys-
tems that affect health directly and indirectly; the significance of problem
definition; and the skills and benefits of twenty-first century competencies
in addition to traditional lawyering skills.
The education of law students continues as they participate in weekly
interdisciplinary case rounds and monthly social determinants of health
rounds with all pediatric and medicine-pediatric residents (not just those
assigned to H.E.A.L.). Case rounds provide an opportunity for law stu-
dents to gain input from their same and different discipline peers while
exploring patterns in the problems their clients face and the conditions in
which they live. As a result, they learn to draw connections between indi-
vidual client concerns and larger societal/structural concerns. Utilizing
twenty-first century competencies, law students and their peers brainstorm
ways to surmount obstacles to problem solving, and, where possible, to
prevent problems from arising in the first place. They improve their
knowledge of the laws, systems, and programs with which their clients
interact, and their understanding of the significant role that context and
266narrative play in the problem-solving process. They discover how law
is both a social determinant of health and one of many tools to remedy the
effect of social determinants. They learn the limits of their own profession
and the benefits of collaboration with those having other knowledge and
266. For example, consider a child who behaves inappropriately at school for reasons stemming
from the child's disability and is repeatedly suspended. The suspensions affect the parent's employ-
ment because the parent cannot leave the child at home unattended. The employer fires the parent,
causing a loss of income and inability to pay the rent, culminating in an eviction notice and impending
situation of homelessness. Law students must understand not only each system (e.g., special education,
employment, behavioral, housing) and relevant laws and policies to properly work with this family
but also the way in which the systems interact to find the best solution. They must trace the problem
back to its root cause, e.g., the district's failure to properly address the child's behavior problems, to
prevent the cycle from repeating, and develop a sustainable solution.
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skill sets. They find common ground with their same and different disci-
pline peers as well as their clients and the community, and discover the
benefits of building on commonalities while respecting differences.
H.E.A.L.'s educational activities transport law students from their
prior training in which they view legal issues narrowly to using a wide
angle problem-identification and problem-solving lens that emphasizes
that not all problems are legal; that even if a problem is legal it may be
defined according to other disciplines; that the lawyer toolkit does not pro-
vide the only, or the best, way to resolve many problems; and that the per-
spective of others, including the client, is critical to the problem prevention
and solving processes.2 6 7 Through their discovery that multiple ways of
analyzing and addressing problems exist, law students come to understand
the many different roles residing within their profession that can effect
268
social change with and for individuals and the community, and the im-
portance of twenty-first century competencies to effective lawyering.
2. Service with and for Individual Clients and the Community
All of H.E.A.L.'s service activities aim to identify, address, and pre-
vent real world health problems. Service activities include consultation,
direct representation, and social work case management and advocacy for
and with individual clients and the community, as well as collaboration
with the community on education, research, organizing, advocacy, and
policy initiatives. Law students "learn by doing" through their experiences
in H.E.A.L. service provision. Experiential learning aligns with principles
of andragogy, which provides that adult learners "attach more meaning to
learnings they gain from experience" and acquire more knowledge when
they have a need to learn to deal with a real-life problem or task.26 9 Since
adult learners "see education as a process of developing increased compe-
tence . . . learning experiences should be organized around compe-
tency-development categories."270 By applying the lessons learned in
H.E.A.L.'s educational activities to their service experiences with live cli-
ents, law students maximize their development of twenty-first century
competencies.
H.E.A.L. assigns an interdisciplinary team to individual clients and
community initiatives so that students may examine the issues from mul-
tiple disciplinary knowledge bases, skill sets and approaches, and learn
267. Law students learn that problems seldom conform to clear-cut disciplinary boundaries and
that "a good lawyer must be able to counsel clients and serve their interests beyond the confines of his
technical expertise-to integrate legal considerations with . .. other nonlegal aspects of the matter."
Brest, supra note 99, at 8.
268. See id.
269. MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION: FROM
PEDAGOGY TO ANDRAGOGY 44 (1980); see also Bloch, supra note 180, at 331 (explaining that andra-
gogical methodology favors experiential and participatory learning).
270. KNOWLES, supra note 269.
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from each other and clients in this process. Teams aim to ensure that cli-
ents and communities are the "protagonists in framing and resolving their
concerns."271 Client interviews involve an exploration of pressing social
determinants that are affecting health adversely, as well as potential future
ones, with an eye towards preventing and addressing conditions before
they have the chance to transform into social or legal problems, as the lat-
ter often are far harder to remedy.
Working side-by-side with their clients and interdisciplinary peers
provides law students the opportunity not only to practice the skills and
tools they have acquired in their own field but also to observe and try out
the tools and approaches used by their teammates.272 Examples of some of
these skills and tools include: systems theory;273 "starting where the client
is,;274 fostering client self-determination;275 strengths-based practice;276
and "goodness-of-fit"2 7 7 between client needs and problem definition, and
the strategies and interventions selected. Students' knowledge base and
skill set expand while collaboration improves. "Working together causes
each participant to see and appreciate how others approach a problem and
envision resolving it . . . . [Therefore,] interactions can become more lat-
eral than hierarchical."278
The twenty-first century competencies students develop in the indi-
vidual client context translate to community work. The community work
enables law students to see beyond individual client problems to structural
and societal causes, and develops in students an increased awareness of
the social, economic, and political context and their effects on justice and
271. Tokarz et al., supra note 155, at 365.
272. For example, social work students' incorporation of systems theory challenges law stu-
dents' tunnel vision and linear thinking; and client's definitions of problems can change the narrative
and subsequent interventions in dramatic ways, testing law students' tendency to define problems and
solutions as purely legal.
273. See Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A New IDEA for Improving the Education of Children with
Disabilities in Foster Care: Applying Social Work Principles to the Problem Definition Process, 26
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 14, 28 (2006) (noting that each system is made up of component parts that
interact, influence, and are influenced by each other, and that, "[b]y examining systems of various
orders that are not comprehensible through investigation of their respective parts in isolation, one may
develop an improved understanding of problems and thereby develop more viable solutions").
274. See id at 27 (explaining that "starting where the client is" requires attention to be paid to
the meaning that an individual attributes to a problem and the problem-solving process, including "an
examination of, among other things, the [person]'s openness to change, self-determination, assessment
of the problem(s), and available strengths and resources, all from [that person]'s perspective").
275. See id. (defining self-determination as "self-direction" and individual autonomy in decision
making (quoting MARY E. WOODS & FLORENCE HOLLIS, CASEWORK: A PSYCHOSOCIAL THERAPY 26
(4th ed. 1990)).
276. See id. at 29 (explaining that "strengths-based practice requires ... a shift in focus from
pathology to possibility" and that it presumes all persons have strengths and one must mobilize one's
strengths to attain one's goals).
277. See id at 30 (defining "goodness-of-fit" as "refer[ring] to the compatibility between a cli-
ent's needs, problem assessment, and the interventions proposed to meet those needs" and as requiring
accuracy in problem assessment and definition to ensure that interventions are properly tailored and
implemented).
278. Piomelli, supra note 162, at 448.
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access to justice for populations.2 7 9 In some community projects, H.E.A.L.
offers its interdisciplinary workforce to the community to support their
efforts to respond to issues raised by multiple community members or
community-based organizations. For example, H.E.A.L. developed an in-
formational pamphlet to respond to parent concerns regarding the health
effects of lead exposure and the legal rights of parents following the local
public school system's disclosure of lead in the water supply.280 In another
project, H.E.A.L. addressed concerns regarding the fragmented nature of
service delivery, and the failure to have a single locale that listed social
service, advocacy, and other resources and programs available for Newark
residents, by researching and creating an internet database with more than
350 local-area social service, health, advocacy, and other programs.281
Other community projects have been more proactive. For instance,
H.E.A.L. drafted a memo summarizing the potential effects of then-new
changes to Medicaid's "free care" policy on public schools' ability to re-
ceive Medicaid reimbursement for health services provided to eligible stu-
dents in New Jersey.2 82 A local organization requested the memo so that it.
283
could determine if and how to address the issue. H.E.A.L. also codevel-
oped a series of one-page informational pamphlets on social service pro-
grams and eligibility requirements and other materials to assist health care
professionals with their screening of families for social determinants of
health.284 In all projects, reactive and proactive, community engagement
plays a key role for the community identified and defined the problem,
called on H.E.A.L. to provide expertise and assistance in the particular
area, and then collaborated on the strategy employed to address the issue.
Accordingly, law students develop an understanding that the law is not "a
unidirectional 'professional service"' but rather "a collaborative commu-
nicative practice."285
Law students prepare for and reflect upon their service experiences
during individual and interdisciplinary team supervision sessions as well
as in case rounds. The opportunity to explore and reflect upon learning
279. See supra Section IV.Al.
280. H.E.A.L. collaborated with the public school student union to distribute pamphlets to the
community.
281. See RUTGERS HELPS NJ RESOURCE GUIDE., www.rutgershelpsnj.org (last visited Feb. 10,
2018) (listing various resources "to assist advocates, professionals and community members in navi-
gating the complex array of federal, state, and local resources and agencies available to the public").
282. See Memorandum by H.E.A.L. Collaborative (on file with author).
283. Another project emerged during H.E.A.L.'s representation of a parent against a charter
school for improper discipline of a child for actions stemming from the child's disability. Students
explored whether other parents were experiencing the same concern and amassed over thirty examples
of similar allegations from local area organizations. H.E.A.L. then met with the head of the State
Assembly's Education Committee to discuss these concerns, and received an invitation to assist in
drafting new charter school legislation for proposal.
284. H.E.A.L. continues to develop similar user-friendly informational pamphlets and form let-
ters for patients.
285. See White, supra note 167, at 158.
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experiences enhances student l arning and reorients their meaning and be-
lief schemes such that the learning becomes ingrained.28 6 Students' partic-
ipation in H.E.A.L.'s service activities permits them to take on some of
the myriad roles an attorney may play,287 and educates them regarding the
importance of nontraditional problem-solving alternatives and the need for
prevention, collaboration, and client and community involvement to
achieve sustainable social change. Further, these activities enhance law
students' social justice orientation; the more that law students experience
with and understand their clients and the community within the social, po-
litical, and economic context, the better they comprehend that problems
often perceived to be individual are really societal and structural, and that
the law is not fair for all.
3. Research Activities
H.E.A.L. Collaborative strives to harness the intellectual resources of
faculty and students from multiple disciplines, as well as community
knowledge in its "community action" and more traditional empirical re-
search initiatives. H.E.A.L.'s community action research projects aim to
contribute to the remediation of community-identified conditions or prob-
lems and thereby create social change. Through its empirical research ini-
tiatives, H.E.A.L. seeks to identify and better understand individual client
and community needs in context; the clients' experiences receiving ser-
vices from H.E.A.L.; and the value of interdisciplinary education and col-
laboration to student and resident learning.288 The information and data
collected through IRB-approved studies enables H.E.A.L. to share useable
knowledge with the community, and to evaluate and improve upon its own
methods and processes for addressing client and community needs, and
educating students and residents.2 89
H.E.A.L.'s research team includes representatives from law, medi-
cine, social work, public health, public affairs, and business.29 0 The pro-
gram's action research examines community conditions and problems
from the perspective of multiple disciplines, reinforcing the invaluable les-
286. Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching
ofSocial Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 51-52 (1995) (discussing andragogy
and the three stages of transformative learning as including the "disorienting experience," "exploration
and reflection," and "reorientation").
287. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1363, 1368-69 (1993)
(reviewing LOPEZ, supra note 161) ("The customary roles of attorney and client are not etched into
stone."); see also Quigley, supra note 286.
288. See H.E.A.L. Collaborative: Service Provider Evaluation IRB #14-005M [hereinafter Study
Protocol I] (unpublished study protocol) (on file with author); H.E.A.L. Collaborative IRB #13-728M
[hereinafter Study Protocol II] (unpublished study protocol) (on file with author).
289. See Study Protocol 1, supra note 288; Study Protocol II, supra note 288.
290. See Study Protocol 1, supra note 288; Study Protocol 11, supra note 288.
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son for law students that not all problems, are legal nor are they best de-
fined or addressed in a legal capacity.291 To illustrate, return to the lead
community project example described briefly, supra, in Part II. Following
distribution of the informational pamphlet, H.E.A.L. partnered internally
across disciplines at Rutgers and with outside area health and environmen-
tal-related.organizations to investigate the myriad disciplines and associ-
ated laws, policies, resources, and concerns that are implicated in an effort
to start a conversation on how to define and address the problem. In this
ongoing process, students learn to define problems and solutions broadly
and to think proactively and creatively as a "designer" with myriad disci-
292
pline-based possibilities for reform.
In accordance with principles of community engagement, H.E.A.L.
routinely seeks individual and community input into and perception re-
garding the potential causes and contributors of specific health problems,
and the viability of possible interventions in its research activities.293 The
information gained provides a starting point for discussions with local
groups about how best to define and address an identified concern, and to
prevent conditions from transforming into legal problems.294 For example,
H.E.A.L. is conducting a needs assessment regarding community access
to quality food and exercise opportunities. As the data is analyzed, law
students explore and experience "the challenges of translating the prob-
lem-solving techniques employed in direct representation of individual cli-
ents []to the larger context of problem-solving [with the] client commu-
nity." 295 They witness "the ways in which community problems may be
interconnected to those faced by individuals, and by how individual cases
or problems may be caused and/or driven by underlying forces that could
be addressed at the root level." 296 H.E.A.L.'s research activities thereby
bolster law students' understanding of the essential role of community en-
gagement in the problem identification, definition, and intervention pro-
cesses.
H.E.A.L.'s action research also enhances law students' exposure to
and development of skills in preventive law. For instance, when research-
ing Medicaid's "free care" policy, students examined the potential impact
of this policy on children's receipt of special education services in schools
to determine if the policy would have an adverse effect.297 In this manner,
they learned to think "preventively" as well as "solutionally." 298 Further,
291. See Berkheiser, supra note 104, at 1156 (noting that prematurely categorizing a problem as
fitting into a single discipline risks perpetuating the situation where "[i]f a lawyer has only legal solu-
tions, everything begins to resemble a legal problem").
292. See Barton, supra note 75, at 29-30.
293. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Section H.A.
295. Kruse, supra note 183, at 405.
296. Seielstad, supra note 105, at 493.
297. See Memorandum by H.E.A.L. Collaborative (on file with author).
298. See Barton, supra note 75.
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the lessons students learned by using preventive law with individual cli-
ents were carried over to community clients, enabling students to antici-
pate, plan, and advise the community on addressing conditions early, ra-
ther than "wait[ing] until a problem has visibly erupted before identifying
it as a 'problem."'
2 99
In addition to community-action research, H.E.A.L. is involved in
IRB-approved empirical studies examining client-service process and out-
comes, and interdisciplinary education and collaboration.300 Specifically,
H.E.A.L. seeks and evaluates clients' and students/residents' perspectives
on the services and education, respectively, provided and the results ob-
tained.301 This information is used to make programmatic improvements
with the aim of maximizing service and education outcomes. The data con-
tributes to professional knowledge on legal services client-service provi-
sion, interdisciplinary collaboration for students and professionals from a
variety of disciplines, and more.
Few lawyers engage in nontraditional forms of legal research, and
law students seldom, if ever, receive exposure to or instruction in this area.
However, participation in collaborative research with the aim of address-
ing a community problem or effecting social change is a critical skill for
law students so that they may contribute effectively to the resolution of
complex social problems. Experience with empirical research teaches law
students to set goals and outcomes towards which to strive, to measure the
effectiveness of the interventions they provide, and to evaluate their pro-
cesses of working with and serving their clients. Through their exposure
to and participation in H.E.A.L. Collaborative's research activities, law
students gain needed competency in and witness the benefits of
twenty-first century competencies in yet another facet of legal work.
B. Challenges of Merging Preventive Law, Interdisciplinary Collabora-
tion, and Community Engagement in a Clinical Law Program
The integration of preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration,
and community engagement in a clinical law program significantly en-
hances law students' knowledge, skills, and competencies needed for ef-
fective twenty-first century law practice.302 Yet the model presents chal-
lenges as well, which warrant some attention. I have grouped them into
five areas: Great-or Too Great-Expectations; Unlearning to Learn; Do
as I Say, Not as You See; Finding Balance; and Program Structure and
Logistics. While some may view these challenges as "cons," they are also
299. See id.
300. See Study Protocol I, supra note 288; Study Protocol II, supra note 288.
301. See Study Protocol I, supra note 288; Study Protocol II, supra note 288.
302. See supra Part II.
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benefits in that they open the door to difficult, eye-opening, reflective, and
insightful discussions that make for wonderful teaching moments.3 0 3
1. Great-or Too Great-Expectations
Law students participating in H.E.A.L. Collaborative are expected to
gain substantive knowledge of relevant law and proficiency in myriad law-
yering skills such as interviewing, counseling, oral, and written advocacy
skills, as well as a foundation in twenty-first century competencies. This
is a tall order for any lawyer, let alone a law student participating in a clinic
for the first time.
The multiple knowledge bases and skill sets required to practice in
an integrated clinic such as H.E.A.L. "add[] complicating layers to these
clinical courses."304 Professor Karen Tokarz likens the process of learning
lawyering in a community to "learning how to kayak on a moving river,3os
due to the multiple roles lawyers must play, the complexity of the legal
and nonlegal issues that occur at micro and macro levels, and "the fact that
situational factors are in constant flux." 306 Professor Janet Weinstein posits
that the success of interdisciplinary training requires a law student to "have
a good understanding of his or her own discipline, both in theory and in
practice," including the profession's strengths and weaknesses, and that
307
this often does not occur until one has years of practice. This leads to
questions about students' abilities "to absorb the requisite lessons in a lim-
ited time frame"308 and whether programs like H.E.A.L. demand too much
of students. At the same time, if the legal academy does not expose law
students to the complexities that exist in solving social and legal problems
on a micro and macro scale, and equip them with the knowledge, skills,
and experiences to tackle such problems, many may graduate with the
view that poverty and the "unmet . . . needs of the poor [are] too over-
whelming a problem to solve" and thus "not worth their effort." 3
09
2. Unlearning to Learn
Most law students have a clear image of the "ideal" lawyer and traits
needed for success that include being "directive, hierarchical, individual-
istic" and "superior" to lay people and other professionals.31 0 According
303. See Abbe Smith, Carrying on in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy
and Other Grievances, I CLINICAL L. REV. 723, 723-27 (1995) (responding to a former student's
critique of his experience in a criminal defense clinic and finding valuable lessons in the critique); see
also Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Education in a Different Voice: A Reply to Robert Rader, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 711, 711-12 (1995) (identifying teachable moments and lessons from a student's
critique of the clinical experience).
304. See Tokarz et al., supra note 155, at 393.
305. Id. at 392-93.
306. Id. at 386.
307. Weinstein, supra note 117, at 357.
308. Tokarz et al., supra note 155, at 386.
309. Kruse, supra note 183, at 424.
310. Enos & Kanter, supra note 115, at 85-86, 102.
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to Professor Alan Lerner, by the end of their first year in law school, law
students, through the professional school socialization process, identify as
"gladiators," and there is little one can do to alter this socialization.3 1
These preconceptions of students cultivate resistance to spending time and
effort to develop "client-centered, client-empowering, multidisciplinary
lawyering methods, and foreclose the opportunity for them to experience
the benefits of such a model."3 12 Thus, to "learn by doing" in and from an
integrated clinic model such as H.E.A.L., law students must "unlearn"
prior law school lessons3 13 and the professional socialization that has oc-
curred must be "undone."
The "unlearning and undoing" process is both difficult and time con-
suming, and time is a scarce commodity in the clinical program. However,
students must go through this process to become open to and develop
knowledge and skills in twenty-first century competencies. Faculty must
"delegitimize all the preconceived notions of the lawyer as savior and lit-
igation as the answer to [all] problems"314 so that students can open them-
selves to principles of preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and
community engagement. Students must learn to identify and accept their
discipline's limitations, and recognize that some of the most complex
problems may not have a solution in law, so that they become willing to
work with and learn from others, including clients and the community.
Moreover, students must grow to understand that there is much more to
law than being reactionary and using litigation to resolve pre-existing
problems so that they accept and develop interest in the myriad other roles
of lawyer, including "planner," "counselor," "educator," and "organizer,"
in accordance with principles of preventive law. 315
A potential risk of participation in an integrated clinic is that some
students will not engage in the resocialization process and resist where the
knowledge and skills expected of them do not fit into their idea of lawyer-
316
ing. As a result, they may discount the contributions of their clients and
those from other disciplines to the problem-prevention and problem-solv-
317
ing processes. Others may engage but discover that they dislike team-
work and collaboration. Thus, prior law school lessons regarding the nar-
row legal knowledge base and skill set, conceptions about the lawyer's
3 11. Alan M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Work Place. Building Better Lawyers by Teaching
Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solver, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107, 109, 124-
25, 146 (1999).
312. Enos & Kanter, supra note 115, at 86.
313. See Tokarz et al., supra note 155, at 395-96 (discussing the need for lawyers to unlearn
lessons that they are superior to lay people and other professionals).
314. Elsesser, supra note 165, at 387.
315. See supra Section II.A.
316. See Barry et al., supra note 177, at 450 (explaining the resistance of some law students to
participating in community legal education projects as due to student perception that such projects are
outside the roles of lawyers).
317. See Tokarz et al., supra note 155, at 383 ("Clinical law faculty and clinic students may
discount the importance of the non-law focus or approach due to ignorance or bias, and non-law pro-
fessionals may experience discomfort if their contributions are not understood or their work is per-
ceived as being devalued.").
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professional identity, and biases and stereotypes towards clients and pro-
fessionals from other disciplines may be reinforced, rather than reoriented,
through participation in an integrated clinic.
3. Do as I Say and Do, Not as You See
Law students' observations of and experiences with legal practition-
ers and legal systems reinforce their concepts of the role, identity, and
tools of lawyers. This occurs both outside the law school in clerkships,
internships, and paid positions in legal organizations and law firms, as well
as inside the law school in classrooms, clinics, and pro bono programs.
The narrow conception of lawyer as sole problem solver who is limited to
legal interventions is perpetuated,31 8 along with the superior placement of
attorneys in the problem-solving hierarchy. With so few professors and
practitioners deliberately incorporating twenty-first century competencies
in their respective teaching and practice, law students have few models to
emulate.
Moreover, law students frequently observe attorneys in practice re-
fusing to collaborate with clients, other professionals, or adversaries. They
witness lawyers relying solely on legal definitions of and solutions to prob-
lems. They watch lawyers rewind to address past problems, but not
fast-forward to anticipate and strategize to prevent future ones. Law stu-
dents model what they see and tend to conform to the culture of the envi-
ronment in which they work.3 19 These experiences disserve law students
by contradicting and detracting from the lessons learned in H.E.A.L.
H.E.A.L.'s instruction in and incorporation of twenty-first century
competencies often conflicts with what students observe inside the legal
academy, including clinical programs, as well, for many faculty and peers
in other clinics follow a more traditional lawyering approach. When stu-
dents observe that they are not "doing" in the same fashion as their peers,
and are learning different approaches and skills, they begin to question
whether H.E.A.L.'s way is appropriate. This questioning transforms into
doubt and compounds tudent resistance to incorporating new and differ-
ent ways of lawyering into their practice.
4. Finding Balance
A successful integrated clinic requires the striking of a proper balance
among numerous forces that pull in different directions. These forces in-
clude meeting the current pressing and future potential needs of individual
clients and the community; developing relationships with and setting and
318. See Enos & Kanter, supra note 115, at 87.
319. See Neil Hamilton & Lisa Monpetit Brabbit, Fostering Professionalism Through Mentor-
ing, J. LEGAL EDUC. 102, 108 (2007) ("Much skill development for law students and new lawyers oc-
curs through observation of and discussion with good role models."); see also Buck Lewis, President's
Perspective, Struggling to Be More Like Malinda and Frank, TENN. B.J., Sept. 2008, at 3 ("If you
don't think young lawyers and staff members and law students are constantly watching how we behave
ourselves, you'd better wake up and smell the coffee.").
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managing the expectations of interdisciplinary and community organiza-
tional partners; and prioritizing pedagogical objectives and practical expe-
riences for students. Simultaneously, the program context and narrative
may affect operations (e.g., through funding issues), programmatic direc-
tion, and research initiatives, thereby causing disruption to the delicate
balance required for integrated clinics to operate. The programmatic chal-
lenge is finding the right balance between the program's duties to students,
to clients, and to partners, and managing the expectations of all in-
volved.320 Despite best efforts, at various points in time, one duty may have
to take precedence over another. This requires a certain degree of juggling
and constant oversight of the program.
The primary balancing challenge concerning law students is finding
the "time, resources and [proper] contexts to help students develop [prob-
lem-solving] skills and . . . integrate them thoroughly into . . . legal prac-
tice."321 H.E.A.L. Collaborative strives to ensure that all law students par-
ticipating in the program receive the same or similar pedagogical experi-
ences. However, this aim may conflict with our desire to meet client needs
by accepting "what walks in the door." As a result, students, at times, do
not receive the same level of exposure to and experience with areas of
substantive law and skills/approaches as their peers who participate in
clinics that focus on only one area of substantive law (e.g., guardianship),
one type of lawyering skill (e.g., appellate practice clinic), and/or adhere
to a more traditional lawyering approach. This may come at a cost to the
development of a particular skill area, be it a skill of traditional lawyering
or of one of the twenty-first century competencies advanced by H.E.A.L.
5. Program Structure and Logistics
The structure of and partners involved in an integrated clinic strongly
influence the clinic's success in advancing its mission. Identifying the
"right" institutional and community partners with respect to professional
discipline, community knowledge, experience, and the ability to work well
with others is critical to achievement of the program mission. Partners
must have excellent communication skills, a willingness to listen as well
as share, and a desire to collaborate in action, not merely in name.
Logistics are another factor that significantly influence integrated
clinic work. Academic calendars can create barriers to collaborative work
with clients, communities, and across disciplines. Differences in semester
start and end dates, course schedules, work hours, field placement and ro-
tation timeframes, and outside obligations all can influence program goals.
The breadth of student learning expected and law school policies on clinic
credits and credit hours can significantly affect the ability to meet peda-
gogical and client goals. One semester, although sufficient to develop pos-
itive working relationships with individual clients, often is insufficient
320. See Sejelstad, supra note 105, at 494-95.
321. Enos & Kanter, supra note 115.
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time for students to establish relationships of trust needed for community
work.322 Students' "transitory situation[s]" resulting from their participa-
tion in a one-semester clinic may "create[] a particular problem when the
nature of the [community] work inherently requires long-term commit-
ment, trust building over time, and an appreciation for community and
partnership history."323
Time limitations may affect interdisciplinary teams' ability to pass
through the stages of forming, norming, storming, and performing needed
for successful team solidarity and collaboration as well.324 Consequently,
some students end the semester during the storming phase and this can
color their perceptions of the benefits of collaboration and the collabora-
tive process for the future. In addition, preventive law practice and the
incorporation of client and community insight and involvement in all as-
pects of the problem-solving process take time up-front despite the fact
that they can save time, energy, and heartache on the back-end.
In light of the aforementioned challenges stemming from incorporat-
ing multiple lawyering approaches in an integrated clinic such as H.E.A.L.
Collaborative, one must ask whether the benefits outweigh the risks such
that the program properly advances law student learning. Based on my
experience, the answer is a resounding yes. Through the education, ser-
vice, and research activities of H.E.A.L. Collaborative, law students have
the opportunity to study, witness, experience, and reflect upon the use of
preventive law, interdisciplinary collaboration, and community engage-
ment in legal practice. As a result, they develop a level of proficiency in
each of these three approaches that enhances their preparation and skill set
needed for effective twenty-first century lawyering.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXPANDING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
LAWYERS' TOOLKIT
As discussed at the start of this article, law school clinics long have
served at the forefront of educating students in essential competencies not
sufficiently addressed, or addressed at all, in other areas of the law school
curriculum. Accordingly, one must wonder if they have become the
"kitchen sink" or "catch-all" provision of legal education. Can and should
clinics continue to undertake the law school's duty to inculcate social jus-
tice values in students, while simultaneously teaching lawyering skills, hu-
man relational skills, professionalism, and creative problem solving in ad-
dition to new competencies such as those proposed here? The integrated
clinic model demonstrates that clinics can meet this challenge, but is this
322. See Fox, supra note 185, at 518 (noting the "long-term relationships" on which community
lawyering is based).
323. Tokarz et al., supra note 155, at 395.
324. See Weinstein et al., supra note 129, at 51 (discussing Tuckman's model of group process
and adding an additional stage, "reforming," between "storming" and "performing" based on their
experiences with law students).
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enough to ensure that he lessons students learn from the experience are
internalized such that they last well into the future?
The legal academy's provision of instruction in and opportunities for
law students to practice twenty-first century competencies in nonclinical
doctrinal and skills classes prior to participating in an integrated clinic no
doubt would foster students' understanding of and comfort using these
competencies while in clinic, such that they are better internalized and be-
come more second nature.325 Through curricular mapping, law schools can
determine at what level and in which courses students should be exposed
to particular knowledge and skills, and then build upon that exposure in
subsequent courses, based on knowledge that "students do not generally
learn a skill in only one class, but as a progression through multiple
courses."326 In this manner, students move through multiple stages of
knowledge acquisition and skill development: from introduction, to com-
petency, to mastery.32 7 Thus, I propose that students receive instruction in
and opportunities to practice twenty-first century competencies through-
out the curriculum to maximize their learning.
The recent amendments to the ABA Accreditation Standards offer an
opportunity for the legal academy to rethink the pressure it places on clin-
ics and the clinical legal education community to handle the catch-all ed-
ucation of law students. In response to critiques of legal education and the
amended standards, some law schools have started or have already en-
gaged in the process of redesigning their curricula substantially to make
their students more "practice ready" upon graduation.328 For those law
schools that have been slower to embark on this endeavor, the time to de-
velop a logical, orderly, and progressive curriculum that introduces, de-
velops, and layers the education of these competency areas is now. "Not
only should the curriculum as a whole be designed to progressively edu-
cate students, but the experiential education opportunities themselves
should be structured to intentionally build upon students' developing com-
petencies."329 By so doing, the final year of law school can become "a
carefully conceived culmination of the knowledge and skills gleaned
throughout the law school experience."330 Through the ABA Accreditation
Standards' newly required assessment process, law schools can measure
the effectiveness of their curricular redesign, in terms of outcomes and
325. See Daicoff, supra note 22, at 865-66 (arguing that delaying instruction in lawyering skills
until a third-year clinical experience "may be [too] late, after troublesome habits have developed").
But see Weinstein, supra note 117, at 357 (arguing that students must be "grounded in their own pro-
fession" in order for interdisciplinary training to succeed and that "even by the third year of law school
students are not well-grounded").
326. Niedwiecki, supra note 22, at 260; see Batt, supra note 11, at 122 (supporting the infusion
of experiential education throughout the "traditional" curriculum).
327. See Niedwiecki, supra note 22, at 260-61.
328. See Barry, supra note 11, at 256-66 (describing innovative curricula at certain law schools).
329. Margaret Moore Jackson, From Seminar to Simulation: Wading out to the Third Wave, 19
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 132 (2016).
330. Barry, supra note 11, at 276.
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process, and use this data to further modify and fine-tune the amended
curriculum to ensure its learning goals are achieved.33 1
Failure to take advantage of this opportunity not only will deprive
new graduates of the essential skills needed for twenty-first century legal
practice but also will disserve individuals, communities, and society at
large.332 The worsening plight of the low-income and poor in this country,
caused by society's repeated failure to remediate the adverse effects of
social and structural determinants on health and well-being, and to develop
viable mechanisms to address the root causes of these problems, warrant
change now. Doing otherwise merely will perpetuate the definition of in-
sanity oft-attributed to Albert Einstein: "[D]oing the same thing over and
over [again] and expecting different results."333 Evidence of the need to
develop law students' competencies in preventive law, interdisciplinary
collaboration, and community engagement is clear, even more so in these
challenging times, and models for progress are in place. H.E.A.L. Collab-
orative is just one example of an integrated law school clinic that bridges
multiple approaches and methodologies for the benefit of law students,
individual clients, the community, and the future of legal practice. The
benefits and challenges of this model may be extrapolated and applied eas-
ily to myriad other areas of law. All that is needed are the desire and com-
mitment to effect change.
331. OUTCOME MVEASURES REPORT, supra note 26, at 56 (discussing the use of law school data
as a basis for further modifying the accreditation standards).
332. See Jackson, supra note 329, at 165-66.






BEYOND DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE: ENERGY




Federal agencies have a legal obligation to consult with Indian tribes
on a government-to-government basis whenever projects require federal
approval. The controversy over the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) is re-
shaping how tribes approach energy development. Protests and lawsuits
against DAPL's owners delayed the pipeline for months and cost its in-
vestors at least $750 million. The industry should learn from DAPL and
rethink its approach to future energy projects involving tribes.
This Article explains why the industry should embrace enhanced
tribal consultation as a risk-management strategy. The adequacy of federal
and state consultations with tribes on energy projects-not just whether
the process occurs, but whether tribes' views are meaningfully considered
in decision making-increasingly matters not only to tribes, but to policy
makers and the courts. The private sector stands to gain by working pro-
actively with tribes earlier in the project-planning process, including in
pipeline routing decisions to address cultural resources concerns, and by
encouraging tribes to participate in surveying, construction, and reclama-
tion activities. Companies should also assist with project-related tribal em-
ployment and make appropriate financial and in-kind assistance available
to tribes to strengthen tribal officials' ability to participate meaningfully
in consultations with federal and state decision makers.
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I. AN OIL PIPELINE BECOMES A HOUSEHOLD WORD
The United States depends on some 2.4 million miles of pipeline sys-
tems to transport fossil fuels across the country.' None has garnered more
recent attention than the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL).2 This $3.8 bil-
lion, 1,172-mile crude oil pipeline, owned and operated by Houston-based
Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., delivers crude oil produced in the Bakken
region of North Dakota through South Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois to major
refining, distribution, and export centers.3 Commenced in 2014, DAPL fi-
nally entered service last June after months of construction delays.4 Oppo-
sition to DAPL, including from more than 100 federally recognized Native
American tribes, peaked during the 2016 presidential campaign year.' At
one point protest camps on and near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation
6in North Dakota swelled to an estimated 10,000 people. A total of 761
protestors were arrested.7
1. Where Are Liquids Pipelines Located?, PIPELINE 101, http://www.pipe-
line 101 .org/Where-Are-Pipelines-Located (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
2. See Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, TIME (Oct.
28, 2016), http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux.
3. Valerie Volcovici, Only the Hardiest Remain at Dakota Protest Camp, REUTERS, Dec. 18,
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-dakota-pipeline-camp/only-the-hardiest-remain-at-
dakota-protest-camp-idUSKBN1470E4.
4. Associated Press, A Timeline ofthe Dakota Access Oil Pipeline, AP NEWS (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.apnews.com/la00f95c83594dac931796a332540750.
5. Rebecca Solnit, Standing Rock Protests: This Is Only the Beginning, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12,
2016, 8:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/12/north-dakota-standing-rock-
protests-civil-rights.
6. Volcovici, supra note 3; Reuters, Only the Hardiest Remain at Dakota Protest Camp,
FORTUNE (Dec. 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/18/dakota-access-protest-camp.
7. Associated Press, Authorities Drop 33 Cases Against Dakota Access Protestors, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 22, 2017, 4:56 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/amp/US/wireStory/authorities-drop-33-
cases-dakota-access-protesters-46959161.
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Opposing DAPL through litigation in the federal courts, as the Stand-
ing Rock Sioux Tribe did beginning in July 2016, later joined by the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe (collectively, the Tribes), ultimately did not stop
the project or alter the pipeline's final route.8 Yet a combination of sus-
tained litigation supported by national legal advocacy organizations, re-
lentless politicking, and on-the-ground protest activity delayed the pro-
ject's completion by several months.9 By December 2016, project delays
were costing DAPL's private investors more than $83.3 million per month
and had already totaled $450 million.' 0
A. The Tribes 'Litigation Strategy
Unlike interstate natural gas pipeline projects, which are nationally
certificated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), no
federal agency has jurisdiction over crude oil pipelines such as DAPL."
Instead, individual state regulatory commissions authorize each state's
segment of a proposed interstate oil pipeline.' 2 The Tribes consequently
targeted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in their litigation because the
Corps has federal statutory authority whenever pipelines traverse jurisdic-
tional waters of the United States.13 Judge James E. Boasberg, of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, considered each
of the Tribes' lawsuits against the Corps.14
1. Fast-Track Project Permitting
The Tribes' first line of legal attack concerned Nationwide Permit
(NWP) 12, a streamlined Corps-permitting program for lineal infrastruc-
ture projects such as pipelines.'5 NWP 12 allowed DAPL to obtain a single
permit for all water crossings in the four states except Lake Oahe, a reser-
voir on the Missouri River.16 The Corps made the current version of NWP
12 available in 2012 to fast-track pipeline and other energy projects,
8. See Associated Press, supra note 4.
9. For a detailed account of DAPL-related litigation and tribal opposition to the project, see
generally Timothy Q. Purdon et al., DAPL: Storm Clouds on the Horizon in Indian Country, 64 FED.
LAW. 63, 63-66 (2017).
10. David Pitt, Pipeline Delays Cost Builder Millions, Risking Contract Loss, BISMARCK TRIB.
(Dec. 6, 2016), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/pipeline-delays-cost-builder-mil-
lions-risking-contract-loss/article_3a 6abf7-b028-5152-b4ab-Oc6fdf0dbc8.html.
11. BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF
NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 2, 7 (2016).
12. Id. at 7.
13. Steven Mufson, How the Army Corps of Engineers Wound Up in the Middle of the Fight
over the Dakota Access Pipeline, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi-
ness/economy/how-the-army-corps-of-engineers-wound-up-in-the-middle-of-the-fight-over-the-da-
kota-access-pipeline/2017/02/08/33eaedde-ed8a- l le6-9662-6eedfl 627882.
14. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (Standing Rock ill), 255 F.
Supp. 3d 101, 111 (D.D.C. 2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (Standing
Rock II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs (Standing Rock l), 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2016).
15. Standing RockI, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 11; see 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012).
16. Dakota Access Pipeline FAQ's, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS,
http://www.usace.army.mil/Dakota-Access-Pipeline/FAQs (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
2018] 595
DENVER LAW REVIEW
prompting numerous legal challenges from environmental groups ques-
tioning whether projects meet the Corps's terms and conditions for such
an expansive permit ever since.17 Few of these challenges have so far suc-
ceeded in the federal courts and DAPL was no exception.18 After Judge
Boasberg upheld the Corps's determinations regarding NWP 12, the
Tribes had little practical choice but to concentrate their claims on the
Lake Oahe pipeline crossing.19
2. The Battle of Lake Oahe
That the courtroom battle over DAPL centered on Lake Oahe had
other ramifications for the Tribes and their political relationship with the
United States. It also helps explain the remarkable outpouring of public
20support that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe received from other tribes.
Damming the Missouri River nearly six decades ago to fill the Lake Oahe
reservoir, which now serves as the eastern boundary of the Tribes' reser-
vations, flooded more than 200,000 acres of Tribal lands.2 1 The Tribes
consider this an epic tragedy: the inundated area of their reservations had
been reserved as Indian Country in 1851 by the Treaty of Fort Laramie.22
Congress reneged on this part of the Treaty by enacting the Pick-
Sloan Flood Control Act in 1944 and imposing the Missouri Basin Pro-
gram on the Tribes.23 When the Corps initiated eminent domain proceed-
ings in 1958 to take Standing Rock Sioux Tribal lands for the Lake Oahe
site, the Tribe convinced a judge to block the Corps's condemnation, only
to have Congress pass legislation overturning the court's decision.24 Today
Lake Oahe is the fourth-largest reservoir in the country by volume. 25it
destroyed communities, farms, and wooded bottomlands for which the
Tribes have been seeking compensation from Congress ever since without
much success.26 From the perspective of Tribal members, DAPL was not
17. See, e.g., Mobile Baykeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 14-0032-WS-M, 2014
WL 5307850, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 16, 2014) (rejecting environmental group's challenge to the
Corps's approval under NWP 12 of proposed twenty-four-inch crude oil pipeline).
18. See Standing Rock I, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 7.
19. See William Yardley, There's a Reason Few Even Knew the Dakota Access Pipeline Was
Being Built, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-dakota-ac-
cess-pipeline-permit-20161104-story.html.
20. See M. ROY CARTOGRAPHY, THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE IN CONTEXT (2016).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887.
24. United States v. 2,005.32 Acres of Land, 160 F. Supp. 193, 202 (D.S.D. 1958), vacated as
moot sub nom. United States v. Sioux Indians of Standing Rock Reservation, 259 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.
1958); see Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-915, 72 Stat. 1762.
25. Largest U.S. Reservoirs, STAN. U., https://npdp.stanford.edu/node/63 (last visited Feb. 28,
2018).
26. For an account of the attempts by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and other tribes to stop
the Missouri Basin Program's taking of tribal lands, and to obtain compensation after the program's
completion, see Peter Capossela, Impacts of the Army Corps of Engineers' Pick-Sloan Program on
the Indian Tribes of the Missouri River Basin, 30 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 143 (2015).
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just a pipeline. It was a reminder of what Native people lost when Con-
gress dammed the Missouri-of broken promises from the federal govern-
ment to which other tribes could easily relate. The Chairman of the Stand-
ing Rock Sioux Tribe, Dave Archambault II, drew this historical connec-
tion:
When the Army Corps of Engineers dammed the Missouri River in
1958, it took our riverfront forests, fruit orchards and most fertile
farmland to create Lake Oahe. Now the Corps is taking our clean water
and sacred places by approving this river crossing. Whether it's gold
from the Black Hills or hydropower from the Missouri or oil pipelines
that threaten our ancestral inheritance, the tribes have always paid the
price for America's prosperity.27
From a legal standpoint, the Lake Oahe crossing required that DAPL
secure (1) a Section 408 permit from the Corps under the Rivers and Har-
bors Act28 and (2) an easement across Corps-administered lands along
Lake Oahe pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act.29 The two Tribes, joined
by a coalition of advocacy groups, broadly targeted DAPL's plan to drill
the pipeline roughly 100 feet below the floor of Lake Oahe.3 0 The plaintiffs
emphasized the reservoir as a source of their drinking water and its im-
portance to their Treaty-based fishing and hunting rights. 3 1 Besides raising
environmental, religious, and cultural claims, they challenged the ade-
quacy of federal decision making, including tribal consultation, under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 32 and the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA).3 3
B. Executive Branch Intervention
1. President Obama Weighs In
As they pressed their claims, the Tribes demanded additional consul-
tation with executive branch officials.34 It was here, outside the courtroom,
that the Tribes and their allies gained traction. On September 9, 2016,
Judge Boasberg issued an order denying the Standing Rock Tribe's motion
for a preliminary injunction to stop DAPL construction until the Corps
27. David Archambault II, Opinion, Taking a Stand at Standing Rock, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/opinion/taking-a-stand-at-standing-rock.html.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 408 (2012).
29. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (2012).
30. Ernest Scheyder, For Standing Rock Sioux, New Water System May Reduce Oil Leak Risk,
REUTERS, Nov. 22, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-dakota-pipeline-water/for-stand-
ing-rock-sioux-new-water-system-may-reduce-oil-leak-risk-idUSKBN1 3H27D.
31. Valerie Volcovici, Federal Judge Orders More Environmental Analysis ofDakota Pipeline,
REUTERS, June 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northdakota-pipeline-dap/federal-
judge-orders-more-environmental-analysis-of-dakota-pipeline-idUSKBNI 95381.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2012).
33. 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101-307108 (2012).
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,




engaged in additional consultation with the Tribe under the NHPA. 35 Later
the same day, the Corps, along with the U.S. Departments of Justice and
the Interior, issued a joint statement temporarily halting the project on
federal land bordering and under Lake Oahe and requesting "that the
pipeline company voluntarily pause all construction activity within 20
miles east or west of Lake Oahe."3 6
President Obama soon announced that he had asked the Corps to
consider rerouting the pipeline.3 7 "We are monitoring this closely,"
President Obama said. "I think as a general rule, my view is that there is a
way for us to accommodate sacred lands of Native Americans. I think that
right now the Army Corps is examining whether there are ways to reroute
this pipeline."38 On November 14, 2016, the ,Corps issued a statement
saying it had not yet determined whether to grant an easement on the
Corps-administered lands at Lake Oahe "at the proposed location" and
invited the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to' engage in additional
consultation.39 A few weeks later, the Corps rejected the easement.40 En-
ergy Transfer Partners described this as a "purely political action-which
the Administration concedes when it states it has made a 'policy deci-
sion'-Washington code for a political decision."4 1 But as the year closed,
the politics were changing. A transition was underway. Executive branch
intervention on DAPL continued when President Donald Trump assumed
office on January 20, 2017, but went in a different direction.
2. President Trump Changes Course
Just four days after taking office, President Trump issued a memo-
randum declaring DAPL to be in the national interest and directing federal
agencies to review and approve it "in an expedited manner, to the extent
permitted by law and as warranted."4 2 The Corps formally notified Con-
gress and Judge Boasberg on February 7, 2017, of its intention to grant the
35. Standing Rock !, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2016).
36. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice, Joint Statement from the Dep't of
Justice, the Dep't of the Army & the Dep't of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (Sept. 9, 2016). The same three departments later followed up by issuing
a joint report with recommendations for enhanced tribal consultation on pipeline and other projects.
See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 34.
37. Christine Hauser, Obama Says Alternative Routes Are Being Reviewedfor Dakota Pipeline,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/us/president-obama-says-engi-
neers-considering-altemate-route-for-dakota-pipeline.html.
38. Id.
39. Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Statement Regarding the Dakota Access Pipe-
line (Nov. 14, 2016).
40. Nathan Rott & Eyder Peralta, In Victory for Protesters, Army Halts Construction ofDakota
Pipeline, NPR (Dec. 4, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/12/04/504354 503/army-corps-denies-easement-for-dakota-access-pipeline-says-tribal-or-
ganization.
41. Press Release, Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., & Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P., Energy
Transfer Partners & Sunoco Logistics Partners Respond to the Statement from the Dep't of the Army
(Dec. 4, 2016).
42. Memorandum of January 24, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,129 (Feb. 17, 2017).
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easement at Lake Oahe.43 These developments and the North Dakota win-
ter had already reduced DAPL protestors to a remnant; the last campers
either left voluntarily or were evicted later that month.44 Because construc-
tion on the rest of the pipeline was almost entirely completed, Lake Oahe
remained the focus-this time for finishing the project. DAPL began com-
mercial oil delivery on June 1, 2017, initially transporting 520,000 barrels
45 46
per day.45 While litigation over DAPL continues, the status quo is very
different; the completed pipeline moves nearly half of the total daily oil
production in North Dakota, the nation's second-leading producing state
behind Texas, with expanded delivery capacity planned soon.4 7
II.How DAPL Is FUELING TRIBAL CONCERNS OVER ENERGY PROJECTS
DAPL might not have gone viral on social media or generated na-
tional headlines had the drama not unfolded during the 2016 campaign
season.4 8 Yet the Standing Rock controversy has heightened awareness of
the ways in which energy development may affect tribal interests. Tribes
and tribal advocacy groups are now scrutinizing projects more closely, in-
cluding new pipelines as well as right-of-way renewals for existing sys-
tems. A few examples include:
* The Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians in Wis-
consin made headlines in January 2017 when its elected leaders
opposed renewing an easement for Line 5, a 1,100-mile pipeline
owned and operated by Enbridge (U.S.), Inc. that has delivered
crude oil from Canada to the Upper Midwest and Eastern Canada
43. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Notice Regarding Recently Issued Public Documents,
Standing Rock II1, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-cv-1534).
44. Mayra Cuevas et al., Dakota Access Pipeline Protest Site Is Cleared, CNN (Feb. 23, 2017,
7:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22/us/dakota-access-pipeline-evacuation-order.
45. Merrit Kennedy, Crude Oil Begins to Flow Through Controversial Dakota Access Pipeline,
NPR (June 1, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/06/01/531097758/crude-oil-begins-to-flow-through-controversial-dakota-access-pipeline.
46. On June 14, 2017, Judge Boasberg entered an order concluding that although the Corps
"substantially complied with NEPA in many areas, the Court agrees that it did not adequately consider
the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights, hunting rights, or environmental justice, or the degree to
which the pipeline's effects are likely to be highly controversial." Standing Rock III, 255 F. Supp. 3d
at 112. The court remanded to the Corps to reconsider those sections of its environmental analysis,
adding that "[w]hether Dakota Access must cease pipeline operations during that remand presents a
separate question of the appropriate remedy, which will be the subject of further briefing." Id.
47. Patrick C. Miller, DAPL Capacity to Expand; Company Files New Legal Challenge, N. AM.
SHALE MAG. (July 5, 2017), http://northamericanshalemagazine.com/articles/2008/dapl-capacity-to-
expand-company-files-new-legal-challenge; Blake Nicholson, Months Needed for Additional Study of
Dakota Access Pipeline, AP NEWS, (July 18, 2017), https://ap-
news.com/103a2d58712a4450b0a97994aba3 1 8e.
48. Following the election, protest camps on various other pipeline rights-of-way generated
media attention but failed to prevent construction. Erin Mundahl, A Year After Standing Rock, It's




since 1953.49 A planned rebuilding and realignment of another ex-
isting Enbridge crude oil pipeline, Line 3 in Minnesota, has en-
countered opposition from area tribes, including high-profile par-
ticipants in DAPL protests.5 0
* The Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACL), a 550-mile system to deliver
natural gas from West Virginia and eastern Ohio to North Carolina,
has encountered unexpected resistance from tribal advocates who
object that its proposed route traverses counties that are home to
three state-recognized tribes.5
* Last year, a federal judge in the Western District of Oklahoma or-
dered Enable Midstream Partners, L.P. to abandon and remove its
twenty-inch natural gas pipeline, built in 1980, from an expired
right-of-way crossing a portion of a 136-acre allotment after the
company failed to reach an agreement with the Kiowa Tribe of Ok-
lahoma, which recently obtained a fractional interest in the allot-
ment and thirty-eight individual Indian allottees.52
Tribal opposition to pipelines is becoming more common even in
parts of the United States that saw little tribal participation in such matters
until recently.53 This apparent trend is being reinforced by tribal activists
and environmentalists, two constituencies whose diverse and often diver-
gent interests frequently aligned throughout the DAPL litigation. DAPL is
also casting a generational shadow. On many reservations and college
campuses, some younger Native Americans now refer to themselves as
"water protectors," a term coined at Standing Rock and used generically
today to denote opposition to conventional energy projects.54
Another sign of the times is evidenced by the actions of the National
Congress of American Indians (NCAI), the nonprofit umbrella organiza-
tion advocating for all 586 federally recognized tribes. In late 2016, the
NCAI issued recommendations for reforming tribal consultation on energy
49. John Myers, Bad River Band Takes Action to Kick Enbridge Pipeline off Reservation,
DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2017, 3:50 PM), http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/news/4193734-
bad-river-band-wants-enbridge-pipeline-reservation.
50. See, e.g., Mike Hughlett, Indian Tribes, Business Leaders Make Their Cases in Enbridge
Line 3 Debate, STAR TRIB. (June 13, 2017, 9:34 PM), http://www.startribune.com/indian-tribes-busi-
ness-leaders-make-their-cases-in-enbridge-line-3-debate/428290743.
51. Rebecca Martinez, Opponents Say Pipeline Would Disproportionately Affect Native Tribes,
WUNC 91.5 (July 25, 2017), http://wunc.org/post/opponents-say-pipeline-would-disproportionately-
affect-native-tribes.
52. Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, L.P., 247 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1239 (W.D. Okla. 2017).
53. See Don Gentry and Emma Marris, Opinion, The Next Standing Rock? A Pipeline Battle
Looms in Oregon, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/standing-rock-pipeline-oregon.html; Elizabeth Ouzts,
North Carolina Tribes Fear Impact of Atlantic Coast Pipeline Construction, ENERGY NEWS
NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2018), https://energynews.us/southeast/north-carolina-tribes-fear-impact-of-at-
lantic-coast-pipeline-construction.
54. See, e.g., Winona LaDuke, Opinion, The Water Protectors Are Everywhere: From One
Pipeline to Another, the Water Protectors Are Standing Strong, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 28,
2017), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/water-protectors-everywhere.
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infrastructure projects.55 "The unprecedented showing of support for the
Standing Rock Tribe's struggle against the Dakota Access Pipeline,"
NCAI stated in a report to the U.S. Department of the Interior, "has been
in part due to the long history of infrastructure projects approved by the
Federal Government over the objections of Tribal Nations. . . . Every sin-
gle Tribal Nation has a story of federally approved destruction."5 6 NCAI
would mandate that federal agencies prepare and monitor an "Indian Trust
Impact Statement" whenever agency action "may harm or threaten tribal
lands, waters, treaty rights, or cultural resources."57 Unless tribes consent,
such projects could only proceed if "a compelling national interest out-
weighs Tribal interests" as determined by a federal Tribal Trust Compli-
ance Officer.58 NCAI also wants to eliminate NWP 12 for crude oil pipe-
line projects.59
III. WHY DEFICIENT TRIBAL CONSULTATION PRESENTS
UNACCEPTABLE RISKS TO ENERGY PROJECTS
To say that federal laws concerning tribal consultation are changing
rapidly-and that the energy industry is not keeping pace-would be an
understatement. President Obama and his administration spent eight years
enhancing the executive branch's consultation policies to give tribes a
greater voice in federal decision-making, expanding tribal consultation at
the cabinet and subcabinet department level as never before. A May 2017
report by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), Improv-
ing Tribal Consultation in Infrastructure Projects, lists eight pages of sep-
arate agency web links to updated tribal consultation policies and points
of contact.60 President Trump has not yet issued any policies on tribal con-
sultation, but those on the books remain and tribal leaders are unlikely to
let go of them easily.
Moreover, as agencies have adopted more sweeping consultation
guidelines, tribes are actively seeking to enforce them in the federal
courts.61 This approach did not prevail before Judge Boasberg in the DAPL
cases.62 However, another federal court has given life to this issue by scru-
tinizing tribal consultation in substantive rather than purely procedural
terms and-convinced that a federal agency did not adequately take tribal
perspectives into account-invalidated the government's actions.63
55. See NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, NCAI COMMENTS ON TRIBAL TRUST COMPLIANCE AND
FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE DECISION-MAKING (2016).
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 32.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 36.
60. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., IMPROVING TRIBAL CONSULTATION IN
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 4-14 (2017).
61. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1327 (D. Wyo. 2015).
62. See Standing Rock III, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, Ill (D.D.C. 2017); Standing Rock II, 239 F.
Supp. 3d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2017); Standing Rock 1, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2016).
63. Wyoming, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1353.
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Whether Wyoming v. United States Department ofthe Interior64 (discussed
below) takes hold nationally remains to be seen, but the case shows the
potential risk to federal decision-making when a court determines that
tribal views have not been meaningfully considered.65
A. Pervasive Tribal Consultation in the Executive Branch
While every President since Richard M. Nixon has formally recog-
nized tribal sovereignty and self-determination,66 President Obama, in No-
vember 2009, pledged that his administration would consult on a govern-
ment-to-government basis with Indian tribes over federal laws and policies
concerning them.6 7 "History has shown," he observed, "that failure to in-
clude the voices of tribal officials in formulating policy affecting their
communities has all too often led to undesirable and, at times, devastating
and tragic results."68 President Obama expanded the Executive Branch's
commitment to consultation, vowing after his reelection: "Greater engage-
ment and meaningful consultation with tribes is of paramount importance
in developing any policies affecting tribal nations."69 Ironically, a key ju-
dicial test of that commitment involved a tribe's challenge to one of the
administration's showcase environmental regulations: The Bureau of
Land Management's (BLM) rule on hydraulic fracturing (fracking) on fed-
eral and tribal lands (Fracking Rule).70
B. Enforcing 'Meaningful' Tribal Consultation Through the Courts
On September 30, 2015, a U.S. District Judge in Casper, Wyoming,
enjoined, on a nationwide basis, the BLM from enforcing its Fracking
Rule. 7 1 In Wyoming, Judge Scott W. Skavdahl-appointed by President
Obama in 201 1 72 -granted a preliminary injunction against BLM sought
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Gabriel S. Galanda, Opinion, Back to the Future: The GOP and Tribal Determination,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 9, 2015), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opin-
ions/back-to-the-future-the-gop-and-tribal-termination.
67. Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies
(Nov. 5, 2009), https://www.usbr.gov/native/policy/obama.pdf
68. Id. In this, his first policy statement on tribal consultation policy, President Obama directed
each agency head to submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, within ninety
days, a detailed plan of actions agency would take to implement Executive Order 13175, an executive
order setting tribal consultation policy issued in 2000 by President Bill Clinton. See Exec. Order No.
13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,252 (Nov. 6, 2000). President Obama's November 5, 2009 memorandum was
elevated to Exec. Order No. 13,604, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,887 (Mar. 22, 2012) ("Improving Performance
of Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure Projects").
69. Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (July 1, 2013).
70. See Wyoming, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1327.
71. Id. Such nationwide injunctions are ordinarily the appropriate remedy under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2012), when reviewing courts determine that agency
regulations are unlawful; the rules are vacated and the result is not limited to the parties in the case.
See, e.g., Nat'1 Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
72. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Names Two to the U.S. Dist.
Court, 2/16/2011 (Feb. 16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2011/02/16/president-obama-names-two-united-states-district-court-2162011.
602 [Vol. 95:3
BEYOND DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE
by four states (Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, and Utah), the Ute In-
dian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and two petroleum indus-
try associations.73 Among other holdings, but significantly, the judge
found that the BLM acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to follow
the U.S. Department of the Interior's (Interior) Policy on Consultation
with Indian Tribes, by which Interior detailed how it would rise to Presi-
dent Obama's call for better tribal consultation and implement President
Clinton's November 6, 2000 Executive Order No. 13175 on tribal consul-
tation and coordination, which President Obama had endorsed.74
Wyoming focused not just on tribal consultation as a process, but on
the adequacy of the dialogue and whether the federal government's en-
gagement with tribal officials was "meaningful."7 5 The BLM said it had
engaged in extensive tribal consultation when it promulgated the Fracking
Rule-holding four separate regional tribal meetings, offering to meet
with tribal representatives individually after those meetings, distributing
copies of the draft rule for tribal comment, and reaching out o affected
tribes again twice after the rule was published. The court held this insuf-
ficient.77 "The BLM's efforts," Judge Skavdahl concluded, "reflect little
more than that offered to the public in general. The [Department of the
Interior] policies and procedures require extra, meaningful efforts to in-
,,78
volve tribes in the decision-making process.
In reaching this result, and italicizing the word "meaningful," the
judge noted that the "BLM spent more than a year developing the [Frack-
ing Rule] before initiating any consultation with Indian tribes."7 When
the agency did make two changes to its ninety-six-page draft rule, the
judge said the agency did not address tribes' expressed concerns." The
judge quoted concerns expressed by the Ute Indian Tribe that the "BLM
has not been consulting with the Tribes in good faith."8 '
Wyoming raises the potential of using the alleged lack of tribal con-
sultation not only as a sword in litigation but as leverage in negotiations
over pipelines and other energy projects.82 It attests to the Obama Admin-
istration's success in driving tribal consultation policies at the agency
73. Wyoming, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1354.
74. Id. at 1344-46 (citing THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3317, DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES (2011)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1345-46.
77. See id. at 1346.
78. Id. at 1345-46.
79. Id. at 1346.
80. Id.; see Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128 (proposed
Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
81. Wyoming, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1345.
82. See also Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1106-07 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (blocking a BLM-approved solar energy project-a
709-MW facility spanning 6,500 acres in the Mojave Desert-after castigating the BLM for deficient
consultation in violation of the NHPA). The BLM and other federal agencies, the court said, "are not
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level.83 By 2015, the Obama Administration had gone well beyond reaf-
firming President Clinton's relatively brief 2000 directive, Executive Or-
der 13175.84 In July 2010, the Office of Management and Budget began
providing detailed guidance to the heads of all executive branch depart-
ments, agencies, and independent agencies on how to carry out Executive
Order 13175-a process that has since expanded tribal consultation poli-
cies at the cabinet and sub-cabinet level, and-as the May 2017 ACHP
report attests-has so far continued in the Trump Administration.
IV. HOW THE ENERGY INDUSTRY GAINS BY SUPPORTING TRIBAL
CONSULTATION
The cumulative effect of President Obama's efforts-beefed-up and
judicially enforceable tribal consultation throughout the executive
branch-provides tribes with more leverage to shape energy infrastructure
projects. As a risk-management strategy for the energy industry, support-
ing rather than undercutting the government-to-government consultation
process between federal and tribal officials (or states and tribes as the case
may be) has distinct practical advantages. The more informed tribal offi-
cials' understanding of a proposed project, the more effectively they can
consider that project in a meaningful way as federal law requires.
From the early days of the republic, Indian tribes-the third sover-
eign recognized in the U.S. Constitution, along with states and the federal
government-have been recognized and protected as "domestic dependent
nations"86 with the inherent power to "make their own laws and be ruled
by them."8  When the energy industry treats tribes as "stakeholders" in
projects rather than as governments, companies disrespect tribal sover-
eignty and do themselves and the industry a disservice. Standing Rock
Chairman Archambault explained this distinction: "You're just another
stakeholder like everybody else. But we're not. We're a nation, and we
expect to be treated like a nation."8 8 Many if not most tribal governments
lack either a credible tax base or equivalent revenue sources for financing
free to glide over requirements imposed by Congressionally-approved statutes and duly adopted reg-
ulations. .. . The Tribe was entitled to be provided with adequate information and time, consistent
with its status as a government that is entitled to be consulted." Id. at 1119. For a discussion of the
Quechan Tribe and the court's substantive due-process analysis of the NHPA, see Troy A. Eid, Why
Solar Projects Move Forward Despite Tribes' Objections, LAW360 (June 22, 2015). See also Jennifer
H. Weddle, Navigating Cultural Resources Consultation: Collision Avoidance Strategies for Federal
Agencies, Energy Project Proponents, and Tribes, 60 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, § 22.02 (2014).
83. See Wyoming, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1345.
84. See Tribal Consultation Policy, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,434 (Sept. 23, 2015).
85. Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, for the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, & Indep. Regulatory Agencies, M-10-33 (July 30, 2010). See
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., supra note 60.
86. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831).
87. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
88. Bo Evans, Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Chairman Dave Archambault Says Dakota Access
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basic public services.89 Yet tribes nevertheless must expend their own
scarce resources, evaluating the impacts of commercial ventures not of
their own making that may provide few if any direct benefits to them.
Treating tribes as stakeholders shifts project costs from energy developers
to tribal governments, which must consult with federal and state officials
on projects not just on tribal lands, but off-reservation, such as treaty and
traditional use areas and aboriginal lands that may be hundreds or thou-
sands of miles away.90
A. Best Practices
Fortunately, some companies are already demonstrating ways to
work proactively with tribes to support the tribal consultation process.91
This approach recognizes that energy developers hould not shift their pro-
ject-related costs to tribes, but instead find ways to help tribal officials gain
access to the specific expertise needed-from sources of tribes' choos-
ing-to make more accurate and complete project assessments. This in-
cludes providing appropriate financial and in-kind assistance to tribes to
cover project-related costs to tribal staff and other governmental resources,
such as the extra expense tribes incur in evaluating off-reservation projects
and consulting with federal officials about them. Such arrangements must
be carefully structured and monitored by companies and tribes to create
no real or perceived obligations on the part of tribal officials to support
projects, and to ensure funds are expended only for legitimate and ap-
proved purposes.
While seldom disclosed publicly given the confidentiality considera-
tions involved, it is becoming increasingly common for project propo-
nents-an interstate pipeline company and a public utility, to give just two
recent examples92 -to pay the tribe's project-related legal fees and costs,
while providing financial and in-kind support so the tribe can retain its
own experts to evaluate the project from scientific, engineering, ethno-
graphic, and other perspectives.93 Such contractual arrangements some-
times take the form of confidential mitigation agreements (Mitigation
89. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a
Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759 (2004).
90. An argument can of course also be made that, to effectuate its trust responsibilities, the
federal government should shoulder the entire cost of tribes' evaluating and commenting on proposed
commercial projects. After digging into the matter, I have not been able to locate any examples, even
anecdotal, where this has actually occurred, including in the current federal budget environment.
91. See A. David Lester, Lester: CERT and the Ruby Pipeline Project: Working Together to
Enhance Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 1, 2010), https://indiancountrymedi-
anetwork.com/news/lester-cert-and-the-ruby-pipeline-project-working-together-to-enhance-tribal-
sovereignty.
92. Both projects are confidential but described here in very general terms with clients' permis-
sion.
93. 1 am finding the same tendency on the part of energy companies and tribes that ask me to
mediate disputes between them. It is hard to track given the confidentiality of mediation, but I have
seen instances where energy companies pay not just for the mediation, but the cost of tribes' inde-
pendently retaining both attorneys and nonlegal consultants.
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Agreements) between companies and tribes to supplement the govern-
ment-to-government memoranda of agreement among federal, state, and
tribal officials.
B. The Ruby Pipeline Project
A rare public example of the energy industry's effective support of
tribal consultation is the Ruby Pipeline Project (Ruby)-a nearly 700-mile
interstate pipeline that delivers natural gas produced in the Rockies Basin
to the West Coast.9 4 As with DAPL, Ruby did not cross any Indian reser-
vation lands but passed through former treaty and aboriginal lands of var-
ious tribes.9 5 The late David Lester, executive director of the. Council of
Energy Resource Tribes, a nonprofit tribal organization, assisted Ruby's
owner, El Paso Corporation (now Kinder Morgan), in strengthening tribes'
ability to participate in consultations with federal officials.9 6 Long before
any construction, Ruby entered into funding agreements that tribes used to
retain their own ethnographic experts to document cultural resources for
federal consultation purposes.97 These experts, chosen by and reporting to
tribal officials, compiled published ethnographies and interviewed tribal
elders in the field.98
The tribes applied this ethnography to create a tribal monitoring pro-
gram, paid for by Ruby, which trained tribal members to survey the pro-
posed route along with the archaeological teams prior to, during and after
construction.9 9
At [the] tribes' request, the Ruby pipeline was rerouted-including
more than 900 "micro-reroutes" to avoid culturally important sites-
at a total cost of approximately $11 million. Traditional plants were
harvested for seeds and preserved in greenhouses prior to ground-dis-
turbing activity and replanted post-construction in the reclaimed right
of way. Ruby also worked with tribes to develop a tribal employment
program. Because skilled pipeline construction jobs typically require
union membership, Ruby supported tribes' requests to pay union dues
and apprenticeships for tribal members seeking work on the project. A
later internal review by the company found that such reroutes and
tribal capacity-building measures [supported by Ruby] saved the com-
pany at least $250 million in avoided project delay costs ... .100
94. Lester, supra note 91.
95. Carol Berry, Pipeline Creates Tribal Dissent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 27, 2010),
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/pipeline-creates-tribal-dissent.
96. Lester, supra note 91.
97. Ruby Pipeline, L.L.C. Accrual of Allowance of Funds for Funds Used During Construction,
131 FERC161007,161028 (Apr. 5, 2010).
98. Lester, supra note 91.
99. Id. Lester described these monitors as "eyes and ears from their respective tribal govern-
ments" who, along with tribal cultural resource technicians, offered advice on cultural resource pro-
tection issues directly to Ruby and its contractors. Id.
100. Conference Panel Addresses Questions on Dakota Access Pipeline, N. AM. SHALE MAG.
(Aug. 1, 2017), http://northamericanshalemagazine.com/articles/2028/conference-panel-addresses-
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CONCLUSION: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DAPL
Even before Watergate, Henry Kissinger complained, "There cannot
be a crisis next week. My schedule is already full."' 0 ' Wherever and when-
ever it happens, managing the next Standing Rock controversy-or better
yet, mitigating or avoiding it-should be on every energy developer's
agenda. Federal law will continue to recognize Indian tribes as govern-
ments, not stakeholders. Embracing tribal consultation may prove to be
the most prudent and effective way for the energy industry to manage busi-
ness risk in post-DAPL America.
questions-on-dakota-access-pipeline; Amy Dalrymple, Attorney Encourages Consultation with Tribes
on Pipelines, BISMARCK TRIB. (July 19, 2017), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-re-
gional/attorney-encourages-consultation-with-tribes-on-pipelines/article_789e3d5c-8ad5-5988-b6f9-
51bca8b72204.html.
101. Patrick Anderson, Confidence ofthe President, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 1, 1969, at 10, 11.
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THE BIOLOGY OF INEQUALITY
LUCY A. JEWELt
ABSTRACT
We have known for quite some time that disadvantaged individuals
suffer from poorer health outcomes and lower life spans than the advan-
taged. The disadvantaged do not perform as well on educational tests than
their wealthier peers. In some situations, racial discrimination intersects
with poverty to worsen these outcomes for minorities. With the notion that
poverty becomes implanted in an individual's genes and brain, science
helps explain how these disparate lifespans and variations in cognitive out-
comes come to be. This Article collectively refers to these scientific theo-
ries as embodied inequality. Embodied inequality explains why it is so
difficult for individuals to escape the effects of socioeconomic disad-
vantage.
Rhetorically, embodied inequality challenges traditional narratives
that assume that individual genes and individual behavioral choices are the
primary causal agents for social outcomes. Individual action plays a role,
but biologists and brain scientists now understand that the environment,
along with one's genes, pulls many of the strings toward particular social
outcomes. While social-policy theorists have long advocated for govern-
ment intervention to create a more robust social safety net and a more nur-
turing society, this Article is the first to apply these emerging scientific
theories to these legal and policy issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Inequality has life or death consequences.' Despite marked advances
in science and medicine, disadvantaged people live shorter lives and suffer
from worse mental and physical health than more advantaged individuals.2
As this Article shows, this disparity stems not from hunger or other phys-
ical forms of deprivation but from the experience of living in stressful dis-
advantaged environments with little social security and control over one's
individual circumstances.
In 1969, Johan Galtung proposed the concept of "structural violence"
to explain how bureaucratic and political forces sometimes fail to prevent
a preventable death.3 As an example, Galtung explained that people con-
tinued to die from tuberculosis even though modem medicine could easily
prevent deaths from this disease.4 In this instance, death happened because
I. See James Banks et al., Disease and Disadvantage in the United States and in England, 295
JAMA 2037, 2037 (2006) (stating that disparities in health outcomes are the greatest at the lowest end
of the socioeconomic spectrum); Daniel A. Hackman et al., Socioeconomic Status and the Brain:
Mechanistic Insights from Human and Animal Research, 11 NATURE REVIEWS 651, 651 (2010)
("Growing up in a family with low SES [Social Economic Status] is associated with substantially
worse health and impaired psychological well-being .... ); Bruce S. McEwen & Peter J. Gianaros,
Central Role ofthe Brain in Stress andAdaption: Links to Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Disease,
1186 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 190, 190 (2010) (explaining that stressful experiences can produce a
maladaptive effect that leads to "interacting behavioral, cognitive, physiological, and neural changes
that promote vulnerability to ill health."). When race intersects with socioeconomic forces, there are
also negative results. See David H. Chae et al., Discrimination, Racial Bias, and Telomere Length in
African-American Men, 46 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 103, 103 (2014) ("Black American men experi-
ence aging-related iseases earlier in life and suffer greater severity and worse consequences of disease
compared to other groups."); Christopher W. Kuzawa & Elizabeth Sweet, Epigenetics and the Em-
bodiment of Race: Developmental Origins of US Racial Disparities in Cardiovascular Health, 21 AM.
J. HUM. BIOLOGY 2, 2 (2008) (explaining that Black Americans, in general, suffer from cardiovascular
disease at a much higher rate than the rest of the population).
2. Michael Marmot, Status Syndrome, SIGNIFICANCE, Dec. 2004, at 150, 150 [hereinafter Mar-
mot, Status Syndrome].
3. Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 170-71 (1969).
Galtung uses the term "structural" in a sociological context. In this context, the term (structural and
its nominalized form, structuralism) is generally concerned with studying the organizational forms
that emerge from human interactions. See Bruce H. Mayhew, Structuralism Versus Individualism:
Part 1, Shadowboxing in the Dark, 59 Soc. FORCES 335, 335-39 (1980); John W. Mohr, Introduction:
Structures, Institutions, and Cultural Analysis, 27 POETICS 57, 57 (2000) (explaining that structuralists
"are concem[ed] with identifying deeper, underlying . . . patterns that find expression in surface level
cultural forms"); Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1313 (2008). Susan
Carle uses the term structural to refer to how social structures determine inequalities of power and
resources that can in turn affect how lawyers approach advocacy for their clients.
4. Galtung, supra note 3, at 168.
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resource-allocation decisions impeded access to modem medicine.5 Be-
ginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Michael Marmot found a correlation be-
tween status and health outcomes in a British civil-servant hierarchy.6 The
higher up an employee was on the social ladder, the lower his risk of death.
Marmot labeled this phenomenon "status syndrome."7
Structural violence and status syndrome are not just abstract theories.
We are now beginning to understand the mechanics of how this happens
in the body. Through the mechanism of stress, social and economic ine-
quality produces measurable changes in the human body at the genetic8
and synaptic level.9 These changes produce negative health outcomes in
the form of higher disease rates, shorter life spans, and greater chances for
becoming mentally ill.' 0 Growing up in a disadvantaged environment cor-
relates with greater social and psychological problems, such as anxiety,
impulsiveness, and depressiveness. These issues can exacerbate the cycle
of poverty and predispose individuals to make choices that place them
within the criminal justice system." A disadvantaged environment can
also negatively impact cognitive performance, creating a tragic circle as
lower cognitive performance creates barriers to education and work, which
then obstruct social mobility.12
The biological concepts of epigenetics and neuroplasticity shed light
on how one's material environment can get under one's skin and into one's
genetic and brain pathways. Epigenetics is the study of how environmental
stimuli alter the expression of individual genes without modifying the
5. See id.
6. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2; Michael G. Marmot, Status Syndrome: A.Chal-
lenge to Medicine, 295 JAMA 1304, 1304 (2006) [hereinafter Marmot, A Challenge to Medicine].
7. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2.
8. Stress impacts the body at the genetic level by altering the way that a gene is expressed. See
NESSA CAREY, THE EPIGENETICS REVOLUTION: How MODERN BIOLOGY IS REWRITING OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF GENETICS, DISEASE, AND INHERITANCE 244-45 (2012) (explaining a study
wherein brain samples of suicide victims with a history of abuse showed higher levels of methylation
than victims with no abusive history); Chris Murgatroyd et al., Dynamic DNA Methylation Programs
Persistent Adverse Effects of Early-Life Stress, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1559, 1559 (2009) (dis-
cussing how, for mice, stress impacts an animal's genes level through the methylation process).
9. Stress impacts the body at the synaptic level in the brain by altering the brain's structure.
See Bruce S. McEwen, Brain on Stress: How the Social Environment Gets Under the Skin, 109 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 17180, 17180 (2012).
10. Johnna R. Swartz et al., An Epigenetic Mechanism Links Socioeconomic Status to Changes
in Depression-Related Brain Function in High-Risk Adolescents, 22 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 209,
209 (2017); Christian H. Cooper, Why Poverty Is Like a Disease, NAUTILUS (Apr. 20, 2017),
http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/why-poverty-is-like-a-disease; see also sources cited supra
note 1.
11. See Hackman et al., supra note 1.
12. Brandon Keim, Poverty Goes Straight to the Brain, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2009, 2:00 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2009/03/poordevelopment; see also Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 652 (ex-
plaining the relationship between a child's low socioeconomic status and lower indications for work-
ing memory and cognitive control); Sebastidn J. Lipina & Michael I. Posner, The Impact ofPoverty
on the Development ofBrain Networks, 6 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 4-6 (2012) (explaining
that, in the context of brain imaging studies, low socioeconomic status leads to discernible differences
in how the brain activates in response to performing attention and reading related tasks).
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DNA itself.13 In this context of this Article, epigenetics shows how the
stress of social inequality alters the body at the genetic level.
Neuroplasticity shows how inequality alters the brain. Neuroplastic-
ity refers to how different external conditions correlate with brain struc-
tures that differ in size and composition.14 Environmental differences can
produce long-lasting changes in brain structure. Moreover, one's material
environment impacts the amount of energy, or bandwidth, one has to de-
vote to cognition tasks. A frenetic environment full of tasks that must be
juggled in the mind creates a drag on the mind's cognitive bandwidth that
impacts performance on cognitive tests, casting doubt on the theory that
intelligence is a pure product of internalized traits.15
Embodied inequality'6 is both durable and inheritable, but it is not
everlasting. Durability comes from the fact that exposure to stress early in
life has long-lasting consequences to endocrinal, hormonal, and metabolic
systems.17 These environmentally mediated biological effects can also be
passed down from one generation to the next, in utero through the pla-
centa, through the father's sperm, or through maternal behavior.18 Alt-
hough embodied inequality is durable and inheritable, it is also reversible.
If the material environment that triggers these changes is altered, the
changes can be reversed.19 In this way, embodied inequality does not lend
itself to a rigidly deterministic view of biological outcomes.
While exposure to certain environmental agents, such as environmen-
tal toxins and hazardous chemicals, can produce negative impacts on the
human body,2 0 this Article focuses on biological changes mediated by so-
cial agents, specifically the relationship between stress and economic ine-
quality. Stress is the underlying mechanism by which poverty can get un-
der the skin and inside the brain. For humans, stress is defined in the sci-
entific literature as involving "early maltreatment, conflict-laden familial
13. CAREY, supra note 8, at 7-8; RICHARD C. FRANCIS, EPIGENETICS: How ENVIRONMENT
SHAPES OUR GENES 28-29 (2001).
14. McEwen, supra note 9, at 17180-81; McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 191.
15. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
16. Harvard epidemiologist Nancy Krieger has also used this term to describe how racial "dis-
crimination, as one form of societal injustice, becomes embodied inequality." Nancy Krieger, Methods
for the Scientific Study of Discrimination and Health: An Ecosocial Approach, 102 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 936, 936 (2012) [hereinafter Krieger, An Ecosocial Approach].
17. See Ian C.G. Weaver et al., Epigenetic Programming by Maternal Behavior, 7 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 847, 847 (2004).
18. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text; see also CAREY, supra note 8, at 103-05;
Darlene Francis et al., Nongenomic Transmission Across Generations ofMaternal Behavior and Stress
Responses in the Rat, 286 SCi. 1155, 1158 (1999).
19. See Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing epigenetics); McEwen & Gianaros,
supra note 1, at 198-99 (discussing neuroplasticity).
20. See Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical Implications of
Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 14-15 (2009).
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relationships, stressful life events, and adverse physical and social condi-
tions-often occasioned by lower socioeconomic environments."2 1
However, extreme circumstances are not required for stress to be-
come embedded. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a reliable proxy for the
kind of stress that can become embodied.22 Living in poverty, even when
it does not involve explicit abuse or trauma, nonetheless creates an espe-
cially acute kind of stress because "it unites individual and societal lack of
control, creates unpredictable adversity, sets conditions that leave people
unable to respond, and creates a [deep] sense of helplessness and des-
pair."23 Michael Marmot characterizes stress as "arising from the inability
to control our lives, to turn to others when we lose control or to participate
fully in all that society has to offer." 24 Embedded stress can derive from
25
such commonplace experiences as a bad marriage or social isolation. In
this context, there is also an intersectional aspect to stress-racial discrim-
ination functions as a "qualitatively distinct stressor."
26
Finally, as developed in Section II.A. of this Article, the stress of not
having control over one's life is deeply connected to neoliberalist policy.
The logic of neoliberalism places each individual in the driver's seat.
There is no justification for a collective safety net-each individual actor
is able to make their way in the market, and if they cannot, there is some-
thing flawed within them. The experience of working and living in this
roiling sea of competition creates, for individuals with little power, the
exact kind of randomized stress that becomes biologically embedded.
These new scientific theories challenge the idea that individual char-
acteristics are most responsible for how one's life turns out. This is just
21. McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 191; see also S.J. Lupien et al., Can Poverty Get
Under Your Skin? Basal Cortisol Levels and Cognitive Function in Children from Low and High So-
cioeconomic Status, 13 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 653, 655 (2001) ("Stress is generally defined as
previous or actual exposure to life events that require adaptation from the individual, or else as a state
occurring when an individual perceives that the demands of the environment exceeds his or her ability
to cope." (citations omitted)).
22. See Jamie L. Hanson et al., Association Between Income and the Hippocampus, 6 PLOS
ONE, no. 5, 2011, at 1; Joan Luby et al., The Effects of Poverty on Childhood Brain Development: The
Mediating Effect of Caregiving and Stressful Life Events, 167 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1135, 1136 (2013).
23. Daniel H. Lende, Poverty Poisons the Brain, 36 ANNALS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRAC. 183,
196 (2012); see also Swartz et al., supra note 10 (discussing how specific stressors (childhood abuse)
and nonspecific stressors (poverty) are both associated with increased methylation of certain gene
promoter parts, which then predict greater risk for mental illness such as depression).
24. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2, at 153.
25. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 42.
26. See Chae et al., supra note 1; see also Nancy Krieger et al., The Unique Impact ofAbolition
of Jim Crow Laws on Reducing Inequities in Infant Death Rates and Implications for Choice of Com-
parison Groups in Analyzing Social Determinants ofHealth, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2234, 2239-41
(2013) [hereinafter Krieger et al., The Unique Impact of Abolition ofJim Crow Laws] (reporting on
study results indicating that the abolition of Jim Crow segregation produced improvements in infant
mortality rates for black Americans); Zo6 Carpenter, What's Killing America's Black Infants?,
NATION (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/whats-killing-americas-black-infants (ex-
plaining that a number of research studies are pointing to racial discrimination, rather than race itself,
as being a factor that explains why black infants die at a much higher rate than white infants).
2018] 613
DENVER LAW REVIEW
not the case if one's environment contributes to biological and neurologi-
cal changes, which in turn produce negative health and cognitive out-
comes. "Social selection" is the theory most aligned with an individualistic
explanation for life outcomes. Social selection posits that individuals se-
lect an environment that most aligns with their innate characteristics and
cognitive ability.2 7 For instance, children who enjoy reading will encour-
age parents to set up a home environment that supports literacy. Social
selection theory puts the individual first.
On the other hand, "social cause" theory holds up the material envi-
ronment as a causal factor for the negative health and cognitive outcomes
experienced by disadvantaged persons.28 If an impoverished and stressful
environment changes a person's health for the worse at the epigenetic level
and negatively impacts the person's brain pathways, the individual lacks
complete control over his or her life destiny. Thus, epigenetics and related
theories of neuroplasticity challenge a core narrative of liberal individual-
ism.
Because embodied inequality corroborates a social cause theory-
that material conditions (rather than individual choice or innate ability)
contribute heavily to outcomes-this lends support for the mobilization of
collective policy solutions. Here, the hard science empowers new rhetori-
cal approaches that might reframe legal debates about poverty and ine-
quality. The science turns a rigidly deterministic approach to outcomes
(you end up where you end up because of your internal merit and cognitive
ability) on its head.2 9 While social Darwinism supports a view that inher-
ited, predetermined traits will predict where you end up in life,30 the sci-
ence of embodied inequality challenges that view by recognizing that the
material environment plays a causal role in life outcomes.
Moreover, the science behind embodied inequality supports progres-
sive theories such as Professor Martha Fineman's vulnerability theory,
which contends that the state should provide a support network for those
in our society who lack control over their own circumstances. We now
have new science-based arguments that can be used to challenge a host of
neoliberal policies-precarious work structures, work schedules, school
discipline, mass incarceration-that, as a whole, remove control and sta-
bility from individuals' lives. These scientific theories strengthen the ar-
gument that we can and should return to a jurisprudential time when large-
scale collective solutions to social problems were both entertained and im-
plemented.
27. See infra notes 269-93 and accompanying text.
28. See Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 653.
29. See Gregory Claeys, The "Survival ofthe Fittest" and the Origins ofSocial Darwinism, 61
J. HIST. IDEAS 223, 228 (2000).
30. Id. (explaining that a Darwinian view of inheritance is a highly deterministic theory).
31. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
EMORY L.J. 251, 255-56 (2010).
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Part I of this Article explores the science, specifically epigenetics and
neuroplasticity, reviewing the theories as they relate to both animals and
humans and describing the impact that embodied inequality has on life
outcomes.
Part II considers how embodied inequality interacts with both rheto-
ric and policy. Section II.A. illustrates how these new scientific discover-
ies can be used to reframe powerfully the individualistic rhetoric surround-
ing inequality and poverty. Section II.B. develops both small-scale and
large-scale prescriptions that, as a whole, might improve individuals' ma-
terial environment and reduce exposure to toxic stress. Included in this
discussion are small- and large-scale initiatives that would shore up social
security for those most affected by stressful and uncontrollable material
environments.
Then, Part III applies the science to specific areas of the law-con-
stitutional law, workplace law, and public-education law. These new sci-
entific theories can be applied to generate novel constitutional theories
concerning equal protection. The biology of inequality is relevant for con-
sidering whether being poor equates to being. in a suspect class, which
would trigger higher levels of scrutiny for government discrimination. The
science is also relevant for determining whether or not robust governmen-
tal remedies for past discrimination are appropriate, if that discrimination
can be biologically traced.
From a more specific standpoint, the science might be applied to re-
form the legal structures that undergird workplace law and public-educa-
tion law. In the context of work, more worker protection would provide
families and children shelter from the stress of living without control,
which would in turn ameliorate many of the biological effects of disad-
vantage. Public education is relevant to this Article because initiatives that
foster stable and integrated public schools correlate with positive collateral
effects in the material environment (reduced pockets of concentrated pov-
erty, more residential integration). Good, integrated (racial and socioeco-
nomic) public schools can slow down or halt some of the detrimental bio-
logical effects mediated by disadvantaged living situations.
I. THE SCIENCE OF INEQUALITY IN THE BODY AND MIND
This section of the Article describes epigenetic and neuroscientific
approaches to social inequality. Section I.A. will first explain epigenet-
ics-how one's material circumstances become embedded in DNA
through epigenetic imprinting; how this imprinting impacts the brain's
structure and stress reaction system; and how these marks can be passed
on to subsequent generations. Section I.A. will also explain the connec-
tions between epigenetics, stress, and SES. Then, Section I.B. will address
neuroscientific explanations for how material conditions negatively im-
pact the mind and brain. Section I.C. explains the intersectional aspects of
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biological inequality, which occur when the double disadvantages of soci-
oeconomic and racial discrimination combine to inflict harm on the body
and mind. Finally, Section I.D. concludes by explaining why social cause
(our circumstances are a controlling factor for social outcomes) trumps
social selection (as individuals, we choose the direction of our path) as an
explanatory theory for these effects. These new scientific theories tell us
that the material world is much more responsible for social outcomes than
what is currently contemplated by the ingrained mindset of individualized
responsibility.
A. Epigenetics. How Inequality Impacts Genetic Expression
Epigenetics refers to the long-term alteration of DNA via chemical
processes, without changing the sequence of DNA itself:32 To understand
epigenetics we start with the premise that genes are not naked.33 They are
"clothed" in a variety of chemical supplements.34 These chemical addi-
tions change the way that genes are expressed.35 By virtue of these chem-
36ical clothes, genes can be turned up or turned down. And when a gene is
turned up or down, this changes the blueprint that cells follow in repro-
ducing themselves.3 ' These changes to the body's instruction manual can
have a tremendous impact on cells, and ultimately on the body.38 Some-
times epigenetic changes occur randomly.39 But often, epigenetic changes
32. CAREY, supra note 8, at 4; FRANCIS, supra note 13, at x; Rothstein et al., supra note 20, at
3. The epigenetics takeaway-that we are not the sum and substance of our genes, that genetic deter-
minism is not the only narrative that explains where we end up-has roundly captured the public's
imagination. See Maurizio Meloni & Giuseppe Testa, Scrutinizing the Epigenetics Revolution, 9
BIOSOCIETIEs 431, 432 (2014). Recently, Pulitzer prize winning author, Dr. Siddhartha Mukherjee,
wrote a compelling article in The New Yorker about epigenetics, which came under heavy criticism.
Siddhartha Mukherjee, Same but Different: How Epigenetics Can Blur the Line Between Nature and
Nurture, NEW YORKER, May 2,2016, at 24, 27-28. The criticism was that the article failed to mention
more established genetics knowledge bases, which explain how genes become expressed, notably
through the RNA transcription process. See Jerry Coyne, The New Yorker Screws Up Big Time with
Science: Researchers Criticize the Mukherjee Piece on Epigenetics, WHY EVOLUTION IS TRUE (May
5, 2016, 10:33 AM), https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2016/05/05/the-new-yorker-screws-
up-big-time-with-science-researchers-criticize-the-mukherjee-piece-on-epigenetics; see also Jerry
Coyne, Researchers Criticize the Mukherjee Piece on Epigenetics: Part 2, WHY EVOLUTION IS TRUE
(May 6, 2016, 10:15 AM), https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2016/05/06/researchers-criti-
cize-the-mukherjee-piece-on-epigenetics-part-2. The critique did not dispute the various studies that
are beginning to populate the epigenetics field, but it did take issue with the way that Dr. Mukherjee
presented the science to the public in the The New Yorker article, more as a proven thing than as a
theory that is yet to be fully proven. While a detailed inquiry into the debate is outside the scope of
this paper, after reading the numerous studies and articles cited in this Article, epigenetics is more than
just a half-baked theory. It behooves us to note that epigenetics is a working scientific theory with
much left to be proven.
33. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at xi.
34. Id
35. See id
36. Id. Another way to think about epigenetics is to think of the DNA as the cell's hardware
and epigenetic processes as the cell's software operating system. See Rothstein et al., supra note 20,
at 3.




THE BIOLOGY OF INEQUALITY
result from environmental stimuli.40 This is the socially important part of
the science-the environment changes how our genes express themselves,
which produces longstanding effects in the body.
Epigenetic changes can also be passed on to subsequent generations.
One of the first illustrations of this passing on phenomenon occurred in a
longitudinal study of Dutch babies born during a famine that occurred at
the end of World War 11.41 Babies in utero during the famine were born
with a low birth weight but suffered significantly elevated levels of obesity
as they grew up.42 They also suffered from a higher risk of metabolic ill-
nesses, such as high blood pressure, coronary heart disease, and type two
diabetes. In addition, these babies carried a higher risk for schizophrenia
and other psychological disorders.4 3 The effects of the Dutch famine con-
tinued into the third generation, affecting the grandchildren of the mothers
who lived through it. 4 4 Similar findings occurred in a study linking low
birth weight and weight at one year in British men with higher death rates
for coronary heart disease.45
It is not difficult to see how babies born to mothers suffering from a
lack of nutrition would be born underweight, but why would the babies
suffer from metabolic syndromes later on in life? The answer may derive
from how hormones interact with the DNA of the child in utero, making
imprints on the child's gene expression. But there are other more radical
theories for how epigenetic changes get passed on to subsequent genera-
tions. Are epigenetic changes, which arise during one's lifetime, passed
on through the germ line during reproduction? The general consensus
would respond "no" to this question because, during reproduction, a DNA
"cleansing" occurs that erases any epigenetic changes that arose during an
individual's lifetime.46 However, some recent studies have found "re-
sistance" to this cleaning process, suggesting that some epigenetic
changes, modulated by the environment, are passed on, just like one passes
on one's genes.4 7
If epigenetic changes are passed through the germ line, this would
present an inheritance theory operating on the short term, as Jean-Baptiste
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1-2; see also CAREY, supra note 8, at 2-4.
42. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 3; see also CAREY, supra note 8, at 3-4.
43. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 4.
44. CAREY, supra note 8, at 4.
45. D.J.P. Barker et al., Weight in Infancy and Death from Ischaemic Heart Disease, 334
LANCET 577, 577 (1989).
46. Jonathan Shaw, Is Epigenetics Inherited?, HARV. MAG., May-June 2017, at 13, 14
("[T]here is no evidence that epigenetic information can survive ... this biochemical cleansing.").
47. See Walfred W.C. Tang et al., A Unique Gene Regulatory Network Resets the Human
Germline Epigenome for Development, 161 CELL 1453, 1454 (2015) (observing some resistance to
the blank-slate epigenetic cleaning that takes place in the mammalian germline, which gives rise to
the possibility that epigenetic imprints can be passed through to the germline).
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Lamarck once proposed.48 Lamarck's theory has been, for the most part,
disproven by Darwinian evolutionary biology,49 but now, epigenetics in-
dicates that single-generation inheritance might be possible. Other expla-
nations hold that epigenetic changes are passed to the child by the mother
while the child is in the womb5 0 or through the mother's behavior toward
the child while the child is in infancy.
For purposes of this Article, it does not matter so much how these
changes are passed on. The point is that environmental factors can become
embedded and can be transmitted to future generations. The xternal en-
vironment "affects us through our genes, by modulating their activity." 52
The policy implication is that certain toxic environments create biological
hardships that then become intractable as they are picked up by subsequent
generations. Whether these genetic modifications are transmitted through
the germline, in utero, or through maternal behavior, the bottom line is that
one's material environment sticks. Children who are exposed to stress,
hunger, or other toxicity do not start off with a clean slate.
In order to understand how epigenetics works, we start with the func-
tion of DNA. In broad strokes, DNA is analogous to the blueprint for the
cell, delivering instructions for how the cells in our body should replicate
53and differentiate. One strand of the DNA's double helix then serves as a
template for mRNA54 to use in the creation of protoprotein, which then
carries out the rest of the building required for the construction of the
cell.55 Epigenetics is the process by which chemicals interact with our
DNA, altering how our genes are expressed. 56 Most of the time, epigenetic
changes serve a useful purpose, directing our cells (all of which have the
same underlying DNA code) to differentiate themselves into skin cells,
eye cells, organ cells, etc.5 As shown more fully below, however, some-
times external conditions (stress, negative maternal environment, trauma)
48. Michael K. Skinner, Environmental Epigenetics and a Unified Theory of the Molecular
Aspects of Evolution: A Neo-Lamarckian Concept That Facilitates Neo-Darwinian Evolution, 7
GENOME BIOLOGY EVOLUTION 1296, 1298 (2015) (describing the distinctions between Charles Dar-
win's natural selection model, where genetic changes occur over the long term, and Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck's theory, which posited that the environment could directly alter an organism's phenotype in
the short term).
49. See CAREY, supra note 8, at 99 (noting that Lamarckian inheritance rarely occurs through
changes passed through the germline).
50. Id. at 103 (discussing nongenomic epigenetic hanges that occur in the womb).
51. Bruce S. McEwen, Understanding the Potency of Stressful Early Life Experiences on Brain
and Body Function, 57 METABOLISM 11, 11 (2008) (theorizing that differences in maternal care pat-
terns produce epigenetic changes while the animal is in infancy).
52. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 5.
53. Id. at 17; see also CAREY, supra note 8, at 43.
54. mRNA stands for "messenger RNA." mRNA is one of the three forms of ribonucleic acid
polymers that carry out the cell-constructing and protein-building instructions contained in DNA. See
HARVEY F. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY § 4.4 (4th ed. 2000).
55. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 17; see CAREY, supra note 8, at 45.
56. See CAREY, supra note 8, at 7-8.
57. See id. at 59.
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can produce adaptive epigenetic modifications, which then produce nega-
tive health and cognitive consequences.
There are three ways that DNA can be modified in an epigenetic man-
ner. The first involves the chemical methylcytosine interacting with DNA,
binding to certain portions of the DNA strand so that genes are either ex-
pressed (active) or less expressed (inactive).5 When areas of DNA be-
come more "methylated," the volume of genes is turned down, and the
genes are prevented from fully expressing themselves in the cell.59 On the
other hand, when areas of the DNA are less methylated, or "demethyl-
ated," the genes become more expressed.60 Another method of epigenetic
change occurs through proteins known as histones, which can bind up the
DNA so that the genes in the tightly bound area become less expressed.6
And finally, epigenetic modifications can occur through RNA interfer-
ence, where certain RNA molecules (responsible in part for carrying out
the DNA's blueprint instructions) bind back to the DNA, limiting the ex-
62
pression of certain genes. Most of this Article will focus on the first
method of epigenetic change, the methylation and demethylation of DNA
strands, as this is the area of research that most relates to how material
conditions can get under the skin and impact human development and
health.
The early childhood environment-specifically, the quality of mater-
nal care that one gets-modulates gene expression. This hypothesis de-
rives from studies of rats conducted by scientist Michael Meaney and his
colleagues.63 In Meaney's studies, rat pups that were frequently licked and
nursed by a mother with an arched back (a comfortable nursing position)
exhibited less methylation (known as hypomethylation or demethylation)
for the gene promoter responsible for glucocorticoid receptors (GR) in the
brain.64 When there is less methylation on a gene promoter, this means that
the gene is more expressed, giving rise to these rats having more GR re-
ceptors in their brain.65
In terms of rat anxiety, more GR receptors are a good thing. More
GR receptors allow the rat pups to better modulate their hormonal reac-
tions to stress, allowing them to calm down in response to anxiety produc-
ing stimuli.66 Less GR receptors cause a rat's hormonal stress-response
58. CAREY, supra note 8, at 56-58; FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 46; Rothstein et al., supra note
20, at 5-6.
59. CAREY, supra note 8, at 59.
60. Rothstein et al., supra note 20, at 5-6, 12.
61. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 60-61.
62. Rothstein et al., supra note 20, at 6.
63. Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 654.
64. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 44-45; Weaver et al., supra note 17, at 847-48; see CAREY,
supra note 8, at 243.
65. CAREY, supra note 8, at 243.
66. Id. at 240; FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 44-45; Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 655; Weaver
et al., supra note 17.
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system to become overheated in response to anxiety producing stimuli,
preventing the rats from easily calming down or mellowing out.67 Rat pups
who received less licking and nursing from their mothers showed in-
creased methylation of the gene responsible for expressing cortisol, pro-
ducing the overheating effect.68 Interestingly, rat pups born to good moth-
ers but fostered by poor mothers underwent the same epigenetic changes
as rat pups born to and mothered by poor mothers, ending up with fewer
GR receptors and an over-reactive stress system.69 These epigenetic
changes were a long-term life effect.70 Thus, maternal behavior perma-
nently altered the development of the rats' genes; the initial changes were
not produced through the germ transmission.
Finally, the kind of maternal care received by a rat pup in its first
week of life influences the maternal behavior that the rat pup will exhibit
upon reaching maturity.72 Rat pups who received poor mothering grow up
to be poor mothers themselves, who can be predicted to reproduce contin-
uing generations of stressed-out rats.73 Professor Michael Meaney theo-
rized that this has something to do with the receptor for the hormone oxy-
tocin and "forms the basis for the intergenerational transmission of indi-
vidual differences in stress reactivity."74
Thus, research indicates that epigenetic changes can be passed down
through maternal behavior.75 The research summarized above indicates
that maternal behavior produces hormone responses that then become as-
sociated with higher or lower methylation patterns on the DNA for certain
genes.76 These patterns influence behaviors, particularly maternal behav-
ior, which then reproduce the epigenetic changes in subsequent genera-
tions. Epigenetic changes might also be passed down to subsequent gen-
erations through the placenta or maternal lactation.77
Newer research indicates that nongenomic changes, mediated by the
environment, might be transmitted through an organism's sperm. While
most epigenetic attachments disappear during the production of sperm
cells and egg cells (a reprogramming process that provides a clean slate to
start with),'7 8 newer research indicates that methylation patterns can stay in
67. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 47; see Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 654-55.
68. CAREY, supra note 8, at 240.
69. Francis et al., supra note 18, at 1156; Weaver et al., supra note 17.
70. Weaver et al., supra note 17, at 852.
71. Id. at 847.
72. Michael J. Meaney, Maternal Care, Gene Expression, and the Transmission ofIndividual
Differences in Stress Reactivity Across Generations, 24 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 1161, 1161, 1172
(2001).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1161.
75. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at xv (discussing the effects of maternal behavior and intrauterine
environment).
76. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
77. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 7.
78. See CAREY, supra note 8, at 103-04; Tang et al., supra note 47, at 1453.
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the male germline (in sperm cells) and get passed on to children in this
way.79 In other words, some environmentally induced epigenetic changes
may resist the reprograming process as sperm cells and eggs are produced,
causing these changes to persist in offspring for a short time or even
transgenerationally.8 0
For instance, scientists have recently found that exposing a mouse to
separation and unpredictable maternal stress impacted small noncoding
RNA in the animal's sperm.8 ' In this study, scientists exposed male mice
to unpredictable maternal separation and maternal stress.82 For two subse-
quent generations, these mice exhibited depressive symptoms of behav-
ioral stress as well as metabolic symptoms.83 Progeny of the mice exposed
to maternal stress and separation showed distinctive markers inthe RNA
in their sperm, although these marks disappeared in the third generation.84
Further, when wild mice were inseminated with the sperm of mice who
had been exposed to early-life trauma, the resulting offspring exhibited
depressive behavioral symptoms and metabolic changes, similar to those
observed in the mice who suffered the trauma firsthand.8 5
As discussed above,8 6 the means by which these changes are trans-
mitted, particularly in humans, are still very much up for debate. Nonethe-
less, it remains undisputed that epigenetic and other environmentally mod-
87
ulated changes carry on through to subsequent generations. It does not
matter so much whether the transmission occurs in the womb, through be-
havioral means in early life, or through the germline. The policy implica-
tions are the same-children who are exposed to trauma are at risk and are
also likely to pass these toxic biological effects to their offspring.
Although epigenetic changes are durable, a change in the environ-
ment can reverse the trend. For instance, when rat pups born to poor moth-
79. Tamara B. Franklin et al., Epigenetic Transmission of the Impact of Early Stress Across
Generations, 68 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 408, 413 (2010) (finding that male mice subjected to un-
predictable maternal separation suffered from depressive symptoms and showed DNA methylation of
several genes in their sperm/germline, indicating that male mice suffering from poor maternal care
pass on the epigenetic changes to their offspring).
80. Tang et al., supra note 47, at 1465.
81. See Katharina Gapp et al., Implication of Sperm RNAs in Transgenerational Inheritance of
the Effects of Early Trauma in Mice, 17 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 667, 667 (2014). RNA coding inter-
acts with an animal's genes in a similar way to epigenetic processes, but it is not exactly the same
thing as epigenetics. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 667-68. As for the behavioral effects, the mice were more fearful in a maze, spent
more time floating in a forced swim test ("a test of behavioral despair"), and gravitated toward the
light, when given a choice between light and dark. Id. As for the metabolic symptoms, the mice had
altered levels of glucose, insulin, and body weight. Id. at 668.
84. Id. at 669. The scientists theorized that the third generation of mice, which still exhibited
the behavioral and metabolic distinctions, could be transmitted through other nongenomic means such
as epigenetic modifications. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 41-47, 72-85 and accompanying text.
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ers are fostered by good mothers, the negative consequences (stress reac-
tivity, etc.) are markedly lessened. This supports the theory that a change
in the environment can ameliorate or reverse the epigenetic changes.89 Sci-
entists have also theorized that epigenetic changes might be reversible
through drugs or hormone injections.90
Meaney's work on rats provides an analogue to human development;
specifically, childhood trauma and stress can produce long-term epige-
netic changes that might be passed down to subsequent generations.9 1
While it is difficult to study gene expressions in the human brain (one
needs to be able to perform an autopsy), Meaney conducted one epigenet-
ics study of human brains, looking for differences in gene expression
based on the presence of childhood trauma.9 2 Meaney looked at human
brain samples from individuals who committed suicide.93 One set of sam-
ples consisted of suicide victims who experienced childhood abuse or ne-
glect.94 Another set consisted of suicide victims who were not abused or
neglected.95 Within the samples, Meaney found higher methylation in
samples of people who were abused or neglected and lower methylation
for those who were not abused.9 6 This led Meaney to theorize that child-
hood trauma does in fact cause epigenetic changes for the genes responsi-
ble for expressing hormonal receptors in the human brain.97
Scientist Rachel Yehuda and her colleagues have found evidence of
trauma-induced epigenetic changes in Holocaust victims and their off-
spring.98 First, Yehuda and her colleagues found that survivors of the Hol-
ocaust had increased methylation and thus less expression for the GR re-
ceptor gene, meaning that Holocaust survivors had more stress hormones
circulating in their bodies at any given time.99 In looking at the offspring
of Holocaust survivors, Yehuda and her colleagues found that offspring of
Holocaust survivors had less methylation at the same genetic marker.00
The methylation levels were not altered in a consistent way; they were
88. Meaney, supra note 72, at 1171.
89. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 11.
90. See id.
91. Meaney, supra note 72, at 1161-62.
92. CAREY, supra note 8; Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 655 (citing Patrick 0. McGowan et
al., Epigenetic Regulation of the Glucocorticoid Receptor in Human Brain Associates with Childhood
Abuse, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 342-48 (2009)).
93. CAREY, supra note 8, at 244.




98. Rachel Yehuda et al., Holocaust Exposure Induced Intergenerational Effects on FKBP5
Methylation, 80 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 372, 372 (2016).
99. Id; see also Tori Rodriquez, Descendants ofHolocaust Survivors Have Altered Stress Hor-
mones, SCt. AM. MIND (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/descendants-of-hol-
ocaust-survivors-have-altered-stress-hormones.
100. Yehuda et al., supra note 98.
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higher in the first generation and lower in subsequent generations of Hol-
ocaust survivors.101 Nonetheless, the amount of methylation visible in a
parent accurately predicted methylation changes in his or her children, at
the same genetic marker for the GR receptor gene.102 Yehuda and her col-
leagues posited that the differences in methylation could be an adaptive
effect; the offspring's lower methylation levels could reflect an adaptive
response to increased exposure to stress hormones.103
Yehuda and her colleagues have also found that the offspring of Hol-
ocaust survivors suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD)
exhibited different levels of methylation for the GR promoter gene.104
(Note that the GR promoter gene is the same gene implicated in Meaney's
rat-pup studies.)0 5 The children of Holocaust-survivor fathers with PTSD
carried a much higher risk for depression.106 The children of Holocaust-
survivor mothers with PTSD carried a higher risk for PTSD. 07 Children
of Holocaust survivors sometimes report PTSD-related nightmares, in
which they are "chased, persecuted, tortured, or annihilated, as if they [are]
re-living the Second World War over and over again. At these times, they
suffer from debilitating anxiety and depression which reduce their ability
to cope with stress and adversely impact their occupational and social
function."'0 8 Essentially, offspring of Holocaust survivors have inherited
the "unconscious minds of their parents." 09 Yehuda and her colleagues
are uncertain of how these epigenetic changes are transmitted, but theo-
rized that they are passed down through parental behavior, intrauterine
transmission, or the male germ line.1 0 Walfred Tang and his colleagues
theorized that some enduring epigenetic hanges, particularly those related
to stress and the brain, might come through to subsequent generations
when the gene expressors "escape" the reprogramming process that usu-
ally occurs at conception."'
In humans, an over-reactive stress system, induced epigenetically,
correlates with increased risk for deleterious health outcomes.' 12 A stress-
ful environment produces epigenetic modifications to the receptors for
stress hormones, which then cause the body's stress system to overheat
101. Id. at 372, 375.
102. Id. at 375, 377.
103. Id. at 378.
104. Rachel Yehuda et al., Influences ofMaternal and Paternal PTSD on Epigenetic Regulation
of the Glucocorticoid Receptor Gene in Holocaust Survivor Offspring, 171 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 872,
875 (2014).
105. See CAREY, supra note 8, at 243; FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 45; Weaver et al., supra note
17, at 848.
106. Yehuda et al., supra note 104.
107. Id.
108. Natan P.F. Kellermann, Epigenetic Transmission of Holocaust Trauma: Can Nightmares
Be Inherited?, 50 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCI. 33, 33 (2013).
109. Id.
110. Yehuda et al., supra note 98, at 377-78; Yehuda et al., supra note 104, at 878-79.
111. Tang et al., supra note 47, at 1465-66.
112. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 58-59; Yehuda et al., supra note 98.
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and retain a high level of stress hormones in the body.1 13 Over time, the
large amount of stress hormones in the body causes internal organs to be-
come too sensitive and creates a risk for diabetes, obesity, heart disease,
and other metabolic diseases.1 14 Specifically, exposure to repeated stress
causes alterations to the body's hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA)
axis, which regulates stress hormones.' Activity within the HPA axis can
be measured by the amount of cortisol present in the body during the day-
time.116
Nutritional deprivation-a kind of stress- is one mechanism that in-
duces epigenetic changes in the human body that can then be transmitted
to subsequent generations. For instance, epigenetics helps explain the gen-
erational effects observed in data surrounding the Dutch babies born dur-
ing World War II. Babies exposed to the famine during the second and
third trimesters were born with a low birth weight but in adulthood expe-
rienced obesity levels roughly twice that of babies born before or after the
famine.117 These low-birth-weight babies also had "higher incidence[s] of
elevated blood pressure, coronary heart disease, and type [two] diabe-
tes."1 8 Finally, the Dutch famine babies themselves gave birth to children
with lower birth weights and other ill effects, indicating an intergenera-
tional effect.' 19 Scientists now believe that epigenetics, changes to the ex-
pression of genes as an adaptive mechanism to this deprivation, played a
role in these outcomes.2 0
Maternal stress can also transmit changes to the human epigenome.
Recall the rats who did not receive high-quality mothering (high quantity
of licking and comfortable nursing) and, as a result, developed over-reac-
tive stress systems. When these young rats matured into mothers, their
stress system likely contributed to a low-quality mothering style, which
reproduced the same deleterious epigenetic changes in their offspring.121
Analogously, human mothers who live a highly stressful way of life trans-
mit higher stress hormone levels to their children, which then correlates
with higher rates of metabolic syndromes, such as obesity and diabetes.122
113. See FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 58-59; see also Amy S. Desantis et al., Developmental
Origins of Flatter Cortisol Rhythms: Socioeconomic Status and Adult Cortisol Activity, 27 AM. J.
HUM. BIOLOGY 458, 458 (2015) (theorizing that the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis func-
tions as the medium by which stress gets inside the body and the brain).
114. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 58-59.
115. Sonia J. Lupien, Effects of Stress Throughout the Lifespan on the Brain, Behavior, and
Cognition, 10 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 434, 434, 440 (2009).
116. Desantis et al., supra note 13.
117. CAREY, supra note 8, at 3-4; FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 3.
118. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 4.
119. CAREY, supra note 8, at 4; MATT RIDLEY, THE AGILE GENE 156 (2003).
120. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 6.
121. Francis et al., supra note 18, at 1156; Meaney, supra note 72, at 1172.
122. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 58-59.
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Thus, severe kinds of stress originating in childhood-such as the
malnourishment experienced in the Dutch famine, 123 the severe trauma ex-
perienced during the Holocaust,124 and sexual abuse1 25 -can trigger epi-
genetic changes. But evidence also indicates that more mundane forms of
stress are correlated with these negative health outcomes.126 In childhood,
"[p]ersistent emotional neglect, family conflict, and conditions of harsh
inconsistent discipline all serve to compromise growth and intellectual de-
velopment and to increase the risk for adult obesity, depression, and anxi-
ety disorders to a level comparable to that of abuse."2 7 The forms of stress
that can trigger epigenetic changes in childhood may be subtle, such as the
stress that derives from minimal parental bonding or cold and distant par-
ent-child relationships.128
Biologically, the chronic stress experienced by individuals living in
low-SES environments has been found to alter the way that an individual's
HPA axis regulates the stress hormone cortisol.129 Individuals exposed to
psychosocial stress (from living in an environment of disadvantage, meas-
ured by SES) have been found to have altered levels of cortisol in their
systems as compared with individuals from more advantaged environ-
ments. 130 Specifically, low-SES individuals have been found to exhibit
"flatter" declines in diurnal cortisol levels than individuals with higher
SES.131 A flatter, or less steep, slope of daily cortisol levels is associated
with metabolic and cardiovascular problems and mental health prob-
lems.132 As discussed more fully in Section C of this Part,133 beyond SES,
racial discrimination functions as a unique stressor that modulates cortisol
levels to produce these same metabolic and cardiovascular health ef-
fects. 134
There are interdigitated connections between stress, epigenetic
changes, and SES. "[I]ndividuals from lower [socioeconomic back-
grounds] report greater exposure to stressful life events .... " 135 This kind
123. Id. at 59.
124. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
125. Meaney, supra note 72, at 1161 (citations omitted).
126. Id.atll61-62.
127. Id.atll61.
128. Id. at 1162.
129. Desantis et al., supra note 113, at 458, 464.
130. Id. at 458, 464, 466.
131. Id. at 464.
132. Id.
133. See infra Section I.C.
134. Emma K. Adam et al., Developmental Histories of Perceived Racial Discrimination and
Diurnal Cortisol Profiles in Adulthood: A 20-Year Prospective Study, 62
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 279, 279-80, 288 (2015) (perceived racial discrimination (PRD) is a
type of psychosocial stress that can produce a type of psychosocial stress that modulates cortisol levels
in a way that leads to negative physical and mental health outcomes).
135. Lupien et al., supra note 21.
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of embodied stress can originate from poverty and social isolation.136 Bi-
ological changes can be triggered by the everyday stress that comes from
living in a socially striated environment: feeling a chasm between oneself
and societal ideals, experiencing social alienation, holding a low opinion
of one's self, and struggling with the inability to meet basic goals that fur-
ther a "good life."137 Other biological stress conductors, related to SES,
might include "economic hardship, marital strife, . . . a lack of social and
economic support,"3 8 as well as harsh or inconsistent parenting styles.3 9
Finally, the stress of poverty might be particularly conducive to becoming
embedded. The stress of poverty would include "criminal victimization,
community violence, reduced access to medical services, economic hard-
ships, and limited educational and employment opportunities."40
For quite some time, we have known that human health and develop-
mental outcomes decline as one traverses from the most privileged groups
to the least privileged groups.141 But now, we are developing a scientific
understanding of the mechanistic processes that are responsible for these
SES-linked differential health outcomes.142 The stressful experiences that
can get under the skin and epigenetically alter the expression of one's
genes (harsh family environments, deprivation, maternal stress, incon-
sistent childhood discipline) are more likely to be experienced by the least
privileged population groups in society.14 3 The working theory is that im-
poverished environments function as stimuli that trigger deleterious bio-
logical changes in one's genes, which subsist throughout the individual's
lifetime and are then passed on to subsequent generations.144
A key link between SES, stress, and the biological embodiment of
one's environment is a lack of control. "[S]tatus is [relevant] to two fun-
damental human needs: to have control over your own life and to be a full
social participant with all that implies about being a recognized member
136. FRANCIS, supra note 13, at 42.
137. Lende, supra note 23 (citations omitted).
138. Meaney, supra note 72, at 1176 (citations omitted).
139. Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 654 (discussing harsh and inconsistent discipline); see also
Ashli J. Sheidow et al., The Role of Stress Exposure and Family Functioning in Internalizing Out-
comes of Urban Families, 23 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 1351, 1352-53 (2014).
140. Sheidow et al., supra note 139, at 1351.
141. Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States,
2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750, 1762 (2016) (noting that in this exhaustive study of U.S. life spans,
results indicated that "life expectancy increased continuously with income"); Clyde Hertzman & Tom
Boyce, How Experience Gets Under the Skin to Create Gradients in Developmental Health, 31 ANN.
REv. PUB. HEALTH 329, 331 (2010) ("[S]ocial subordination, even in the very young, is associated
with heightened cardiovascular, autonomic, and adrenocortical responses to stress and with dispropor-
tionately higher rates of chronic medical conditions and injuries."); Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra
note 2 ("Health and longevity are intimately related to position in the social hierarchy. The lower the
status, the higher risk of illness and death, and consequently the shorter the life expectancy.").
142. Hertzman & Boyce, supra note 141, at 330, 337 (linking the theory of epigenetics to dis-
parate health outcomes based on SES).
143. Id. at 330-31.
144. Id-
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of society."l4 5 Stress, in both animals and humans, is created by removing
control.146 Control over one's life connotes a certain amount of predicta-
bility and stability. For instance, in a study of male mice, scientists repli-
cated a lack of control by removing the mice from their mother at predict-
able and unpredictable times.147 It was only when the mice were removed
at unpredictable times that the mice developed depressive behaviors that
lasted their lifetime.14 8 In theorizing about status syndrome, Michael Mar-
mot argues that the stress that "aris[es] from the inability to control our
lives, to turn to others when we lose control" is the kind of stress that be-
comes biologically embodied.149 And "low control is more common the
lower down the pile you find yourself."5 o Thus, social inequality produces
biological inequality.
Enduring ill health, produced by biological reprogramming and trig-
gered by a hostile social environment, presents a frightening picture of
inequality. This is not about having less money and less food. Epigenetics
runs contrary to the rugged-individualism narrative that holds that any in-
dividual can make their way to a positive outcome through grit and effort.
This is not the case if the individual is starting out with a deficit of biolog-
ical assets. From a moral perspective, the child who falls victim to epige-
netic reprogramming is blameless. This blamelessness hould be a signal
call for the state to step in and assist. As will be discussed more fully in
Part II, there is a need to dismantle many of the neoliberal policies that
produce the stress and lack of control that have become embodied. New
approaches to work, education, and poverty law are needed to counter this
disturbing type of inequality.
The next section explains how socioeconomic environments can be-
come embodied in neural pathways, which then negatively influence cog-
nitive outcomes. In addition to the disparate health outcomes that are cor-
related with SES, which we now know are explainable by epigenetic pro-
cesses, one's material environment influences cognition. These theories
support the conclusion that intelligence does not derive purely from the
individual's makeup and genetics but is rather mediated by the material
and social environment one inhabits.
145. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2, at 153.
146. Id.
147. Franklin et al., supra note 79.
148. Id. For instance, when the male mice were unpredictably removed from their mothers and
mated with stressful mother mice, the depressive behavioral symptoms were passed to subsequent
generations. Id.




B. Neuroplasticity and Neuroscience: How Inequality Gets into the
Brain
The previous section explained how stress-induced epigenetic
changes to DNA expression induce bodily illness by modulating the
body's stress-reaction system. Extensive releasei of stress correlates with
metabolic problems in "the immune, gastrointestinal, cardiovascular, and
reproductive systems."'5 1
This section discusses how stress interacts with the mind and brain.
When stressed, an animal's body (including a human's) becomes less able
to modulate its response to stress; instead, it unleashes a large mass of
stress hormones.152 This overheated stress feedback loop, over time, can
alter the structure of the brain." 3 A change in brain structure may be im-
plicated in cognitive and neurological deficits.154 Where early stress is not
present, there is a greater capacity for cognitive tasks and learning, and
reduced declines in age-related learning and memory deficiencies. ss
Thus, a stressful environment, the type of environment where many
disadvantaged families live, can negatively influence an individual's cog-
nitive outcomes. In childhood, socioeconomic disadvantage is associated
with lower cognitive outcomes, with children from disadvantaged back-
grounds scoring approximately one-half to one full standard deviation be-
low their more advantaged cohorts.156 These disparities in cognitive out-
comes, in turn, "have long-lasting ramifications for physical and mental
health."1 5 1
Here, the science suggests that one's environment, mediated by SES,
influences everything from an individual's performance of cognitive tasks
to the size and shape of specific areas of the brain and the amount of cog-
nitive bandwidth that can be directed toward particular goals.'5 8 One's so-
cioeconomic environment heavily influences one's cognitive resources,
151. Hertzman & Boyce, supra note 141, at 336; see also McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at
205.
152. See Hertzman & Boyce, supra note 141, at 336-38.
153. See McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 194-95 (describing that one of the ways that the
body can become overburdened with stress is by a failure to terminate automatic release of stress
hormones in response to stressful situations).
154. See Hertzman & Boyce, supra note 141.
155. Id. at 337.
156. Kimberly G. Noble et al., Neural Correlates of Socioeconomic Status in the Developing
Human Brain, 15 DEVELOPMENTAL SC. 516, 516 (2012) [hereinafter Noble et al., Neural Correlates];
see also Rajeev D.S. Raizada et al., Socioeconomic Status Predicts Hemispheric Specialisation of the
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus in Young Children, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1392, 1392 (2008) ("SES explain[s]
32% of the variance in children's scores on phonological and vocabulary tests.") (citations omitted);
Courtney Stevens et al., Differences in the Neural Mechanisms of Selective Attention in Children from
Diferent Socioeconomic Backgrounds: An Event-Related Brain Potential Study, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL
SC. 634, 634 (2009) ("Even before the first day of kindergarten, a child's academic prospects can be
predicted based on characteristics of his or her parents, including their income, occupation, and level
of education.") (citations omitted).
157. Noble et al., Neural Correlates, supra note 156.
158. See infra notes 155-224 and accompanying text.
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which in turn impact outcomes like reading, school grades, and test
scores.15 9 Here again, as with epigenetics, the science challenges tradi-
tional theories of meritocracy, that one's innate intelligence is the primary
predictor of one's life outcomes. The science indicates that rather than be-
ing the products of preexisting intelligence and traits, mental and cognitive
functioning are the products of the material environment's interaction with
the brain and the body.
First, we start with the concept of neuroplasticity. Neuroplasticity
holds that the brain is malleable and can be shaped by one's social envi-
ronment.160 Growing up in a disadvantaged environment can negatively
influence the "structural and functional plasticity of the hippocampus,
amygdala, and prefrontal cortex-processes collectively referred to as
neuroplasticity."1 61 It can also produce disparities in the size of brain struc-
turesl62 and brain activity.163
In the context of this Article, neuroplasticity is related to epigenetics.
As explained above, epigenetic variations at the gene level modulate the
amount of stress hormones released into the human body. A stressful en-
vironment, commonly experienced by low-SES individuals, interferes
with the expression of the genes responsible for modulating stress hor-
mones, which can cause an individual's stress-axis system to overheat and
flood the body with stress hormones.164 In turn, too many stress hormones
in the body, over a period of time, can impact the structure of the brain,
shrinking the hippocampus (critical for memory) and increasing the amyg-
dala (related to processing of fear).165
For neuroplasticity theory, the external environment is an important
causal mechanism for these differences in brain size, structure, and perfor-
mance. By way of example, higher SES children are exposed to quieter
home environments (less noise pollution), which correlates with better
working memory ability, which is helpful for completing cognitive tasks
related to reading and speaking.166 Moreover, because higher SES children
159. See Kimberly G. Noble et al., Brain-Behavior Relationships in Reading Acquisition Are
Modulated by Socioeconomic Factors, 9 DEVELOPMENTAL SCL 642, 642 (2006) [hereinafter Noble et
al., Brain-Behavior Relationships] (discussing relationships between socioeconomic factors and aca-
demic achievement); see also Raizada et al., supra note 156.
160. McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 191.
161. Id.
162. See Kimberly G. Noble et al., Family Income, Parental Education and Brain Structure in
Children andAdolescents, 18 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 773, 773 (2015) [hereinafter Noble et al., Fam-
ily Income].
163. See Noble et al., Brain-Behavior Relationships, upra note 159.
164. See supra notes 108-29 and accompanying text; see also Margaret A. Sheridan, The Impact
of Social Disparity on Prefrontal Function in Childhood, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 4, 2012, at 10 (finding
more variable amounts of the stress hormone cortisol in low-SES children).
165. Luby et al., supra note 22.
166. See Michele Tine, Working Memory Differences Between Children Living in Rural and
Urban Poverty, 15 J. COGNITION & DEV. 599, 608 (2013).
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are exposed to more printed material in the home, a rich environment
strengthens the brain's pathways used for language acquisition.1 67
Links have been found between SES and the size of structures within
the brain and activity levels in the brain, which might explain why differ-
ent SES groups experience different outcomes in cognitive processing,
self-control mechanisms, and responsiveness to emotional cues, all of
which are mediated by neurological processes.'68 These cognitive effects
produce disparities in cognitive performance,1 69 which impact life out-
comes because ducational achievement, test scores, and other markers of
cognitive performance matter so much.170
The size of structures in the brain is one SES-linked factor that con-
nects the environment to individual cognitive performance. In one study,
conducted by neuroscientist Kimberly Noble, differences in income were
associated with "large differences in [brain] surface areas, . . . [typically]
in [brain] regions [relating to] language, reading, executive functions and
spatial skills."' 7' Professor Noble found that higher SES subjects tended
to have brains with a greater cortical surface area and thickness.172 In a
separate study, Noble found SES and parental education predicted differ-
ences in the size of the brain's hippocampus and amygdala.17 3 Similarly,
another study found a significant association between childhood SES and
hippocampal volumes in the brain, an association that continued into adult-
hood.17 4 Yet another study found that higher SES correlated with more
gray matter volume in the brain.175 (Both the hippocampus and gray matter
are vital for performing higher level cognitive tasks.)176
In addition to supporting the relationship between SES and brain size,
several studies lend support to the connection between a child's SES-
mediated environment and brain activity relating to language processing,
167. See Noble et al., Brain-Behavior Relationships, supra note 159.
168. See Noble et al., Family Income, supra note 162, at 774 (finding a positive relationship
between SES and the brain's cortical surface area); Roger T. Staff et al., Childhood Socioeconomic
Status and Adult Brain Size: Childhood Socioeconomic Status Influences Adult Hippocampal Size, 71
ANNALS NEUROLOGY 653, 653, 657 (2012) ("[A] significant association between childhood SES and
hippocampal volume .... ).
169. Katarzyna Jednor6g et al., The Influence of Socioeconomic Status on Children's Brain
Structure, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 8, 2012, at 4 (finding SES affects cognitive performance); Noble et al.,
Brain-Behavior Relationships, supra note 159 ("SES . . . is a robust predictor of children's reading
achievement . . . .") (citations omitted); Noble et al., Neural Correlates, supra note 156 ("[S]ocioeco-
nomic disadvantage in childhood is associated with negative effects on cognitive and socio-emotional
development.") (citations omitted).
170. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY 22 (2002).
171. Noble et al., Family Income, supra note 162.
172. Id. at 774-75. For study subjects with higher income, income had less of an effect on brain
morphology. Id. at 773.
173. Noble et al., Neural Correlates, supra note 156, at 522-23. In this study, lower parental
education correlated with a larger amygdala (indicating greater exposure to stress) and a smaller hip-
pocampus (an area of the brain critical for memory). Id.
174. Staff et al., supra note 168, at 657.
175. Jednor6g et al., supra note 169, at 5.
176. See Hanson et al., supra note 22, at 4.
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attention, and working memory. For instance, a study of neuroimages of
children found a correlation between higher SES and more brain activity
in the left inferior frontal gyrus, the part of the brain that relates to lan-
guage. 1n Children with lower SES indicators showed weaker neural spe-
cialization, or less activity, in language processing areas of the brain.i7
The authors of this study theorize that a richer linguistic environment in
the home (more books and printed matter) could be producing greater vol-
ume in the brain's pathways responsible for language processing.179
SES also correlates with children's ability to marshal cognitive re-
sources related to attention. Attention is a cognitive science concept that
refers to the ability to perform tasks that require "filtering distracting in-
formation, managing response conflict, and regulating behavior."iso This
study found that children from low-SES backgrounds experienced diffi-
culties with aspects of attention, showing a reduced ability to filter out
distracting information.18 ' These difficulties with attention correlate with
performance problems in other areas, such as preliteracy and language ac-
quisition.182 For children with attention issues, the typical classroom is
"poorly suited for learning."'8 3 Moreover, children need the ability to fo-
cus their attention to learn to read.184 Thus, these attention problems create
a cascade effect that creates an achievement gap between low-SES and
high-SES students.8 5
Finally, a study from Professor Michelle Tine found connections be-
tween a child's working memory and the child's SES-mediated environ-
ment.'86 Working memory, which refers to the brain's ability to hold in-
formation while completing cognitive tasks,'8 7 can be visuospatial or ver-
bal.88 Interestingly, Tine's study uncovered neurological distinctions
based on whether the child's environment was a low-income urban versus
a low-income rural setting.'89 Children from urban environments howed
symmetrical differences in both visuospatial and verbal working
memory.190 In other words, in comparison with their more privileged co-
horts, children from lower SES environments had deficits in both
visuospatial and verbal working memory.19' Children from low-income
rural environments also scored less well on working-memory tasks than
177. Raizada et al., supra note 156.
178. Id. at 1399.
179. Id. at 1398-99.
180. Stevens et al., supra note 156, at 635.
181. Id. at 635, 640, 642.
182. Id. at 636.
183. Id. at 643.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 634.
186. Tine, supra note 166, at 599.
187. See Sheridan, supra note 164, at 2.
188. Tine, supra note 166, at 599.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 599, 607.
191. Id.
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their higher income cohorts, but low-income rural children, unlike low-
income urban children, had worse visuospatial- than verbal-working-
memory scores.192
Professor Tine theorized that children in low-income rural environ-
ments exhibit stronger verbal working memory but weaker visuospatial
memory because children in more rural environments are exposed to less
noise pollution.1 93 Noise pollution, because of its negative impact on at-
tention, has been correlated with deficits in verbal working memory.'94 On
the other hand, low-income urban children may have higher visuospatial
working memory because they are exposed to more everyday visual stim-
ulation, such as "traffic, crowds, commercial, residential, industrial build-
ings and signs, and opportunities to navigate public transportation sys-
tems."i Because the brain is plastic and because the environment plays a
key role in the brain's plastic structure, children who are exposed to less
visual stimulation may have more attenuated brain pathways that relate to
the performance of visuospatial tasks.196
In a related sense, the environment, mediated by a higher SES, can
help augment a child's neurological activities, producing better cognitive
outcomes for those who reside in more advantaged homes. This theory
was borne out in a study conducted by Professor Noble and her col-
leagues.'9 7 In this study, scientists viewed neuroimages of children's
brains while they were reading.198 Professor Nobel and her colleagues then
looked specifically at the area of the brain associated with phonological
awareness (PA).199 When this area of the brain appeared active in the neu-
roimages, it indicated that the child possessed a strong cognitive ability for
language processing.200 In children with higher SES, sometimes the pho-
nological awareness region was not as active.201 Yet, these children still
showed a higher reading ability than low-SES children with similar PA
202activity levels. Professor Noble and her colleagues theorized that even
with a similar neurological activity, higher SES children enjoy an environ-
ment in which they can draw upon alternative modes of literary support
that derive from their environment-such as increased exposure to printed
materials-which buffers reading skills.20 3
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id.
197. Noble et al., Brain-Behavior Relationships, supra note 159.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 642, 650-52.
201. Id. at 650-51.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 651-52.
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In addition to the studies of SES and brain development in children,
other studies show how SES interacts with adult brains. Specifically, SES-
related correlations exist in areas of the brain relating to the processing of
fear and stress. For instance, in a neuroimaging study, Peter Gianaros and
his colleagues found that, in comparison with higher status individuals,
individuals with lower social status exhibited greater amygdala activity in
response to being presented with threatening and angry facial expres-
sions.204 The amygdala is responsible for regulating the body's stress re-
sponse system, so greater activity in the amygdala indicates a more stress-
ful response to threatening stimuli.205 The authors of this study theorized
that disadvantaged environments measurably impact brain function, which
becomes visible with higher levels of amygdala activity.206
Another of Professor Gianoros's neuroimaging studies indicates that
human individuals with a perceived low social standing tend to exhibit
reduced amounts of gray matter volume in the perigenual anterior cingu-
late cortex (pACC). 2 07 Gray matter in the pACC is responsible for pro-
cesses involving "the appraisal of salient environmental and personal
events, the experience of emotional states, and the regulation of behavioral
and autonomic responses to emotional and stressful stimuli." 208 Less gray
matter in this part of the brain could explain adverse mental health out-
comes, such as problems with self-control, decision making, and over-re-
active emotional responses.20 9
Professor Gianaros and his colleagues suggested that the stress of liv-
ing a disadvantaged life could structure the brain (through hormonal inter-
actions) to reduce the amount of gray matter in the pACC. 2 10 Alternatively,
the study authors posited that individuals with comparatively lesser
amounts of gray matter could be predisposed to view themselves in a de-
211
pressive way, contributing to perceptions of having low social status.
Regardless of how the correlation between gray matter and SES percep-
tions comes about, this is a harmful feedback loop. Individuals with less
204. McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 203 (citing Peter Gros et al., Potential Neural Em-
bedding of Parental Social Standing, 3 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 91, 91-92
(2008)).
205. Id.
206. See Pilyoung Kim et al., Effects of Childhood Poverty and Chronic Stress on Emotion Reg-
ulatory Brain Function in Adulthood, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 18442, 18444 (2013) (finding that
adults who grew up in poverty possessed increased amygdala activity, which was likely a result of
stress exposure, which "provides evidence of neural embedding of childhood poverty").
207. Peter J. Gianaros et al., Perigenual Anterior Cingulate Morphology Covaries with Per-
ceived Social Standing, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 161, 166 (2007).
208. McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 205 (citing George Bush et al., Cognitive and Emo-
tional Influences in Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 4 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sa. 215, 215 (2000)).
209. See Gianaros et al., supra note 207, at 161-62, 170; see also John M. Allman, The Anterior
Cingulate Cortex: The Evolution of an Interface Between Emotion and Cognition, 935 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 107, 114 (2001) (explaining that the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in regulating
self-control, attention, and social maturity).
210. Gianaros et al., supra note 207, at 169-70.
211. Id. at 170 (citing Ronald A. Cohen et al., Early Life Stress and Morphometry of the Adult
Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Caudate Nuclei, 59 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 975, 978-79 (2006)).
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gray matter in the pACC are prone to exhibit maladaptive behavioral and
212mental reactions, which would be exacerbated in environments of dis-
advantage.
Another provocative study developed the theory that persons living
in disadvantage do not do as well on cognitive performance test because
so much cognitive energy (cognitive bandwidth) is expended to survive in
213socially stressful scenarios. In this study, psychologist Anandi Mani and
her colleagues divided their study subjects into groups and noted each sub-
ject's SES status.2 14 After considering one of two problems, the study par-
ticipants were then asked to complete a test designed to assess cognitive
control and fluid intelligence.215 The first problem involved a car breaking
down with repairs that would cost $150.216 The second problem involved
car repairs costing $1,500.217 For both lower and higher SES subjects, con-
templation of the $150 car repair problem had no appreciable impact on
how the subject performed on the subsequent cognitive test.2 18 But for low-
SES subjects who were "primed" with the $1,500-car-repair problem, their
performance was "significantly worse" on both the cognitive-control and
fluid-intelligence tests.219
Having to "manage sporadic income, juggle expenses, and make dif-
ficult tradeoffs" produces an immediate cognitive load that creates burdens
in performing any other cognitive tasks.220 The drag on one's cognitive
bandwidth caused by being poor is analogous to losing a full night's sleep,
221suffering from the effects of chronic alcoholism, or losing 13 IQ points.
This study confirms the recurring theme of this Article, which is that one's
material environment does more than just affect one's financial circum-
stances. Being poor bleeds into the brain and the mind.222 Cognitive per-
formance, so often held out as a product of innate individual merit, is not
212. See Gianaros et al., supra note 207, at 161-62, 170.
213. Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCIENCE 976, 976 (2013).






220. Id at 976-77.
221. Id at 980.
222. Dr. Brett Ingram, a scholar who is applying neuroscience to communications explains that:
The congruencies between people who have suffered brain injuries, and those who have
suffered social marginalization, could be attributable to the fact that, at the microscopic
level, emotional distress caused by rhetorical or symbolic affronts to one's social standing
is manifested in neurological injuries-a deformation of the neural circuitry with which
the brain represents itself to itself that effects what amounts to an ontological change in the
subject's conscious thought.
Brett Ingram, Critical Rhetoric in the Age of Neuroscience 162 (Feb. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open access-disser-
tations/690.
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such an easy story. We must accept that the material environment also
shapes these outcomes.
As with epigenetics, SES's negative influence on the brain can be
explained as stress related. Stressful experiences can change the structure
of the brain. Higher levels of stress, in both animals and humans, correlate
with reduced gray matter in the hippocampus and orbital prefrontal cortex
area of the brain.223 And here, the stress of being disadvantaged is exactly
the kind of stress that wreaks problematic changes in the function and
shape of the human brain. As Bruce S. McEwen and Peter J. Gianoros
write: "early maltreatment, conflict laden familial relationships, stressful
life events, and adverse physical and social conditions-often occasioned
by lower socioeconomic environments-during development and aging
can [negatively] influence the structural and functional plasticity of the
hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex."224 In this manner, neuro-
anthropologist Daniel Lende writes that "[t]he social organization of ine-
quality happens through how social forces shape our neuroplastic and em-
bodied brains."2 25 Lende writes that because of these embodied effects, we
cannot and should not reduce poverty to an abstracted problem for social
theorists and the political economy.226 As the studies reviewed in this Ar-
ticle show, "people suffer through their embodied brains, through despair
and toxic stress and destructive behavior."227
The brain-science studies discussed in this Article, taken together, il-
lustrate the deleterious cascade effect hat a low-SES environment can
have on an individual's cognitive outcomes, which then link up with social
outcomes. As with epigenetic changes, environmentally mediated effects
on the brain are reversible.228 The plastic brain can be retrained. It might
be possible, for instance, to strengthen the brain pathways of children liv-
ing in noisy or low-literacy environments through targeted brain train-
ing.229 However, we should not let the potential for individual brain re-
training distract us from contemplating the embedded structural reasons
that individuals from lower SES environments are burdened with weaker
brain pathways, heavier cognitive loads, and more toxic stress. While the
theory of neuroplasticity can be deployed to celebrate a neoliberal vision
of the individual subject,230 it also supports the conclusion that the material
conditions that one finds oneself in, starting in childhood, deeply influence
the neural pathways responsible for cognitive performance and, in turn,
223. McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 199.
224. Id. at 191.
225. Lende, supra note 23, at 197.
226. See id. at 198-99.
227. Id.
228. See McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 196, 198.
229. Stevens et al., supra note 156, at 634, 636.
230. See Victoria Pitts-Taylor, The Plastic Brain: Neoliberalism and the Neuronal Self 14
HEALTH 635, 635 (2010).
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social outcomes. Until we, as a society, devise collective solutions to pro-
vide a better environment for all children, these disparities will likely con-
tinue.
C. Intersectional Effects of Biological Inequality
Biological inequality is intersectional. In the United States, black
Americans experience lower birth weights and higher incidences of cardi-
ovascular disease in comparison with white cohorts.231 Scientists Christo-
pher Kuzawa and Elizabeth Sweet argue that these disparities are products
of epigenetic mechanisms driven by the hostile social environment that
black people inhabit.23 2 As referenced above, maternal stress transmits ep-
igenetic changes.2 3 3 And, as discovered within the Dutch-famine data,
low-birth-weight babies are at greater risk for developing metabolic dis-
eases, such as heart disease, diabetes, and high blood pressure.234 Kuzawa
and Sweet argue that low birth weights for black babies are traceable to
the stress, discrimination, and lower SES experienced by black American
mothers during the course of their lives and pregnancies.235 The stress of
racial discrimination, experienced in employment, housing, education,
law, and everyday life is a type of stressor that can become biologically
embodied.236 Thus, Kuzawa and Sweet argue that race-related stress func-
tions as durable "developmental programming" that produces epigenetic
changes, which in turn produce persistent, unequal health outcomes for
black Americans.2 37
Kuzawa and Sweet present evidence that supports the conclusion that
the U.S. social environment has become biologically embedded within the
black populace and that these biological effects cannot be explained by
inherent genetic variations. Their theory is borne out by data indicating
that black American newborns have lower birth weights than children born
238
to women who recently immigrated to the United States from Africa.
The birthweight of children for subsequent generations of African immi-
239grants then regresses to converge with the lower black American mean.
This phenomenon leads Kuzawa and Sweet to theorize that the social en-
231. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 2, 8.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 17-118 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
235. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 3, 8.
236. See Chae et al., supra note 1.
237. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 2, 4.
238. Id. at 8. See generally Gopal K. Singh & Stella M. Yu, Adverse Pregnancy Outcomes: Dif-
ferences Between US- and Foreign-Born Women in Major US Racial and Ethnic Groups, 86 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 837 (1996) (examining the differences between US-born and foreign-born mothers in
pregnancy risks); Martha S. Wingate & Greg R. Alexander, The Healthy Migrant Theory: Variations
in Pregnancy Outcomes Among US-Born Migrants, 62 SoC. SCL & MED. 491 (2006) (finding internal
migrant populations have better birth outcomes).
239. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 8.
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vironment, rather than genes, is responsible for variations in black Amer-
icans' health.240 Moreover, in their paper, Kuzawa and Sweet caution that
black American birth outcomes are not a product of the mother's choice.24 1
Rather, "[t]he most important predictors of compromised birth outcomes
include factors such as self-perceived discrimination, racism, and chronic
stress."242
When the law changes to legally prohibit discrimination, it improves
the health outcomes for black people.243 This was shown in a recent study,
conducted by Harvard epidemiologist Nancy Krieger, which analyzed the
repeal of Southern Jim Crow laws on the health of black citizens.244
Krieger documented that after the repeal of Jim Crow laws in the South,
health among blacks improved and overall health inequities between
blacks and whites decreased.245 Krieger used infant mortality to track these
health inequities because infant mortality, in particular, functions as an ef-
fective marker for a population's overall health.246 Infant mortality "is
highly sensitive to living conditions and access to medical technology dur-
ing pregnancy and the first year of life and is also reflective of mothers'
cumulative health status before and after conception."247 Krieger's data
analysis indicated that during Jim Crow, infant-mortality rates for blacks
were higher in regions where Jim Crow laws were in effect than in areas
without these laws.24 8 After the 1964 Civil Rights Act abolished de jure
segregation, there was a convergence in the infant mortality for black in-
249
fants inside and outside of jurisdictions that experienced Jim Crow.
However, the black infant-mortality rate, though it improved in some ar-
eas, remained much higher than the white infant-mortality rate.250
Krieger theorizes that while the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act improved health outcomes for black people, it was not enough, given
251
the persistence of the black-white infant-mortality gap. Structural
changes, aimed at de facto forms of discrimination, are necessary to re-
solve this tragic problem.252 Krieger thoughtfully advocates an "ecosocial"
240. Id at 8, 10.
241. Id at 10. ("[T]he research reviewed here overwhelmingly points to the importance of factors
that are symptomatic of structural inequality and discrimination rather than choice.").
242. Id at 10; see also DeAnnah R. Byrd et al., Infant Mortality: Explaining Black/White Dis-
parities in Wisconsin, 11 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 319, 320 (2007) (reporting on women who
report racial discrimination and low birth weight for infants as a factor that heavily contributes to risk
of infant mortality).





248. Id. at 2236.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2241; Nancy Krieger et al., Jim Crow and Premature Mortality Among the US Black
and White Population, 1960-2009: An Age-Period-Cohort Analysis, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGY 494, 503
(2014) [hereinafter Krieger et al., Jim Crow and Premature Mortality].
252. See Carpenter, supra note 26 (reporting on Dr. Krieger's theories).
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approach to racialized public-health outcomes to understand "how we lit-
erally biologically embody exposures arising from our societal and eco-
logical context, thereby producing population rates and distributions of
health."253 Moreover, Krieger recommends that research on race and
health outcomes should analyze race not as an "a priori trait of individuals"
but as a multidimensional category entwined with political, economic, and
social relations.2 54
David H. Chae and his colleagues have documented a connection be-
tween the psychosocial stress of racial discrimination and the deterioration
of one's DNA, which controls the aging process.25 Black men have a life
expectancy of 69.7 years, compared to 75.7 years for white men.256 Black
men suffer from age-related diseases that appear earlier and show more
severity than diseases suffered by other groups.2 57 Chae and his colleagues
discovered that black men had shorter DNA telomeres than other
groups.258 Telomeres are pieces of the ends of the DNA that protect the
DNA from deterioration.259 black men who reported experiences of dis-
crimination and held internal antiblack attitudes had shorter telomeres than
black men who held more problack attitudes.260 While the Chae study does
not encompass epigenetics as the mechanism for how the telomeres be-
come shortened, it does suggest that the social environment coupled with
the psychic internalization of negative stereotypes can become embodied
and impact life expectancies. "[R]acial discrimination in concert with the
internalization of racial bias has pernicious effects on biological aging,
and . . . this is one pathway through which social inequities generate
greater disease vulnerability in the population."261
Finally, Northwestern University Professor Emma Adam has found
data supporting a theory that race-based stress influences the HPA (the
hormonal apparatus that regulates stress) in a way that produces highly
negative physical and mental health outcomes.262 Specifically, Adam and
her colleagues observed cortisol levels (which measure HPA activity) in a
large set of longitudinal data.263 Adam's found that individuals (both black
and white) who reported high levels of perceived racial discrimination
253. Krieger, An Ecosocial Approach, supra note 16.
254. Krieger et al., Jim Crow and Premature Mortality, supra note 251.
255. Chae et al., supra note 1, at 107.
256. Id. at 103.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 104.
259. Id
260. Id. at 107. Amy J. Schulz and her colleagues reported similar findings with respect to de-
pression in black American women. Amy J. Schulz et al., Discrimination, Symptoms of Depression,
and Self-Rated Health Among African American Women in Detroit: Results from a Longitudinal Anal-
ysis, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1265, 1265, 1267 (2006). In this study, Schulz found that black American
women who experienced an increase in racial discrimination over time had a correlated increase in
symptoms of depression. Id.
261. Chae et al., supra note 1, at 108.
262. Adam et al., supra note 134, at 280, 288.
263. Id. at 288.
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(PRD) showed cortisol levels with a flatter slope than individuals who did
not report PRD.264 Notably, among those individuals reporting PRD, black
subjects reported different cortisol levels in the morning and lower overall
cortisol levels throughout the day.265 These racially disparate results led
Adam to theorize that her study's black subjects were "actively mobilizing
[their stress response systems] to cope with the anticipated discriminatory
experiences" that they know they will face during the day.266
In a more recent paper, Adam and her colleagues theorized that the
physiological impact of race discrimination might explain racial and eth-
nic academic-achievement gaps.267 The racial discrimination primarily ex-
perienced by black and Latino youth is linked to physiological effects,
such as overactivation of the body's HPA system and disruptions in an
individual's sleep cycle.268 While low SES is also associated with these
physiological effects, which mediate academic achievement, members of
racial minorities suffer from double disadvantage; the stress of living in
economic disadvantage is compounded by the stress of being a target of
discrimination.269 Adam and her colleagues explain that both the HPA-
system response (which can lead to behavioral and mood changes, like
increased anxiety and anger) and disruptions in individual sleep cycles
(which can also lead to fatigue induced behavioral issues) can explain the
racial and ethnic educational-achievement gap, which has remained stable
since the 1990s, even between individuals at higher SES levels.2 70
Adam's work debunks the highly offensive idea, propagated by Rich-
ard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, that race-based disparities on IQ tests
and other cognitive metrics are a product of genetic differences between
different races.271 While scholarly consensus has rejected Murray and
264. Id. It has been theorized that stress exposure produces flatter diurnal cortisol rhythms, which
in turn correlate with higher incidents of depression, anxiety disorders, PTSD, fibromyalgia, cardio-
vascular disease, and metabolic disorders-the ill health effects that have been identified throughout
this paper. Id. at 280, 288.
265. Id. at 288. Lower daily cortisol levels indicate hypcortisolism-"a pattern of low and less
dynamic cortisol levels that is thought to result from past chronic stress or traumatic stress, and is
associated with negative health outcomes." Id. Having a flat (as opposed to steep) pattern of cortisol
produces negative health outcomes, but low overall levels of the stress hormones is an additional neg-
ative indicator. Id.
266. Id.
267. Dorainne J. Levy et al., Psychological and Biological Responses to Race-Based Social
Stress as Pathways to Disparities in Educational Outcomes, 71 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 455, 455-56
(2016).
268. Id. at 461-64.
269. Id. at 458-59.
270. Id. at 456-57, 461-64. Although the SES achievement gap has widened and is now twice
as large as the black/white achievement gap, it does not fully explain the racial/ethnic achievement
gap because that gap has not changed since the 1990s, and persists at higher income levels. Id. at 456-
57 (citing Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Income Achievement Gap, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, May 2013,
at 10, 11-12).
271. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 269, 270 (1994).
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Hermstein's theory,272 the idea that innate individual characteristics (in-
cluding racial characteristics) produce positive or negative life outcomes
remains ingrained in U.S. conservative culture. While many scholars have
persuasively theorized that social, psychic, and economic conditions ex-
perienced by historically oppressed racial minorities have more to do with
273achievement gaps than genetics, these newer biological studies add
helpful strength and legitimacy to this point.
The one-two punch of racial discrimination and economic disad-
vantage has the capacity to produce enduring injury. In considering the
work of Rachel Yehuda and her colleagues, which documented pigenet-
ically programmed stress disorders in Holocaust survivors and their off-
274
spring, We can reasonably hypothesize that the trauma of slavery, the
terroristic enforcement of Jim Crow segregation, and the continuing sub-
ordination of black people have-become embodied, producing a biological
inequality that continues to be transmitted to subsequent generations. This
enduring biological inequality belies the argument that black people can
and should overcome discrimination through grit and individual effort.
Such a quest is not fully possible when past and present violence and dis-
crimination continue to invade, infect, and sicken.
D. Social Cause Versus Social Selection
Is one's inherited material environment the primary causal factor that
determines one's life outcomes? This is the theory of social cause. Or, does
one inherit certain cognitive traits that predispose one to choose certain
environments over others? This is the theory of social selection.
Social selection theory posits that differences in inherited cognitive
ability predispose people to certain SES environments, which then become
embodied.27 5 In the context of the brain, social selection theory holds that
272. Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, Introduction to THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE
GAP 1, 2 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) ("[D]espite endless speculation, no one
has found genetic evidence indicating that blacks have less innate intellectual ability than whites.");
Richard E. Nisbett, Race, Genetics, andIQ, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra, at 86, 89
("Despite the assertions of some scholars, including Hermstein and Murray, a review of the evidence
in both areas provides almost no support for genetic explanations of the IQ difference between blacks
and whites.").
273. Stereotype threat presents a social and cultural explanation as to why racially disadvantaged
perform less well on standardized tests. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and
the Test Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
SCORE GAP, supra note 272, at 401-02, 422-23. Professor Claude Steele developed stereotype threat
theory in a series of studies showing that in a cognitive testing environment, racially disadvantaged
students perform less well when they are told the test is a measure of their cognitive ability and also
when their racial identity is primed. Id. at 401-23. Being confronted with a negative racial stereotype
in a high-pressure testing environment depresses performance on the test. Id. at 422-23. Meredith
Phillips and her colleagues provide a succinct explanation of the social theories that explain the black-
white academic performance gap. See Meredith Phillips et al., Family Background, Parenting Prac-
tices, and the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE, supra note 272, at
103, 109-10 (stating black genes "cause social and economic inequalities that affect cognitive skills").
274. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
275. Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 653.
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"all human capacities are present in the exuberantly wired brain" and the
individual simply seeks out those preferred external stimuli that will influ-
ence the individual's brain structure.2 7 6 Social selection has also been de-
scribed as a theory that actively correlates individual genes to the environ-
ment.277 As an example, because children with above average verbal abil-
ities will enjoy reading, the children's positive reactions to reading encour-
age parents to set up a home environment that supports literacy.278 Social
selection holds that people are born with certain traits and characteristics
that function as neural limits, which produce a selective effect.279 Individ-
uals with high cognitive abilities end up with greater SES, whereas indi-
280
viduals with lesser abilities end up in the lower classes.
The conflict between social cause and social selection figures into the
debate concerning policy solutions to remedy (or not remedy) the deeply
unequal outcomes experienced by the haves and have nots in the United
States. The standard conservative position is that inherited differences in
intelligence are the controlling a priori factors that determine one's place
in society.2 8 1 The authors of the infamous book The Bell Curve favorably
frame the founding fathers' belief that people should be sorted into a nat-
ural aristocracy, with the smartest taking on the responsibility for govern-
ance.282 If an individual's place in society is primarily a product of inher-
ited cognitive ability, then it does not make much sense to marshal re-
sources to provide more equal outcomes to everyone.283 Thus, social se-
lection, with its emphasis on inherited traits, is aligned with a conservative
position that would decline to devote collective resources to achieving
more equal outcomes.
Although it matches up with neoliberal or conservative conceptions
of the self, social selection is not the only explanatory theory for the envi-
ronment-outcome relationship. Social selection and social cause are not
mutually exclusive-both have support in the scientific literature-the de-
bate centers on how much emphasis one should be given over the other.284
276. JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: How OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 87 (2002).
277. See Phillips et al., supra note 273, at 110.
278. See id.
279. Lende, supra note 23, at 188.
280. Id.
281. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 271, at 10 (describing the theory that IQ determines
social standing).
282. See id. at 530-33.
283. Id. at 530.
284. For a view into the two ideological poles of this debate, see Herrnstein & Murray's The Bell
Curve and the book written in response to it-The Black-White Test Score Gap. See generally
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 271; THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 272. In
the introduction of The Black-White Test Score Gap, the editors explain that "despite endless specula-
tion, no one has found genetic evidence indicating that blacks have less innate intellectual ability than
whites." Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, Introduction, supra note 272, at 1, 2. For a recent
argument that expresses deep skepticism for whether social cause theories should support arguments
for more robust antipoverty programs, see Amy L. Wax, The Poverty of Neuroscience of Poverty:
Policy Payoffor False Promise?, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 239, 241-42 (2017). Professor Wax argues that
because neuroscience cannot definitively quantify how much of poverty's embodied effects derive
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For debates about remedies for lessening unequal outcomes, recent ad-
vances in epigenetics and neuroplasticity indicate that the balance should
be tipped more heavily in favor of social cause.
In contradistinction to social selection, the theory of social cause el-
evates the material environment as a causal factor for the various negative
health and cognitive outcomes associated with disadvantaged status.285 In
dividual action does play a role, but biologists and neuroscientists now
understand that the environment, along with one's genes, pulls many of
28the strings toward particular social outcomes.286 While "[g]enes may play
an essential role in placing a function in the brain of every human, . . . at
the same time [they] make a relatively small contribution to differences in
the way that function is wired in individuals."287
Social cause theory is supported by studies showing that small in-
come increases lessen the rate of childhood mental-health issues in impov-
erished families; that SES-mediated environments explain IQ differences
in adopted children; and that the impact of poverty on children is greater
in early childhood than late childhood.28 8 As Michael Marmot points out,
social cause theory is substantiated by "[b]irth cohort studies show[ing]
that social position precedes the development of ill-health."28 9 And, Mar-
mot's studies of British civil servants indicated that "job promotion led to
better health, rather than the reverse."290
Moreover, the kind of stress that mediates embodied inequality is not
a matter of selection. The stress produced by living in an impoverished
environment "involves both brain and body and is often driven by reac-
tions to environmental stressors, both real (e.g., a fistfight) and perceived
(e.g., thinking a fistfight could happen)."2 91 The research on embodied in-
equality supports the concept that culture and social structure shape the
individual, just as much as or perhaps even more so than the characteristics
that the individual is born with.292
A disadvantaged environment (e.g., an uncaring mother, harsh disci-
pline, fear of violence in the neighborhood) impacts biology at the indi-
vidual level.293 The connection between epigenetic changes and maternal
from social causes as opposed to genetic characteristics, then the science should not be used to support
antipoverty reform. Id.
285. Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 653.
286. Id (explaining that social selection and social cause are not mutually exclusive and may
operate together); Hertzman & Boyce, supra note 141, at 341 (explaining the theory of "gene-by-
environment" to explain differences in cognitive achievement between high-income and low-income
children); Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 2-3 (explaining how genetics alone fail to explain for
racial disparities in health outcomes).
287. LEDOuX, supra note 276, at 91.
288. Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 653.
289. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2, at 152 (emphasis added).
290. Id at 150, 152.
291. Lende, supra note 23, at 191.
292. See id. at 191-93.
293. Hackman et al., supra note 1, at 654; McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at 192.
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care makes it easy to blame the individual, in this case mothers. Indeed,
Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein believe that poverty and its related
stress effects are in large part perpetrated by "incompetent" "single women
of low intelligence."29 4
Such a callous, reductive framing, however, is a shortsighted ap-
proach for both the causes of and solutions to embodied inequality.295 Em-
bodied inequality is a structural problem.2 96 While biologically impactful
stress operates at the individual level (parenting, discipline), it also origi-
nates from a cascade of mundane aggressions, from everyday life occur-
rences that normally do not come under criticism 297 to choices and institu-
tional arrangements that maintain equilibrium between groups.298 Moreo-
ver, there is comparative evidence that stress is related to the amount of
inequality in a society's hierarchy; the steeper the hierarchy in a given so-
ciety, the worse the health outcomes are for those at the bottom.2 99 In this
way, it is not likely that intervention aimed exclusively at the individual
level will fully solve the problem because of how deeply inequality runs
in the material environment, our bodies, and our brains.300 Accordingly,
the biological embodiment of inequality is a problem that requires struc-
tural approaches, collective solutions capable of changing the degree of
inequality that exists in our society.
The next sections consider what, if anything, law and policy can do
to remodel the landscape of our capitalistic democracy in a way that re-
moves or ameliorates the toxic material conditions that can get under the
skin. From a rhetorical and legal standpoint, solving this problem requires
engagement with the logic of neoliberalism because neoliberalist policies
are, in great part, producing the stress and uncertainty that then become
embodied.
II. RHETORIC AND POLICY RESPONSES
While the big problems driving biological inequality-poverty, edu-
cation, income inequality, racial inequality-may not be entirely solvable
through legal means, the scientific theories explained in this Article, as
294. HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 271, at 519 ("[I]nadequate nutrition, physical abuse,
emotional neglect, lack of intellectual stimulation, a chaotic home environment ... are very difficult
to improve . .. when the single mother is incompetent.").
295. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 10 (arguing that embodied inequality is best seen as
"symptomatic of structural inequality and discrimination rather than [poor] choice[s]").
296. Id.
297. Hertzman & Boyce, supra note 141 ("[1]t is often the less memorable but hurtful and far
more prevalent misfortunes of childhood that become embedded in neural circuitry and produce the
vulnerabilities of adult life.").
298. See generally Christine Stephens & Annemarie Gillies, Understanding the Role ofEveryday
Practices of Privilege in the Perpetuation of Inequalities, 22 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 145, 145-56 (2012) (arguing that solving inequality must involve analyzing how the actions
of middle class groups (however unintentional) keep those beneath them in their place).
299. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2, at 150, 152-53.
300. Lende, supra note 23, at 197 (arguing that any attempt to address inequality at the individual
level will not fully address the problem because of how deeply rooted the problem is).
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they evolve, provide new openings for novel legal arguments and ap-
proaches to policy making. Ostensibly, neoliberalism and neoliberalist
rhetoric, with their relentless individualism and abstracted economic and
market focus, have produced the bodily harm suffered by the poor and
disadvantaged. Countering neoliberal thinking by cataloging and describ-
ing harm to individual bodies gives these arguments a new visceral fire-
power. Thus, the biology of inequality provides progressive advocates
with powerful new science-based evidence to support arguments that
would elevate collective, communitarian goals over individual interests.
For quite some time, progressive advocates have grappled with a de facto
narrative of virtue and merit that places individual striving front and cen-
ter.301 But now there is evidence that this narrative does not function in a
material environment of deprivation and disadvantage, produced by face-
less capitalistic forces, which damages bodies and brains so much.
Armed with science, progressive legal scholars and legal policy mak-
ers now have the ability to push for policy and legal remedies that could
reshape the material experiences of disadvantaged citizens in such a way
as to reverse these harmful and intractable biological effects. Such reme-
dies could be small scale, focused on interventions at the family level, or
larger scale, such as legal interventions in, constitutional, workplace, and
education law.
The new science supports policy solutions to strengthen the safety net
in a way that lessens capitalism's effects on society's most vulnerable.
Within the law, changes to workplace law and education law represent
universal remedies that could ameliorate the kind of randomized stress that
becomes embedded and passed on to subsequent generations. The science
could also re-animate the deployment of race-based remedies (affirmative
action and reparations) on the ground that biological harm is now traceable
to the psychosocial stress produced by slavery, Jim Crow terror, and to-
day's pervasive institutional racism. Section II.A. explains the new rhetor-
ical strategies that the science makes available. Then, Section II.B. out-
lines some of the policy changes that could heal these wounds. Part III will
address remedies specific to law.
A. Rhetorical Strategies: Countering Neoliberalist Logic
Embodied inequality can mount a strong challenge to the logic of ne-
oliberalism and advance arguments for collective solutions for society's
most durable problems-failing public education, poverty, and income in-
equality. This Article directly engages with neoliberal logic because ne-
oliberalist policies engender the kind of stress and lack of control that be-
comes embedded in the body and brain.
301. See ROLLO MAY, THE MEANING OF ANXIETY 180-81, 184 (rev. ed. 1977) (explaining the
deep folkways within Western culture that emphasize virtue, individualism, and competition against
others).
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Neoliberalism refers to the political logic that foregrounds the market
and individuals in competition as the primary actors in society; the gov-
ernment is relegated to the background, stripped of the power to intervene
and remedy social problems.3 0 2 As a mode of thought, it is most associated
with policies advanced in the 1980s by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan, policies that sought deregulation, stable private-property systems,
and the dismantling of the welfare state to shift the role of government
from public to private.30 3 Influenced by the economic theory of Friedrich
Hayek, neoliberalism posits that the only thing the state should do is sup-
port the market, protecting the mechanisms by which individuals can com-
pete and be entrepreneurs.304 The system, according to the theory, does not
privilege one set of values over another.305 The market is morally neu-
tral.306 Thus, neoliberalism differs somewhat from other incarnations of
conservative individualism because it presents itself as value free. Rather
than emphasizing the virtuosity of values, like a striving work ethic, it de-
clares that the neutral market is the best system for organizing social rela-
tions.307 However, the longstanding positive valence placed on individual-
ism remains in the thought system as an enthymeme, an implicitly under-
308stood premise.
Neoliberalism, operating through its contention that it is value free,
might be thought of as individualism on steroids. The subject's virtue is
measured by a capacity for "self-care," the ability to provide for one's own
need and ambitions.309 Poor social outcomes are solely the fault of the in-
dividuals who made poor choices in the market.310 "The neoliberal model
of [individual] choice does not recognize the material constraints that limit
an individual's choices because those constraints are seen as merely the
product of her previous choices."3 1'
Under neoliberalist logic, if a person fails, it is her own fault. 3 12 So-
ciologist Loic Wacquant refers to this phenomenon as "[t]he cultural trope
302. See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM'S STEALTH REVOLUTION 10,
17, 28, 30, 42 (2015). In neoliberalist economies, global capital remains dependent on the state's dif-
fuse and variegated network of law, treaties, and quasi-governmental institutions. Jackson Lears, The
Long Con, 37 LONDON REV. BOOKS 28, 29-30 (2015) (reviewing STEVE FRASER, THE AGE OF
ACQUIESCENCE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZED WEALTH AND
POWER (2015)).
303. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis ofLegal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
71, 83 (2014).
304. Id. at 72, 73, 85, 99.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 99.
307. Id.
308. See id. at 88, 89, 102 (explaining that neoliberalist logic/rhetoric is so powerful because it
is "inextricably tied to [deep-seated] beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as
corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change").






of individual responsibility," a rhetoric that enables corporations and gov-
ernments to abdicate responsibility for individuals' wellbeing.3 13 If you do
not do well in the market, it is your own fault.314 In this way, neoliberalism
privileges a highly atomistic view of human relations that denies the ne-
cessity of communal or collective solutions to provide stability and secu-
rity to working people.3 15 As theorized in more depth below, neoliberalist
philosophy produces uncertainty and anxiety, which then morph into the
kind of stress that can become embodied.
The neoliberalist perspective efficiently dispenses with arguments
that seek to remedy unequal social outcomes. The law should ensure qual
opportunity but not concern itself with the absence of equal outcomes.316
According to this logic, the state should not interfere with social sorting
mechanisms because differences in social outcomes result from differ-
317ences in cognitive talent. Inequality becomes the norm, "a market for-
mulation of winners and losers."318
In this way, antipathy to interventions for public welfare sets neolib-
eralism apart from liberalism. Although liberalism emphasized the virtues
of individual striving and competition, it also viewed law as an appropriate
mechanism (particularly Keynesian319 approaches) for accomplishing the
objectives of a society.320 However, in the words of Margaret Thatcher,
"[t]here is no such thing as society."321 Two strains of neoliberal thought
support the hostility to large-scale state or government programs that seek
to achieve social security for all, as a public good.322 The first concept is
that the market is such a complex and fragile ecosystem that anything that
might interfere with it should be avoided.323 And second, drawing upon
Cold War experiences, is the belief that it is simply impossible for the state
3 13. Lofc Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity,
25 Soc. F. 197, 213-14 (2010).
314. See id.; Blalock, supra note 303, at 88.
315. Blalock, supra note 303, at 87.
316. In their book, Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray provide an example of the con-
servative thought that advocates for equal opportunity without regard to outcomes. See HERRNSTEIN
& MURRAY, supra note 271, at 530-34.
317. Id. (discussing differences in cognitive ability against the backdrop of affirmative action).
See generally CHRISTOPHER HAYES, TWILIGHT OF THE ELITES: AMERICA AFTER MERITOCRACY
(2012) (discussing how American individualism views unequal outcomes as a natural sorting based
on innate individual differences).
318. BROWN, supra note 302, at 41.
319. John Maynard Keynes (for whom Keynesian economics is named) theorized that a state's
government can and should be actively involved in managing the economy, through fiscal policy and
government spending. See Alan S. Blinder, The Fall andRise ofKeynesian Economics, 64 ECON. REC.
278, 278-83 (1988).
320. Blalock, supra note 303, at 84.
321. Id at 73 (quoting Interview by Douglas Keay with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of
the U.K., in London, U.K. (Sept. 23, 1987), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689).
322. Blalock, supra note 303, at 87 ("The neoliberal framework, premised on the impossibility
of enacting a collective substantive vision, clearly cannot ground the state's legitimacy in democratic
authority and pursuit of the common good the way liberalism does.").
323. Id. at 85-86.
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to successfully effectuate social policy for the public good; the market is
the only mechanism that works.324
Specifically, neoliberalism eschews any commitment, grounded in a
sense of the collective good and moral responsibility, to provide individual
workers with a secure, lifelong job that carries a living wage.3 25 After
World War II, as more competition emerged from postwar economies, the
American economy morphed from an industrial economy to a finance
economy.326 In this transition, the focus moved from making money by
manufacturing things, which created fairly stable jobs at the firm level, to
an emphasis on inflating stock prices, for which mass layoffs created the
best payoff.327 Neoliberalism has ushered in an era of disaggregated pro-
duction, offshore jobs, and temporary staffing models.328
Thus, within the neoliberal political economy, the distressing effects
of material inequality are not a moral problem to be reckoned with. Ine-
quality is just the natural and probable consequence of faceless market
forces.32 9 Neoliberalism thus enshrines an incredibly harsh style of social
Darwinism that was absent from liberalism, which was at least animated
by humanistic values, which in turn supported social-welfare policies to
help vulnerable subjects.3 30 Unlike liberal Keynesian approaches, neolib-
eralist logic abdicates all responsibility for individuals who falter. "The
state is not responsible if individuals do not properly respond to the mar-
ket's incentive structures, but it is responsible for the pernicious conse-
quences of sheltering individuals from the market's disciplinary ef-
fects."331 Thus, neoliberalist logic views social welfare programs as anath-
emas, shelters that shield individuals from the consequences of their own
actions. The government's only concern is giving people access to markets
and the ability to pursue their own interests.332
Rhetorically, the social insecurity inherent in the neoliberal economy
has been refrained as free agency. All individuals, regardless of their cir-
cumstances, are reduced to human capital or capitals exercising choice in
the market.33 3 And, as human capitals, everyone must be competitively
324. Id. at 93-94.
325. Lifelong social support in exchange for a life's work is referred to as the Fordist-Keynesian
social compact. See Wacquant, supra note 313, at 201.
326. Lears, supra note 302.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Blalock, supra note 303, at 88.
330. See BROWN, supra note 302, at 187-88 (discussing the post-WWII view that liberal arts
exposure would cultivate humanistic values, helpful for citizenship and democracy); Wacquant, supra
note 313, at 198-99 (referencing the acceptance of social welfare initiatives during the middle of the
twentieth century).
331. Blalock, supra note 303, at 88.
332. Id.
333. Blalock, supra note 303, at 87; BROWN, supra note 302, at 37.
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entrepreneurial, constantly working to increase value and return on invest-
ment.33 4 Think of the person who works in a low-wage job during the day
and is a sharing-economy "entrepreneur" for Uber at night.335 By catego-
rizing all workers as entrepreneurial, neoliberalism obscures class visibil-
ity. 336 Workers are just like management (just exceedingly unequal to in-
dividuals in management or executive positions).337 And yet, ordinary
workers "have no guarantee of security, protection, or even survival." 338
From a rhetorical perspective, neoliberalism gains its power because
its logic is based around an enthymeme, a syllogism in which the premises
(inequality is normal; the market is an effective, value-free organizing in-
stitution) are left unstated and thus untouched. Neoliberalism, by not di-
rectly engaging with democratic principles oriented around the collective
good-or "the demos" as Wendy Brown frames it-has been able to con-
duct a "stealth revolution" and erase intelligent, legitimate alternatives to
the current political rationality, held collectively.339 Neoliberalism is heg-
emonic.340 As Jackson Lears quipped, neoliberalism is "everywhere and
nowhere; its custodians are largely invisible."34 1
Thus, on the one hand, neoliberalist rhetoric focuses on individual
responsibility that says that if one fails to obtain a meaningful place in life,
342then it is one's own fault. On the other hand, neoliberalism employs an
"illusion of amorality"343 along with neutral market and economics lan-
guage to extract individual personhood from corporate actors in a way that
entirely absolves them from responsibility.344 In fact, neoliberalism's neu-
trality allows it to be "indifferently embraced by politicians of the Right
334. BROWN, supra note 302, at 36, 65.
335. See Robert Reich, Robert Reich: The Sharing Economy Will Be Our Undoing, SALON (Aug.
25, 2015, 2:15 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/08/25/robert-reichthe-sharingecon-
omywill be our undoing partner.
336. BROWN, supra note 302, at 65.
337. Seeid.
338. Id. at 37.
339. Id. at 68-69, 115-16. Brown refers to neoliberal logic as "more termitelike than lionlike."
Id. at 35.
340. Blalock, supra note 303, at 89.
341. Lears, supra note 302. Looking at this submerging phenomenon from a slightly different
angle, Loic Wacquant argues that certain aspects of neoliberalism (particularly its tendency toward
mass incarceration of the poor and racially oppressed) operate in a highly visible way, through the
police, the courts, and popular culture that celebrates law enforcement (Law & Order, CSI, Dog the
Bounty Hunter, etc.)). See Wacquant, supra note 313, at 206. Nonetheless, the carceral arm of neolib-
eralism effectively submerges the bodily pain and suffering experienced by those in the bottom ranks
of society by invisibilizing and containing them behind prison walls. See id.
342. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
343. Blalock, supra note 303, at 99.
344. See Linda Nader, The Life ofthe Law - A Moving Story, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 655, 662 (2002)
(describing consumer/business disputes as moving from a face-to-face method of conversation to a
fact-to-faceless culture).
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or the Left." 3 4 5 Neoliberalist rhetoric is brilliant in its power to both scape-
goat (in a neutral way) individuals who are at the bottom rungs of society
and mask responsibility for those at the top. This dual rhetoric relies on
both submersion (not seeing the palpable harm that the capitalistic appa-
ratuses create) and abstraction (giving corporate actors a mask of invisi-
bility).
Finally, despite its claim to being value-free, abstract neoliberalist
rhetoric descends from the conservative political rhetoric, devised by
Richard Nixon adviser Lee Atwater and successfully deployed to dampen
the public sentiment garnered by the civil rights, anti-war, and other 1960s
social-justice-oriented movements. In the 1960s, political and social infor-
mation were presented in a new, highly visual way that galvanized audi-
ences.346 Progressives gained rhetorical ground in part by emphasizing (on
television and in photojournalism) the visual and visceral harm happening
to bodies. Television and print media exposed audiences to black Ameri-
can civil rights protesters being mauled by police dogs and collapsing un-
der high-pressure fire hoses, as well as Southern school children facing
hateful heckling in their journey to a newly desegregated school.347 View-
ers also beheld the corpses of the murdered Emmett Till and Dr. Martin
Luther King, together with universal images of human grieving and des-
pair in photographs of Mamie Till and Coretta Scott King.348 Also in con-
text, audiences were moved to oppose the war in Vietnam upon viewing
the slain student protesters at Kent State and haunting photographs of ag-
onized children fleeing napalm in Vietnam.349
In response to this leftward shift in public sentiment, Lee Atwater's
"Southern Strategy" replaced visibly racial rhetoric (racial epithets, re-
peated calls for segregation, etc.) with abstract language focusing on indi-
vidual freedom: freedom of association (as an argument against forced de-
segregation), freedom from forced busing of children (an argument against
school desegregation efforts), and freedom from the dangerous inner-city
crime.3 5 0 This more abstracted rhetoric was much more middle-class and
345. Wacquant, supra note 313, at 209. In fact, Democratic President Bill Clinton's 1990s wel-
fare reforms and tough on crime positions integrated neoliberalism fully into the U.S. political econ-
omy. See id.
346. See Christine Harold & Kevin Michael DeLuca, Behold the Corpse: Violent Images and the
Case ofEmmett Till, 8 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 263, 267 (2005). See generally MAURICE BERGER, FOR
ALL THE WORLD TO SEE: VISUAL CULTURE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (2010) (providing
a comprehensive examination of the ways images inspired audiences to join the civil rights move-
ment).
347. KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 210 (2005).
348. See Harold & DeLuca, supra note 346, at 265.
349. See RODGER STREITMATTER, MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD: HOW THE NEWS MEDIA HAVE
SHAPED AMERICAN HISTORY 177-87 (2012) (discussing the impact of news and photojournalism on
the public's view of the Vietnam War).
350. Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy,
NATION (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/exclusive-lee-atwaters-iifamous-1981-in-
terview-southem-strategy; see also KRUSE, supra note 347, at 6-8, 164, 194 (explaining Southern
6492018]
DENVER LAW REVIEW
respectable than populist racialized rhetoric (e.g., the rhetoric of George
Wallace).35 1 Accordingly, the Southern Strategy successfully drew mid-
dle-class white voters to the Republican Party throughout the 1970s and
1980s.352
In tandem with this rhetorical shift from demagoguery to a more ab-
stract focus on rights, brute physical violence gave way to legitimized
forms of social control administered through the police, courts, prisons,
and the deployment of "law and order" and "broken windows" narra-
tives.353 LoYc Wacquant refers to these popular-culture narratives as "law
and order pornography,"354 expressed in television shows like Cops, Law
& Order, CSI, etc. These shows allow the law and order narrative to be-
come a "core civic theater onto whose stage elected officials prance to
dramatize moral norms and display their professed capacity for decisive
action, thereby reaffirming the political relevance of Leviathan3 55 at the
very moment when they organize its powerlessness with respect to the
market."356 Also in this same time period, the United States became four
or five times more punitive, imprisoning scores of mostly poor and minor-
ity citizens.35 7 In this way, conservative rhetoric and action has been able
to divert attention away from highly visible and visceral bodily depictions
of oppression hurting people living in the social and racial underclass. The
poor and oppressed living in the nether spaces of society are taken to the
mass prison system where they are contained, warehoused, and isap-
358
peared from view.
In response to this invisibilization trend, the biology of inequality di-
rects the eye back toward the palpable injuries suffered by disadvantaged
adults and children, simply as a result of living in capitalistic society. Re-
focusing on the visceral, corporal effects of a previously abstracted and
decontextualized system could prove to be highly persuasive.359 Using vis-
ual imagery to detail the harm and pain flowing from embodied inequality
conservatism's successful transformation from bald-faced racist demagoguery to new arguments
premised on a rhetoric of "rights, freedoms, and individualism").
351. KRUSE, supra note 347, at 7.
352. Id. at 6.
353. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 40 (2012) (arguing that a racial caste system in America exists through the
targeting of black men through the criminal justice system); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street
Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457
(2000) (arguing that the "broken windows" theory of policing disproportionally targets people of color
living in poorer neighborhoods).
354. Wacquant, supra note 313, at 206.
355. Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (a biblical sea monster) metaphorically illustrates how a pow-
erful sovereign imposes order and discipline over a mass of citizens. See generally THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN (Christopher Brooke ed., Penguin Classics 2017) (1651).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 199 n.4, 208.
358. Id. at 203-04.
359. See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock
Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 486
650 [Vol. 95:3
THE BIOLOGY OF INEQUALITY
360
produces an inherently visceral reaction in an audience. Visual rhetoric
(whether in the form of images or imagistic language), particularly as it is
focused on injury to the human body, has the potential to demand a "force
[ofl reckoning, an active redistribution of knowledge that is different from
what had sufficed before."361 Moreover, rhetoric itself operates on an em-
bodied level:
[W]hen rhetoric influences us, it does so in an embodied way, trigger-
ing electro-chemical reactions that traverse our neural pathways, [out-
side] the purview of our conscious thought. Although it sounds like a
science fiction concept, the biological and embodied nature of rhetoric
is in line with the beliefs of the ancient Sophists, who understood rhet-
oric to have the same kind of effect on the brain as a drug.
362
Thus, attacking neoliberal thought patterns by using rhetoric that
trains our focus on the body operates on two different levels: (1) the sub-
ject matter of the rhetoric operates on a visceral level; and (2) the rhetoric
itself, in general, has an embodied impact. Using rhetoric that elevates
principles of community, care, and nurturance over those of individualism
and competition has the potential to forge new collective thought patterns,
thereby influencing collective values and policy choices.363
Thus, as a rhetorical strategy to respond to neoliberalism, progressive
scholars and theorists should focus on the body and strive to concretize
and surface the tragic uncaringness that underlies neoliberalism. One part
of this project is to dredge up and display, through scientific description,
the acute bodily infections that occur from living in unforgiving environ-
ments of social insecurity and racialized oppression. We can emphasize
how years of physical and psychic threats, fueled by racial oppression,
have infected countless black men, women, and children, who continue to
experience negative mental and health outcomeS364 as well as higher rates
of mortality than their white counterparts.
There should also be emphasis on the universal pain inflicted by bio-
logical inequality. We now know that white working-class males are also
experiencing serious setbacks in mortality, which are best explained by
concomitant socioeconomic setbacks that have occurred since the 1970s-
(1997) (gruesome imagery has a special ability to "generate a sense of moral outrage that demands
someone be found responsible and held accountable").
360. See id.
361. Harold & DeLuca, supra note 346, at 281 (discussing the impact that images of Emmett
Till's corpse had on the public).
362. Lucy A. Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing
Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 663 (2017).
363. See infra notes 357-65 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 225-67 and accompanying text.
365. ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8-9
(2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/casedeatonspl 7_finaldraft.pdf.
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the disappearance of secure jobs along with the family and social stability
that these good jobs bring.366
Unlike other policy arguments seeking to call out neoliberalist logic
and advocate interventions for inequality, arguments related to the biolog-
ical embodiment of inequality bring two new things to the table: (1) the
ability to induce moral outrage and (2) scientific legitimacy. The moral
outrage (life and death should ignite deep-seated normative reactions) pre-
sented by this problem could shock the legal system into a new catalytic
state where large-scale collective solutions to societal problems are seri-
ously entertained.3 67 We are talking about life and death, and death comes
more quickly if you are poor, and even more quickly if you are poor and a
member of a historically oppressed group. In fact, both Hillary Rodham
Clinton and Bernie Sanders referred to the disparate life expectancies be-
tween the poor and the rich in their presidential campaigns.3 68
Rhetorically, when progressives confront the logic of neoliberalism,
we might take advice from cognitive scientist George Lakoff. Lakoff iden-
tifies two deep-seated metaphors to explain left and right thought patterns
in the-United States-the strict father and the nurturing mother.369 Neolib-
eral or conservative logic mostly relies on the strict father metaphor-the
individual who fails does so as a result of his own poor choices or weak-
370ness in the face of competition; that individual must be disciplined.
More progressive policies draw upon the nurturing mother metaphor.37 1
Lakoff advises progressive political advocates to frame the government in
the role of the empathic mother and emphasize that the "first responsibility
of the government is to protect and empower its citizens" through an "eth-
ics of care."372 These two family metaphors, though they are oppositional,
are deep-seated and embodied in our minds.373 Most humans respond to
both of these metaphors.374 One side can gain a cognitive rhetorical ad-
vantage by repeatedly emphasizing one metaphor, or frame, in a way that
trumps the other frame.375
366. Id. at 2, 8, 29-34.
367. GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND: A COGNITIVE SCIENTIST'S GUIDE TO YOUR
BRAIN AND ITS POLITICS 53 (2008) ("To get the public to adopt progressive moral positions you have
to activate progressive moral thought in them by openly-and constantly-stressing morality, not just
the interests of demographic groups.").
368. See Sabrina Tavemise, Disparity in Life Spans of the Rich and the Poor is Growing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/health/disparity-in-life-spans-of-the-rich-
and-the-poor-is-growing.html.
369. See LAKOFF, supra note 367, at 76-77.
370. Id. at 78-79.
371. See id. at 81.
372. Id. at47-48.
373. Id. at 82-84.
374. See id at 76-84.
375. Id. at 53, 114.
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Scientific knowledge produced through empirical data collection and
laboratory studies also legitimizes legal and policy arguments.376 The con-
sequences of inequality infect the human body and brain at the genetic and
synaptic levels, and are then passed on to subsequent generations. The sci-
ence lends empirical credibility to the argument that deepening inequality
is more than just a policy problem, it is a medical issue that carries far
more complexity than a facile narrative of winners and losers, sorted based
on inherent "merit."
Here, the science on embodied inequality could generate novel legal
arguments that might return us to a jurisprudential time when large-scale
collective solutions to social problems were both entertained and imple-
mented. As Professor Jack Balkin has stated, individualism and commu-
nalism constitute the most important pair of opposed ideas in legal and
moral thought.377 So many legal quandaries turn on how much responsi-
bility to give to the individual versus how much responsibility the com-
munity should have collectively.37 8
Progressive scholars generally advocate that the legal continuum
should swing more in the direction of collective responsibility over indi-
vidual responsibility. For instance, such a collective approach is found in
Martha Fineman's vulnerability theory, that the state should become more
responsive and actively step in and protect its citizens, who are all vulner-
able.379 Here, Professor Fineman's vulnerability theory dovetails nicely
with the embodiment heories discussed in this Article. For Professor Fine-
man, we humans are inherently vulnerable because of our embodiment;
we are always susceptible to bodily harm and injury from accidents and
catastrophes.3 8 0 Similarly here, the theories of epigenetics and neuroplas-
ticity are aligned with Professor Fineman's theory. Because our bodies and
brains are shaped by negative material- and social-environmental condi-
tions and, in many instances, these conditions exist outside of our control,
the biological embodiment of inequality substantiates a theory that we are
all vulnerable and we all need protection. In accordance with Professor
Fineman's theory, collective solutions, delivered by a robust state, can and
should ameliorate some of the conditions that can get under the skin. The
next section considers how embodied inequality might support policy ini-
tiatives grounded in a collective approach to solving large-scale social
problems.
376. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles & Constitutional
Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 101, 162 (2003) (quoting MICHEL SERRES & BRUNO LATOUR,
CONVERSATIONS ON SCIENCE, CULTURE AND TIME 87 (1995)).
377. Jack M. Balkin, The Crystalline Nature of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12-13
(1986).
378. Id. at 16.
379. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human





This Part of the Article focuses on potential policy choices that could
be pursued to reverse the bodily harm that is so highly correlated with
economic, social, and racial degradation. Scientists have theorized that ep-
igenetic and neuroplastic changes to the body can be reversed by altering
an individual's environment. 38 ' If the material environment can be shifted
from punitive to curative, then there is the possibility of healing. Drawing
upon the scientific theory, if we can change the material environment to
give individuals more of a sense of control, this will decrease the acute
levels of stress responses associated with living with no control. Accord-
ingly, the ill health effects discussed supra, might be reversed.
With this general end in mind, Section II.B. 1. discusses small-scale
solutions and Section II.B.2. discusses large-scale structural changes that
would improve disparities in biological outcomes.
1. Small-Scale Solutions
Small-scale solutions would be aimed at improving environments at
the individual and family level. The goal is to teach and build mental and
neural pathways that are resilient, that are better able to handle the types
of stress that can become embedded.382 For example, the Perry Preschool
Project studied the effects of parent coaching in the form of weekly home
383visits with participating families (low SES). At three and four years old,
children in this project also attended a free, high-quality preschool pro-
384
gram. The Perry Preschool Project's robust intervention resulted in
short-term improvements in cognitive performance, long-term impacts on
high school graduation rates, self-sufficiency, and reduced incarcera-
385tion. Unfortunately, few of the thousands of programs based on the
Perry Preschool Project have been able to replicate its structure and bene-
fits (for funding reasons or otherwise).386
Similarly, in response to its black infant-mortality crisis,387 Milwau-
kee has initiated Blanket of Love, a program of nurse home visits to black
381. Kuzawa & Sweet, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing epigenetics); McEwen & Gianaros, supra
note 1, at 198-99 (discussing neuroplasticity). There is also reason to believe that epigenetic and neu-
roplastic changes can be reversed with drugs or hormones. See McEwen & Gianaros, supra note 1, at
190, 198-99. For moral and ethical reasons (a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article),
the policy of injecting disadvantaged individuals with drugs or hormones to try to reverse embodied
inequality is not an ideal solution.
382. See, e.g., Nat'l Sci. Council on the Developing Child, Supportive Relationships and Active
Skill-Building Strengthen the Foundations of Resilience 1 (Ctr. on the Developing Child at Harvard
Univ., .. Working Paper No. 13, 2015), http://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/re-
ports and working papers/working papers/wpl3.
383. Jack P. Shonkoff, Changing the Narrative for Early Childhood Investment, 168 JAMA




387. See supra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
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mothers residing in high-poverty areas, an initiative that has proven effec-
tive in other cities.388 Women living in poverty in Milwaukee face "a par-
ticularly brutal slate of risk factors and stressors" that make pregnancy and
parenting deeply challenging.38 9 Blanket of Love sends out nurses and
other professional caregivers to engage with at-risk pregnant women and
"wrap the pregnant woman up in love." 390 The volunteers in this program
intervene to reduce the stressors correlated with the conditions of racial-
ized poverty by finding women homes or furniture; helping them feel con-
fident in talking to doctors; providing education on safe sleeping condi-
tions; or in some cases, helping women escape abusive relationships.3 91
While these individualized interventions have been shown to help, those
who are studying the infant mortality crisis in Milwaukee note that much
of the problem goes beyond the individual level and touches on large-scale
issues like mass incarceration, housing precarity, and the cloud of racism
and bias that infects everyday experiences at work and other settings (like
Ob-Gyn doctor's offices).392
Small-scale solutions hould be pursued, but not at the expense of
larger scale solutions, as politically difficult as those solutions may be.
Embodied inequality cannot be solved with prenatal support, parental ed-
ucation, or cognitive stimulation alone.393 While embodied inequality can
be reversed, that reversal happens only if the material environment is sub-
stantively changed. This supports the adoption of large-scale structural
remedies.
2. Large-Scale Solutions
This section of the Article proposes policy solutions, broad in scope,
that would strengthen social security in the United States and give large
portions of citizens a greater sense of stability and control over their lives
and their children's lives.
Large-scale solutions should be aimed at reducing poverty and per-
sistent racial inequality and bias. In the context of this Article, poverty
concentrates stress at toxic levels by creating unpredictable adversity that
leaves people unable to respond. The resulting lack of control, at the indi-
vidual and societal level, in turn releases ruinous toxins in the body and
mind.394 Those with racial disadvantage suffer these effects twofold, the
so-called double jeopardy of poverty and racial disadvantage.
A move toward social democracy, with a massive shoring up of so-
cial-welfare programing, would ameliorate the stress that stems from the





393. Lende, supra note 23, at 194.
394. See supra notes 23-24, 145-50 and accompanying text.
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unbridled uncertainty of living in poverty. The state should broadcast the
message that we will catch you if and when you fall. It is worth noting that
citizens in Greece, with a much lower gross national product per capita but
a much stronger social-welfare support system,-enjoy a higher life expec-
tancy than citizens in the United States.395 Thus, an inference can be drawn
that robust social security systems positively impact lifespan umbers.
Beyond the project of making the United States look more like West-
ern Europe (the success of which, in this climate, is politically dubious),
other large-scale initiatives 396 that would give individuals more control
over their lives include the following:
* A living wage-a living wage would reduce stress by giving indi-
viduals certainty over how and whether they will be able to support
-397their families.
* Paid family and sick leave policies-these policies would reduce
stress for workers by eliminating having to choose between sus-
taining income and being able to care for loved ones.398
* Universal healthcare-having access to healthcare increases cer-
tainty and a sense of control over unpredictable health issues;
moreover, unsurprisingly, the underinsured and uninsured have a
higher chance of dying than the privately insured.399
* An end to mass incarceration-mass incarceration leads to disen-
franchisement; civic alienation; and exclusion from employment,
housing, education, and other benefits, all of which negatively im-
pact the health of those affected. These negative health conse-
quences likely impact the incarcerated and their partners and chil-
dren.400
III. LEGAL SOLUTIONS
As addressed in this Part, the scientific theories discussed in this Ar-
ticle can be applied to generate novel constitutional theories concerning
equal protection. The biology of inequality is relevant for considering
395. Marmot, Status Syndrome, supra note 2, at 153.
396. See McEwen & Gianoros, supra note 1, at 210 ("[B]asic education, housing, taxation, set-
ting of a minimum wage, and addressing occupational health and safety and environmental pollution
regulations are all likely to affect the brain and health via a myriad of mechanisms.").
397. COUNCIL ON CMTY. PEDIATRICS, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, POVERTY AND CHILD
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, PEDIATRICS 4, 7 (2016).
398. CURTIS SKINNER & SUSAN OCHSHORN, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, PAID
FAMILY LEAVE: STRENGTHENING FAMILIES AND OUR FUTURE 5-6, 9 (2012).
399. Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2289, 2292 (2009).
400. See Krieger, An Ecosocial Approach, supra note 16, at 938 (discussing the negative biolog-
ical impact of mass incarceration); Carpenter, supra note 26 (discussing the work of Arline Geroni-
mus, who theorized that pregnant women who experience the incarceration of a partner or spouse
experience chronic stress, which releases harmful chemicals, which are then passed to her child in
utero).
656 [Vol. 95:3
THE BIOLOGY OF INEQUALITY
whether being poor equates to being in a suspect class, which would trig-
ger higher levels of scrutiny for government discrimination.4 0 ' The science
is also relevant for determining whether robust governmental remedies for
past discrimination are appropriate, if that discrimination can be biologi-
cally traced.
From a more specific standpoint, the science might be applied to re-
form the legal structures that undergird workplace law and public-educa-
tion law. In the context of work, more worker protection would provide
families and children shelter from the stress of living without control,
which would in turn ameliorate many of the biological effects of disad-
vantage.
Public education is relevant to this Article because initiatives that fos-
ter stable and integrated public schools correlate with positive collateral
effects in the material environment (reduced pockets of concentrated pov-
erty, more residential integration).402 Thus, a strong inference can be
drawn that good, integrated (racial and socioeconomic) public schools can
slow down or halt some of the detrimental biological effects mediated by
disadvantaged living situations.
A. Constitutional Jurisprudence
Two areas of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence could be impacted by
the scientific theories discussed in this Article. First, the science supports
arguments that impoverished people might be considered a suspect class
for the purpose of equal protection analysis. Second, if and when racial
harm becomes biologically traceable, this will challenge existing Supreme
Court holdings restricting the use of race to remedy past and continuing
racial harm. Further development of these arguments will hopefully appear
in a subsequent article. In particular, the biology of inequality supports
new arguments: that (1) poverty should be considered a suspect character-
istic; and (2) existing jurisprudence concerning race remedies (affirmative
action, reparations) can be discarded because racial harm may soon be-
come biologically traceable.
With respect to poverty, the Supreme Court has definitively held that
impecunity is not a suspect class characteristic.403 In San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriquez,404 Justice Powell, writing for the ma-
jority, held that poor people, as a class, are "not saddled with such disabil-
ities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
401. See supra notes 392-95 and accompanying text.
402. See infra note 489 and accompanying text.
403. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 19-22, 25 (1973). Julie Nice wrote
a masterful critique of the Court's holding on this point. Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Decon-
stitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
629, 646-47 (2007).
404. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-
traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."405
As this Article has described, the new science of epigenetics-and to
a certain extent, neuroplasticity-roundly challenges the Court's reason-
ing on this point. The new science indicates that persons living in poverty
do become saddled with persistent disabilities, as the ill effects of deprived
material environments seep into the body and mind and get passed on,
through biology (i.e., in utero exposure to stress hormones) and physicality
(repeated early exposure to toxic material environments). While some
might incorrectly construe the science as supporting a socially determinist
argument that poor people suffer because they are innately weak, these
new scientific theories reject that argument out of hand. The persistent bi-
ological suffering discussed in this Article primarily results from the en-
vironment that one is born into and comes of age into, rather than from
any kind of innate characteristic or individual choice.
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, state actors cannot use
race in affirmative action programs to heal and repair the effects of past
racial discrimination unless a specific constitutional or statutory violation
406has been shown. In Bakke, Justice Powell, writing for a plurality, rea-
soned that "[t]here is no principled basis for deciding which groups would
merit 'heightened judicial solitude' and which would not. Courts would be
asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered
by various minority groups."407 But what if it becomes possible to biolog-
ically trace the harm that one group has inflicted on another? Multiple sci-
entists are developing the theory that the racial and social environment has
408become biologically embedded within the black American populace.
Soon it might be possible to trace the biological harm deriving from the
atrocities of slavery; the terror of Jim Crow; the despair of discrimination
in housing, finance, employment, education, militarized policing, and in-
carceration; and the stress of daily exposure to interpersonal bias and in-
stitutionalized racism. The health gap (infant mortality rates and lifespans)
between whites and blacks cannot be explained by inherent genetic varia-
tions.409 Immigrants to the United States from Africa do not suffer from
these same ill-health consequences.4 10 The cloud of U.S. culture and insti-
tutions continues to infect black citizens in a particular and unique way. If
racial harm becomes biologically traceable, that opens up new arguments
for the justness and efficacy of reparations. Reparations are no longer a
remedy that is too far removed from the original harm because the original
harm endures.
405. Id. at 28.
406. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302, 308-09 (1978).
407. Id. at 296-97.
408. See supra notes 225-67 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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While the biological traceability concept bolsters the argument that
the harm of racism can possibly be traced to a chain of de jure and de facto
causes, it does not address the problem of the innocent member of the ma-
jority who "bear[s] no responsibility for whatever harm [a minority group
member] . . . [has] suffered."411 At this point, the analysis shifts into nar-
ratives of individual responsibility, when a more appropriate analysis
might focus on an inquiry into the problem of unequal distributions of bi-
ological capital.
B. Specific Legal Solutions
This section makes prescriptive arguments and observations about
two areas of the law, workplace law and education law, that might be re-
formed to make positive impacts on material environments. Workplace
law might be reformed to give families more certainty and control over
their income and work time. Public education can be structured to con-
struct healthy environments that produce positive educational outcomes as
well as collateral benefits for the community and the economy. Reform in
both of these areas could reshape expectations about work and wages to
create more certainty and control and reduce toxic stress.
1. Workplace Law
Biologically embedded stress derives, in great part, from a perceived
lack of control over one's life.4 12 In the context of working-poor and im-
poverished people, embedded stress is exacerbated by neoliberalist work
policies that, by their very nature, create a deep sense of uncertainty and
unpredictability. As Wendy Brown writes, neoliberalism places every in-
dividual, no matter what the individual's particular contextual circum-
stances, in the role of a capital agent, responsible for the individual's own
wellbeing in the market.413 The logic of neoliberalism holds that because
everyone is an independent entrepreneur and capitalist, there is no need
414
for anyone to be dependent upon collective support structures. In a sys-
tem where every person is for themselves, people do not know whether or
not their work will earn them enough income to pay for shelter and food.
Low-wage workers, in particular, struggle with a lack of control over
working hours, work time, and the overall security of their jobs. This lack
of control affects the stability of the environment that parents are able to
provide for their children,415 which can produce long-term physical and
mental health damage. Thus, workplace laws could be changed to provide
more certainty to low-wage workers. As mentioned above, a living wage
would go far, but laws could also mandate a certain number of consistent
411. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
412. See supra notes 23-26, 140-45 and accompanying text.
413. BROWN, supra note 302, at 22.
414. See id. at 22-23, 30, 34-37, 40-41.
415. LEILA MORSY & RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., PARENTS' NON-STANDARD
WORK SCHEDULES MAKE ADEQUATE CHILDREARING DIFFICULT 2 (2015).
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hours; more heavily regulate just-in-time or on-call employment practices;
or enact more across-the-board protections for workers, such as shifting
some at-will work relationships into more protected positions.
For instance, the just-in-time or on-call aspects of labor practices un-
der neoliberalism exacerbate the lack of control experienced by low-wage
workers. With just-in-time or on-call labor practices, employers use big-
data algorithms to dictate when workers may work and get paid,. or not
work and not get paid.416 These scheduling systems are emblematic of ne-
oliberalism's dedication, in the name of flexibility, to slashing all possible
expenses deriving from human labor, "allowing [companies] to staff stores
during busy times and save on payroll during slow days."417 Under this
system, workers might make childcare and travel arrangements to get to
work, only to be told, hours before the shift is to start, that there are not
enough customers available to justify the employee's presence.418 Not
knowing whether one will have hours to work during a day, whether one's
child care arrangements are for naught, or the amount of one's paycheck
creates the exact kind of loss of control that fuels chronic stress that then
becomes embodied.
The end result for people operating in this environment is stress and
anxiety, total uncertainty over the things-income, health, shelter- nec-
essary to sustain life. Creating a sense of control, in this context, involves
creating more predictability and less uncertainty in terms of the job itself
as well as work hours.4 19 Unionized jobs offer better protections to workers
in terms of stability of work schedules, and some states now require em-
ployers to provide minimum pay and pay guarantees for employees called
in to work.420 But more stringent federal regulation of workplace policies
would go further.421 Guaranteed minimum hours of pay and required sta-
bility in employee scheduling would give low-wage workers the certainty
to both work and plan family care.




419. For stressful events, predictability functions as a mitigating factor. People who experience
anxiety producing events (i.e., shocks administered in a psychological experiment) feel less distress
when the events are predictable. Randy Katz & Til Wykes, The Psychological Difference Between
Temporally Predictable and Unpredictable Stressful Events: Evidence for Information Control Theo-
ries, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 781 (1985); see also B. Kent Houston, Control Over
Stress, Locus of Control, and Response to Stress, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 249, 255
(1972) (noting study subjects "found a threatening situation in which they had no control [the ability
to stop the administration of electric shocks by performing well on a test] more anxiety provoking than
one in which they had some control over the situation").
420. See Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low- Wage Work,
50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 19-30 (2015).
421. Such an approach would require amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-14 (2012), to mandate "uniform protection for all workers and further incentivize em-
ployers to minimize instability in low-wage work," Alexander, Haley-Lock & Ruan, supra note 420,
at 35-37. Or, the Department of Labor could adopt a new interpretation of the FLSA that would treat
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Precarity in work-not knowing if one is going to continue to have a
job or not-is stressful. A more radical (but not unthinkable) approach
would be to consider moving U.S. law from an at-will model-a worker
can be terminated for no reason or any reason-to a for-cause model-a
422worker can only be terminated for good cause4. In the United States, by
virtue of private-law protection, privileged individuals (high-ranking cor-
porate workers, tenure-track professors, etc.) are often sheltered from ar-
bitrary employment terminations. In the United States, as elsewhere, priv-
ileged individuals live longer than the less privileged.423 In other high-in-
come countries, more levels of workers receive protection from arbitrary
employment termination.424 U.S. citizens live shorter lives than citizens
residing in these other high-income countries that have more substantive
protection from job termination.42 5 The connection between at-will em-
ployment and overall life expectancy, at this point, is supported by infer-
ence rather than causation. But as further research is conducted, it is prob-
able that further correlations between employment structures and health
outcomes will emerge. Returning to a wide-lens focus, for-cause employ-
ment would increase certainty and a feeling of control in employees. And
the presence of certainty and control is associated with better mental and
physical health in the long- and short-term.426 There will, of course, be
points of critique that this kind of labor realignment will come at too great
an economic cost. The reasoned response would be to study and analyze
the economies of those Western European countries (e.g., Germany) that
offer robust forms of protection to their workers and enjoy economic
health.
2. Education Law
Public education is relevant to this Article because it necessarily en-
gages with the material environment and it is still considered a public
good. Whether this sentiment derives from a liberal understanding that
workers scheduled using just-in-time practices as "on call" workers. "For these workers, the hours
spent waiting to be called to work would be compensable." Alexander, Haley-Lock & Ruan, supra
note 420, at 37.
422. CHARLES J. MUI-tL, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL-
DOCTRINE: THREE MAJOR EXCEPTIONS (2001); see also Moshe Z. Marvit & Shaun Richman, Ameri-
can Workers Need Better Job Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2017, https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/12/28/opinion/american-workers-job-protections.html.
423. See Marmot, A Challenge to Medicine, supra note 6.
424. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law:
Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343 (2014) (describing the employment laws
of other countries).
425. One study explained this disparity in the fact that in the United States, more individuals die
from accidents, particularly from prescription opioid overdoses. See Andrew Fenelon et al., Major
Causes of Injury Death and the Life Expectancy Gap Between the United States and Other High-
Income Countries, 315 JAMA 609, 610 (2016). The higher levels of prescription opioid overdoses
are, however, connectable to declining levels of social security, particularly within middle-class white
men. See CASE & DEATON, supra note 365, at 8.
426. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
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public education functions for the collective good or a neoliberal under-
standing that it enables individuals' entry into the market, the bottom line
is that the state, in administering public schools, is authorized to design
healthy environments for the schoolchildren that pass through its doors.
Despite the neoliberalist line of thought that collective social solutions are
427too impossible to administer, public school environments remain one of
the only public spaces that the state (local or federal) orchestrates. Public
school environments, in this sense, might function as an oasis from the
harsh effects of a child's disadvantaged home and neighborhood environ-
ment.
As explained below, when school districts can sustain racial and eco-
nomic integration, which occurs when collective interests for all school-
children are pursued over the interests of wealthy individual families who
wish to select their public school based on where they live, school districts
are able to produce biologically healthy material environments, in the form
of more stably integrated neighborhoods, maller pockets of high-poverty
areas, and economic growth.
The optimal public school educational environment is an integrated
one, on economic and racial axes.4 28 Despite Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,429 many public U.S. schools remain racially and economically segre-
gated,4 3 0 and the environments within them function like petri dishes for
the physical, mental, and social ills wrought by disadvantage.4 31 Segre-
gated schools also impact the cognitive performance of the schoolchildren
that are sheltered within their doors, visible in persistent achievement gaps
between white students and black and Hispanic students, and between
middle-class and poor students.43 2 As an example of a curative material
environment, "integrated schools boost academic achievement (defined in
terms of test scores, attainment (years in school and number of degrees),
427. Blalock, supra note 303, at 94.
428. See JAMES COLEMAN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ED012275, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY SURVEY (1966); HALLEY POTTER ET AL., THE CENTURY FOUND., A
NEW WAVE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION 1, 4 (2016); Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropol-
itan Segregation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 364, 424 (2015).
429. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
430. Orfield, supra note 428, at 420-22.
431. See Angela Valenzuela, Ogbu's Voluntary and Involuntary Hypothesis and the Politics of
Caring, in MINORITY STATUS, OPPOSITIONAL CULTURE, AND SCHOOLING 496, 496, 498, 503-04
(John U. Ogbu ed., 2008).
432. POTTER ET AL., supra note 428, at 4-5 (discussing black/Hispanic and white, as well as
poor and middle-class, achievement gaps); Orfield, supra note 428, at 424-26 (explaining how inte-
gration boosts academic achievement). In a podcast, public education researcher Nikole Hannah Jones
explains that the one thing that "really worked, that cut the achievement gap between black and white
students by half' was "the one thing that we are not really talking about, and that very few places are
doing anymore." The Problem We All Live with - Part One, THIS AM. LIFE (July 31, 2015),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/562/transcript. That one thing is integration.
Id.
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and expectations), improve opportunities for students of color, and gener-
ate valuable social and economic benefits (better jobs with better benefits,
greater ease of living, and diverse future work environments)."4 33
Segregated public schools also engender, in a cascade effect, de-
prived material environments in the form of ailing cities and dying neigh-
borhoods. Professor Myron Orfield has masterfully shown that deeply seg-
regated school systems (mostly a result of the withering away of Supreme
Court remedial jurisprudence and white-flight demographic shifts) destroy
communities and deter economic growth.434 Specifically, in his study of
two school districts (Detroit and Louisville), Professor Orfield described
Detroit's trajectory after the Supreme Court's Milliken v. Bradley435 deci-
sion, which rejected district-wide integration efforts.4 36 Professor Orfield
then described Louisville, which had successfully adopted a district-wide,
metropolitan integration plan.437 A few months after Milliken, the Sixth
Circuit distinguished Louisville from Detroit (in part because Louisville
only had two school districts whereas Detroit had fifty-three) and allowed
a metropolitan-wide remedy to stand.438
After Milliken, Detroit schools became acutely segregated.43 9 In
2000, for instance, the average Detroit student attended a school that was
ninety-eight percent black.440 This return to segregation was driven in
great part by white flight.44 1 Whites fled inner city Detroit for school dis-
tricts in white suburbs.442 The loss of population within Detroit decimated
its tax base and its school system.443 One hundred Detroit schools closed,
the school board had to be taken over by an emergency manager, and the
444
city itself had to be taken over by the state of Michigan. Detroit's econ-
omy sank into failure.445 Residential segregation also worsened. In the
1990s and 2000s, Detroit's inner-ring suburbs briefly became more di-
verse as blacks moved out of the inner city.446 Within a few years, how-
ever, ethnic minorities comprised the primary demographic as whites fled
433. Orfield, supra note 428, at 424-25.
434. Id. at 368.
435. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
436. Id. at 756; Orfield, supra note 428, at 447-62.
437. Orfield, supra note 428, at 447-5 1.
438. Id. at 417-18 (citing Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975)).
439. By 2010, Detroit schools were "the third most racially segregated among the nation's fifty-
largest regions." Orfield, supra note 428, at 447.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 371-72,436-40,458-59.
442. Id. at 371.
443. Id. at 451.
444. Id. at 453-55.
445. Id. at 451-52.
446. Id at 456-57.
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further toward the exurbs.447 Those inner-ring suburbs are now sites of ex-
treme poverty.448 Detroit's trajectory matches those of other large cities
with multiple metropolitan school districts and without a county-wide in-
tegration plan.449
By adopting and administering a county-wide integration plan, Lou-
isville was able to block the incentives for white flight. Because the broad
integration plan impacted all of Jefferson County, there were no white mu-
nicipal enclaves to retreat to.450 Including most of white suburbia in the
metropolitan-wide plans also ensured that schools, in large areas of the
county, would remain majority middle-class and majority white, though
integrated.4 51 After Louisville's integration plan was implemented, Louis-
ville became the eleventh-most-racially-integrated school district among
the nation's top fifty regions.4 52 In Louisville, the average black student
went to a school that was fifty percent white.4 53 After Louisville adopted
its plan, academic performance improved for black American students.454
Tellingly, black American students in Louisville scored much higher on
reading and math than Detroit students did.4 55 Louisville's neighborhoods
grew more stably integrated and its economy boomed.456 Integration in its
schools enabled Louisville to support the growth of healthier educational
and residential environments.
Despite the palpable harm produced by segregated schools, the pro-
ject of public school integration in the United States remains a deeply
rooted, "wicked problem."457 An in-depth exploration of this topic is be-
yond the scope of this paper, but the perspicacious problem of school seg-
447. See id
448. Id. at 457. Detroit's residential patterns in its suburbs mirror that within the rest of the na-
tion. "Ferguson[, Missouri,] is a prime example of how concentration of poverty is moving from the
inner-city to the suburbs. As recently as 1990, Ferguson was 75 percent white, but by 2010 it was
about two-thirds black. The poverty rate shot up from 7 percent to 22 percent over that period. Three
out of ten neighborhoods in Ferguson now have poverty rates of more than 40 percent." PAUL A.
JARGOWSKY, THE CENTURY FOUND., ARCHITECTURE OF SEGREGATION: CIVIL UNREST, THE
CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14 (2015).
449. Orfield, supra note 428, at 434-38.
450. Id. at 439, 441. After Louisville adopted its integration plan, there was a short period of
limited white flight out of the county altogether, but soon thereafter, "enrollment increased and stabi-
lized." Id. at 419.
451. Id. at 439.
452. Id. at 447.
453. Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
454. Id. at 419-20.
455. Id. at 449.
456. Id. at 450-52. It helped that Louisville pursued housing integration initiatives in tandem
with its school integration plan. See Alana Semuels, The City That Believed in Desegregation,
ATLANTIC, Mar 27, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/the-city-that-be-
lieved-in-desegregation/388532.
457. A "wicked problem" is a complex problem that cannot readily be solved in a straightforward
linear fashion. See Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education's "Wicked Problems," 61
RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 870-71 (2009).
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regation and integration has to do with shifts in the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to equal protection in education.45 8 The Court has shifted away
from its post-Brown459 jurisprudence that mandated eradication of public
school discrimination "root and branch"460 to lifting federal desegregation
orders to return schools as soon as possible to local control;4 61 hostility for
large-scale busing remedies that would support integration between mu-
nicipal school districts, on the basis that federal courts lack the power to
remedy patterns categorized as de facto segregation;462 and the striking
down of voluntary integration plans using race as a school assignment fac-
463tor. This shift aligns with the contemporary Supreme Court's conserva-
tive and neoliberal jurisprudence, which olds that race and class inequal-
ity can usually be explained as a product of individual choices and per-
sonal preferences.464 According to the Court's current jurisprudence, be-
cause these forms of racial and social inequality cannot be traced to a spe-
cific animus, collective governmental intervention should be blocked.46 5
In addition, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that education is
a fundamental constitutional right and that discriminatory school spending
based on the wealth of particular property tax districts violates the equal
protection clause.466 This means, under federal law, public schools can be
unequal based on economic resources received, as long as each school pro-
vides a baseline adequate education. The Supreme Court's precedents on
integration remedies and school finance also mean that it will be increas-
ingly rare to see a federal court mandate a large-scale integration rem-
edy.467 However, some school districts have voluntarily adopted system-
wide integration plans that seek to achieve both racial and socioeconomic
diversity.468 But other metropolitan areas have stuck with the fragmented
approach seen in Detroit.469
Although Louisville's metropolitan plan started out as federally man-
dated and disfavored, within a few years, it became popular among a wide
majority of parents.470 But a small group of parents remained dissatisfied
458. See generally Orfield, supra note 428 (exploring the Supreme Court's desegregation deci-
sions and its effect on the schools and cities in America).
459. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
460. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
461. Orfield, supra note 428, at 420 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ.
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)).
462. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 (1974).
463. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Scb. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743-44 (2007).
464. Orfield, supra note 428, at 428.
465. Id. at 371, 412, 428.
466. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1973).
467. Remedies in school finance and equal protection have successfully moved forward on the
basis of state constitutional rights for education and equal process, which can go further than federal
rights. See Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the Hope for Re-
gional Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 91, 108-09 (2007).
468. POTTER ET AL., supra note 428, at 5; Orfield, supra note 428, at 438.
469. Orfield, supra note 428, at 364.
470. Semuels, supra note 456 (contrasting surveys done in the 1970s in which ninety-eight per-
cent of suburban parents opposed Louisville's integration plan with a survey done in 2011 where
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with the plan. After some litigation and a potential resolution involving
Louisville's plan in the 1990s, in 2003, one parent challenged Louisville's
plan as violating the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause on the basis
that it gave more choices to black students than to white students.471 The
resulting case, Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,472 be-
came the companion case to Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1.473 A sharply divided Supreme Court, pivot-
ing on Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence, struck down Louis-
ville's plan on the basis that it used ethnicity too crudely in its assignment
plans.474 Currently, Louisville has changed its plan so that it makes assign-
ments based on a student's residential census block, which is ranked based
on the percentage of minority residents, educational income of adults, and
average household income.475 Louisville no longer uses race as a stand-
alone factor, but it is built into the equation. In addition, Louisville's use
of census-block data to make assignments allows it to use SES as a strong
factor for school assignments.47 6 SES, unlike race, does not raise the spec-
ter of strict scrutiny under federal law. 477
During the Meredith litigation, a wide-ranging coalition emerged to
protect the system and the positive economic, educational, and neighbor-
hood effects that had been flowing into Louisville. Louisville's Chamber
of Commerce (usually a bastion of conservatism)478 submitted an amicus
brief in favor of Louisville's plan.4 79 Turning local-control-based federal-
ist arguments upside down, the Chamber of Commerce argued that "[t]he
School Board should be allowed to formulate a student assignment plan
suitable to the local community to promote racial integration without in-
terference from a federal court."4 80 The brief touted the positive industry
and business effects of having an integrated school system and advocated
that Louisville had used means narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling
eighty-seven percent of parents supported integration as a goal and eighty-nine percent of parents were
satisfied with the quality of their child's education). Some parents disapproved of the plan because it
does not guarantee that a child can attend the closest school within their neighborhood and also, in
some instances, requires long bus rides. Id. This conflict pits the longstanding individualistic view that
public schools belong exclusively to neighborhood residents versus the community approach that
views public education as a public good that belongs to everybody. See KRUSE, supra note 347, at
143-44 (describing white perceptions of integration as an attack on "our" schools).
471. Orfield, supra note 428, at 442-47.
472. 547 U.S. 1178 (2006).
473. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
474. Orfield, supra note 428, at 446 (citing Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
475. Semuels, supra note 456.
476. See id.
477. Because wealth is not a suspect class that triggers strict scrutiny, Orfield, supra note 428,
at 395, there is more leeway in how it can be used to achieve diversity in public and higher education.
478. See generally ALYSSA KATZ, THE INFLUENCE MACHINE: THE U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND THE CORPORATE CAPTURE OF AMERICAN LIFE 61 (2015).
479. Brief Amici Curiae of the Louisville Area Chamber of Commerce, Inc. (D/B/A Greater
Louisville Inc.) & Louisville Metro Mayor Jerry E. Abramson in Support of Respondents at 12, Mer-
edith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006) (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 2927086.
480. Id.
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interest of achieving diversity in its schools.481 The Chamber of Commerce
further argued that Louisville's public school system effectively prepared
students for work in diverse settings.482 In tandem with the probusiness
arguments in favor of integration, Louisville citizens voiced progressive
arguments, asserting that the integration plan recognized values of "soci-
ety as a collective group" and "communal benefits."4 83
In Louisville's effort to maintain its integrated school system, collec-
tive values triumphed over the libertarian every-person-for-himself ap-
proach. This victory was enabled by a unique confluence of pragmatic
business interests and progressive values. In this example, neoliberalist
values (promote competition, access to labor markets) aligned with pro-
gressive communitarian values (protect the public good). Without giving
up on the critical project of dismantling the logic of neoliberalism and un-
trammeled capitalism, we can still appreciate pragmatic points for policy
reform. In terms of practical strategies for obtaining legal support for more
curative material environments, a regional and local, rather than federal,
situs might be the best approach.484 Indeed, vibrantly progressive state
court decisions like California's Serrano v. Priest485 (wealth is a suspect
class under the California constitution's equal protection clause)486 and
New Jersey's NAACP v. Mount Laure 87 doctrine ("land use regulations
should provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing for at least some
part of its resident poor who now occupy dilapidated housing")488 provide
a template for progressive reform at the state and local level.
A return to the Warren Court's invigorated approach to federal rights
would be ideal as it would further substantive equality for all. But nostal-
gia will not change the Supreme Court's current composition and deeply
conservative jurisprudence. Thus, federalism offers a vessel of hope, im-
perfect as it is. Local and regional approaches are, at this point, a place
where substantive, structural change might be accomplished and main-
tained.
In summary, public-education policy is highly relevant to this Article
because education policy correlates with the germination of toxic environ-
ments associated with deleterious health and mental effects that are then
passed on to subsequent generations. As this Article has shown, living in
environments of economic disadvantage and racial discrimination re-
moves an individual's sense of stability and control and generates toxic
481. Id. at 4-5.
482. Id. at 7-12.
483. Semuels, supra note 456 (summarizing the words of one Jefferson County public schools
graduate who opposed the dismantling of Louisville integration plan).
484. Orfield, supra note 467, at 135.
485. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
486. Id. at 951.
487. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
488. Id. at 418.
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levels of stress that penetrate and interact with gene expressions, stress-
hormone systems, and brain structures. All of this combines to produce
negative physical-health and mental outcomes, which in turn produce
overall worse life outcomes.
Segregated schools are associated with biologically toxic environ-
ments; they engender esidential racial and socioeconomic segregation, in-
transigent poverty, and economic stagnation.489 Areas of the country that
have been able to successfully integrate their schools have enjoyed better
residential integration, smaller pockets of concentrated poverty, more ro-
bust economies, and better race relations.490 In the context of creating pos-
itive material environments, public education provides an environment
that millions of children spend their days in. Further, public education is
one environment that most of the public agree should be a common good,
available to all school children.4 9 1 Thus, solving the problem of segrega-
tion in schools is one remedy that could ameliorate some of the environ-
mentally mediated biological harm that has been discussed in this Article.
And there is hope, in the form of local and regional approaches, supported
by alignments between business and progressive interests, that school in-
tegration can be achieved and maintained.
CONCLUSION
Whether it is at the genetic level or in the brain, toxic and stressful
effects related to poverty and discrimination can "get under the skin." Em-
bodied inequality challenges traditional narratives that assume that indi-
vidual genes and individual behavioral choices are the primary causal
agents for social outcomes. The violent injustice of embodied inequality
(experienced in disparate health outcomes and age spans) can fuel progres-
sive legal solutions that might lessen the harshness of these deleterious
biological and health outcomes.
From the standpoint of law-related rhetoric, the biological embodi-
ment of inequality adds, in a very novel way, scientific legitimacy to ar-
guments for remedying structural inequality and poverty. In the frame-
work of George Lakoff, the science affords a rhetorical opportunity to shift
the debate toward a frame of collective nurturance and caring, a frame that
ultimately has the capacity to heal.492
Potential legal and policy solutions include broad-based solutions
that would make the U.S. landscape more socially democratic and more
nurturing. Small-scale and large-scale solutions designed to ameliorate the
structural conditions that perpetuate poverty and racial oppression should,
489. Orfield, supra note 428, at 368.
490. Id.
491. See Larry Cuban & Dorothy Shipps, Introduction to RECONSTRUCTING THE COMMON
GOOD IN EDUCATION: COPING WITH INTRACTABLE AMERICAN DILEMMAS 1, 2 (Larry Cuban & Dor-
othy Shipps eds., 2000) (tracing the longstanding American belief that "publicly funded, locally con-
trolled schools open to all children would promote the common good and improve society").
492. See supra notes 358-64 and accompanying text.
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based on the scientific theories, also heal the biological harms that flow
from these wounds. To the extent that studies are able to connect specific
biological harm to recurring experiences of racial subordination, these sci-
entific theories support radical jurisprudential approaches, including eval-
uating whether poverty is a suspect class characteristic and whether race-
based remedies, such as affirmative action, can be used to remedy or com-
pensate for past and continuing biological harm, which can be traced to a
causal chain of de facto and de jure discrimination.
On a more discrete level, the science also supports concrete legal
remedies applied universally to remedy inequality, such as interventions
in the workplace and in public education. In the workplace, this Article
suggests enacting changes that would give employees more control and
certainty over work. For public education, the point is to promote curative
environments, the brick-and-mortar school itself as well as the collateral
effects that flow from the presence of good (integrated) schools. With pub-
lic education, local, state, and regional action might be more pragmatic to
achieve these initiatives than reliance on federal rights.
The theories discussed in this Article-that the structure of inequality
can become embodied and heritable-raise intense policy and moral ques-
tions. The crushing mental and physical consequences uffered by indi-
viduals living in disadvantage are now visible through the legitimizing
lens of science. While the science of disadvantage is still in a nascent stage,
the data set is growing. The stress of poverty and discrimination can liter-
ally make one sick. In comparison with more advantaged individuals, a
person saddled with inequality's negative health and mental effects does
not enjoy a level playing field. In this context, the hyper-individualistic
mantra "every man for himself 493 conflicts with the very idea of equal
opportunity. The biology of inequality, as developed in this Article, sup-
ports the marshaling of collective resources to promote deeper economic
and racial equality. Within the longstanding conflict between libertarian
individualism and democratic communitarianism, these new theories can
shift the pendulum toward potent healing solutions.
493. See MAY, supra note 301, at 180.
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"FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
OF CAPITAL JURY SENTENCING
MARIA T. KOLARt
ABSTRACT
In the modem death penalty era in America, two findings have
emerged as generally required before a murderer can be sentenced to
death. First, the decisionmaker must find that the murder was especially
egregious, due to specific, statutorily-defined characteristics of the murder
or the murderer-typically referred to as "aggravating circumstances." Se-
cond, the decisionmaker must find that any aggravating circumstances in
the case "outweigh" any "mitigating circumstances," i.e., anything that
makes the crime or the defendant seem less deserving of death. Remarka-
bly, regarding the second finding (the weighing finding) it remains unclear
who "the decisionmaker" must be and how convinced the decisionmaker
must be-even though the Supreme Court held back in 2002, in Ring v.
Arizona, that the Sixth Amendment mandates that the decisionmaker for
the aggravating circumstance finding must be a jury and that the jury must
be convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt."
This Article asserts that Ring's use of the word "fact" to describe the
kind of determination that must be made by a jury has completely under-
mined the functional and elements-based approach of Ring. This approach,
properly understood, mandates that the Sixth Amendment jury require-
ment applies to any finding (not just "fact") that is required for a death
sentence. This Article traces the Court's use of the term "finding" in this
context-from the beginning of the modern death penalty era in 1976,
through Apprendi v. New Jersey in 2000, Ring in 2002, and Hurst v. Flor-
ida in 2016-and asserts that the Apprendi Court's use of the broader term
"finding" in this arena is more faithful to the Sixth Amendment and to
substantive state law. This Article catalogs how state supreme courts and
federal circuit courts overwhelmingly concluded (post-Ring) that the cap-
ital weighing finding is not subject to the Sixth Amendment, because it is
not a "fact" under Ring-aided by the Court's Eighth Amendment "death
eligibility" doctrine, which misleadingly suggests that defendants become
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law; J.D. Yale
Law School; M.A. Emory University; B.A. University of Notre Dame. The author thanks OU College
of Law Professors Murray Tabb, Donald Bogan, and Monika Ehrman, as well as all the participants
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"eligible" for a death sentence based solely on the finding of an aggravat-
ing circumstance.
The Court's broader approach in Hurst does provide some hope in
this realm and has led to momentous changes in Delaware, Florida, and
Alabama. And all but two states now insist that a jury make all the findings
that are required for a death sentence under state law. Nevertheless, while
nearly 75% of the current thirty-one death penalty states require a weigh-
ing-type finding for a valid death sentence, almost 75% of these states till
fail to require that this finding be made beyond a reasonable doubt, as the
Sixth Amendment mandates. There is still much work to be done.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2002, in Ring v. Arizona,I the United States Supreme
Court announced, in a 7-2 decision and with six Justices on the majority
opinion, that the jury had a critical and required role to play in deciding
which convicted murderers could be sentenced to death.2 In particular, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes the
right to have a jury, and not merely a judge, make the first finding that is
1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. Id. at 587-89.
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required in every capital case before a defendant can potentially be sen-
tenced to death-namely, the finding that at least one statutorily-estab-
lished "aggravating circumstance" exists in the case.
Thus, beginning in 2002, states no longer had the option of entirely
removing the jury from the capital sentencing process, and capital defend-
ants in the United States have had the right to insist that a jury play a key
role in any death sentence. Furthermore, Ring established that this first
required jury finding, that at least one aggravating circumstance exists in
the case, must be made "beyond a reasonable doubt."A Consequently, after
Ring, no American defendant could be sent to death row without a jury
being thoroughly convinced that at least one aggravating circumstance (or
its functional equivalent) exists in the case, which makes that particular
murder or that particular murderer significantly "worse" than others.
Unfortunately, however, the Ring Court explicitly declined to decide
whether its holding applied to the second required finding of most capital
sentencing proceedings, i.e., the finding that any aggravating circum-
stances in a case "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances in the case. In
other words, Ring did not decide who the decisionmaker must be for this
weighing finding or how convinced the decisionmaker must be regarding
this second finding. Does the Sixth Amendment require that a jury make
this weighing finding or can it be made by a judge? And does the Sixth
Amendment require that the weighing finding (like the finding of an ag-
gravating circumstance) be made beyond a reasonable doubt? These issues
remain unresolved even today and are the focus of this Article.
The Ring decision was unusual and surprising in a number of im-
portant ways. First, even though it was a death penalty decision, it was
based upon the Sixth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment,
which had been the undisputed foundation of the Supreme Court's modem
death penalty jurisprudence.6 Second, the Ring pronouncement regarding
3. Id. at 609. In essence, "aggravating circumstances" are the facts about a particular murder
that make it especially egregious due to the manner in which it was committed, the criminal history of
the murderer, the vulnerability of the victim, the risk caused to others, the motivation for the killing,
etc. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12 (2016) (listing Oklahoma's "aggravating circumstances").
4. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 607-09 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477
(2000)); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) (describing Ring as holding
"that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any aggravating
circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a
reasonable doubt") (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09)).
5. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4. "Mitigating circumstances" can include anything about the
murder itself or the defendant's life, family history, limitations, positive qualities, etc., that could po-
tentially cause the decisionmaker to choose a sentence other than death. Mitigating evidence includes
evidence suggesting a lesser degree of culpability for the murder, but also anything that could cause
the decisionmaker to view the defendant more sympathetically or to give a sentence other than death.
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113, 115 (1982) (discussing mitigating factors).
6. See discussion infra Part I. In Part I, this Article briefly summarizes Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the 1972 Eighth Amendment decision that struck down the death
penalty as it then existed in America and set the stage for a new and entirely different "modem era"
of capital sentencing.
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the central role of the jury in capital sentencing was directly contrary to a
string of earlier cases in the modem era, which had repeatedly denied that
the jury had any necessary constitutional role in the capital sentencing pro-
COS7cess.7
The Ring decision was also surprising because in the very cases that
were its immediate predecessors and progenitors-the Supreme Court's
1999 decision in Jones v. United States8 and its 2000 decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey9-the Court had insisted that these groundbreaking deci-
sions about the role of the jury in noncapital cases did not conflict with its
prior rulings that the jury did not have any required role to play in
death-penalty sentencing.'o
On the other hand, the underlying legal logic and rationale of both
Jones and Apprendi, when extended to the capital sentencing context,
seemed to compel the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does give cap-
ital defendants the right to insist that a jury make any findings that are
required for a sentence of death." And in 2002, the Ring Court agreed that
at least the first such finding in a capital case (the finding of at least one
statutorily-established aggravating circumstance) does indeed have to be
found by a jury, and it has to be found beyond a reasonable doubt.12 This
was a revolutionary result, and Ring seemed to portend a great expansion
in the concept of the constitutionally-required role of the jury in capital
-13sentencing.
Nevertheless, sixteen years later, the Court has gone no further, at
least in terms of its holdings, not even in 2016, when it struck down Flor-
ida's death penalty system for violating Ring, in Hurst v. Florida.14
7. See discussion infra Part II. In Part II, this Article briefly reviews the "Gregg cases," the
five 1976 Eighth Amendment cases that launched the modem era and established the key features that
have defined Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence ever since: the need to narrow the class of
murders subject to the death penalty and the need to allow consideration of the individual characteris-
tics of both the crime and the defendant within the capital sentencing process. Part II then focuses
upon the capital jury cases from the first twenty years of the modem era, during which the Court
recognized that a death sentence requires that multiple "findings" be made, but denied that the Con-
stitution mandated any role for the jury in this regard.
8. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
9. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
10. See, e.g., id. at 496-97 (reaffirming prior capital-case decisions).
11. See discussion infra Section III.A. In Section III.A., this Article analyzes the Court's non-
capital decisions in Jones and Apprendi and how their functional approach to the "elements" required
for a particular sentence logically led to the revolutionary capital sentencing holding of Ring. This
Article emphasizes, in particular, the broad language and approach of Apprendi, especially its use of
the generic term "finding" interchangeably with the term "fact" (and "finding of fact") when referring
to the determinations that must be made in order to sentence a defendant to death.
12. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477).
13. See discussion infra Section III.B. In Section III.B., this Article analyzes Ring, emphasizing
both its revolutionary result and impact, as well its potential limitations, especially its seemingly nar-
rower focus (compared to Apprendi) on "facts" and "factfinding."
14. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
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This Article asserts that the legal logic of Apprendi/Ring compels the
conclusion that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments together mandate
that the "weighing" finding that is required by most death penalty jurisdic-
tions-about whether the aggravating circumstances in a case "outweigh"
the mitigating circumstances in the case-must also be made by a jury and
that a jury must make this finding beyond a reasonable doubt. In other
words, this Article maintains that the Sixth Amendment rule of Ap-
prendi/Ring applies to the weighing finding.
Of the numerous state and federal jurisdictions that have addressed
this issue, however, precious few have reached this same conclusion. As
will be explained in detail, the "rule of Apprendi/Ring" is based upon a
functional analysis of a particular jurisdiction's requirements for a death
sentence, i.e., the "elements" of a death sentence. Under this functional
approach, if a particular finding is a required element for a death sentence,
it must be found by a jury and be found beyond a reasonable doubt. This
approach would seem to compel the conclusion that, at least for jurisdic-
tions that do require a weighing finding, this finding must also be made by
a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this has been a dis-
tinctly minority conclusion in this realm.15
The "failure" of the Ring revolution in this regard has been so pro-
nounced and disappointing (at least for some) that some scholars have ar-
gued that the Sixth Amendment itself has been a failure and that the Eighth
Amendment may provide a more viable avenue for appropriately recog-
nizing the jury as the primary decisionmaker in the capital context.16 Upon
reviewing the minimal impact of Ring, which they blame mainly on its
applicability only to "findings of fact,"' 7 Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau
propose that "the role of the jury in capital sentencing is best realized not
through the Sixth Amendment, but through the Eighth Amendment."'
8
15. See discussion infra Section III.C. In Section III.C., this Article reviews and analyzes how
the Ring revolution stalled and faltered during the years between Ring and Hurst regarding both its
impact on "hybrid" judge-jury capital sentencing schemes, see discussion infra Section III.C. ., and
its applicability to the weighing finding, see discussion infra Section III.C.3. In Section III.C.2., this
Article suggests that the Court's Eighth Amendment concept of "death eligibility" is a misnomer, at
least when taken too literally, which has contributed to an overly narrow interpretation of the proper
scope of Ring in the Sixth Amendment realm. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
16. See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury's
Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 529-31 (2011). Kamin and Marceau argue
that although "Ring was initially seen, both by its proponents and its detractors, as a sea change in the
way states could structure their capital decision making[,]" this "apparent watershed decision has not
forced much change[] [because] [s]tate and federal courts'continue to take a crabbed reading of exactly
what constitutes fact finding" under Ring. Id at 529, 581. Kamin and Marceau maintain that the basic
problem is that Ring, by its terms, is limited to findings of "fact"; and they blame this limitation for
the ease with which the force of Ring's functional analysis has been avoided by courts seeking to limit
its impact. See id. at 582-83 ("Unless a sentencing decision can be described as fact finding, it simply
falls outside the Apprendi-Ring purview.").
17. See id. at 580 ("Ring requires a jury only when the decision at issue hinges on a finding of
fact. . . .").
18. Id. at 531.
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They maintain that the Eighth Amendment (at least as understood by Jus-
tices Stevens and Breyer) can "better effectuate[] the jury-right promise of
the Sixth Amendment than does the Sixth Amendment itself." 19
This Article rejects the suggestion that the Sixth Amendment Ring
approach to capital jury sentencing is doomed or inadequate (though it
certainly has been slow). This Article asserts that the main culprit for the
shortfalls of the Ring revolution is the Ring Court's use of the word "fact"
in its opinion (along with "factfinding" and "findings of fact"). While the
word "fact" and a decidedly narrow, nonfunctional approach to this word
have indeed been the main cause of Ring's minimal impact-with some
help from the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment concept of being
"death eligible" (which is also troubling and potentially misleading in this
realm)-this Article maintains that there is another word that can poten-
tially "save the day" or at least help bring the Ring revolution to its logical
and constitutionally appropriate conclusion. And the word is "finding."
This Article undertakes a careful, textual analysis of the Apprendi
decision, upon which Ring is explicitly based, and asserts that the Ap-
prendi Court used the broader term "finding" interchangeably with the
seemingly more narrow terms "fact" and "finding of fact" to describe the
type of determination that is covered by its functional rule.20 This Article
emphasizes that although the Ring opinion and holding focus upon the
terms "fact" and "factfinding," a narrow understanding of these terms is
entirely inconsistent with Ring's roots in Apprendi and, more importantly,
with the explicitly functional nature of the analysis mandated by both.
This Article recognizes that although the Court's 2016 decision in
Hurst did strike down Florida's death penalty system for violating Ring, it
did not explicitly change or expand the rule of Ring.21 On the other hand,
Justice Sotomayor's Hurst opinion returned to a much broader "find-
ing"-based Sixth Amendment approach (like that ofApprendi), which may
herald a future fulfillment of the Ring revolution by applying its ele-
ments-based rule to all required capital findings, including the weighing
finding.22 Decisions by the Supreme Courts of Florida and Delaware have
already recognized Hurst's broader vision and approach and have applied
19. Id. at 531-32; see also Jeffrey Wermer, Comment, The Jury Requirement in Death Sentenc-
ing After Hurst v. Florida, 94 DENW. L. REV. 385, 410, 411 (2017) (proposing that due to the "fact-
finding" limitations of the Sixth Amendment's Ring approach, even post-Hurst, "Eighth Amendment
capital jurisprudence should . . . be brought to bear to protect a criminal defendant from being sen-
tenced to death by ajudge's determination"); id. at 400 (lamenting that "[lt]he effects of Ring and Hurst
depend on what exactly a 'fact' is with regard to capital sentencing").
20. And in Apprendi's application of its new rule to the facts of that case, it consistently de-
scribed its analysis as applying to "the required 'motive' finding" and the finding of biased purpose
without ever concluding that such "findings" constituted "facts" or "factfinding." Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494-95 (2000) (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (1999), rev'd, 530
U.S. 466).
21. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
22. See discussion infra Section IV.A. In Section IV.A., this Article analyzes Hurst and its
broader "finding"-based vision of the jury's necessary Sixth Amendment role in capital sentencing.
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Hurst expansively within their jurisdictions (at least prospectively). On the
other hand, it remains to be seen whether the numerous capital jurisdic-
tions that already require a weighing-type finding will likewise recognize
that under the Sixth Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring/Hurst, such find-
ings must be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.2 3
I. FURMAN V. GEORGIA AND THE END OF ABSOLUTE JURY DISCRETION
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,24 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, struck down the death penalty as it existed at the time for violat-
ing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punish-
ment[] .25 In the years leading up to Furman, death penalty sentencing in
America was entirely jury determined, with the decision about whether to
sentence a particular defendant (who had been convicted of a capital of-
fense) to death or to some term of imprisonment left entirely to the un-
guided discretion of the jury.26 Interestingly, such discretionary jury sen-
tencing had previously been seen as a significant and progressive sentenc-
ing reform in America, since it was preceded-from colonial times until
late in the nineteenth century-by a protracted age of mandatory capital
sentencing, in which a death sentence followed automatically from a con-
viction for a remarkably wide range of crimes.27 This positive understand-
ing of discretionary capital sentencing had begun to come under sharp at-
tack, however, in the years leading up to Furman, based upon a growing
perception that the death penalty was being imposed not for the worst
crimes or upon the worst criminals, but arbitrarily and often due to racial
- 28,animus.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's 1972 landmark decision in Fur-
man, striking down the death penalty as it was then being used, came as a
huge shock.29 In addition, the basis for the Supreme Court's decision was
not easy to discern because the Furman decision resulted in a very brief
per curiam holding, followed by nine separate opinions, one for every Jus-
tice on the Court, and with no Justices in the majority joining the opinion
of anyone else, i.e., no plurality opinion, let alone a majority opinion.30
23. See discussion infra Section IV.B. In Section IV.B., this Article summarizes the impact of
Hurst among the states that had judge-jury capital sentencing at the time of Hurst (especially Dela-
ware, Florida, and Alabama) and analyzes the death penalty statutes of all thirty-one current death
penalty states regarding the potential applicability of Ring/Hurst to the weighing-type findings that
are required by the vast majority of these states.
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 239-40; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
26. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 43 (2016) ("By the 1960s, every capital jurisdiction afforded absolute discre-
tion to jurors to impose or withhold the death penalty.").
27. Id. at 9-12.
28. Id. at 44.
29. Id. at 60 ("National and state leaders greeted Furman with vehement objection.").
30. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam); id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
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Yet among the opinions of the Furman majority Justices, the completely
discretionary nature of capital sentencing as of 1972 appeared to be its
main downfall. Whereas Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the
death penalty itself violated the Eighth Amendment, ' Justices Stewart and
White focused upon the unpredictable and seemingly capricious nature of
capital sentencing decisions at the time, in which death sentences were
quite rare overall, but also seemingly random.3 2 Justice Douglas empha-
sized, in particular, the profound potential for (and apparent reality of) vast
racial discrimination within this entirely discretionary process.
After Furman, it was not entirely clear whether the death penalty in
America was gone for good or just needed to be reformulated. Jurisdic-
tions that wanted to continue to use- the death penalty scrambled to come
up with a system that would pass constitutional muster, i.e., be upheld by
the Supreme Court, and the main focus of these efforts was to come up
with a system of "guided discretion."34 During the four short years after
Furman, a remarkable thirty-five states and the U.S. Congress passed new
death penalty statutes.35 The death penalty in America was not going down
without a fight.
I.THE CAPITAL JURY IN THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THE
MODERN ERA: COMMON, BUT NOT REQUIRED
On July 2, 1976, on the brink of the 200th anniversary of the signing
of the Declaration of Independence, the Supreme Court issued its decisions
in five separate cases regarding the constitutionality of the capital punish-
ment systems adopted in Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and
Louisiana.36 The Supreme Court's "modem" death penalty jurisprudence
can be described as beginning on this day when the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the capital sentencing schemes of Georgia, Florida,
405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
31. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are cruel and unu-
sual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."); id. at 310 (describing the
American death penalty as "wantonly and ... freakishly imposed"); id at 313 (White, J., concurring)
(concluding that "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not").
33. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitu-
tional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unu-
sual' punishments.").
34. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 26, at 61 ("The distinctive feature of all the new statutes
was an effort to limit the discretion characteristic of death penalty schemes before Furman.").
35. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion).
36. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Car-
olina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
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and Texas (and struck down the systems of North Carolina and Louisi-
ana). For present purposes, two key themes came out of these cases. First,
capital systems must specifically narrow the class of offenses for which
the death penalty can be given in order to limit discretion. This theme came
out of the cases affirming the death penalty schemes of Georgia, Florida,
and Texas, especially Gregg v. Georgia.3 8 Second, capital systems must
allow for individual consideration of the specific crime and criminal at
issue, including the character and record of that defendant. This theme
emerged in the cases striking down the mandatory death penalty schemes
of North Carolina and Louisiana, particularly the decision in Woodson v.
North Carolina.39
By and large, the "narrowing" requirement has been implemented
through the use of either guilt-stage "aggravated murder" crimes or sen-
tencing-stage "aggravating circumstances," both of which specifically
limit the murders to which the death penalty can be applied.40 And the
"individualized consideration" requirement has been implemented by in-
sisting that death penalty jurisdictions allow consideration of any mitigat-
ing evidence or "mitigating circumstances" that the defendant chooses to
offer as a basis for a sentence less than death.4 1
While the 1976 "Gregg cases" focused on how the death penalty de-
cision must be made, they mostly paid little attention to who was actually
making this decision and whether the jury was required. In fact, during the
first twenty years of the modem era, the Court consistently declined to find
that the jury had any central or constitutionally-required role in capital
sentencing, often with quite limited and conclusory analysis of the issue.
Instead, the Court repeatedly chose to allow the states great freedom in
their decisions about how to use the jury in the realm of capital sentencing,
including. not at all.
37. While Furman could also be described as the beginning of this "modem era," the return of
the death penalty to the United States in 1976, in significantly changed form, is also a plausible place
to mark the start of this new era.
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-72, 189 ("Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbi-
trary and capricious action.").
39. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." (citation omitted)).
40. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("[A]n aggravating circumstance must
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.");
see also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) ("We see no reason why this narrowing
function may not be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phrase of the trial or the guilt
phase.").
41. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) ("[A] death penalty statute must not
preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors."); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
112 (1982) ("[T]he sentencer in [a] capital case[] must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating
factor. . . .").
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Proffitt v. Florida42 was one of the five Gregg cases that marked the
beginning of the modem era and was the Court's first post-Furman con-
sideration of a capital system in which a jury was not the key death penalty
decisionmaker.43 Although Florida had not entirely removed the jury from
the capital sentencing process, it subjugated the jury to the trial judge, who
served as the actual decisionmaker regarding both the required findings
and the ultimate sentencing decision.4 4 Although the challenges to Flor-
ida's capital system were not Sixth Amendment challenges,4 5 the Proffitt
Court's statements about the role of the jury set the stage for the Court's
resolution of jury-focused claims in later cases.
The Florida system provided that, after a defendant was convicted by
a jury of first-degree murder, a separate evidentiary hearing would be held
before the same judge and jury to determine whether the defendant would
be sentenced to life imprisonment or to the death penalty.4 6 Evidence could
be presented by both the prosecution and the defense regarding "aggravat-
ing circumstances" and "mitigating circumstances," as defined by Florida
law, and about whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.47 The
jury was not asked to make any specific findings, but was directed to con-
sider "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist. . . which out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist," and then make a sen-
tencing recommendation, life or death, which was based on a majority vote
and was only advisory.48
In order to actually sentence a defendant to death, the trial judge was
required to set forth in writing: (1) which of Florida's statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances existed in the case, and (2) whether the mitigating cir-
cumstances in the case were "insufficient ... to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances."49 The trial court could only sentence a defendant to death
if it made both of these two findings.50
42. 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
43. See id. at 246. The Proffitt decision, upholding Florida's new capital sentencing scheme,
was decided by a vote of 7-2 with only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244,
260-61. The plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244-60,
is generally regarded as articulating the "authoritative rationale" for the Court's holding. Bryan A.
Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in
Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2003).
44. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251.
45. Id. at 244 ("The issue presented by this case is whether the imposition of the sentence of
death for the crime of murder under the law of Florida violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.").
46. Id at 247-48.
47. Id. at 248 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b)-(c) (1976) (amended 2017)).
48. Id. at 248-49 (quoting § 921.141(2)(b)-(c)).
49. Id. at 250 (quoting § 921.141(3)(a)-(b)).
50. Id. The Florida capital sentencing procedure upheld in Proffitt in 1976 was fundamentally
and structurally the same as the Florida procedure struck down almost forty years later in Hurst, based
upon the Court's 2016 conclusion that the Sixth Amendment "require[s] Florida to base ... [a] death
sentence on a jury's verdict, not ajudge's factfinding." Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
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The Proffitt Court recognized that in Florida "the actual [death] sen-
tence is determined by the trial judge,"' while the jury's role "is only ad-
visory."52 The Proffitt Court's analysis of the potential constitutional sig-
nificance of Florida's subjugation of the jury's role, however, was remark-
ably brief: "This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a capital
case can perform an important societalfunction, v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
519 n. 15 (1968), but it has never suggested that jury sentencing is consti-
tutionally required."53 And that was the entirety of Proffitt's analysis re-
garding whether ajury is constitutionally required for sentencing a defend-
ant to death, i.e., a notation that the Court has "never suggested" that ajury
is "constitutionally required," which, in turn, served as a strong suggestion
that it is not.
Exactly eight years later, on July 2, 1984, in Spaziano v. Florida,5 4
the Supreme Court took up this issue directly and made its big "wrong
turn" on the issue of capital jury sentencing-a turn that the Court majority
would not seriously question or attempt to right until Ring in 2002. The
Court made this wrong turn by allowing the states unconstrained flexibility
to choose who would be the death penalty decisionmaker, even while im-
posing many other limitations on how the death penalty decision could be
made, as well as the evidence that must be admitted regarding this deci-
*55sion.
The Spaziano case involved a challenge to the same Florida capital
sentencing scheme addressed in Proffitt.5 6 In Spaziano, after convicting
the defendant of murder, the jury recommended a sentence of imprison-
ment for life.57 The trial judge, however, reached a different conclusion,
finding, "notwithstanding the recommendation of the jury," (1) that two
specific statutory aggravating circumstances existed in the case, (2) that
"the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh such aggra-
vating circumstances," and (3) that "a sentence of death should be imposed
in this case."5 8
51. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 252 (citation omitted) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n. 15 (1968)).
The Proffitt Court's citation to its pre-Furman (i.e., pre-"modern era") capital decision in Witherspoon
is quite striking here because the Witherspoon Court did envision a critical and important role for the
jury in the capital sentencing process. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) ("[A] jury
that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death.").
54. 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616.
55. Id. at 462, 464.
56. See id at 449.
57. Id. at 451.
58. Id. at 451-52 (quoting the trial court).
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This "judge trumps jury" result is often described as a "judicial over-
ride,"59 and defendant Spaziano challenged the judicial override in his
case.60 In particular, he challenged it under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.6 1 The Court noted that it could have limited its
decision to whether Florida's judicial-override system was constitutional,
but it ultimately chose to speak more broadly about whether the jury had
any necessary constitutional role in the choice about whether to sentence
a defendant to death.62 And the Spaziano Court spoke very broadly indeed:
In light of the facts that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury
sentencing, that the demands of fairness and reliability in capital cases
do not require it, and that neither the nature of, nor the purpose behind,
the death penalty requires jury sentencing, we cannot conclude that
placing responsibility on the trial judge to impose the sentence in a
capital case is unconstitutional.63
Regarding the Sixth Amendment, the Spaziano Court defaulted to the
same (weak) conclusion it had invoked in Proffitt, namely, that "[t]he
Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury
determination" regarding "the appropriate punishment to be imposed on
an individual."64 And regarding the Eighth Amendment, the Court quickly
dispatched the "because death is different" argument for requiring a jury
to sentence a defendant to death.65
When Florida's capital sentencing scheme was yet again challenged
five years later in Hildwin v. Florida,6 6 the focus was on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing.67 The Hildwin petitioner asserted that Flor-
ida's system violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed a defendant
59. See id. at 463 (referring to states that "allow[] a judge to override a jury's recommendation
of life"); see also Ryan Lovelace, Alabama Knocks Down Judicial Override in Death Penalty Cases,
WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 12, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alabama-
knocks-down-judicial-override-in-death-penalty-cases; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Lets Alabama
Judges Impose Death Penalty, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/23/supreme-court-alabama-florida-death-penalty-judge-
jury/96947280.
60. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457.
61. Id. at 457-58.
62. See id at 458, 464. The Court noted that it "need not decide whether jury sentencing in all
capital cases is required," because the case presented "only the question whether, given a jury verdict
of life, the judge may override that verdict and impose death." Id at 458. The Court further noted,
however, that defense counsel had "acknowledged at oral argument . .. [that] his fundamental premise
is that the capital sentencing decision is one that, in all cases, should be made by a jury." Id. Hence
the Court concluded: "We therefore address that fundamental premise." Id.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 459.
65. See id at 460 ("[T]here certainly is nothing in the safeguards necessitated by the Court's
recognition of the qualitative difference of the death penalty that requires that the sentence be imposed
by a jury.").
66. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
67. Id. at 638. There was no judicial override issue in Hildwin because thejury had unanimously
recommended a death sentence, and the trial court agreed. Id at 639.
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to be sentenced to death "without a specific finding by [a] jury that suffi-
cient aggravating circumstances exist to qualify the defendant for capital
punishment."68 This argument was unlike any that had been made or ad-
dressed in Spaziano.69 Nevertheless, the Hildwin Court rejected it in a per
curiam opinion, noting that in Spaziano it had "upheld against Sixth
Amendment challenge the trial judge's imposition of a sentence of death
notwithstanding that the jury had recommended a sentence of life impris-
onment."70 The Court added: "If the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to
impose a sentence of death when the jury recommends life imprison-
ment, . . . it follows that it does not forbid the judge to make the written
findings that authorize imposition of a death sentence when the jury unan-
imously recommends [death]."
The Hildwin Court maintained that "the existence of an aggravating
factor here is not an element of the offense but instead is 'a sentencing
factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found
guilty."' 72 This assertion is, in a nutshell, precisely the same argument that
would be made by the State of Arizona (and rejected by the Court) thirteen
years later in Ring. Nevertheless, the above conclusory sentence was all
that was offered to justify the Hildwin Court's rejection of this Sixth
Amendment challenge. The Hildwin Court declared, "Accordingly, the
Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing
the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury." 74
When this same issue came before the Court again just one year later
in Walton v. Arizona,75 the Court again quickly disposed of it.76 The Ari-
zona capital system considered in Walton, unlike the Florida system, was
entirely judge based.77 The death penalty sentencing hearing was con-
ducted "before the court alone,"7 and the judge would determine whether
any of Arizona's statutory aggravating circumstances existed, whether any
mitigating circumstances existed, and whether any "mitigating circum-
stances [were] sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."7 9 As in
68. Id.
69. It was also the argument that later prevailed in Ring. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
607, 609 (2002).
70. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639-40.
71. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 641 (quoting McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
73. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
74. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Hildwin Court
here and otherwise (including supra) referred to the determinations that must be made before a de-
fendant could be sentenced to death as "findings," though the Court emphatically declined to require
that these findings be made by a jury. See id
75. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
76. Id. at 647-49, 655.
77. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (1989) (current version at §§ 13-751 to -752
(2017)).
78. Walton, 497 U.S. at 643 (quoting § 13-703(B)).
79. Id. at 643-44 (quoting § 13-703(E)).
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Hildwin, the petitioner challenged this system under the Sixth Amend-
ment, arguing that "every finding of fact underlying the sentencing deci-
sion must be made by a jury, not by a judge."8 0
The Walton Court's response was both summary and unflinching:
"Any argument that he Constitution requires that a jury impose the sen-
tence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a
sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court."8' And
the Court quoted Hildwin's conclusion that "the Sixth Amendment does
not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sen-
tence of death be made by the jury." 82
The Walton opinion reveals that the Court clearly understood the
overall import of the defendant's claims in that case, namely, that if either
the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment mandate that the "find-
ings" that are required for a death sentence be made by a jury, this jury
mandate would apply to all required capital "findings."8 3 And the Walton
Court, like the Hildwin Court, repeatedly referred to the "findings"-in
the plural-that were required for a death sentence, under the laws of the
jurisdictions at issue.84 These decisions recognized that if the Constitution
mandates that any required capital findings (such as the existence of an
aggravator) have to be made by a jury, then it would logically follow that
all death-sentence-required "findings" have to be made by a jury (includ-
ing, for example, any finding regarding the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances or whether mitigating circumstances are "suffi-
ciently substantial to call for leniency"). Although Walton and.Hildwin
rejected the claim that aggravating circumstances are required "elements"
of a capital offense, they recognized what was at stake and the profound
significance of starting down this path.
And by 1995, the Court seemed to have reached overwhelming con-
sensus in its resolution not to go down this path. In Harris v. Alabama,
in an opinion that garnered the assent of eight of the nine Justices on the
Court, the Court rejected a claim that Alabama's hybrid "judge-jury" cap-
ital sentencing statute was unconstitutional because it did not specify the
weight that the trial judge had to give to the jury's sentencing recommen-
dation.86 Considering that in Walton the Court had upheld a capital sen-
tencing scheme with no jury involvement at all, this result seems unsur-
prising. It is worth noting, however, that this time there was only one dis-
senter, Justice Stevens, who articulated a powerful argument for the role
of the jury in all capital sentencing proceedings.87 Yet because both Justice
80. Id. at 647.
81. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)).
82. Id. (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam)).
83. See id. at 647-49.
84. See id at 647-48.
85. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
86. Id. at 504, 512.
87. See id at 515-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
684 [Vol. 95:3
2018] "FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
Brennan and Justice Marshall had left the Court since Walton-and no
other Justice had joined the Stevens camp-he dissented alone.
The near-unanimity of the Harris opinion, as well as the unblinking
nature of the final paragraph, are both rather striking. The opinion con-
cludes, with nary a citation to authority nor a caveat, as follows: "The Con-
stitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence.
It is not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to
consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper
weight."8 8
As of 1995, any argument that the American jury had any required
constitutional role-beyond finding the defendant guilty of murder-in a
decision about whether a convicted murderer could be or should be sen-
tenced to death seemed to be effectively over. It appeared that the Court
would allow death penalty states complete freedom to choose who would
be the decisionmaker regarding any required "findings" in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, including findings about aggravating circumstances,
findings about whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances, and the ultimate finding about whether the defendant
should be sentenced to prison or to death. It appeared that the Court was
quite comfortable that the Constitution permitted a trial judge, a jury, or
any combination of the two to make any and all of these decisions. Neither
the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor the Fourteenth
Amendment appeared to provide any restrictions on state discretion in this
regard; and the Supreme Court appeared quite content with this result.
But revolutions are often hard to predict. And the Supreme Court's
capital jury sentencing revolution was actually not far off.
III. THE CAPITAL JURY IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:
REQUIRED, BUT TO WHAT EXTENT?
A. The Unlikely Beginning of the Capital Jury Revolution
Death penalty cases are overwhelmingly state court cases, and (in the
modem era) they are always murder cases.89 Nevertheless, the case that
began the capital jury sentencing revolution was not a capital case, nor was
it a murder case or a state court case. The revolution began with Jones v.
88. Id. at 515 (majority opinion).
89. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S 407, 413 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the death penalty as punishment for rape of child where crime does not result in death of
victim), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty as punishment for crime of
rape of an adult woman). These cases are generally understood to mean that the death penalty is only
allowed for murder. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (concluding that for "crimes against individual
persons," the death penalty can only be given in cases where a life has been taken).
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United States, which was nominally a case about the statutory interpreta-
tion of the federal carjacking statute.90 Although Jones seemed to poten-
tially herald a sentencing revolution in general, it did not appear to be one
that would affect capital sentencing.9 1
The federal carjacking statute established three different punishment
ranges for carjacking: up to fifteen years for the basic carjacking offense,
up to twenty-five years if the carjacking resulted in "serious bodily injury,"
and up to life imprisonment if the carjacking resulted in a death.9 2 The
Jones petitioner was indicted and convicted at a jury trial of carjacking
based simply upon the elements of the basic offense.9 3 At his later sentenc-
ing before the district court, however, the state presented evidence that the
offense involved "serious bodily injury." 94 The district court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that this was true (over defense objection
that this had not been charged or proven to the jury) and then sentenced
the petitioner to imprisonment for twenty-five years on the carjacking
count.95
The Jones majority described the case as turning on "whether the fed-
eral carjacking statute . . . defined three distinct offenses or a single crime
with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sen-
tencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury ver-
dict." 96 The Court concluded that "the better reading is of three distinct
offenses, particularly in light of the rule that any interpretive uncertainty
should be resolved to avoid serious questions about the statute's constitu-
tionality." 9 7 The 5-4 Jones decision revealed a deeply divided Court, and
the real fight was not nearly so much about the best interpretation of the
federal carjacking statute, but rather about whether the case raised "serious
constitutional questions."98
The Court emphasized that the key question was whether the "serious
bodily injury" provision was "an element of an offense rather than a sen-
tencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the indict-
ment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."99 And even the dissenters agreed that he issue at stake
was whether the provisions establishing higher penalties for a carjacking
90. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999). The Jones decision was about 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1988), as of the time the petitioner was charged. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-30; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1988) (amended 1996).
91. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Departing from this recent authority,
the Court's sweeping constitutional discussion casts doubt on sentencing practices and assumptions
followed not only in the federal system but also in many States.").
92. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
93. Id. at 230-31.
94. Id. at231.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 229.
97. Id
98. Id at 251.
99. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
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that resulted in "serious bodily injury" or "death" created new and separate
offenses (for which these provisions were required "elements") or merely
"sentencing considerations" of a single carjacking offense.00
The Jones majority and the dissenters disagreed vehemently over the
proper test for determining whether something is an "element." The ma-
jority's test-which proposed a bold new rule-was as follows:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the no-
tice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to ajury, and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.101
The majority conceded that "our prior cases suggest rather than establish
this principle" and thus that the government's proposed interpretation of
the carjacking statute raised an issue of constitutional "doubt," rather than
a clear violation.' 02
While the majority recognized the plausibility of the dissent's single-
offense interpretation of the carjacking statute,103 it maintained that its
reading of the statute should be preferred because it avoided the "grave
and doubtful constitutional questions" that would be raised by the dissent's
approach.10 4 The majority maintained that allowing an increase in the de-
fendant's maximum possible sentence-from fifteen years to twenty-five
years to life-based upon a "preponderance of the evidence" finding by
the court at sentencing (about the results of the carjacking), rather than a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" finding by the jury at trial, raised troubling
constitutional issues regarding the appropriate role of the jury.'0
The Jones dissenters warned, however, that the majority's proposed
approach actually caused constitutional doubt regarding the Court's capi-
tal sentencing cases, asserting, "If it is constitutionally impermissible to
allow a judge's finding to increase the maximum punishment for carjack-
ing by [ten] years, it is not clear why a judge's finding may increase the
maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment to death."'06 The
dissent warned: "Reexamination of this area of our capital jurisprudence
100. See id. at 254-55, 269 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that if something qualifies as an
"element" of an offense, this implies the constitutional requirements of being included in an indictment
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
101. Id. at 243 n.6 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
102. Id
103. Id at 238-39.
104. Id at 239-40 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (1909)).
105. Id. at 242-44.
106. Id at 271-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's dissent added
that "Walton [v. Arizona] would appear to have been a better candidate for the Court's new approach
than is the instant case." Id. at 272. It should also be noted here that Kennedy's dissent used the term
"finding" to refer to the kind of required capital sentencing determination that was at issue. See id
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can be expected."107 Thus the Jones dissenters predicted the Court's even-
tual conclusion in Ring, even while the Jones majority denied that its new
approach raised any such conflict and even before the majority's new ap-
proach had been actually adopted as the law of the land.'08
Just one year later in 2000, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court's
new approach became the law of the land, launching a broad and general
sentencing revolution in earnest.io, Once again, the vote was 5-4, with the
same Justices in the majority and dissenting as in Jones (though the Court
was even more deeply divided),"10 and with the majority continuing to
deny that its bold, new approach to sentencing in general had any implica-
tions for capital sentencing.'
The question before the Court was the constitutionality of a New Jer-
sey "hate crime" statute, which provided for an increased maximum term
of imprisonment if a trial judge found at sentencing (by a "preponderance
of the evidence") that the crime at issue was committed "with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group .. .because of race, color, gender, hand-
icap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity."l l2 In Apprendi, the relevant
underlying offense (to which the defendant pleaded guilty) was for se-
cond-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which had a
sentencing range of five to ten years.' 13 Even though the defendant's in-
dictment did not mention the hate crime statute or allege that he had acted
with a biased purpose, after the defendant pleaded guilty, the prosecutor
requested that his punishment on a particular second-degree possession of
a firearm count be "enhanced" based on the hate crime statute."14 After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that the New Jersey hate crime
enhancement applied because the offense at issue was "motivated by racial
bias," which increased the potential sentence on that particular count to a
range of ten to twenty years.'
107. Id
108. See id. at 250-51 (majority opinion) (denying the relevance of Spaziano, Hildwin, and Wal-
ton to the Sixth Amendment analysis and approach relied upon in Jones).
109. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 524 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today,
in what will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law, the Court imposes as
a constitutional rule the principle it first identified in Jones.").
110. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Apprendi, which was joined by Justices Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 468 (majority opinion). Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opin-
ion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Id. at 523 (O'Con-
nor, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring), and Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, which was joined in part by Scalia, id. at 499
(Thomas, J., concurring). And Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 496-97.
112. Id. at 468-69 (majority opinion) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1997)
(amended 2001)).
113. Id. at 469-70.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 470-71. The trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the sentencing
enhancement applied-and that it was constitutional-and then sentenced the defendant to imprison-
ment for twelve years on the enhanced count. Id. at 471.
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The Apprendi majority framed the issue before the Court as follows:
"The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an in-
crease in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from [ten] to
[twenty] years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.""16 The Court noted that it had "foreshadowed" its answer to this
question in Jones and that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the
same answer in this case involving a state statute."17
The Apprendi Court emphasized the "surpassing importance" of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial and concluded that "[lt]aken together, these rights indis-
putably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.""'8 After discussing the common law tradition regard-
ing the rights to jury trial and due process, the early American understand-
ing of these rights, and the Court's own case law regarding these rights,"19
the Apprendi majority formally adopted the rule it had foretold in Jones:
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the pen-
alty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-
mitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 2 0 The Apprendi
majority described this principle as "the constitutional rule that emerges
from our history and our case law."1 21
The Court's approach in Apprendi was an adamantly functional one,
rather than a formalistic one, regarding how its new rule should be applied.
The Apprendi Court emphasized that in determining whether a particular
"required finding" is an "element" that must be proven to a jury or a "sen-
tencing factor" that could be found by a judge, "[1]abels do not afford an
acceptable answer." 2 2 The Court also noted that the location of a particu-
lar statute within a jurisdiction's statutory scheme was likewise not deci-
sive and, in particular, that "the mere presence of this 'enhancement' in a
sentencing statute does not define its character."23
Instead, the Court emphasized that the determinative issue was the
effect of the finding at issue: "[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form,
but of effect-does the requiredfinding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" 24 And the
Court found constitutional significance in the change in the defendant's
116. Id. at 469.
117. Id.at476.
118. Id. at 476-77 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
510 (1995)).
119. See id at 476-90.
120. Id. at 490.
121. Id. at 492.
122. Id. at 494 (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999)).
123. Id. at 495-96.
124. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
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maximum sentence (from ten years to twenty years): "Both in terms of
absolute years behind bars, and because of the more severe stigma at-
tached, the differential here is unquestionably of constitutional signifi-
cance."1 25 The Court declared: "When a judge's finding based on a mere
preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum
punishment, it is appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog
of the substantive offense."'
1 26
It should be noted that the Apprendi Court here repeatedly used the
word "finding" to refer to a determination that, under the Court's new rule,
must be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of its
label or characterization by the jurisdiction at issue, if the effect of the
determination is to increase the maximum possible sentence on the under-
lying count.127 Although the Apprendi opinion also used the term "fact" to
refer to such determinations,128 which is arguably narrower and more lim-
ited than the term "finding," a careful reading of the opinion reveals that
the Court did not intend its use of the term "fact" in its various assertions
of this new rule to be read narrowly or to have any different meaning than
the term "finding," which it used repeatedly and interchangeably with the
term "fact" in this context.
For example, the Apprendi Court noted that the defendant's argument
on appeal was that due process "requires that the finding of bias upon
which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt." 29 And the Court noted that in Jones it had "expressed
serious doubt concerning the constitutionality of allowing penalty-enhanc-
ing findings to be determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."1 30
Furthermore, the Apprendi Court consistently used the term "find-
ing," rather than "fact" or even "factual finding," when referring to the
specific determination that was at issue in the case before the Court:
whether the defendant had acted with a "purpose to intimidate" based upon
race.131 This is understandable because it sounds somewhat strange to call
this type of purpose or mental state a "fact." 1 32 The Apprendi Court noted
that the challenged New Jersey scheme allowed a defendant to be con-
victed at trial based upon a jury's "finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
he unlawfully possessed a prohibited weapon" (a second-degree offense),
but then allowed a judge to impose a sentence identical to that of a greater
125. Id. at 495.
126. Id (emphasis added) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
127. See id. at 474, 494-95.
128. See supra text accompanying note 120.
129. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
130. Id. at 472 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999)).
131. See id at 471-74, 491-95.
132. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court dissent in the case below, which the Apprendi ma-
jority quoted from, likewise used the word "finding" to refer to the determination at issue. See id at
473-74 (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 498 (N.J. 1999) (Stein, J., dissenting)).
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(first-degree) offense "based upon the judge's finding, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the defendant's 'purpose' for unlawfully possessing
the weapon was 'to intimidate' his victim on the basis of a particular char-
acteristic the victim possessed."'33 The Court also noted that in the current
case, "it does not matter whether the required finding is characterized as
one of intent or of motive,"' 34 still referring to this determination as in-
volving a "finding" (rather than a "fact" or a "finding of fact"). 3 5
Yet despite the Apprendi opinion's emphasis on the broad and func-
tional nature of its new rule-that any "finding" that, by law, effectively
increases a defendant's maximum sentence is actually an "element" of a
greater offense that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt-
the majority maintained that its new rule did not undermine its capital
cases, such as Walton, allowing judges (rather than juries) "to find specific
aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death."3 6 The Apprendi
majority suggested (briefly and unconvincingly) that the capital sentenc-
ing context was different and that its new rule would not apply there any-
way because "once ajury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements
of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death,
it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather
than a lesser one, ought to be imposed."'3 7 This proffered distinction was
both inaccurate (because a jury conviction of murder does not, without
further findings, actually expose a defendant to a death sentence) and con-
trary to the Court's own consistent recognition of the nature of capital sen-
tencing in America in the modem era.138
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, was extensive, vigor-
ous, and quite hard hitting.'3 9 The four dissenting Justices disagreed vig-
orously with the majority on numerous issues and predicted extensive
133. Id. at 491 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999) (amended 2013)). The
Court concluded, "In light of the constitutional rule explained above, and all of the cases upporting
it, this practice cannot stand." Id. at 491-92.
134. Id. at 494.
135. See id. (referring to "the required 'motive' finding" (quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d
485, 492 (N.J. 1999)); id. at 495 (referring to "the finding of biased purpose"); id. (referring to "the
required biased purpose finding"); id. at 474 (noting the significance of the purpose "finding .. . be-
cause it increased-indeed, it doubled-the maximum" sentence at issue).
136. Id. at 496 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990)).
137. Id. at 496-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998)).
138. Justice Thomas candidly recognized that "Walton did approve a scheme by which a judge,
rather than a jury, determines an aggravating fact that makes a convict eligible for the death penalty,
and thus eligible for a greater punishment"-in clear conflict with the rule of Apprendi. See id. at 522
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas was in no hurry, however, to actually reach this issue in Apprendi
and seemed relieved to conclude that it was "a question for another day." See id. at 523.
139. See id. at 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor quipped that the majority opinion
"marshals virtually no authority to support its extraordinary rule. Indeed, it is remarkable that the Court
cannot identify a single instance, in the over 200 years since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, that
our Court has applied, as a constitutional requirement, the rule it announces today." Id. at 525. Justice
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damage as a result of the Apprendi decision, including the demise of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines and similar state sentencing schemes, as
well as great disruption and confusion within American criminal courts
generally.141 Nevertheless, for present purposes, it is enough to note that
the dissenters did not buy the majority's claim that Apprendi would not
impact the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence. In particular, Justice
O'Connor argued that Walton "plainly reject[ed]" the 'increase in the
maximum penalty' rule" adopted in Apprendi.142 And regarding the Ap-
prendi majority's claim that Walton could be distinguished because it was
based on a system where "the jury makes all of the findings necessary to
expose the defendant to a death sentence," O'Connor described this prof-
fered "distinction" as both "baffling" and "demonstrably untrue."l43 The
dissenters in Apprendi had no doubt that this "watershed change in consti-
tutional law" portended a monumental reconsideration of the Court's de-
cisions in the capital sentencing context in terms of the jury's role.144 And
they were right.
B. Ring v. Arizona: The Capital Jury Revolution Begins
Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court took up the
issue of Apprendi's impact in the death penalty sentencing context. 145 The
Arizona capital sentencing scheme at issue in Ring was essentially the
same one that the Court had considered and upheld in 1990 in Walton.146
Under this system, after a jury convicted a defendant of first-degree mur-
der, the sentencing phase was conducted entirely by the trial judge, with-
out any jury involvement at all.1 47 And to sentence a defendant to death,
Breyer also dissented, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id at 555 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). Breyer focused on the argument that Apprendi is impractical. See id. at 555 (asserting that the
Apprendi rule "would seem to promote a procedural ideal," but that "the real world of criminal justice
cannot hope to meet any such ideal" and "can function only with the help of procedural compromises,
particularly in respect to sentencing").
140. See, e.g., id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (warning of potentially "severe" conse-
quences from Apprendi, including "invalidation of the [federal] Sentencing Guidelines," along with
the "determinate-sentencing schemes [of] many States"); id at 550 (describing Apprendi as "invali-
dat[ing] with the stroke of a pen three decades' worth of nationwide [sentencing] reform").
141. See id (forecasting that "perhaps the most significant impact of the Court's decision ... [is]
its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and state determinate-sentencing
schemes"); id. at 551-52 (arguing that Apprendi "threatens to cast sentencing in the United States into
what will likely prove to be a lengthy period of considerable confusion" and that its impact "could be
colossal").
142. Id. at 536-37.
143. Id. at 538; see also id (noting that in Walton the Court "upheld the Arizona scheme specif-
ically on the ground that the Constitution does not require the jury to make the factual findings that
serve as the "prerequisite to imposition of [a death] sentence") (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 647 (1990)).
144. Id. at 524; see also id. at 539 (criticizing the Apprendi majority's "unprincipled and inex-
plicable distinctions between its decision and previous cases addressing the same subject in the capital
sentencing context"); id. at 538 ("If the Court does not intend to overrule Walton, one would be hard
pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today.").
145. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
146. Compare Walton, 497 U.S. at 642-44, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 588 (noting that Court upheld
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme in Walton).
147. Compare Walton, 497 U.S. at 643, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 592.
"FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
the trial judge was required to make two findings: (1) that at least one stat-
utory aggravating circumstance exists in the case, and (2) that any mitigat-
ing circumstances in the case are not "sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency." 48
The Walton Court had concluded that "the Sixth Amendment does
not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sen-
tence of death be made by the jury." 4 9 Yet Apprendi held that "[i]t is un-
constitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed."5 o Although the Apprendi majority had asserted
that Arizona's system was compatible with this new Apprendi rule,'5 ' the
Arizona Supreme Court had since rejected that claim in Timothy Ring's
case.152 In particular, that court clarified that the maximum sentence an
Arizona defendant could receive for a first-degree murder conviction by a
jury was imprisonment for life (with or without parole), and thus that the
findings made as part of Arizona's capital sentencing process (entirely by
the trial judge) were necessary to increase a convicted murderer's maxi-
mum potential sentence to death.153 In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court
specifically rejected the Apprendi majority's characterization of Arizona's
capital sentencing system and endorsed the description of Justice O'Con-
nor (in her Apprendi dissent): "Therefore, the present case is precisely as
described in Justice O'Connor's dissent-Defendant's death sentence re-
quired the judge's factual findings." 54
The Ring Court acknowledged this clarification of Arizona law by
Arizona's highest court and the (now undeniable) "manifest tension be-
tween Walton and the reasoning of Apprendi."'5 ' The Ring Court empha-
sized that Apprendi "held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a
148. Walton, 479 U.S. at 644 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1989) (current ver-
sion at §§ 13-751 to -752 (2017))). Compare id. at 643-44, with Ring, 536 U.S. at 593 ("The State's
law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant to death only if there is at least one aggravating
circumstance and'there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."'
(emphasis added) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (2001) (current version at §§ 13-751
to -752 (2017))).
149. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per
curiam)).
150. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 252 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
151. See id. at 496-97.
152. See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc), rev'd, 536 U.S. 584.
153. See id ("In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury's ver-
dict, regardless of the jury's factual findings. . . . It is only after a subsequent adversarial sentencing
hearing, at which the judge alone acts as the finder of the necessary statutory factual elements, that a
defendant may be sentenced to death.").
154. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1151. The Arizona Supreme Court was in the strange position of having a
Supreme Court case upholding its system (Walton) being challenged on the basis of a new Supreme
Court case, which included a clear misstatement of Arizona law (Apprendi). See id. at 151-52. After
recognizing the conflict between Walton and Apprendi, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Walton
was "still the controlling authority" and declined to strike down Arizona's capital sentencing system.
Id. at 1152.
155. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596 (2002).
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defendant to be 'expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he
would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury ver-
dict alone." 5 6 And the Ring Court ultimately ruled-in a 7-2 decision,
with six Justices on the majority opinion157-that "Apprendi's reasoning
is irreconcilable with Walton's holding" and "overrule[d] Walton in rele-
vant part."15 8
The Ring Court declared that under the Sixth Amendment, "[c]apital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, .. . are entitled to a jury
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment."159 Furthermore, while reviewing its deci-
sion in Apprendi, the Ring Court recognized that "[i]f a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding
of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'60 And the Ring Court concluded by pro-
nouncing as follows:
The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would
be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary
to increase a defendant's sentence by two years [as in Apprendi], but
not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the
Sixth Amendment applies to both.
161
On the other hand, the Ring Court noted that the specific claim at
issue in that case was "tightly delineated."162 The petitioner's claim was
that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial mandates that the first required
death penalty finding, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance, must be made by a jury-not a court-in order for a death
sentence to be constitutional.163 The Ring Court emphasized that the peti-
tioner "makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to mitigating cir-
cumstances[;] . . . [n]or does he argue that the Sixth Amendment required
156. Id. at 588-89 (alterations in original) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
157. Id. at 587. Like many capital cases, Ring produced quite a bit of separate writing by the
Justices. See id. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Ring Court, which was joined by Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Id. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, which
was joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also filed a concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 613 (Breyer, J., concurring). And Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Id at 589 (majority opinion).
159. Id
160. Id at 602 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83); see also id. at 600 ("[U]nder the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999))).
161. Id. at 609.
162. Id. at 597 n.4.
163. Id. ("Ring's claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment re-
quired jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him."). It should be noted that
the Ring Court did here use the term "findings" in this context, just as the Court had done regularly in
Apprendi.
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the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death
penalty."l64 Thus whether the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial also re-
quires that a jury, rather than a judge, make the second finding necessary
to sentence a defendant to death, i.e., whether the mitigating circumstances
in a case are "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency" or (as this anal-
ysis is more typically described by state law) whether any aggravating cir-
cumstances in a case "outweigh" any mitigating circumstances, was not
before the Ring Court. And the Ring Court declined to address or even
comment on this issue.
Hence the full impact of the Ring decision regarding the jury's con-
stitutionally-required role in capital sentencing under the Sixth Amend-
ment was left unsettled-much like the impact of Apprendi in the capital
sentencing realm had been left unsettled.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ring, in typical pithy form, described
the functional, elements-based Apprendi/Ring rule thus:
[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to the imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls
them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
165
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion (which was joined by Justice Thomas)
is also noteworthy for its commentary about why he (and perhaps other
Justices) hesitated to follow the Sixth Amendment rationale of Jones and
Apprendi to its logical conclusion in the capital sentencing context. His
opinion may also help explain why the majority opinions in both Jones
and Apprendi seemed to strain to declare that these cases would not impact
the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence (which for over twenty years
had given the states complete discretion about how to use the jury in the
capital sentencing context, if at all).
Scalia described the Ring case as confronting him "with a difficult
choice" 66 because it was the Court's own cases, beginning with Furman,
that "compelled Arizona (and many other states) to specify particular 'ag-
gravating factors' that must be found before the death penalty can be im-
posed."1 6 7 And, Justice Scalia continued, "In my view, that line of deci-
sions had no proper foundation in the Constitution."68 He added, "I am
therefore reluctant to magnify the burdens that our Furman jurisprudence
imposes on the States." 69
164. Id. (citation omitted).







This acknowledgment of "reluctance" to apply constitutional doc-
trines adopted in the noncapital context to the capital sentencing context
is helpful in explaining some of the Court's unconvincing analysis "dis-
tinguishing" the capital cases (such as Walton) in Jones and Apprendi-
analysis that the Court ultimately had to discard in Ring. It should also be
noted that Justice Scalia was actually much more critical of the Wood-
son-Lockett line of cases, upon which the second required finding in most
capital jurisdictions is based (the weighing finding) than he was of Furman
and its progeny, which form the basis for the first requirement (the finding
of at least one aggravating circumstance).1 7 0
In his concurring opinion in Walton,17 1 which upheld the Arizona
capital scheme that was struck down in Ring,172 Justice Scalia sserted that
although he was dubious of the Court's decision in Furman, because Fur-
man was "arguably supported by" the language of the Eighth Amendment,
he was "willing to adhere to the precedent established by [the Court's]
Furman line of cases."l7 3 Regarding the Woodson-Lockett line of cases,
however, Scalia declared that "Woodson and Lockett are rationally irrec-
oncilable with Furman."1 74 He insisted that these two fundamental features
of modem capital sentencing "cannot be reconciled."17 5 He further main-
tained that he personally "would not know how to apply them-or, more
precisely, how to apply both [Woodson-Lockett] and Furman-if [he]
170. See Chris Hutton, Legitimizing Capital Punishment: Rationality Collides with Moral Judg-
ment, 42 S.D. L. REV. 399, 411 (1998) ("In contrast to his tolerating Furman, Justice Scalia ridiculed
the Woodson-Lockett cases."). In Woodson, the Supreme Court established that sentencing in death
penalty cases "requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of in-
flicting the penalty of death." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion). The Woodson Court likewise held that such decisions could not be "mandatory" based simply
upon a conviction of first-degree murder. Id. at 302, 305. In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court further held
that in death penalty cases the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments "require that the sentencer . .. not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). Hence Woodson and Lockett are fundamen-
tally about the constitutional requirement that the capital sentencer must be allowed to consider any
mitigating evidence that he defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. See id at 606;
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. And this imperative is typically accomplished by directing the jury to
consider the mitigating circumstances in the case and then determine whether the aggravating circum-
stances in the case "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances, which in most death penalty states is the
second requirement for a defendant o be eligible for a death sentence, i.e., the "weighing" require-
ment. See discussion infra Section III.C.
171. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled by Ring,
536 U.S. 584.
172. Id. at 649 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 670-71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 673; see also id. at 667 ("It is difficult enough to justify the Furman requirement [of
limiting capital sentencing discretion] so long as the States are permitted to allow random mitigation;
but to impose it [Furman] while simultaneously requiring random mitigation is absurd.").
175. Id. at 664. Scalia added that describing these two lines of cases as forming the "twin objec-
tives" of modem death penalty law, id (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984)), "is
rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil." Id.
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wanted to."176 And he added: "Stare decisis cannot command the impos-
sible." 77 Justice Scalia then announced that from then on, he simply would
not uphold or enforce the Woodson-Lockett requirement that he capital
sentencer must be allowed to consider any mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant.'78
Considering that Justice Scalia was crucial to the slender 5-4 major-
ity decisions in both Jones and Apprendi,179 Scalia's mere grudging ac-
ceptance of Furman-and his outright hostility regarding Woodson-Lock-
ett-may well help explain the Court's unwillingness to take the funda-
mental Sixth Amendment principle of Jones/Apprendi/Ring to its full legal
and logical conclusion in the capital sentencing context, both within those
cases and subsequently.80 While the majority Justices in Jones, Apprendi,
and Ring agreed that the Sixth Amendment requires a beyond a reasonable
doubt jury finding on all the "elements" of a crime that establish the max-
imum sentence for that crime, these same Justices were quite deeply di-
vided regarding the Supreme Court's role in "regulating" the death pen-
alty, through the Eighth Amendment and otherwise.
Nevertheless, the capital sentencing decision in Ring, like its Jones
and Apprendi predecessors in the noncapital sentencing context, does
seem quite revolutionary. It announced a bold new rule, namely, that states
cannot leave capital sentencing entirely to trial judges because the Sixth
Amendment provides capital defendants with a right to have a jury (not
just a judge) determine whether at least one "aggravating circumstance"
exists, which is required for a constitutional death sentence. Ring also
squarely endorsed the functional approach of Apprendi, under which any
finding that increases the maximum sentence for an offense functions as
an "element" of a greater offense, which must be found by a jury and be-
yond a reasonable doubt. And Ring warned that states could not evade the
substance of the Court's new approach by simply renaming or recharac-
terizing the finding at issue and rejected Arizona's attempt to cling to the
result in Walton (by invoking certain Arizona statutory language) as fol-
lows: "If Arizona prevailed on [this] . . . argument, Apprendi would be
reduced to a 'meaningless and formalistic' rule of statutory drafting."'8 '
176. Id. at 673.
177. Id.
178. See id. ("I cannot adhere to a principle so lacking in support in constitutional text and so
plainly unworthy of respect under stare decisis. Accordingly, I will not, in this case or in the future,
vote to uphold an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer's discretion has been unlawfully re-
stricted.").
179. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 229 (1999).
180. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 558 (2002); see also id at 610-14 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Justice Thomas, who joined Scalia's concurring opinion in Ring, was likewise critical to the
bare majority decisions in Jones and Apprendi. See id. at 610, 611-12.




Thus, on the one hand, the Ring Court appeared to be announcing a
rather bold, functional, and nonformalistic approach to future questions
about the right to a jury-determined process in the capital sentencing con-
text. And parts of the Ring opinion wax in quite poetic terms regarding the
significance and centrality of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,
including in death cases:
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right . .. does not turn on the relative
rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. Entrusting
to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support a death sentence
might be "an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice
designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the
State.... The founders of the American Republic were not prepared
to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one
of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never
been efficient; but it has always been free."1 82
The Ring opinion also made a sharp break with many past cases by invok-
ing the language and reasoning of the dissenters in prior cases, which cer-
tainly sounds revolutionary.'8 3 And Justice Scalia asserted that despite his
previous "reluctan[ce]" to fully apply the Court's jury cases in the capital
sentencing context, he had "acquired new wisdom" (or "discarded old ig-
norance") and now recognized that "[w]e cannot preserve our veneration
for the protection of the jury in criminal cases if we render ourselves cal-
lous to the need for that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty
without it."l 84
On the other hand, the Ring Court seemed to want to keep the impact
of this revolution rather small and to require as few changes to state capital
sentencing as possible.'8 5 Two aspects of the Ring opinion are particularly
noteworthy in this regard. First, the Court explicitly limited its holding to
the first finding of most capital sentencing systems-the finding about
whether an aggravating circumstance exists in the case.1 86 Second, and
perhaps most significantly, the Ring Court repeatedly used the terms
"fact," "finding of facts," or "factfinding," rather than the broader term
182. Id. at 607 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
183. See, e.g., id. at 599 (quoting extensively from Justice Stevens's dissent in Walton, including
his description of the common law understanding of the jury's role at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted); id at 601 (quoting Justice Kennedy's dissent in Jones regarding the majority's attempt to
distinguish Walton); id. at 603 (quoting Justice O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi regarding the major-
ity's attempt to distinguish Walton).
184. Id. at 610-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
186. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (majority opinion) ("[W]e overrule Walton to the extent that it
allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
imposition of the death penalty.").
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"finding" (or a term like "determination") to describe the type of determi-
nation at issue and the rules governing this determination.'87
Although the Apprendi Court had sometimes used the term "fact" to
describe the kind of determination at issue under its new rule, as explained
herein, the Apprendi Court often used the broader and more generic term
"finding" in this context.'88 And Apprendi's overall analysis revealed that
even its use of the term "fact" was essentially synonymous with the more
general term "finding."' 89 In addition, the Apprendi Court consistently de-
scribed the determination at issue in that case (whether the defendant had
acted with a "purpose to intimidate") as a "finding" that had to be made
by a jury, not just a trial judge.190 Thus, the Ring Court's use of the terms
"fact," "finding of facts," and "factfinding," within its descriptions of the
type of capital-stage determinations covered by its new rule, suggests that
the Ring Court may have had a narrower vision of its new rule than the
Apprendi Court did or perhaps that the Ring Court was more "reluctant"
to impose the full logical and legal force of this new rule in the capital
context than it was in the noncapital context of Jones and Apprendi. It is
likewise entirely possible that the Ring opinion was written with more nar-
row language to "bring together" as many Justices as possible, including
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who had a much different view of the Court's
appropriate role when it came to death penalty cases.191
Regardless of the possible motivation, if any, for the Ring Court's
frequent use of the seemingly more narrow terms "fact," "finding of fact,"
187. See, e.g., id at 589 ("Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude,
are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment."); id. at 607 (discussing the inconsistency of "[e]ntrusting to a judge the find-
ing of facts necessary to support a death sentence" with the founder's vision of the right to jury trial);
id. at 609 ("The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly dimin-
ished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but
not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.").
188. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying note 128.
190. See supra text accompanying note 124.
191. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
described the Ring decision as follows:
[TIoday's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision says is
that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed. Those
States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so-
by requiring a priorjury finding of [an] aggravating factor in the sentencing phase, or, more
simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs any-
way) in the guilt phase.
Id. Justice Scalia here emphasizes his view that the Constitution does not require that a jury make the
ultimate capital sentencing decision and his desire that the Court go no further than it was going in
Ring. Scalia's view stands in sharp contrast with the view expressed by Justice Breyer in his separate
opinion in Ring, asserting that the Eighth Amendment does require that the jury make the ultimate
capital sentencing decision. See id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The Eighth Amendment requires
that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a defendant to death."). Justice Scalia's response
to this view was rather caustic: "While I am, as always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer's company,
the unfortunate fact is that today's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing.. . . Justice Breyer
is on the wrong flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Ap-
prendi-land."). Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and "factfinding" to describe the kind of determination at issue-rather
than the more broad and open-ended term "finding," which Apprendi used
regularly in this context-this approach left the door open to arguments
by death penalty states and the federal government that the weighing find-
ing is not a "factual" finding and, thus, is not covered by the Ring decision
and rule. As will be described in the next section, such arguments were
quite successful in the years following Ring, despite the Ring Court's em-
phasis that it was adopting afunctional approach, rather than a formalistic
one, and that it was applying the elements-based approach of Apprendi to
the capital sentencing context.
The application of Ring should have involved looking to the substan-
tive law of the jurisdiction at issue to decide whether a particular determi-
nation is necessary to increase the defendant's maximum possible sen-
tence from some form of imprisonment to death (i.e., whether a particular
finding is a required "element" for a death sentence) as the basis for deter-
mining whether the Sixth Amendment requires that he determination at
issue be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately,
this was not the approach that was typically taken in the years between
Ring and the Supreme Court's next big decision in this realm, Hurst v.
Florida, which was not until 2016.192
C. The Revolution Stalls on Hybrid Juries and Falters on Weighing
1. From All-Judge Sentencing to Judge-Jury Sentencing
The Ring Court recognized that at the time of its 2002 decision, five
states had "all-judge" capital sentencing systems.193 The Court noted that
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska all "commit both capi-
tal sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to
judges."'9 4 Justice O'Connor remarked in her dissent that the Ring major-
ity had effectively declared the capital sentencing schemes of these five
states to be unconstitutional.195 After Ring, Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho
switched to entirely jury-determined capital sentencing schemes, placing
both the key capital findings and the ultimate death penalty decision en-
tirely in the hands of the jury.1 96 Montana and Nebraska, on the other hand,
responded to Ring by altering their schemes to place the aggravating cir-
cumstances decision in the hands of the jury, but continued to place the
192. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
193. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6.
194. Id. (listing relevant statutes for Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska).
195. Id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703 to -703.01 (2003) (current version at §§ 13-751
to -752 (2017)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2003) (amended 2014); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515
(2003) (amended 2006).
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"weighing" finding and the ultimate sentencing decision in the hands of
judgeS. 197
The Ring Court also recognized that as of 2002, there were four states
with "hybrid" capital sentencing systems, in which the jury rendered an
"advisory verdict" about how the jury thought the defendant should be
sentenced, but the judge then independently made the required capital
findings and the final sentencing decision-which could include a death
sentence, even when the jury had recommended imprisonment.' Ring
recognized Alabama, Florida, Delaware, and Indiana as all having such a
system.1 99 Justice O'Connor worried in her dissent that death row prison-
ers in these states would "seize on" the Ring decision to challenge their
200
sentences. She was not wrong, but such prisoners had very little success
in this regard (prior to 2016).201
In particular, the Supreme Courts of both Florida and Alabama-two
of the most "active" death penalty states in America-upheld the consti-
tutionality of their "advisory jury" capital sentencing systems against
202
Ring-based Sixth Amendment challenges. In response to a Ring chal-
lenge in a Florida case, the Florida Supreme Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, noted: (1) that the U.S. Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld Flor-
ida's capital sentencing system in the past (citing Proffitt, Spaziano, and
Hildwin), (2) that Ring did not directly address the constitutionality of
Florida's system, and (3) that the Supreme Court had lifted a stay in the
case at issue without explicitly directing reconsideration in light of Ring-
and then rejected the defendant's Ring claim without substantive analy-
- 203
When faced with a Ring challenge in the Alabama case of Ex parte
Waldrop,204 the Alabama Supreme Court emphasized the differences be-
tween the Arizona system at issue in Ring and the Alabama capital system,
197. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522 (2003)
(amended 2011). In Montana, after a jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance, the trial judge
must decide whether there are "mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,"
which determines whether the defendant is sentenced to death. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305.
As in Arizona, Montana effectively defines any sentence less than death in this context as "leniency."
See id.; accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2017) (disallowing the death penalty unless the
jury "determines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leni-
ency"). In Nebraska, after a jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance, a three-judge panel is
used to receive and evaluate mitigating evidence, which includes determining "[w]hether the aggra-
vating circumstances . . . justify imposition of the sentence of death" and "[w]hether sufficient miti-
gating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circum-
stances," and then make the ultimate death penalty sentencing decision, which must be unanimous if
a death sentence is imposed. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (2017).
198. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6.
199. Id. (listing relevant statutes from Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana).
200. Id. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201. See infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
203. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam), abrogated by Hurst
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
204. 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002).
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particularly the fact that many of Alabama's second-stage "aggravating
circumstances" duplicate or "overlap" with Alabama's "capital offenses,"
(i.e., the aggravated murder offenses that must be found by a jury during
the guilt stage, in order for a defendant to be subject to a possible death
205sentence). In the case at issue, the defendant had been convicted of the
capital offense of murder during a robbery, which overlapped with one of
the aggravating circumstances alleged in the case (murder during a rob-
bery).20 6 Consequently, the Alabama Supreme Court asserted that (in ef-
fect) "the jury, and not the trial judge, determined the existence of the 'ag-
gravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty,"'
207
based on the jury's decision to convict the defendant, even though the jury
had actually recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole
during the sentencing hearing.208 The Waldrop court concluded that Ala-
bama's first-stage narrowing "is all Ring and Apprendi require,"209 even
though the "overlap" between Alabama's first-stage capital offenses and
second-stage aggravating circumstances is not complete or perfect in gen-
eral (i.e., the two lists are not identical) and was not complete or perfect
even in that case (because the judge-imposed death sentence in the Wal-
drop case also relied on a second aggravating circumstance, i.e., that the
murder was "heinous, atrocious, or cruel," for which there was no corre-
sponding Alabama "capital offense" and no jury finding at trial).2 10
Hence the Florida and Alabama Supreme Courts maintained the con-
stitutionality of their hybrid judge-jury capital sentencing systems in the
aftermath of Ring, and the legislatures of both states declined to make any
changes to their capital systems.in light of the Ring decision. Indiana, on
the other hand, quickly shifted to a jury-dominated capital sentencing sys-
tem, placing both the required capital findings and the ultimate sentencing
decision in the hands of the jury. 2 11 And Delaware modified its hybrid sys-
tem by insisting that any death sentence be based upon a ."beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" jury finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, but
continued to allow the trial court to make its own finding about whether
205. Id. at 1188 (quoting Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 178 (Ala. 1997)).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609 (2002)). The Waldrop court added,
"Therefore, the findings reflected in the jury's [guilt-stage] verdict alone exposed [the defendant] to a
range of punishment that had as its maximum the death penalty." Id.
208. Id at 1184.
209. Id at 1188.
210. See id. at 1185 (quoting Waldrop v. State, 859 So. 2d 1138, 1174 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000));
see also id at 1188 (noting the overlap between the capital offense and an aggravating factor). Com-
pare ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (2017) (listing "capital offenses"), with § 13A-5-49 (listing "aggravating
circumstances"). The Alabama Supreme Court has continued to rely on the (imperfect) overlap be-
tween Alabama's first-stage capital offenses and second-stage aggravating circumstances to uphold
the constitutionality of its advisory jury system, even after the Supreme Court struck down Florida's
advisory jury system in Hurst. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016); Ex parte Bohannon,
222 So. 3d 525, 528-36 (Ala. 2016) (quoting extensively from Waldrop).
211. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(l)(1), (2) (2003) (amended 2016) (stating that the jury must find
the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance and that any aggravating circumstances "out-
weigh" the mitigating circumstances).
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any aggravating circumstances "outweighed" any mitigating circum-
stances, which would determine whether the defendant was actually sen-
tenced to death.2 12 Although the Delaware jury was required to make an
actual finding on both "the existence of at least [one] aggravating circum-
stance" and whether "the aggravating circumstances .. .outweigh the mit-
igating circumstances,"2 13 the jury's weighing "recommendation" only
had to be given "such consideration as deemed appropriate" by the
judge.2 14
Hence soon after the Ring decision, there were no more all-judge cap-
ital sentencing systems among the states, but there were five states-Flor-
ida, Alabama, Delaware, Montana, and Nebraska-that maintained some
type of hybrid approach, all of which placed both the weighing determina-
tion and the ultimate sentencing decision in the hands of trial judges. In
addition, both Florida and Alabama continued to base the death sentences
in their states on the findings of the trial judge regarding the aggravating
circumstances in the case, which were not limited to the aggravating cir-
cumstances found by the jury, either implicitly (during the guilt stage in
Alabama) or explicitly (during the sentencing stage in either state).2 15 Fur-
thermore, the statutory schemes in both Florida and Alabama continued to
allow trial judges to override jury recommendations of life with sentences
of death, just as they were doing at the time Ring was decided in 2002.216
Nevertheless, despite numerous opportunities (particularly in cases from
Florida and Alabama) to evaluate the constitutionality of these judge-dom-
inated, hybrid capital systems, the Supreme Court declined to take up any
new Ring-based capital sentencing challenges for over thirteen years.
2. The Misnomer of Eighth Amendment "Death Eligibility"
For the overwhelming majority of death penalty jurisdictions that al-
ready relied entirely upon the jury for all capital sentencing determina-
tions, the fact that Ring applied to the first required capital finding, i.e., that
any aggravating circumstances must be found by a jury and be found be-
yond a reasonable doubt, was quite clear and was easily implemented (if
any change to existing law was even needed). The bigger question was
whether the Ring decision meant that the second finding that is required in
most capital jurisdictions, i.e., that any aggravating circumstances in a case
"outweigh" any mitigating circumstances (or some similar finding), must
likewise be found by a jury and be found beyond a reasonable doubt.2 17
212. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 4209(d)(1) (2003) (amended 2013).
213. Id. § 4209(c)(3)(a)(1), (2).
214. Id. § 4209(d)(1).
215. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(e), -47(d)-(e) (2003); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1)-(3) (2003)
(amended 2017).
216. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3).
217. Although different death penalty jurisdictions formulate this "weighing" or "balancing" de-
cision in different ways, the great majority of American death penalty jurisdictions require that the
capital decisionmaker make some kind of weighing or balancing finding in order to sentence a defend-
ant to death. See infra text accompanying note 243.
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As it turns out, resolution of the Sixth Amendment questions of
whether the capital weighing finding must be made by a jury and "beyond
a reasonable doubt" has been critically impacted by the Supreme Court's
use of a few specific words and concepts: (1) the Court's use of the word
"fact" in Ring, and (2) the Court's use of the word "eligible," in terms of
being "eligible for the death penalty," in its Eighth Amendment cases. This
Article has already addressed the theme that the Ring Court's use of the
term "fact" was different than the Apprendi Court's use of this term, which
the Apprendi Court used more broadly and interchangeably with the more
general term "finding"-a generic term that Apprendi used to describe any
determination that must be made in order for a defendant to be sentenced
to death.
Before turning to an analysis of how various death penalty states and
the federal circuit courts have resolved the applicability of Apprendi/Ring
to the capital weighing finding, this Article will briefly (and quite sum-
marily) suggest that the Supreme Court's use of the concept of being "eli-
gible" for the death penalty in the Eighth Amendment context is incom-
plete and potentially misleading, at least if it is taken too literally or ap-
plied in the Sixth Amendment context. In the Sixth Amendment context,
an unreflective use of the concept of being "death eligible" (based merely
upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance) is particularly likely to
lead to incongruous and constitutionally inappropriate results.
In Tuilaepa v. California,218 the Supreme Court summarized its
Eighth Amendment cases as addressing "two different aspects of the cap-
ital decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection de-
cision."2 19 The Court recognized that a defendant can only be eligible for
the death penalty upon conviction "of a crime for which the death penalty
is a [constitutionally] proportionate punishment," such as murder.220 The
Court then made this (seemingly innocuous) statement: "To render a de-
fendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, . . . the trier of
fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one 'aggravating cir-
cumstance' (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase."22' Im-
portantly, the Court hereby limited the idea of being "eligible" for a death
sentence to simply a murder conviction, followed by a finding of at least
one aggravating circumstance (or a functional equivalent). The Court then
218. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
219. Id. at 971.
220. Id. at 971-72.
221. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that this "aggravating circumstance": (1) could be
"contained in the definition of the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or in both)"; (2) "must
apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder"; and (3) "may not be unconstitutionally
vague." Id at 972.
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described the remainder of the capital sentencing process as the "selec-
tion" phase, "where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible
for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence."222
The capital sentencing process described in Tuilaepa (and other
Eighth Amendment cases) has two basic components: (1) a finding that at
least one aggravating circumstance xists in the case, which (if made)
makes the capital defendant eligible for a death sentence, and (2) a process
during which the decisionmaker considers all the evidence presented and
then selects a sentence for the defendant.223 The decisionmaker can only
proceed to the selection phase if the required finding of an aggravator is
made, but the Tuilaepa Court made clear that the Eighth Amendment does
not require that any specific additional findings be made during the selec-
224tion process.
The problem with this approach to death "eligibility," however, is
that it is not based upon an analysis of what is actually required by the
jurisdiction at issue for a death sentence to be lawfully imposed. In fact,
the California statute at issue in Tuilaepa (then and now) mandates that in
order for a defendant to be sentenced to death, the jury must "conclude[]
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances."225 Thus, a California defendant is not actually eligible for a death
sentence-at least not in the sense that this term is typically used-based
only on the finding of an aggravating circumstance (i.e., a first-stage "spe-
cial circumstance" under California law) because California law also re-
quires that the jury make a finding/conclusion/determination regarding the
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly declined to mandate under the
Eighth Amendment that state death penalty systems require such addi-
226
tional findings (beyond the existence of an aggravating circumstance),
it is important to recognize that the Court's use of the concept of death
222. Id. (emphasis added). Regarding this selection phase, the Tuilaepa Court described the re-
quirements of the Eighth Amendment as follows: "What is important at the selection stage is an indi-
vidualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
crime." Id (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)). The Court noted that this require-
ment "is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of
the defendant and the circumstances of the crime." Id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 977-80. Hence the Tuilaepa Court rejected the petitioners' claim that the Eighth
Amendment requires that specific findings be made about the "selection factors" that a California jury
is directed to consider during the capital sentencing process, id., and concluded that "the sentencer
may be given 'unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after
it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty,"' id. at 979-80
(quoting Zant, 426 U.S. at 875).
225. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2017) (death sentence allowed only "if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances"); id. ("If
the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances
the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of [imprisonment] . . . for a term of life without the possibility
of parole.").
226. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979-80.
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eligibility (in this Eighth Amendment context) is not based upon a deter-
mination regarding what the law of a particular jurisdiction actually re-
quires for a death sentence.
In most death penalty jurisdictions, death penalty sentencing actually
involves three components: (1) afinding about whether an aggravating cir-
cumstance exists in the case, which narrows the class of murders to which
the death penalty can potentially be applied; (2) a process during which
the decisionmaker considers all the evidence presented, including all the
mitigating circumstances in the case; and (3) afinding about whether any
aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances in the
227case (or the functional equivalent of such a finding). In some states, a
death sentence follows automatically from this second finding.228 In other
states, there is actually a fourth step, in which the sentencer chooses
whether to sentence the defendant o death or to some form of imprison-
22ment (i.e., the sentencer selects the sentence).229 In both such systems, the
second finding is required for a death sentence; and a defendant is not truly
eligible to be sentenced to death until the second finding is made.
Although not all death penalty jurisdictions require a weighing-type
finding, most do.230 Consequently, whatever merit the concept of being
"death eligible" might have in the Eighth Amendment realm-based
merely upon a murder conviction and a finding of at least one aggrava-
tor-because this concept is not based upon a review of the substantive
law of the jurisdiction at issue, this term is potentially quite misleading in
the Sixth Amendment context. While the Eighth Amendment approach of
cases like Tuilaepa simply declares, in general, that in order to become
"eligible for the death penalty[,]. . . the trier of fact must convict the de-
fendant of murder and find one 'aggravating circumstance,"'Z31 the Sixth
Amendment approach of Ring/Apprendi mandates a review of the substan-
tive law of the jurisdiction at issue to determine the required elements for
a death sentence in that jurisdiction. This jurisdiction-specific review is
227. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1), (2) (2017). Such weighing-type findings can
include a determination that based upon all the evidence in the case, a death sentence is "justified" or
"appropriate." See id
228. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(3) (2017) ("If the jury determines that one or more
aggravating circumstances . . . exist and that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances, if any, it
shall return a verdict of death"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2017) ("The trier of fact shall
impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in subsection F of this section and then determines that there are no mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.").
229. See, e.g., OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 4-80 (2d ed. 2017) ("If you unanimously find
that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless you also unanimously find that any such aggravating circumstance or
circumstances outweigh the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances. Even ifyou find that the
aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh(s) the mitigating circumstance(s), you may impose a sentence
of imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole or imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole.").
230. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
231. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72.
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required by the Sixth Amendment because it is these jurisdiction-specific
required elements for a death sentence that must be found by a jury and
beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi and Ring. A defendant is not
truly "eligible" for a death sentence in any jurisdiction until the prosecu-
tion has established all the required elements for a death sentence in that
jurisdiction. And under the approach ofApprendi/Ring, it is precisely these
elements that must be found both by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Rejection of the Ring Rule for the Weighing Finding
By 2002, most death penalty states required that before a capital de-
fendant could be sentenced to death, the sentencing decisionmaker (usu-
ally a jury) had to find that the aggravating circumstances in the case out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances (or make some similar "weighing"
type finding).232 Yet few state statutes contained a particular standard of
proof or "certainty standard" by which this decision had to be made.233
Hence, after Ring, death penalty states that did not require all-jury sen-
tencing and states that did have jury sentencing but did not require that the
weighing finding be made beyond a reasonable doubt both began facing
claims that under Apprendi and Ring, the Sixth Amendment requires that
the weighing finding be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.234
Unfortunately for the capital defendants and death row inmates who were
making these claims, however, such claims were rejected by the great ma-
jority of the state courts of last resort that decided them.2 35
Alabama appears to have been the first state supreme court to address
this issue in detail, taking it up in Ex parte Waldrop,236 the same year that
Ring was decided. As noted earlier, this decision addressed (and upheld)
237
post-Ring the constitutionality of Alabama's hybrid judge-jury system.
Waldrop also addressed whether the weighing determination had to made
by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. The Waldrop court rejected this
claim and distinguished Ring, asserting that "the weighing process is not
a factual determination" and "is not susceptible to any quantum of
proof."238 Rather, the court found, "[I]t is a moral or legal judgment that
takes into account a theoretically limitless set of facts."2 39 The Waldrop
court also invoked the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment eligibility
cases to support its ruling that the weighing finding is not an element of a
death sentence.240 The court concluded: "Thus, the determination whether
232. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2003) ("Of the [thirty-eight] States with capital
punishment, [twenty-nine] generally commit sentencing decision to juries."); see also infra note 243
and accompanying text (listing state death penalty statutes requiring "weighing" type findings).
233. See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
234. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
235. See infra note 243 and accompanying text..
236. See Exparte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1188, 1188-90 (Ala. 2002).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 204-10.
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the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is
not a finding of fact or an element of the offense. Consequently, Ring and
Apprendi do not require that a jury weigh the aggravating circumstances
and the mitigating circumstances."241 The court likewise concluded that
the weighing finding does not have to be made beyond a reasonable
doubt.242
The Alabama Supreme Court's approach set the tone for what would
be a steady stream of state court rejections of the claim that the Sixth
Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring applies to the capital weighing finding.
Under the functional and elements-based rule of Apprendi/Ring, these
state courts should have been focused on determining whether the weigh-
ing finding (or whatever finding was at issue) was required for a death
sentence under the law of that jurisdiction, i.e., whether the weighing find-
ing was required in order to increase a convicted murderer's maximum
possible sentence from some form of imprisonment to death. Instead, state
courts of last resort that addressed the weighing issue overwhelmingly
concluded that Ring does not even apply to the weighing finding because
a weighing determination is not the kind of "fact" or "factual finding" that
is covered by Ring-often while also emphasizing that because a defend-
ant is considered "eligible" for a death sentence (under the Eighth Amend-
ment) after a proper finding of an aggravating circumstance, any weighing
determination that occurs after that is merely part of the process of select-
ing the defendant's punishment, rather than a required element for a death
sentence.24 3
241. Id. at I190.
242. Id ("While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a fact susceptible
to proof . . , the relative weight is not. The process of weighing . . . , unlike facts, is not susceptible
to proof by either party.") (first emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Ford v. Strickland, 696
F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983)).
243. See, e.g., People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1147 (Cal. 2003) (rejecting a Ring weighing claim
because "the penalty phase determination 'is inherently moral and normative, not factual' (quoting
People v. Rodriguez, 726 P.2d 113, 144 (Cal. 1986))); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003)
(finding that "[alithough a judge cannot sentence a defendant to death without finding that the aggra-
vating factors outweigh the mitigating factors," because a defendant becomes "eligible" for a death
sentence based on "the finding of [a] statutory aggravator[,].... Ring does not extend to the weighing
phase"), overruled by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016); Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 266
(Ind. 2004) (because defendant is already "eligible" for death penalty before required weighing find-
ing, Apprendi and Ring do not require "that weighing be done under a reasonable doubt standard");
Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151 (Md. 2003) ("[T]he weighing process is not a fact-finding one
based on evidence ... . The weighing process is purely ajudgmental one, of balancing the mitigator(s)
against the aggravator(s) to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment in the particular
case."); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 628 (Neb. 2003) (rejecting a claim that Ring applies to a
weighing finding by a three-judge panel and concluding that "[i]t is the determination of 'death eligi-
bility' [by the finding of an aggravating circumstance] . . . [that] triggers the Sixth Amendment right
to jury determination as delineated in Apprendi and Ring"); Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 241 (Nev.
2011) (concluding that "weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a factual
determination" under Apprendi and Ring); State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 178 (N.H. 2013) (per curiam)
("[T]he weighing process is neither a 'fact' nor an element of the charged offense." (citing U.S. v.
Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007))); State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 531, 534 (N.M. 2005) (after
noting that "[t]he jury can sentence a defendant to death only if it unanimously determines that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances," rejecting a Ring weighing claim
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A few state supreme courts rejected a claim that the Sixth Amend-
ment Ring rule applies to a capital weighing finding even after specifically
recognizing that the state death penalty statute at issue required that the
weighing finding be made in order for a defendant to be sentenced to
death. In other words, these state courts specifically recognized that the
weighing finding was necessary to "increase[] a defendant's maximum
possible sentence,"244 which is exactly the trigger for the functional rule of
Apprendi/Ring, but then still concluded that the Ring rule did not apply.24 5
For example, the Supreme Court of Indiana recognized that "before the
jury can recommend the death penalty, it must find that. . . 'any mitigating
circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance
or circumstances."'246 Nevertheless, in the same opinion the court went on
to conclude that this required weighing finding was not covered by Ring
because an Indiana defendant becomes "eligible" for the death penalty
based merely upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance.24 7 And the
Nevada Supreme Court, after emphasizing that the weighing finding does
not involve a finding of fact,248 actually stated: "[E]ven if the result of the
weighing determination increases the maximum sentence for first-degree
murder beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, it is not a factual find-
ing that is susceptible to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof."249 The court thereby turned the functional, elements-based test of
Ring upon its head.
There were a few state courts that applied the Apprendi/Ring test to
the weighing finding in the functional manner that these decisions estab-
lished, but not many. The Supreme Court of Missouri carefully and
because "[lt]he balancing process does not contemplate the finding of a 'fact' that increases a defend-
ant's maximum possible sentence within the meaning of Apprendi"); State v. Belton, 74 N.E.3d 319,
337 (Ohio 2016) ("Weighing is not a fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment, because
'[t]hese determinations cannot increase the potential punishment to which a defendant is exposed as a
consequence of the eligibility determination."' (quoting Gales, 658 N.W.2d at 628)); id ("[T]he
weighing process amounts to 'a complex moral judgment' about what penalty to impose upon a de-
fendant who is already death-penalty eligible." (quoting United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516
(4th Cir. 2013))); Torres v. State, 58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (summarily rejecting a
Ring weighing claim); Commonwealth v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351, 360-61 (Pa. 2005) (rejecting a weigh-
ing claim because it "does not implicate the 'fact-finding' concerns articulated in Apprendi and Ring").
244. Fry, 126 P.3d at 534.
245. See, e.g., Brice, 815 A.2d at 322; Fry, 126 P.3d at 531, 534; see also supra note 243.
246. Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 264-65 (quoting IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(l)(2) (2003)).
247. Id. at 265-66. Similarly, although the California Supreme Court upheld a California stand-
ard death penalty jury instruction because it correctly and "clearly stated that the death penalty could
be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating," People
v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 144 (Cal. 1991) (en banc), that court has also held that "Ring imposes no
new constitutional requirements on California's penalty phase proceedings," because a California de-
fendant is already "eligible" for a death sentence based upon the guilt-phase narrowing process in
California. Prieto, 66 P.3d at 1147; see also People v. Samuels, 113 P.3d 1125, 1152 (Cal. 2005)
(concluding that Ring does not require "that the jury be instructed concerning burden of proof' for
weighing determination).
248. See Nunnery, 263 P.3d at 251-53 (citing cases finding that capital weighing is not
"fact-finding" under Ring and quoting dictionary definition of "fact").
249. Id. at 250.
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thoughtfully applied the Ring rule to the specific requirements of Mis-
250souri's death penalty statute. In particular, the court concluded that be-
cause a death sentence requires a finding that any mitigating evidence is
not "sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation,"25 1 this determi-
252nation is a "factual finding[]" under Ring that must be made by a jury.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that because the (for-
mer) Colorado death penalty statue established that a death sentence re-
quired a finding (by a three-judge panel) that "[t]here are insufficient mit-
igating factors to outweigh the aggravator or factors that were proved,"
this weighing determination constitutes a "finding of fact" under Ring, and
thus that both the finding of an aggravator and the weighing finding have
253to be made by a jury. Hence the court concluded that the Colorado death
penalty statute under which the defendants had been sentenced-based
upon the findings of a three-judge panel-was unconstitutional under
Ring.254 Alas, this kind of careful, functional analysis was the exception,
not the norm, in the years after Ring.255
In the federal realm, federal circuit courts considering the Federal
Death Penalty Act (FDPA)2 56 have likewise overwhelmingly concluded
that Ring does not apply to capital weighing and thus that federal capital
juries need not apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard when mak-
257ing the weighing evaluation required by the FDPA. In the sentencing
phase of an FDPA case, "the jury must make three determinations ... be-
fore it can impose the death penalty."258 The first two determinations-
that the defendant acted with the required mens rea and that at least one
statutory aggravating factor exists in the case-must be found unani-
mously and beyond a reasonable doubt.259 The third determination, how-
ever, while it must be found unanimously by the jury, need not be found
"beyond a reasonable doubt" under the FDPA.260 Rather, the jury must
250. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256-62 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
251. Id. at 258 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030.4(4) (1994)).
252. See id. at 261. This required finding (and others) had been made by the trial judge in that
case, after ajury voted 11-1 in favor of a life sentence. Id. at 261. The Missouri Supreme Court struck
down the defendant's death sentence. Id. at 256, 262 ("This process clearly violated the requirements
of Ring that the jury rather than the judge determine the facts on which the death penalty is based.").
253. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266-67 (Colo. 2003) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103(2)(b)(II)(A)-(B) (2000) (repealed 2002)).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002) (per curiam) (concluding that
because a death sentence in Nevada requires a finding "'that there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found[,]' . . . Ring requires a
jury to make this finding" (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(3) (1998))), overruled by Nunnery,
263 P.3d 235. But see Nunnery, 263 P.3d at 250-51 (overruling Johnson's analysis of the Ring weigh-
ing issue).
256. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-99 (2012).
257. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
258. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir. 2005).
259. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-93).
260. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).
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decide "whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist suffi-
ciently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify
a sentence of death."261
As in the state realm, federal defendants sentenced to death under the
FDPA have challenged the FDPA's failure to require that this weighing
finding be made "beyond a reasonable doubt" as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment under Apprendi/Ring. Thus far, the federal circuit courts have
rejected this, claim, mostly by ruling that the weighing finding is not a
"factual" determination under the terms of Apprendi/Ring.262 These courts
typically contrast the type of factual determination that the jury must make
(and make beyond a reasonable doubt) under Ring with the highly subjec-
tive and largely moral "judgment" that must be made about whether a de-
fendant should be sentenced to death.26 3
There are currently no federal circuits that hold that the jury's FDPA
weighing finding must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, although there
was one circuit court panel that did so find. In 2011, in United States v.
264 1 SiGabrion, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a death
sentence based upon its conclusion that under Apprendi/Ring the FDPA
weighing determination is subject to the reasonable doubt standard.265 Alt-
hough the five circuits that had addressed the issue at the time had ruled
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., Purkey, 428 F.3d at 750 (asserting that "it makes no sense to speak of the weighing
process mandated by [the FDPA] as an elemental fact"); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 346
(5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Apprendi/Ring rule should not apply here because the jury's decision that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors is not a finding offact.... The Apprendi/Ring rule
applies by its terms only to findings of fact, not to moral judgments."); United States v. Sampson, 486
F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim for assuming "that the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors is afact" and concluding that "the requisite weighing constitutes a process, not a
fact to be found"); United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1107-08 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting and
adopting analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Fields, 483 F.3d at 346); United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d
931, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2007) (questioning whether weighing involves finding of "fact," noting "no
authority" suggesting Apprendi extends this far and rejecting the claim under plain error review);
United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (clarifying that analysis of Barrett, 496
F.3d 1079, which involved the death penalty under a different federal statute, "applies with equal force
in connection with the FDPA"); United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (joining
the "four other circuits [that] have held that the reasonable-doubt standard does not apply to the weigh-
ing of aggravating and mitigating factors, reasoning that that process constitutes not a factual determi-
nation, but a complex moral judgment"); United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532 (6th Cir. 2013)
(en bane) ("The problem with [the defendant's] argument is that Apprendi does not apply to every
'determination' that increases a defendant's maximum sentence. Instead it applies only to findings of
'fact' that have that effect.").
263. See, e.g., Fields, 483 F.3d at 346 (contrasting "findings of fact" with the weighing determi-
nation, which "is a 'highly subjective,' 'largely moral judgment' 'regarding the punishment that a
particular person deserves"' (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985))); Barrett,
496 F.3d at 1107-08 (quoting Fields, 483 F.3d at 346); see also Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 993 (character-
izing weighing as an "individualized judgment whether a death sentence is justified"); Gabrion, 719
F.3d at 532-33 (characterizing FDPA's weighing requirement as "not a finding of fact, but a moral
judgment").
264. 648 F.3d 307 (6thCir. 2011), rev'den bane, 719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013).
265. Id. at 329 ("[O]ur determination that [the defendant] was entitled to a reasonable doubt
instruction as to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors requires the reversal of his death
sentence.").
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otherwise, the Sixth Circuit panel undertook a functional approach to the
question at issue-just as the Supreme Court had instructed in Apprendi
and Ring.266
The Gabrion panel, in an opinion by Judge Merritt, noted that "the
[FDPA] plainly requires as a necessary precondition to a capital defend-
ant's receiving the sentence of death that the government prove and the
jury find that [the] aggravators outweigh the mitigators."2 67 The panel de-
scribed the government's argument that, under the FDPA, the defendant
becomes eligible for a death sentence when the jury finds the presence of
at least one aggravator (i.e., prior to any weighing) as "an empty formalism
of the sort the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Ring."26 8 The panel's
functional analysis was as follows:
It is plain from the Act that, even after the jury finds the presence of
aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, more needs to be proven be-
fore the defendant may be sentenced to death: a defendant is not truly
"eligible" for the death penalty . . . unless and until the jury makes the
determination that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators.... [T]he
range of penalties to which he is exposed does not include the death
penalty until the jury makes that required factual finding of this ele-
ment of the offense.269
Consequently, the panel held that "a jury's finding that the aggravat-
ing factors outweigh the mitigating factors is an element of the death pen-
alty and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt."270 Nevertheless, the
Gabrion panel's careful functional analysis was reversed on precisely this
issue upon en banc review by the entire Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.271
IV. THE CAPITAL JURY TODAY: HURST V. FLORIDA AND BEYOND
A. The Limits and Promise of Hurstfor Completing Ring
Remarkably, sixteen years after the Supreme Court's decision in
Ring, the Court still has not directly taken up the lingering issue of whether
266. Id. at 325-29.
267. Id. at 326.
268. Id. at 327 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
269. Id. Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Mitchell, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit panel's rejec-
tion of the defendant's claim that the FDPA weighing determination must be made "beyond a reason-
able doubt," reflects this same kind of thoughtful, careful, functional analysis. See United States v.
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 1011-13 (2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("From this functional perspective,
there is no practical difference between the increase in punishment due to the finding of an aggravating
factor and the increase due to the finding that aggravators outweigh mitigators. Because the [FDPA]
requires both findings in order for a judge to sentence a defendant to death, the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to make these findings beyond a reasonable doubt.").
270. Gabrion, 648 F.3d at 325.
271. See Gabrion, 719 F.3d at 531-33. The en banc court's analysis was not functional, see supra
note 262 (quoting en banc opinion), and failed to discuss or even cite Ring. See Gabrion, 719 F.3d at
531-33. The court did note that the other six circuits that had addressed a claim that the FDPA's
weighing finding requires a beyond a reasonable doubt jury finding had all rejected it, and the en banc
court seemed quite pleased to announce: "Today we become the seventh." Id. at 533.
712 [Vol. 95:3
"FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING
the Sixth Amendment requires the involvement of a jury in the process of
death penalty decision-making, beyond the finding of an aggravating cir-
cumstance. It is hard to believe that forty-plus years into the age of the
modem death penalty, such a basic question as "who decides?" remains
unresolved, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's extensive regula-
tion of other aspects of capital sentencing (and even the minutia of some
aspects of capital sentencing).272 It is likewise remarkable that over thir-
teen years passed before the Supreme Court addressed the impact of its
Ring decision for Florida's "advisory jury" capital sentencing system (or
the similar one in Alabama), especially when, in terms of its structure,
Florida's very active capital sentencing system was still the same
judge-dominated and judge-determined system that the Court first ad-
dressed and upheld in 1976 in Proffitt (and then upheld again in Spaziano
and Hildwin).273 After all of the Ring Court's strong language about the
need for a jury to make the required finding of an aggravating circum-
stance in a capital case, for over thirteen years post-Ring, capital defend-
ants in Florida (and Alabama) continued to be sentenced to death based
upon a judge's finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, with only
an advisory role for the jury in this regard, in addition to a judge's finding
274regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
On January 12, 2016, in Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court finally
again took up (and this time struck down) Florida's capital sentencing
scheme.275 This time the vote was 8-1, with seven Justices on the majority
opinion; and the Court opinion by Justice Sotomayor was direct, concise,
and emphatic.2 76 Regarding Florida's capital sentencing system, the Hurst
Court declared: "We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional. The
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary
to impose a sentence of death. A jury's mere recommendation is not
enough."277
The Hurst Court focused upon the actual content of Florida's statu-
tory provisions (as a proper Sixth Amendment elements-based analysis
should) and appeared to have little trouble concluding that its decisions in
Ring and Apprendi dictated that Florida's "advisory jury" capital sentenc-
ing scheme must be struck down-even though this also meant (finally)
272. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 26, at 2-3.
273. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)-(3) (2015) (amended 2017); see also ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45
to -47 (2015).
274. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)-(3); ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 to -47; see also supra notes
202-10 and accompanying text.
275. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
276. Id. at 618. Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Hurst Court was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan. Id. Justice Breyer concurred in
the judgment. Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Alito dissented. Id. at 624 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing).
277. Id. at 619 (majority opinion).
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explicitly overturning its decisions in Spaziano and Hildwin, which had
upheld precisely this system.
We now expressly overrule Spaziano and Hildwin in relevant part.
Spaziano and Hildwin summarized earlier precedent to conclude that
"the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings au-
thorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury."
Their conclusion was wrong, and irreconcilable with Apprendi.278
In other words, under Hurst, the Sixth Amendment does "require that
the specificfindings authorizing the imposition of [a] sentence of death be
made by [a] jury."279 Importantly, the Hurst Court here reaches back not
just to Ring, but to Apprendi's broader language about the "findings" that
authorize a death sentence (rather than merely the fact of an aggravator).
Thus, the Hurst Court declared-in broader language and with broader
potential consequences than in Ring-a full and complete break with the
Court's first twenty years of its modern capital sentencing (no jury needed)
jurisprudence. In the words of Justice Sotomayor: "Time and subsequent
cases have washed away the logic of Spaziano and Hildwin."280
Furthermore, while the narrow holding of Hurst, like that of Ring,
focuses upon the need for a jury to make the required finding of at least
one aggravating circumstances in a capital case,28' the Hurst Court's over-
all approach and language are significantly broader than in Ring and more
similar to that of Apprendi. Like Ring, the Hurst Court articulates and re-
lies upon the functional approach of Apprendi. In particular, Hurst sum-
marizes Apprendi as holding "that any fact that 'expose[s] the defendant
to a greater punishment han that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict' is
an 'element' that must be submitted to a jury."282 Thus, Hurst is explicitly
premised on the functional and elements-based approach of both Apprendi
and Ring. On the other hand, while the Hurst Court here and otherwise
refers to the finding of "facts" and "factfinding," the Hurst Court also re-
peatedly refers more generally to the "findings" that must be made during
a capital sentencing, and the Hurst opinion uses the terms "facts" and
"factfinding" interchangeably with the broader term "findings," within its
descriptions of the type of determination that must be made before a de-
fendant can be sentenced to death-much as the Apprendi Court had done
(but unlike Ring).
278. Id. at 623 (citation omitted) (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per
curiam)).
279. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41).
280. Id. at 624.
281. See id. (noting that Spaziano and Hildwin "are overruled to the extent they allow a sentenc-
ing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury's factfinding, that is necessary
for imposition of the death penalty").
282. Id. at 621 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
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In its description of the Florida capital sentencing scheme, the Hurst
Court repeatedly refers to "findings," including when quoting Florida law,
which also used the term "findings" to refer to the type of determination
that had to be made within its capital system.28 3 And the Hurst Court
clearly recognized that a defendant could only be sentenced to death in
Florida (as in most other states) based upon multiple findings, not just a
single finding that an aggravating circumstance exists.284 As the Hurst
Court worked through applying the Apprendi/Ring functional "in-
crease-in-the-maximum-sentence" analysis to the Florida system, it noted
that the maximum sentence that a convicted first-degree murderer could
receive in Florida (based upon just the murder conviction) was life impris-
onment.285 The Hurst Court noted that such a person could receive a death
sentence "only if an additional sentencing proceeding 'results in findings
by the court that such person shall be punished by death."' 28 6 Although the
Florida system did use an advisory jury as part of its capital sentencing
scheme, this jury did not render any specific findings on aggravating cir-
cumstances or on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, but gave only an "advisory sentence" (based upon a majority vote)
of either death or imprisonment for life, without specifying the basis for
its recommendation.2 87
The Hurst Court emphasized that Florida's capital scheme did require
that certain findings be made before a defendant could be sentenced to
death but also that these findings had to be made by the trial judge (not the
advisory jury):
[T]he Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for
death until "findings by the court that such person shall be punished
by death." The trial court alone must find "the facts . .. [t]hat sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist" and "[t]hat there are insufficient mit-
igating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."
288
This quotation is significant because it exemplifies the Hurst Court's
recognition: (1) that a defendant is not "eligible" for the death penalty un-
der Florida law until multiple "findings" are made by the trial court, and
(2) that these required "findings" include both the existence of "sufficient
aggravating circumstances" (i.e., at least one) and that the mitigating cir-
cumstances in the case are "insufficient" to "outweigh" the aggravating
283. For example, the Hurst Court noted that under Florida law, "[i]f the court imposes death, it
must 'set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based."' Id. at 620 (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010) (amended 2017)).
284. See id (noting that in Hurst the sentencing judge sentenced Hurst to death based on two
aggravating circumstances).
285. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)).
286. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)) (emphasis added).
287. Id. (summarizing Florida law).
288. Id. at 622 (citations omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(1), 921.141(3)).
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circumstances.28 9 This passage is also noteworthy because (while describ-
ing Florida law) it describes both of these findings as "facts." This suggests
that the weighing finding may actually already be covered by the "fact"
language of the holdings of both Ring and Hurst.2 9 0
This interpretation is further supported by the Hurst Court's applica-
tion of Ring to the case at issue, in which the Court clearly recognized that
multiple findings-not just a single finding about he existence of an ag-
gravating circumstance-are required as the basis for a death sentence.
The Hurst Court wrote:
Like Arizona at the time of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to
make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Ra-
ther, Florida requires a judge to find these facts .... It is true that in
Florida the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make the spe-
cific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or ag-
gravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the
trial judge."
29 1
And the Hurst Court summarized its application of Ring as follows: "As
with Timothy Ring, the maximum punishment Timothy Hurst could have
received without any judge-made findings was life in prison without pa-
role. As with Ring, a judge increased Hurst's authorized punishment based
on her own factfinding. In light of Ring, we hold that Hurst's sentence
violates the Sixth Amendment."292
The quotations provided in the preceding paragraph show the Hurst
Court using the terms "findings," "facts," "factual findings," and "fact-
finding" interchangeably in this context and using all of these terms to
apply to all the findings that are required for a death sentence, including
the weighing finding-rather than in a way that suggests that the finding
of an aggravator is a narrower "factual" finding, which may be unlike the
weighing finding (a possibility that was left open in Ring).
Consequently, although the Hurst Court does not actually address the
issue of whether, under the Sixth Amendment, a capital defendant has a
right to a jury finding regarding the "weighing" of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, because the Court's analysis recognizes that all
289. See id.; see also id. at 620 (discussing Florida death penalty procedure). The Hurst Court
likewise quoted the following language from a decision by the Florida Supreme Court: "[T]he trial
court alone must make detailed findings about the existence and weight of aggravating circumstances;
it has no jury findings on which to rely." Id. at 622 (quoting State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla.
2005)).
290. See id. at 619 (holding that "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find
each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (hold-
ing that capital defendants "are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment").
291. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
292. Id. (emphasis added).
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"findings" that are required for a death sentence under the law of the ju-
risdiction must be made by a jury and that both an aggravator finding and
a weighing finding are required for a death sentence in Florida, it logically
follows that the weighing finding, along with the finding of an aggravating
circumstance, must be made by a jury.293 Furthermore, under the Sixth
Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring, this weighing finding must be made
"beyond a reasonable doubt."294
Justice Alito, the sole dissenter in Hurst, likewise recognized the de-
cision in broad terms and described Hurst as "holding that the Sixth
Amendment does require that the specific findings authorizing a sentence
of death be made by a jury." 2 95 Although Alito disagreed with this conclu-
sion, he recognized its broad scope, which he believed to be an unwise
"extension" of Ring.296
The conclusion of the Hurst opinion also reflects a more expansive
vision of the capital jury, invoking the idea of a right to a "jury's verdict"
in the death penalty context-arguably suggesting a right to have the jury
be the ultimate sentencer in a capital case-a suggestion that goes beyond
the more limited Sixth Amendment Apprendi/Ring right to a jury determi-
nation on all the "elements" that are required for a death sentence in the
jurisdiction at issue. The Hurst Court wrote: "The Sixth Amendment pro-
tects a defendant's right to an impartial jury. This right required Florida to
base Timothy Hurst's death sentence on ajury's verdict, not ajudge's fact-
finding." 2 9 7 The Court then concluded that Florida's sentencing scheme
"is therefore unconstitutional."298 Although the Hurst Court did not other-
wise suggest hat there is a constitutional right to a jury "verdict" on the
ultimate sentencing issue of whether a defendant is actually sentenced to
death, this expansive language is consistent with the broad language and
overall approach of the Hurst opinion, which does strongly suggest that
where a jurisdiction requires a weighing finding as a precondition for a
death sentence, this finding must be made by a jury and beyond a reason-
able doubt.
B. The Role of the Capital Jury Post-Hurst
Judicial and legislative responses to the Supreme Court's 2016 Hurst
decision among the death penalty states arguably affected by it have
293. It should be noted that this Sixth Amendment analysis always depends upon the actual con-
tent of the underlying statutory provisions at issue, i.e., the actual requirements for a death sentence in
the jurisdiction at issue.
294. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior convic-
tion, any fact that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
295. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 625 (Alito, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
296. Id. (arguing that "even if Ring is assumed to be correct," he "would not extend it," as the
majority does in Hurst).




ranged from enthusiastic implementation (or at least acquiescence) to de-
fiance (or at least inaction). Much of the silence/inaction is likely attribut-
able to the fact that "death penalty states" (defined herein as states that
currently have in place a statutory death penalty system)299 vary so widely
in terms of how often this penalty is actually sought or imposed.3 00 In ad-
dition, death penalty prosecutions nationally are currently at or near his-
toric lows for the modem era, and the number of actual executions in the
United States has dropped to the lowest level since the early 1990s.3 01 Con-
sequently, in the many states where death penalty prosecutions and execu-
tions are legal but rare, it is not surprising that Hurst has not sparked much
specific response.
Among the five hybrid states that did not have all-jury capital sen-
tencing at the time of Hurst-i.e., Florida, Alabama, Delaware, Montana,
and Nebraska-Montana and Nebraska seem to fall into this category.
While they continue to have their same judge-jury sentencing systems in
place, they are .not particularly "active" in the death penalty realm.30 2 Del-
aware, Florida, and Alabama, on the other hand, have all responded to
Hurst.
Delaware's Supreme Court was the first to address the impact of
Hurst on its hybrid capital sentencing system, and its ruling was quite stun-
ning. The Delaware Supreme Court declared, in a per curiam opinion, that
"Delaware's current death penalty statute violates the Sixth Amendment
role of the jury as set forth in Hurst."303 And by answering a series of
questions that had been certified to the court, it further declared that under
the Sixth Amendment, as applied to Delaware law: (1) a jury must "find"
the existence of an "aggravating circumstance"; (2) this "finding" must be
both unanimous and beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) a jury must "find"
"that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating
circumstances found to exist"; and (4) this "finding" must be both unani-
mous and beyond a reasonable doubt.304 The court ruled that Delaware's
299. This Article includes in its definition of "death penalty states" states that continue to have
statutory death penalty schemes in place, even if they also have a governor-imposed moratorium on
executions. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited May 16, 2018) (listing
states with a gubernatorial moratorium).
300. See State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/state by state (last visited May 16, 2018) (providing a searchable database r garding state
death penalty imposition).
301. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
302. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2017) (trial judge decides whether there are "mitigat-
ing circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency," after a jury finds at least one aggravat-
ing circumstance); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520 to -2522 (2017) (following a jury finding of at least
one aggravating circumstance, three-judge panel evaluates mitigating evidence, makes various deter-
minations, and determines sentence). Montana and Nebraska have both executed three persons in the
modem era. See State by State Database, supra note 300 (select "Montana" from the "select a State"
dropdown menu); id (select "Nebraska" from the "Select a State" dropdown menu).
303. Raufv. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
304. Id. at 433-34.
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death penalty statute violated all four of these requirements and thus, was
"unconstitutional" for all of these reasons.30 s The court then struck down
Delaware's entire death penalty statute, declaring that it would be left up
to the Delaware General Assembly "whether to reinstate the death pen-
alty."306
Nearly two years later, the Delaware legislature has not reinstated the
death penalty.307 Thus, as a result of Hurst and the Delaware Supreme
Court's interpretation of Hurst, Delaware is no longer a death penalty
state.30s
Because Florida's capital sentencing scheme was struck down in
Hurst, the Florida legislature was forced to act, and it significantly
amended its capital statute in 2016.309 Under this revised statute, a jury is
required to find at least one "aggravating factor," unanimously and beyond
a reasonable doubt, in order for a defendant to be sentenced to death.310
The jury is also required to determine "[w]hether sufficient aggravating
factors exist" and "[w]hether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the
mitigating circumstances" before deciding whether or not to "recom-
mend[]" a death sentence-and ajudge may not impose a death sentence
without a jury recommendation of death.311 Thus, Florida no longer rele-
gates the jury to a merely advisory role, and it no longer allows for judicial
override of a jury's recommendation of a "non-death" sentence.3 12 On the
other hand, the 2016 revised statute allowed a trial judge to sentence a
defendant to death if at least ten of twelve jurors voted to recommend a
death sentence.313
In Hurst v. State,314 upon remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Florida Supreme Court evaluated the 2016 amended version of Florida's
death penalty statute under the Supreme Court's decision in Hurst.3 15 The
Florida Supreme Court interpreted Hurst broadly and recognized its ap-
plicability to all "findings" that are required for a death sentence:
The Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida has now made clear that the
critical findings necessary for imposition of a sentence of death are the
sole province of the jury. And because these findings occupy a position
on par with elements of a greater offense, we conclude that all thef
305. Id.
306. Id. at 434.
307. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 299.
308. See id
309. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2016) (amended 2017)).
310. Id. § 921.141(2)(b).
311. Id. § 921.141(2)(b), (3)(a).
312. Compare id. (requiring jury recommendation of death in order for defendant to be sentenced
to death by trial court), with FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2015) (providing for "advisory" jury sentence that
does not limit the trial court's choice of actual sentence).
313. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c), (3) (2016).
314. 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
315. Id. at 43-45.
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findings necessary for the imposition of a sentence of death must be
made by the jury ... 316
And the court ruled that in Florida, the "specific findings required to
be made by the jury include the existence of each aggravator factor ... ,
the finding that the aggravating factors are sufficient, and the finding that
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances."317 Hence
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Ring rule applies to Florida's
required weighing finding and also to Florida's requirement that he ag-
gravators be "sufficient." And the Florida Supreme Court, like the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, used the term "finding" throughout its analysis.
But the Florida Supreme Court went even further and ruled, in an
expansive and wide-ranging opinion, that Florida's state constitution in-
cludes a requirement for unanimity in criminal jury verdicts and that in
capital cases this requirement of unanimity applies to all the findings that
must be made, including the jury's ultimate decision about whether to rec-
ommend a death sentence.319 Hence, notwithstanding all the improvements
in Florida's amended death penalty statute, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled, in a separate case that was decided the same day as Hurst v. State,
that the 2016 statute's allowance a death sentence based upon a non-unan-
320imous jury recommendation was unconstitutional. In 2017, the Florida
legislature responded by again amending its capital statute-this time to
require that the jury be unanimous in order to recommend a death sen-
tence.32 1
Unlike Delaware and Florida, the Alabama Supreme Court remained
completely unrepentant regarding the constitutionality of Alabama's
judge-jury capital system and its own post-Ring decisions upholding this
system. In Ex parte Bohannon,322 an 8-0 decision, with seven justices join-
ing the majority opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded: "Ring
and Hurst require only that the jury find the existence of the aggravating
factor that makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty-the plain lan-
guage in those cases requires nothing more and nothing less."323 The court
essentially pronounced that it found nothing new or significant in Hurst
and that "Hurst was based on an application, not an expansion, of Ap-
prendi and Ring."32 4 The court concluded: "Our reading ofApprendi, Ring,
316. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 44.
318. See, e.g., id (noting that "specific findings" must "be made by the jury" in death penalty
sentencing).
319. Id. at 53-54.
320. Perry v. State, 210 So. 3d 630, 634 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
321. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c) (2017).
322. 222 So. 3d 525 (Ala. 2016).
323. Id. at 532, 537.
324. Id. at 533.
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and Hurst leads us to the conclusion that Alabama's capital-sentencing
scheme is consistent with the Sixth Amendment."325
Nevertheless, in 2017 the Alabama legislature amended Alabama's
death penalty statute in some significant ways. Alabama law now provides
capital defendants with a right to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" jury find-
ing regarding the existence of at least one "aggravating circumstance"
(though a verdict of guilt on a capital offense that overlaps with an aggra-
vating circumstance is still considered an adequate jury finding in this re-
gard).326 In addition, Alabama capital defendants now have a right to insist
upon a jury finding that any aggravating circumstances in the case "out-
weigh the mitigating circumstances."3 2 7 Hence Alabama is no longer a hy-
brid state, in terms of allowing a judge to give a sentence different from
that of the jury, and Alabama judges can no longer override a jury's deci-
sion not to recommend a death sentence.328 On the other hand, Alabama
law does allow a defendant to be sentenced to death based upon a jury
recommendation of a death sentence by just ten of the twelve jurors.329
Consequently, although a jury finding on weighing is required, it need not
be unanimous, and there is no requirement in the statute that it be beyond
a reasonable doubt.330
Looking back, the impact of Hurst on the death penalty systems of
Delaware, Florida, and Alabama has been quite striking. The Supreme
Courts of Delaware and Florida interpreted Hurst broadly and as applying
to all the findings that are required for a death sentence in their particular
jurisdictions. Furthermore, despite the foot-dragging of the Alabama Su-
preme Court, the Alabama legislature has likewise implemented a rather
expansive vision of Ring/Hurst, which includes a right to a jury finding on
all the elements of a death sentence in that state, and which does not allow
a death sentence unless the jury (i.e., at least ten jurors on the jury) recom-
mends a death sentence.3 31
Consequently, in America today, every death penalty state (except
Montana and Nebraska) provides capital defendants with a statutory right
325. Id. at 532.
326. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45(e), -46(e)(3) (2017).
327. Id. § 13A-5-46(e)(2), (3).
328. See id. § 13A-5-47(a) ("Where the jury has returned a verdict of death, the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to death. Where a sentence of death is not returned by the jury, the court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole.").
329. Id. § 13A-5-46(f) ("The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must be
based on a vote of at least [ten] jurors."); see also ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.4(f) (specifying the number of
people on a jury).
330. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)-(f).
331. See id §§ 13A-5-45(e), -46(e)-(f). Alabama's willingness to allow a death sentence based
upon the recommendation often of twelve jurors makes Alabama the only state that still allows a death
sentence based upon a non-unanimous jury recommendation. Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States
Treat Non-Unanimous Jury Votes in Capital-Sentencing Proceedings, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/Non-Unanimous-Jury-Votes-in-Capital-Sentencing-Pro-
ceedings.
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to insist that the findings required for a sentence of death be made by a
jury. Furthermore, every death penalty state (except Montana and Ne-
braska) places the ultimate death penalty decision in the hands of the jury
rather than a judge.3 32 While in some states a judge can impose a lesser
sentence than the jury recommends, in America today a judge may not
impose a sentence of death when a jury has recommended a sentence of
life. 333
The main lingering issue in America today regarding completion of
the Ring revolution is whether the Ring rule mandates that any required
weighing finding (and any other required finding in the jurisdiction at is-
sue) must be made "beyond a reasonable doubt." Despite the Supreme
Court's failure to require a weighing finding for a valid death sentence, the
majority of death penalty states in America today do require that before a
defendant can be sentenced to death, the decisionmaker must make some
type of finding that the aggravating circumstances in the case "outweigh"
(or are not outweighed by) the mitigating circumstances in the case.334 Out
332. Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States Treat Non-Unanimous Jury Votes in Capital-Sen-
tencing Proceedings, supra note 331. Although in many states the jury's ultimate sentencing decision
is described as a "recommendation," as of the summer of 2017, there are no longer any states in which
a trial judge is allowed to "override" a jury recommendation of "not death," i.e., some form of impris-
onment, with a sentence of death. See Alabama Abolishes Judge Override in Death Penalty Cases,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 4, 2017), https://eji.org/news/alabama-legislature-passes-law-abolish-
ing-judicial-override (noting that Alabama abolished judicial override in death penalty cases, becom-
ing the final state to abolish the practice).
333. See Alabama Abolishes Judge Override in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 332.
334. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (no death penalty unless jury "determines" that any ag-
gravating circumstances "outweigh the mitigating circumstances"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(2)
(2017) (no death penalty unless jury finds that "[a]ggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a rea-
sonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 2017)
(no death penalty unless jury "concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(II) (2017) (no death penalty unless jury
"unanimously finds and specifies in writing that ... [t]here are insufficient mitigating factors to out-
weigh the aggravator factor or factors that were proved"); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b)(2)(b) (2017)
(no death penalty unless jury finds that "aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances found to exist"); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(I)(l)-(2) (2017) (death sentence requires that
jury "find that . .. any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(e) (2017) (no death penalty unless "the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not out-
weighed by any mitigating circumstances"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (2017) (death sen-
tence requires that jury "find . . . [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances . . . to outweigh
the aggravating circumstances"); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030(4)(3) (2017) (no death penalty if the jury
"concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of punishment, . . . which is sufficient to outweigh the
evidence in aggravation of punishment"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(2) (2017) (death sentence re-
quires "determination" by three-judge panel "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist
which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances"); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 175.554(3) (2017) (no death sentence unless jury "finds that there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:05(IV) (2017) (no death sentence unless "the jury concludes that the aggravating factors out-
weigh the mitigating factors"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(3) (2017) (death sentence requires
"finding[]" by jury "[t]hat the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1)
(West 2017) (no death penalty unless prosecution establishes "by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to
outweigh the factors in mitigation"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (2017) (no death penalty "if it is
found [by the jury] that any such aggravating circumstances [are] outweighed by the finding of one or
2018] "FINDING" A WAY TO COMPLETE THE RING 723
of the current thirty-one death penalty states in America, eighteen (58%)
require a weighing finding.335 And an additional five death penalty states
require some type of finding that despite the mitigating circumstances in
the case, the defendant "deserves" a death sentence.336 Thus, twenty-three
out of America's thirty-one current death penalty states (over 74%) require
a weighing finding or some similar "deserves-a-death-sentence" finding
before a capital defendant can be sentenced to death.337 The other eight
capital states only require that jurors "consider" mitigating evidence, with-
out requiring any particular findings in this regard.
On the other hand, of the twenty-three states that require a weighing
or some kind of "deserves death" finding, only six states statutorily man-
date that this required finding be made "beyond a reasonable doubt."33 9
Hence only 26% (six of twenty-three) of the states that require such a find-
ing also require that it be made beyond a reasonable doubt.34 0 Thus, while
nearly 75% of death penalty states do require a weighing or similar find-
ing, almost 75% of these states do not require that it be made beyond a
reasonable doubt.341
more mitigating circumstances"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 971 l(c)(1)(iv) (2017) (no death sentence un-
less "the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigat-
ing circumstances"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)(2) (2017) (no death penalty unless prosecution
proves that any "aggravating circumstance(s] ... outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(5)(b) (West 2017) (no death pen-
alty unless "the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total
mitigation").
335. See supra note 334.
336. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2017) (no death penalty unless the jury "deter-
mines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency"); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515(3)(b), (8)(a)(ii) (2017) (jury must make finding "whether all mitigating circum-
stances, when weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling [such] that
the death penalty would be unjust"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2017) (death sentence requires
that trial court "find[] that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(e)(1) (West 2017) (death sentence requires
unanimous jury finding that there is not "a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to
warrant ... a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence"); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 10.95.060(4), .080(2) (2017) (no death penalty unless jury is unanimously "convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency"). The
Idaho statute, as quoted herein, contains both weighing language and language about whether a death
sentence would be "unjust." IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(3)(b), (8)(a)(ii). Because the idea of "justice"
seems to be primary in the statute, Idaho is included within the "deserves-a-death-sentence" states
listed here.
337. See supra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
338. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (West 2017);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(c) (2017); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2017); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(A)-(B) (2017); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(iii) (2017).
339. These states are Arkansas, Kansas, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington; and among
these six states, the finding at issue is a weighing finding for all but Washington. See supra notes 333
and 335.
340. See supra notes 334 and 336.
341. See supra notes 334 and 336.
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This analysis suggests that there is a substantial amount of work left
to do in terms of completing the Ring revolution, by ensuring that all find-
ings that are required for a death sentence be made by a jury and beyond
a reasonable doubt. In addition, this analysis also reveals a limitation of
the Sixth Amendment approach. The eight "consider" states, which do not
require any particular post-aggravator findings, are not covered by this Ar-
ticle's Sixth Amendment approach because the extent of the Sixth Amend-
ment's reach (as addressed herein) is based upon the content of the under-
lying law of the jurisdiction at issue. And these eight states do not require
any specific death penalty findings other than the existence of at least one
aggravating circumstance (or a functional equivalent).34 2
Nevertheless, as shown by the very significant changes that Hurst has
inspired in the death penalty schemes of Delaware, Florida, and Ala-
bama-including abolition of the death penalty in Delaware-the Sixth
Amendment approach of Apprendi/Ring/Hurst is powerful indeed. In ad-
dition, this Sixth Amendment approach, if taken to its logical and legal end
in this realm--by applying it to all required death penalty findings-has
the very significant advantage (over any potential Eighth Amendment ap-
proach) of being mandatory under the existing decisions of Apprendi,
Ring, and Hurst.343 In addition, as shown by shown by the 8-1 vote in
Hurst, with seven Justices on the majority opinion, the basic Sixth Amend-
ment approach has already acquired broad agreement among the Justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court.34 4 The Sixth Amendment approach has al-
ready had significant impact upon the states in this realm, and this impact
seems likely to continue to expand.
CONCLUSION
In In re Winship,345 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process includes the right not to be convicted of
a crime "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt."346 The Court
wrote:
No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless
the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the
evidence before them . . . is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable
342. See supra note 338.
343. Although the Supreme Court still has not directly addressed the applicability of the Ap-
prendi/Ring rule to the weighing finding, Justices Sotomayor and Breyer have indicated that they have
concluded that the Sixth Amendment does extend this far. See, e.g., Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S.
Ct. 405, 405, 410-11 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of cert. review) (concluding that
because Alabama's capital weighing finding is "necessary to impose the death penalty" in that state,
"[u]nder Apprendi and Ring, [this] finding ... must be made by a jury").
344. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 618-19 (2016). Among the Court's current member-
ship, six were part of the majority opinion in Hurst. See id. In particular, Justice Sotomayor's Hurst
majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Kagan. Id.
345. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
346. Id. at 364.
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doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.347
In America today, no capital defendant should be deprived of life unless
the jurors who try and sentence that defendant are able, upon their con-
sciences, to declare that every finding that is necessary for a death sentence
has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Sixth Amendment rule of Apprendi/Ring/Hurst requires this re-
sult. No defendant can be constitutionally sentenced to death in America
unless a jury finds that every element that is required by law for a death
sentence has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. When it comes
to all of the required findings for a death sentence-including any finding
regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances-the
jury must be the decisionmaker, and the standard must be "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." In this matter of life and death, the jury must decide, and
the jury must be sure.
347. Id. at 363 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895)).
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ABSTRACT
Climate change has significant consequences for land conservation.
Government agencies and nonprofit land trusts heavily rely on perpetual
conservation easements. However, climate change and other dynamic
landscape changes raise questions about the effectiveness and adaptability
of permanent conservation instruments like conservation easements.
Building upon a study of 269 conservation easements and interviews with
seventy conservation-easement professionals in six different states, we ex-
amine the adaptability of conservation easements to climate change. We
outline four potential approaches to enhance conservation outcomes under
climate change: (1) shift land-acquisition priorities to account for potential
climate change impacts; (2) consider conservation tools other than perpet-
ual conservation easements; (3) ensure that the terms of conservation ease-
ments permit the holder to adapt to climate change successfully; and (4)
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provide for more active stewardship of conservation lands. There is still a
good deal of uncertainty as to the legal fate of a conservation easement
that no longer meets its original purposes. Many state laws provide that
conservation easements can be modified or terminated in the same manner
as traditional easements. Yet conservation easements are in many ways
unlike other easements. The beneficiary is usually the public, not merely
a neighboring landowner, and the holder is always a nonprofit conserva-
tion organization or a government agency. Thus, there is a case to be made
for adaptive protection. An overly narrow focus on perpetual property
rights could actually thwart efforts to meet adaptation needs over the long
term. We call for careful attention to ensuring conservation outcomes in
dynamic landscapes over time.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change will alter the composition of our land-, water-, and
sea-scapes and the natural communities that inhabit them.' Climate change
has significant consequences for land conservation.2 From habitat protec-
tion to coastal conservation, climate change will make effective conserva-
tion efforts more difficult and at the same time more important.3 Much of
what is happening now is surprising.4 Much of what will happen in the
future is unforeseeable.
Healthy functioning ecosystems are important to a functioning soci-
ety. Unfortunately, healthy functioning ecosystems do not dominate our
world today. Instead, human impacts have thrown natural systems into dis-
array.6 Ecologists and conservation biologists offer guidance on how to
sustain Earth's systems, ensuring a healthy future for humanity. Many
call for conservation efforts that focus on resilient adaptable landscapes
protected from most human interference in the long term.8 This presents
conservation organizations with the difficult challenge of balancing flexi-
1. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014:
Synthesis Report (2015); Gian-Reto Walther et al., Ecological Responses to Recent Climate Change,
416 NATURE 389 (2002).
2. See, e.g., L. Hannah et al., Climate Change-Integrated Conservation Strategies, 11 GLOBAL
ECOLOGY & BIOGEOGRAPHY 485, 485-86 (2002); Jonathan R. Mawdsley et al., A Review of Climate-
Change Adaptation Strategies for Wildlife Management and Biodiversity Conservation, 23
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1080, 1082 (2009); Paul Opdam & Dirk Wascher, Climate Change Meets
Habitat Fragmentation: Linking Landscape and Biogeographical Scale Levels in Research and Con-
servation, 117 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 285, 285 (2004).
3. See, e.g., W. Neil Adger et al., Social-Ecological Resilience to Coastal Disasters, 309
SCIENCE 1036, 1037-39 (2005); James Battin et al., Projected Impacts of Climate Change on Salmon
Habitat Restoration, 104 PNAS 6720, 6720 (2007); Christopher D. G. Harley et al., The Impacts of
Climate Change in Coastal Marine Systems, 9 ECOLOGY LETTERS 228, 229-30 (2006); Kirk R.
Klausmeyer & M. Rebecca Shaw, Climate Change, Habitat Loss, Protected Areas and the Climate
Adaptation Potential of Species in Mediterranean Ecosystems Worldwide, 4 PLoS ONE, no. 7, 2009,
at 4-8; Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Governing for Sustainable Coasts: Complexity, Climate
Change, and Coastal Ecosystem Protection, 2 SUSTAINABILITY 1361, 1363-64 (2010).
4. Stephen H. Schneider, Abrupt Non-Linear Climate Change, Irreversibility and Surprise, 14
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 245, 245 (2004).
5. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncer-
tainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 10-15 (2009).
6. See BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING 2 (2006).
7. See, e.g., CRAIG GROVES, DRAFTING A CONSERVATION BLUEPRINT: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE TO PLANNING FOR BIODIVERSITY 4 (2003); MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM E. REES, OUR
ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT: REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 3 (1996); F. Stuart Chapin, III
et al., Earth Stewardship: Science for Action to Sustain the Human-Earth System, 2 ECOSPHERE, no.
8, 2011, at 1, 10-13; Richard J. Hobbs et al., Intervention Ecology: Applying Ecological Science in
the Twenty-First Century, 61 BIOSCIENCE 442, 444-47 (2011).
8. See, e.g., IAN THOMPSON ET AL., FOREST RESILIENCE, BIODIVERSITY, AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE BIODIVERSITY/RESILIENCE/STABILITY RELATIONSHIP IN FOREST
ECOSYSTEMS 7-8 (2009); Carla M. Sgrb et al., Building Evolutionary Resilience for Conserving Bio-
diversity Under Climate Change, 4 EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 326, 332-34 (2011) (arguing for
the need of what they call "evolutionary resilience" in landscape conservation). See generally Nicole
E. Heller & Erika S. Zavaleta, Biodiversity Management in the Face of Climate Change: A Review of
22 Years of Recommendations, 142 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION (2009) (describing views from dif-
ferent researchers).
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bility and permanence. Both present and future on-the-ground implica-
tions of climate change highlight the need for robust climate change adap-
tation programs. In some cases, climate change adaptation requires alter-
ing current land uses over time or actively managing lands for conserva-
tion.
To accomplish environmental protection and achieve adaptation
goals, conservationists look to schemes that can limit human development
and save space for changing coastlines, habitats, and other ecosystem fea-
tures. Strategic use of legal tools is necessary to fulfill these policy goals.
In the realm of land conservation, public and private entities have long
heavily relied on perpetual conservation easements. However, climate
change and other dynamic landscape changes raise questions about the ef-
fectiveness and adaptability of permanent conservation instruments like
conservation easements, calling for careful attention to conservation out-
comes over time. An overly prescriptive use of perpetual property tools
could actually thwart efforts to meet adaptation needs over the long term.
In this Article, we examine the traditional perpetual conservation
easement in the context of climate change. Conservation easements are
widespread in the United States; a conservative estimate is 40 million
acres.o Other countries are also rapidly embracing this model and devel-
oping property-law tools as ways to achieve land conservation goals."
When conservation organizations prevent development with a conserva-
tion easement, they often impose a present-day image of what that habitat
should look like.1 2 Conservation groups have been largely unsuccessful in
9. Mawdsley et al., supra note 2, at 1082.
10. Conservation Easements and the National Conservation Easement Database: What Is
NCED?, NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, https://conservationeasement.us/story-
map/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
11. Gerald Korngold, Globalizing Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for In-
ternational Environmental Protection, 28 WIS. INT'L L.J. 585, 633-37 (2010). They are already well-
established in Canada. See KIMBERLY GOOD & SUE MICHALSKY, SUMMARY OF CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE WITH CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3 (2008). Australia and New Zealand have developed similar structures.
Vanessa M. Adams & Katie Moon, Security and Equity of Conservation Covenants: Contradictions
ofPrivate ProtectedArea Policies in Australia, 30 LAND USE POL'Y 114, 114 (2013); Caroline Saun-
ders, Conservation Covenants in New Zealand, 13 LAND USE POL'Y 325, 325 (1996). Scotland has
had a law in place for several years, see Colin T. Reid, The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible
New Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in the UK, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 203, 206 (2011), and there
is pending legislation in England and Wales, see Conservation Covenants: Current Project Status,
LAW COMMISSION, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/conservation-covenants (last visited Mar. 8,
2018). We also see examples popping up elsewhere. See, e.g., R. WATSON ET AL., AFRICAN WILDLIFE
FOUND., EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION OUTSIDE PROTECTED AREAS IN KENYA:
THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EASEMENTS 5 (2010); M. Root-Bemstein et al., Conservation Ease-
ments and Mining: The Case of Chile, I EARTH'S FUTURE 33, 33-34 (2013); Blanca Soro Mateo et
al., Custodia del Territorio y Bancos de Conservacicn, in DERECHO AMBIENTAL PARA UNA
ECONOMiA VERDE (2016) (describing a related program of land stewardship in Spain).
12. See Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements:
Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
1039, 1042 (describing conservation easements as preventing any changes to the "ecological status
quo"); Duncan M. Greene, Comment, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing the Problem ofPer-
petuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 884, 902 (2005).
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creating agreements that enable changing land uses, even if such changes
might be necessary for meeting conservation goals. Too little flexibility
may create pressure to break, rather than bend, a conservation easement.13
There is still a good deal of uncertainty as to the legal fate of a conservation
easement no longer meeting its original purposes. Many state laws allow
modification or termination of conservation easements in the same manner
as other easements.14 But this may not be appropriate because conservation
easements are unlike traditional easements.15 The beneficiary is the public
and the holder or enforcer of the agreement is a nonprofit conservation
organization or a government agency working in the public interest. This
enhanced public interest and involvement in these conservation measures
suggests that applying rules regarding simple private transactions could be
inadequate. This public investment enhances the argument for adaptive
protection.
As part of a 2011 study of conservation easements and conservation-
easement professionals in six states, we reached out to the land-conserva-
tion community to learn how organizations are addressing climate change,
if at all, and specifically to assess the effectiveness of conservation ease-
ments in the face of a changing climate.1 6 We interviewed more than sev-
enty officials from land-conservation organizations, including both non-
profit land trusts and government conservation agencies, and reviewed
more than 260 conservation easements. 1 The investigation indicated that
land-conservation organizations are slowly beginning to incorporate goals
or strategies related to climate change. Yet conservation easements them-
selves almost never mention climate change and may not have many
mechanisms that make them responsive to change. Since the study, we
have been exploring the implications of the data gathered as well as re-
searching alternative land-conservation tools that might be better able to
13. Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions,
Amendment, and Termination ofPerpetual Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 37-
43 (2012) (describing conundrums around conservation-easement termination); Jessica Owley, Con-
servation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 209-13
(2011) (discussing various common law doctrines that can lead to dissolution of conservation ease-
ment in the face of too much change).
14. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 13, at 43-61; Jessica E. Jay, Understanding When Perpetual Is
Not Forever: An Update to the Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of
Perpetual Conservation Easements, anda Response to Ann Taylor Schwing, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
247, 252 (2013).
15. Michael Allan Wolf, Conservation Easements and the "Term Creep" Problem, 33 UTAH
ENVTL. L. Rev. 101, 116-20 (2013) (explaining that conservation easements are not really like tradi-
tional easements and do not merit the same label).
16. We did so through a distributed graduate seminar. For details of the seminar structure, see
generally Jessica Owley & Adena R. Rissman, Distributed Graduate Seminars: An Interdisciplinary
Approach to Studying Land Conservation, 2 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 88 (2011).
17. For more information about the data gathered, see generally Jessica Owley & Adena R.
Rissman, Trends in Private Land Conservation: Increasing Complexity, Shifiing Conservation Pur-
poses and Allowable Private Land Uses, 51 LAND USE POL'Y 76 (2016); Adena R. Rissman et al.,




respond to changing landscapes and social conditions. This Article de-
scribes the findings of the research, what we have labeled the Six-State
Study, along with recommendations for how the land-conservation com-
munity should address the challenge of climate change. Building upon the
2011 study, we examine flexibility (or often lack thereof) in conservation
easements. We discuss ways to improve the responsiveness of the tool and
the resiliency of lands under protection; we include some alternative land-
conservation tools; and we consider how conservation easements might
evolve to become more adaptive.
The Six-State Study shows widespread awareness of the potential im-
pacts of climate change on private land conservation but a lack of explicit
action on the issue in terms of actual land-conservation practices. Few
land-conservation organizations in our study considered mitigation of or
adaptation to climate change as an organizational goal. This may be chang-
ing as the Land Trust Alliance and other entities become more engaged in
climate change issues. Despite the lack of focus on climate change, many
land-conservation organizations in our study believed their land protec-
tions would fare well even in a changing landscape because of the broad
and flexible purposes of the land restrictions. In the Sections below, we
describe the positions of the land-conservation organizations and evaluate
the resiliency of their land-conservation tools. Overall, we conclude that
land-conservation organizations could do more to improve conservation
outcomes in the context of a changing world.
We identify a first (and continuing) step in the process: encouraging
conservation organizations to inform themselves about the potential ef-
fects of climate change on the lands and waters they steward.'9 This ap-
pears a particular problem for land trusts-the private land-conservation
organizations we examined. Universities, government agencies, and larger
land trusts will often be willing to help.20 Furthermore, conservation or-
ganizations should work to educate everyone involved in their work and
conservation transactions (e.g., staff, board members, and landowners)
and integrate climate information into their strategies, business processes,
and analyses of risks.
Beyond informing themselves, the land trust community can take a
variety of steps to better ensure that its efforts are effective in the face of
18. For instance, the Land Trust Alliance launched the Land Trust Climate Change Initiative in
January 2017. Climate Change: Land and Climate Program, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/topics/climate-change (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). See also the work
of The Nature Conservancy, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentis-
sues/global-warming-climate-change/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2018), and the Open Space Insti-
tute, OPEN SPACE INST., https://www.openspaceinstitute.org/what/land-for-climate-protection (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018).
19. See infra Section V.A.
20. Acknowledging, however, the apparent rend toward a reduced federal government role un-
der the Trump Administration.
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climate change. This Article outlines four types of climate-responsive land
conservation strategies:
1. Shift land acquisition priorities to account for potential cli-
mate change impacts.2 1 Conservation organizations should
evaluate the benefits of protecting lands-including migration
corridors, species refugia, and areas of resilience-that could
help in climate-adaptation efforts. When acquiring lands that are
highly susceptible to climate-induced changes, organizations
should develop a climate-vulnerability assessment and adapta-
tion plan to protect conservation purposes over time. Climate
change efforts generally follow two pathways: mitigation of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere or adaptation to the changing
world that is the outcome of the increased level of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. Conservation organizations are in a po-
sition to work on both goals, but the organizations are strategi-
cally placed to think about adaptation because of their desire to
protect landscapes and seascapes in perpetuity. Many land trusts
operate on a parcel-by-parcel basis. Indeed, some acquisitions are
ad hoc and opportunistic without regard for the environmental or
strategic value of the land, due in part to landowner demand for
tax deductions or development mitigation.22 Even where an or-
ganization uses an acquisition plan, it can be difficult to deter-
mine how the plan can work in the climate change context. Or-
ganizations need to undertake considered and deliberate efforts
to incorporate climate change risks into acquisition and manage-
ment decisions consistently.
2. Consider conservation tools other than perpetual conserva-
tion easements.23 Conservation organizations should consider
using tools that provide greater flexibility in time and space in
either the powers that the organizations enjoy over their lands or
in the duration of the protection, including fee ownership, option
agreements, contractual payments, term conservation easements,
moving conservation easements, tradable conservation ease-
ments, and flexible reserves.
3. Ensure that the terms of conservation easements permit the
holder to adapt to climate change successfully.24 Where con-
servation organizations do use conservation easements, they
should consider the terms carefully and contemplate the potential
implications for climate change on their holdings. In particular,
conservation organizations should incorporate climate change in
21. See infra Section V.B.
22. See also Jeffrey C. Milder & Story Clark, Conservation Development Practices, Extent, and
Land-Use Effects in the United States, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 697, 699 (2011) (describing larger
development projects that often incorporate conservation easements).
23. See infra Section V.C.
24. See infra Section V.D.
2018] 733
DENVER LAW REVIEW
the conservation-easement-purposes sections; provide for bio-
physical monitoring; allow adequate authority to manage for cli-
mate risks and stresses; consider proper responses to changed
conditions; and potentially authorize needed amendments. Man-
agement plans may provide an especially useful means of provid-
ing for flexibility over time, but groups should be wary of using
management plans as a way to avoid making important drafting
decisions regarding the terms of their conservation easements.
Land-conservation organizations need to grapple with how their
overall goals and mission might change as both the landscape and
social needs change. Furthermore, organizations need to think
about how activities and changes outside their own parcels might
affect their conservation efforts.
4. Provide for more active stewardship of conservation assets.
To ensure effective adaptation to climate change, conservation
organizations should gather detailed environmental information
when acquiring land; provide for adequate stewardship funds; de-
velop policies to guide ongoing management decisions; and, in
the case of conservation easements, develop closer relationships
with the owners of the underlying land. An attractive feature of
conservation easements for conservation organizations has gen-
erally been the low level of involvement required. If a land trust
can simply monitor annually, it need not invest much money or
time into the land holding each year. To meet some conservation
goals, this may be satisfactory, but for meaningful provision of
25biodiversity and ecosystem services, it is likely inadequate.
Where active involvement in the operations of the land (or mon-
itoring operations of the land) is called for, so is greater capacity
of the land-conservation organizations.26 Conservation organiza-
tions should confront the anticipated needs of the land even if this
means reducing the amount of land they encumber with re-
strictions.
Part II of this Article details the concerns created by climate change,
Part III describes the current private-land conservation framework, Part IV
explains our research project and findings, and then Part V discusses each
of the reforms above in detail. These reforms are the first steps conserva-
tion organizations should take in preparing for climate change. More
sweeping innovations may be needed in the future, accompanied by policy
reforms that allow conservation organizations to pursue them.
25. See, e.g., Heller & Zavaleta, supra note 8, at 27; K.D. Holl & T.M. Aide, When and Where
to Actively Restore Ecosystems?, 261 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGM'T 1558, 1561 (2011); Maria K. Jan-
owiak et al., A Practical Approach for Translating Climate Change Adaptation Principles into Forest
Management Actions, 112 J. FORESTRY 424, 425 (2014).
26. Rissman et al., supra note 17.
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The Earth's climate is changing, with important implications for con-
servation efforts. In the twentieth century, the global average temperature
increased by 0.850 C (1 .530 F); extreme weather and climate events, includ-
ing heatwaves, droughts, storms, and floods, are increasingly more fre-
quent and intense; and global sea level has risen by 0.17 to 0.21 meters
(6.6 to 8.3 inches).2 7 Even if the atmospheric concentration of carbon di-
oxide stabilized at today's concentrations of 405 parts per million, scien-
tific studies indicate that global average surface temperatures would con-
tinue to increase by another 0.3 to 4.80C (0.50F to 8.6'F) by the end of the
century.28 If, however, we remain on the current greenhouse-gas-emis-
sions trajectory, climate projections suggest that, through the end of the
twenty-first century, we can expect a global mean temperature increase of
between 5.4 and 10.80 F and global mean sea-level rise between 0.26 to
0.82 meters (10.2 and 32.3 inches), depending on the greenhouse gas emis-
sions scenario.2 9 This sea level rise would eliminate significant amounts
of coastal land.3
With just under one degree warming thus far, scientists have docu-
mented changes in species across the globe including distributional shifts
in animals, plants, and insects; changes in the timing of biological phe-
nomena such as flowering, breeding, and migration; and decoupling of co-
evolved species interactions such as plants and their pollinators.31 In gen-
eral, these responses have resulted in range shifts both poleward and up-
ward along elevational gradients,32 but the asynchronicity of the responses
are resulting in novel ecosystems. Novel ecosystems are combinations and
relative abundances of species that have not previously occurred.33 With
the documentation of such dramatic changes in response to a small and
incremental temperature increase, conservationists are beginning to pon-
der the implications of increasingly common extreme weather events in
this backdrop.
Extreme climatic events such as heat waves, droughts, storms, floods,
and fires will deliver punctuated impacts in time and space that will mag-
nify the influence of the average climatic trends and other stressors. That
27. IPCC, supra note 1, at 2-4.
28. Id. at 8-10.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6; MICHELLE D. STAUDINGER ET AL., IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
BIODIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEMS, AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TECHNICAL INPUT TO THE 2013 NATIONAL
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 2-11 to 2-19 (2012); Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Re-
sponses to Recent Climate Change, 37 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 637, 638
(2006).
32. Walther et al., supra note 1, at 390.
33. Richard J. Hobbs et al., Novel Ecosystems: Implications for Conservation and Restoration,
24 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 599, 599 (2009); Volker C. Radeloff et al., The Rise of Novelty
in Ecosystems, 25 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2051, 2052 (2015).
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is, the character and severity of impacts from climate extremes depend not
only on the extremes themselves but also on the background exposure and
vulnerability of the species that result from sustained incremental temper-
ature and precipitation changes.34 Slow, incremental changes can set in
motion fundamental changes that make ecosystems much more vulnerable
in the face of extreme events. An illustrative example comes from the
Rocky Mountains where rising temperatures have stressed conifer tree
species allowing for expanded infestation by the mountain pine bark bee-
tle, whose range previously had been confined by cold temperatures.3 5
Since the 1990s, this climate-change-propelled ynamic has induced for-
est die-off on sixty million acres from northern New Mexico through Brit-
ish Columbia,36 impacting millions of acres of protected areas.3 7 Extreme
climate events such as prolonged severe drought have resulted in the death
of beetle-infested trees, creating increased fuel for fires and an increase in
large, high-intensity fires across the western United States.38
Adaptation measures differ from mitigation measures, which seek to
reduce the overall impact of climate change by reducing its intensity (gen-
erally through programs in carbon reduction or carbon storage).39 While
mitigation measures tend to have one overarching goal-reduction of the
level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere-adaptation is more varied.
Because the impacts of climate change vary so greatly, so do the re-
34. Omar-Dario Cardona et al., Determinants of Risk: Exposure and Vulnerability, in
MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION 67 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2012).
35. Barbara J. Bentz et al., Climate Change and Bark Beetles of the Western United States and
Canada: Direct and Indirect Effects, 60 BIOSCIENCE 602,609 (2010).
36. Forest Service maps show the spread of insects and diseases. FRANK J. KRIST, JR. ET AL.,
U.S. FOREST SERV., 2013-2027 NATIONAL INSECT AND DISEASE FOREST RISK ASSESSMENT (2012),
https://www.fs.fed.us/foresthealth/technology/pdfs/2012_RiskMapReport web.pdf. See also LINDA
A. JOYCE ET AL., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 175-94 (2014) (detailing climate
change impacts on forests in the United States), https://nca20l4.globalchange.gov/sys-
tem/filesforce/downloads/low/NCA3 FullReport_07_ForestryLowRes.pdf; Teresa B. Chapman
et al., Spatiotemporal Patterns ofMountain Pine Beetle Activity in the Southern Rocky Mountains, 93
ECOLOGY 2175, 2175 (2012). See generally Sally Embrey, Justin V. Remais & Jeremy Hess, Climate
Change and Ecosystem Disruption: The Health Impacts of the North American Rocky Mountain Pine
Beetle Infestation, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 818 (2012) (describing the loss of trees and citing a U.S.
Forest Service study suggesting a die off of more than 58 million acres); Constance I. Millar & Nathan
L. Stephenson, Temperate Forest Health in an Era ofEmerging Megadisturbance, 349 SCIENCE 823
(2015).
37. See also Aaron S. Weed et al., Consequences of Climate Change for Biotic Disturbances in
North American Forests, 83 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 441, 444-54 (2013) (detailing the spread of
insects and diseases in North American forests due to climate change).
38. A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western US. Forest Wildfire
Activity, 313 SCIENCE 940, 940 (2006).
39. The IPCC defines mitigation as, "An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or
enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases." Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability 750 (2007). There are measures that can form
part of both mitigation and adaptation efforts, such as land conservation that can aid in carbon seques-
tration while saving space for both human and nonhuman migrations. David Takacs & Jessica Owley,
Flexible Conservation in Uncertain Times, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE.LAW AND
POLICY: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE IPCC 65, 69 (2016).
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sponses. Climate change has numerous impacts on protected areas that re-
quire adaptive responses from managers. For instance, climate-induced
shifts in species ranges mean that protected areas may hold a depleted rep-
resentation of biodiversity, and that conservation organizations will need
to create additional protected areas to conserve biodiversity.40 Connectiv-
ity among protected areas to allow for species migration is increasingly
important under climate change.41 Protected-areas managers need to re-
spond to near-term impacts, as well as plan for longer-term changes.42 At
the property scale, it may be hard to tell whether climate change drives a
particular change.43 For example, if floods occur more regularly, pro-
tected-area managers and private landowners will need to adapt regardless
of the cause of the floods (e.g., climate change, increasing development,
nearby hydrologic changes, or a combination thereof). This may lead some
managers to shrug their shoulders and decide that it does not matter what
causes their problems. Such an approach can retard active responses to
climate change and may miss funding opportunities from climate change
adaptation programs or funds.
Protected areas can contribute directly to climate change mitigation
by avoiding deforestation and thus reducing greenhouse gas emissions to
the atmosphere, by sequestering carbon, and by offering opportunities for
restoration of carbon stocks.44 Ecosystems represented within global ter-
restrial protected areas store over 312 gigatons of carbon or fifteen percent
of the terrestrial carbon stock.45 The sustainable management opportuni-
ties offered by these reserves will be essential to reducing carbon fluxes.
II. PRIVATE-LAND CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Development ofLand Conservation
1. Public Land, Public Efforts
Since at least the publication of George Perkins Marsh's Man and
Nature in 1864, Americans have been concerned with conserving the nat-
ural landscape from damage caused by human use and abuse. Over time,
40. Lee Hannah et al., Protected Area Needs in a Changing Climate, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY
& ENV'T 131, 131 (2007); Alison Johnston et al., Observed and Predicted Effects of Climate Change
on Species Abundance in ProtectedAreas, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1055, 1055 (2013); Chris D.
Thomas & Phillipa K. Gillingham, The Performance of Protected Areas for Biodiversity Under Cli-
mate Change, 115 BIOLOGICAL J. LINNEAN SOC'Y 718, 718 (2015).
41. David G. Hole et al., Toward a Management Framework for Networks ofProtected Areas
in the Face of Climate Change, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 305, 306 (2011).
42. See Heller & Zavaleta, supra note 8, at 28.
43. Christine M. Anhalt-Depies et al., Understanding Climate Adaptation on Public Lands in
the Upper Midwest: Implications for Monitoring and Tracking Progress, 57 ENVTL. MGMT. 987, 990
(2016).
44. Britaldo Soares-Filho et al., Role ofBrazilian Amazon Protected Areas in Climate Change
Mitigation, 107 PNAS 10821, 10821-22 (2010).




Americans have used three distinct sets of legal tools to achieve conserva-
tion goals. First, Americans began managing public lands-lands owned
by state and federal governments-to protect resources in the long term.
Later, both federal and state governments turned to regulation to protect
the environment on both public and private land. Through the twentieth
century, Americans increasingly turned to a property-rights-based ap-
proach to land conservation, involving increased public-private partner-
ships. Climate change is transforming all three of these sets of tools.
Public lands have been a fundamental part of the United States since
before it became a republic. The state of New York created the first federal
public domain in 1781 when it agreed to transfer its claim to unsettled
territory westward to the Mississippi River.46 In Federalist No. 7, Alexan-
der Hamilton argued in favor of a strong federal government as necessary
to resolve continuing disputes about western lands.47 The federal govern-
ment currently owns roughly twenty-eight percent of land in the United
48States.48 At one time or another, the federal government owned eighty-one
percent of the present land in the United States.4 9
Conservation is an established tradition on public lands. In March
1872, President Grant signed the bill establishing Yellowstone National
Park.o Conservation became more systematic on March 3, 1891, when
President Harrison signed what we now call the National Forest Reserve
Act.51 The purpose of the almost 200 million acres of forest reserves cre-
ated in the decades after 1891 was to preserve timber and protect water-
sheds.52 Through the Antiquities Act of 190653 (authorizing the creation of
national monuments), the Weeks Act of 191154 (authorizing the purchase
of additional lands for conservation), the National Park Service Organic
46. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2016,
at 1 (2017).
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 6 (2017).
49. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 46, at 3.
50. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)).
51. Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 ("That the President of the
United States may, from time to time, set apart and reserve, in any State or Territory having public
land bearing forests, in any part of the public lairds wholly or in part covered with timber or under-
growth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations, and the President shall, by public
proclamation, declare the establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof.").
52. See SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 59, 66 (2d ed. 1980).
53. Antiquities Act, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended
at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301-320303 (2012)).
54. Weeks Act, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961 (1911) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
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Act of 1916 5 (creating the National Park Service and system), the Wilder-
ness Act of 196456 (creating the National Wilderness Preservation Sys-
tem), and many other statutes, the federal government has managed federal
public lands for conservation. Similar legal structures have emerged
within states, creating state parks and state forests.
In the 1970s and 1980s, building on antecedents in state law,58 the
federal government enacted a far-reaching set of regulatory protections for
the environment.59 On January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, the first of the flood of environmental
laws that would emerge within the decade and continue to protect envi-
ronmental quality in the United States.60 By the time Russell Train, first
chairman of the President's Council on Environmental Quality, issued the
first edition of Environmental Quality61 in August 1970, the "effects" of
"environmental problems" had begun to take on their now characteristic
mix of health concerns, aesthetics, economic costs and benefits, and con-
cern about humans' effects on natural systems.62 The report declared that
the human health "impact of environmental deterioration on health is sub-
tle, often becoming apparent only after the lapse of many years."6 3 Under
economic costs, the report noted "[a]ir pollution causes the housewife to
55. National Park Service Organic Act, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as amended at 54
U.S.C. §§ 100301-100303 (2012)).
56. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended atl6 U.S.C.
§§ 1131-36 (2012)).
57. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 190.0 (2018). For a discussion of the role
of governmental land in conservation (along with a comparison of direct governmental acquisition
with private conservation and regulation), see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: To-
ward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 270-74 (2002); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Providing Biodiversity Through Policy Diversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 355, 355-56 (2002).
58. "By 1912, [almost] every major city in the United States had a smoke abatement program."
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 679,
685 (1999).
59. See Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A
Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 391-92, 392
n.176 (1990); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of
Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1460 (1996).
The boundaries of governmental environmental authority have never been clear. Public environmental
conservation efforts traditionally focused on public lands because governments were more confident
making rules regarding land they owned. Hesitation over potential takings claims coincided with the
growth in retention and acquisition of public lands as a conservation strategy. Leigh Raymond & Sally
K. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative to the "Shift-to-Reten-
tion " Thesis, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649, 659-60 (1999) (discussing focus on federal land acquisition
as an environmental protection strategy).
60. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 68 (2004).
61. Environmental Quality is an annual report on environmental conditions, trends, activities,
and funding available for protecting the environment along with a "program for remedying the defi-
ciencies of existing programs and activities." Annual Environmental Quality Reports, NEPA.GOV
(quoting National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 201, 83 Stat. 852, 854 (1970)),
https://ceq.doe.gov/ceq-reports/annual-environmental_quality reports.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
62. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 16-18 (1970).
63. Id. at 16.
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do her laundry more often. The farmer's crop yield is reduced or de-
stroyed. Water pollution prevents swimming, boating, fishing, and other
recreational and commercial activities . . . ."64 Finally, under natural sys-
tems, the report included general references to the "great Dust Bowl," es-
tuarine pollution, and a prophetic reference to air pollution triggering
"large-scale climatic changes."65 Subsequent issues of Environmental
Quality acknowledged increasing environmental concerns, demonstrating
a recognition by the federal government of the severity of the problem.66
In recent decades, climate change has become a significant issue in
the management of public lands. National Environmental Policy Act guid-
ance, Forest Service planning regulations,68 and a variety of other laws
and legal directives require the federal government to consider climate
change in its land manag'ement. Under Forest Service regulations, carbon
storage is on the list of "ecosystem services."69 Although some state for-
esters have been slower to respond to climate change, the National Asso-
ciation of State Foresters issued a series of recommendations in 2015 for
climate change mitigation and adaptation with a focus on private and state
forests.
In 2007, in Massachusetts v. EPA,71 the U.S. Supreme Court effec-
tively ordered the Executive Branch to consider a regulatory strategy for
dealing with greenhouse gas emissions under the 1970 Clean Air Act. 72 A
decade later, the elements of that regulatory strategy remain unclear.73 In
2017, the Trump Administration announced the country's withdrawal
from the Paris Climate Accord,74 appointed an opponent of government
recognition of climate change to head the Environmental Protection
64. Id. at 17.
65. Id. at 18.
66. The Reports, issued from 1970 to 1997, are at Annual Environmental Quality Reports, supra
note 61.
67. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM
FOR HEADS OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (2016).
68. See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
FOR RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2008); see also Regulation Database - Forest Service,
COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. (compiling policies, plans, rules, guidelines,
and other documents related to the climate change and produced by the U.S. Forest Service), http://co-
lumbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/database/usfs (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
69. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2018).
70. NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE FORESTERS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE ROLE OF
FORESTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND ECOSYSTEM ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(2015).
71. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
72. Id. at 533-35.
73. See Coral Davenport & Alissa J. Rubin, Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama
Climate Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-
executive-order-climate-change.html.
74. Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, Communication Regarding




Agency, and generally expressed plans and policies of inaction in the
battle to either mitigate or adapt to climate change. This leaves much un-
certainty at the federal level. At the time of this writing, policies remain in
place to protect public lands, but they are at risk. Extending federal pro-
tection efforts to private lands in this political climate seems highly un-
likely. However, federal action is not the only option. The following Sec-
tion highlights the protection of private land.
2. Private Lands, Private Action
Acknowledging that protecting public lands alone will not meet en-
vironmental conservation goals-particularly when combined with loos-
ening protections on public lands-leads conservationists to look to pri-
vate lands. Trying to figure out the best way to protect private lands is no
easier task than trying to figure out the best federal regulations. The first
widely used technique was simply purchasing special lands. This impetus
serves as the foundation for the land trust movement in the United States.
The desire to own land to keep it in its current state is probably as old
as the concept of ownership itself. In Buying Nature: The Limits of Land
Acquisition as a Conservation Strategy, Sally Fairfax, Lauren Gwin, Mary
Ann King, Leigh Raymond, and Laura Watt identify the preservation of
Mount Vernon by the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association in 1856 as an
early example of a transaction for preservation in the United States.76 Most
American land trusts recognize as their earliest progenitor the Trustees of
Public Reservations, a Massachusetts organization founded in 1891 that
protected land through fee simple ownership.77
The conservation easement (the favorite tool of land trusts) emerged
later. In the 1930s, federal laws authorized the government to purchase
scenic easements on the U.S. Capitol grounds, near the Blue Ridge Park-
way, and near the Natchez Trace Parkway.78 During the Great Depression,
the federal Bureau of Biological Survey became the holder of extensive
conservation easements to preserve wildlife habitat in North and South
Dakota.79
The term "conservation easement," however, did not emerge until the
1950s through the work of journalist William Holly Whyte. Whyte's 1959
Life magazine article, A Plan to Save Vanishing U.S. Countryside, and his
75. Benjamin D. Santer et al., Tropospheric Warming over the Past Two Decades, 7 SCI. REP.,
No. 2336, at 1 (2017); Doina Chiacu & Valerie Volcovici, EPA Chief Unconvinced on C02 Link to
Global Warming, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-epa-pruitt/epa-
chief-unconvinced-on-co2-link-to-global-warming-idUSKBN16GlXX.
76. SALLY K. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE: THE LIMITS OF LAND ACQUISITION AS A
CONSERVATION STRATEGY, 1780-2004, at 1-3 (2005).
77. See GORDON ABBOTT, JR., SAVING SPECIAL PLACES I1-12 (1993).
78. Roger A. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45
DENV. L.J. 167, 181 (1968); Charles C. Goetsch, Conservation Restrictions: A Survey, 8 CONN. L.
REV. 383, 383 (1976).
79. FAIRFAX ET AL., supra note 76, at 113.
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1968 book, The Last Landscape, centered upon comprehensive planning,
land-use control, and private land conservation.8 0 Whyte's key insight was
that rights in land were not absolute.81 The analogy real estate lawyers of-
ten used to explain this principle is the so-called "bundle of rights": rights
to the mineral substrate, to the land surface, to air space, to easements, and
to other servitudes.82 To protect open space, Whyte realized, conservation-
ists did not necessarily need to purchase the whole bundle (or, rather, its
closest practical equivalent-fee simple title). Instead, they could pur-
chase enough rights to protect the values they wished to preserve, whether
that was a wilderness, a historic fagade, a working ranch, or an unob-
structed view. Whyte identified a tool for the purchase of less-than-fee-
simple rights in land and called it "the conservation easement."83
As this perpetual partial right differed from traditional easements,
many states did not recognize it, and statutes were needed to confirm its
enforceability.84 The oldest identifiable state conservation-easement s at-
utes were adopted in 1954 and 1956 in Massachusetts8 5 and 1959 in Cali-
fornia.86 Originally, the California and Massachusetts tatutes only author-
ized government entities to hold conservation easements, but in 1969,
Massachusetts became the first state to recognize nonprofit organizations
as legal recipients of conservation easements.87 More of these conserva-
tion easement-holding nonprofit organizations, which we now call land
trusts, came into being shortly thereafter.8 8
Changing attitudes towards environmental regulation may help ex-
plain the emergence of public-private land conservation and the rise of
conservation easements. Environmental regulation led to restrictions on
privately owned land.89 Regulation inspired an eventual backlash by the
80. Goetsch, supra note 78, at 384 (citing William H. Whyte, A Plan to Save Vanishing U.S.
Countryside, LIFE (Aug. 17, 1959)); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN
AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 7 (1959); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE 11-13
(1968) [hereinafter WHYTE, LAST LANDSCAPE].
81. WHYTE, LAST LANDSCAPE, supra note 80, at 78-79.
82. See Julie Ann Gustanski, Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and Private Lands,
in 9 PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 14-15 (Julie
Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
83. WHYTE, LAST LANDSCAPE, supra note 80, at 79.
84. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law ofLand Trusts and Con-
servation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1080
(1995); Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation Easements:
Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 65, 71-72
(2006).
85. Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma
ofConservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 128 (2010); Jessica Owley, Exacted Con-
servation Easements: The Hard Case ofEndangered Species Protection, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 293,
305 & n.55 (2004).
86. CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-54 (West 1959).
87. King & Fairfax, supra note 84.
88. Bray, supra note 85.




Reagan Administration in the 1980s. At the same time however, Ameri-
cans still placed a high premium on environmental amenities.90 This drove
lawmakers and activists to seek out different methods for conservation.
The number of land trusts and the amount of land encumbered with con-
servation easements began to multiply.
B. Introduction to Conservation Easements
As the utility of conservation easements became increasingly clear
across the country, more states began to recognize and codify their use.
Legislation was required because conservation easements can be incon-
sistent with common law property rules. For example, in common law, an
"easement in gross" is often unenforceable.91 Conservation easements are
most straightforwardly structured as easements in gross; the "easement" is
not attached to property that is adjacent to the parcel subject o the ease-
ment. State conservation-easement legislation usually permits the holder
of a conservation easement o enforce its terms whether or not the holder
92owns adjacent property.
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA), developed in
1981, provided states with an elegant template for recognizing this used
and useful tool for conservation. More than twenty-five American juris-
dictions have statutes based on the UCEA, and nearly all states have en-
acted laws that authorize conservation easements.9 3 North Dakota appears
to be alone in prohibiting perpetual conservation easements94 (thus render-
ing North Dakota conservation-easement donations to a holder other than
a federal agency nondeductible).9 5 Even North Dakota has not been able
to avoid permanence in federally held conservation easements.96
By 2005, all fifty states had statutes specifically authorizing conser-
vation easements in some form.97 By that time, the federal government had
90. Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation, 8
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 209, 209 (1998).
91. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2007).
92. See, e.g., id § 3.
93. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) reports
that twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted UCEA.
They are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Several other states have made relatively minor modifications of the
Act. On the other hand, Maine, listed by the NCCUSL as a UCEA state, has actually done substantive
customization of its conservation-easement enabling act. The laws in states that have not adopted the
UCEA vary substantially; Illinois, for example, gives neighbors certain limited enforcement rights.
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(c) (2018).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1(2) (2017).
95. Wachter v. Comm'r, 142 T.C. 140, 151 (2014).
96. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1983), affg 650 F.2d 911 (8th Cir.
1981).
97. See ROBERT H. LEVIN, A GUIDED TOUR OF THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT ENABLING
STATUTES app. A (2014).
2018] 743
DENVER LAW REVIEW
already allowed charitable deductions based on the donation of conserva-
tion easements.98 Specific Tax Code recognition of conservation ease-
ments as qualified conservation contributions dates to 1980.99
A landowner that enters into a conservation easement conveys con-
servation-related restrictions on the use of real property to a government
or nonprofit entity.ioo The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a
conservation easement as follows:
[A] nonpossessory interest of a holder in a real property imposing lim-
itations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include re-
taining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values-of real prop-
erty, assuring its availability for agriculture, forest, recreational, or
open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhanc-
ing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, ar-
chaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.o10
When an owner places a conservation easement on her land-
whether by donating the conservation easement, selling it, or creating it to
meet legal requirements-she is agreeing to refrain from exercising cer-
tain rights. The conservation-easement agreement, though, is more than a
contract. It is a deed of conveyance by which a property owner 'transfers
away what otherwise would be her right to undertake specified develop-
ment activities or land uses. These rights or uses can include, for example,
the right to build houses, the right to cut trees, and the right to introduce
non-native species. The conservation easement does not transfer affirma-
tive rights to engage in those uses. Rather, the conservation-easement
holder has, in effect, been granted the right to enforce the grantor's prom-
ise not to engage in those uses. Any right to do so associated with the un-
derlying fee title has been terminated by the provisions of the conservation
easement he owner has conveyed. Thus, when an owner, by deed of con-
servation easement, conveys away the right to harvest timber on a prop-
erty, the holder cannot itself harvest trees. But the holder can bring an ac-
tion for injunction if the landowner threatens a harvest.102
The use of conservation easements has increased at stunning rates in
the past thirty years. The National Conservation Easement Database, ad-
mittedly an incomplete census of conservation easements in the United
98. REV. RUL. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
99. Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation Easements in
the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, 1 J.L. PROP. & SOc'Y 107,
117 (2015).
100. Several states do not explicitly restrict ownership of conservation easements to government
or nonprofit organizations. New Hampshire appears to be one example. But New Hampshire law only
exempts nonprofit and government easement holders from the operation of the common law doctrines
that limit the utility and permanence of conservation easements. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:46
(2017).
101. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § I (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2007).
102. Id. § 3.
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States, 103 has catalogued over 146,236 conservation easements encumber-
ing more than 25,692,063 acres104 and estimates that conservation ease-
ments encumber more than 40 million acres of land.'0 The database also
reveals an increase in the rate of growth in conservation-easement-encum-
bered acreage in the United States. The acreage encumbered annually from
the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s hovered below 140,000, while acreage
annually placed under conservation easement from 2002 to 2012 often ex-
ceeded 1,000,000.106 Conservation easements are now employed interna-
tionally as well.107
As we have indicated above, many conservation easements are held
by nonprofit organizations called land trusts. The Land Trust Alliance's
2015 census showed 1,363 land trusts in the United States, an increase of
nearly a thousand over the total number of land trusts in 1980.0 Other
sources estimate that an even greater number of land trusts are operating
in the United States.109
Land trusts probably hold about half as many acres in fee as acres
protected through conservation easements.'10 According to the Land Trust
Alliance 2015 National Land Trust Census Report, state, local, and na-
tional land trusts have protected 56 million acres in the United States -
an area larger than the state of Utah.1 2 Of that acreage, more than 16 mil-
lion acres were encumbered by conservation easements held by private
land trusts; more than 8 million acres were owned outright by land trusts;
and more than 12 million acres had been acquired by land trusts and re-
conveyed for conservation to "government agencies and other entities."ll3
Conservation-easement-encumbered land merits special attention be-
cause the partial property interest complicates monitoring, enforcement,
and climate adaptation. Stakeholders with different interests and poten-
tially different opinions on management may include the state (in defense
103. Completeness, NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, http://conservationease-
ment.us/about/completeness (last visited May 29, 2018).
104. NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, http://conservationeasement.us (last visited
May 29, 2018).
105. Conservation Easements and the National Conservation Easement Database: What Is
NCED?, supra note 10.
106. Id.
107. See Korngold, supra note 11, at 633-37.
108. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements-A Troubled Adolescence, 26 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 47, 49, 50 graph 1 (2005); Land Trusts and the Land Trust Movement,
RICHARD BREWER (last updated Apr. 17, 2010), http://richardbrewer.org/land-trusts-and-the-land-
trust-movement.
109. See McLaughlin, supra note 108, at 51.
110. KATIE CHANG, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2015 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT:
OUR COMMON GROUND AND COLLECTIVE IMPACT 5 (2016).
111. Id.
112. See Geography Statistics, STATEMASTER.COM, http://www.statemas-
ter.com/graph/geolan-acr tot-geography-land-acreage-total (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
113. CHANG, supra note 110.
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of its public charitable interest in a nonprofit asset); the federal govern-
ment (in defense of its tax investment in a deductible gift conservation
easement, its oversight of the conservation-easement holder as a federally
recognized nonprofit organization, or as a funder or facilitator of conser-
vation easements through programs under the federal programs managed
by the Department of the Interior or the Department of Agriculture); the
conservation-easement donor; the current property owner; the neighbors;
and the holder.
C. The Effect of Climate Change on Conservation Easements and Con-
servation-Easement Holders
Climate change will affect virtually all conservation organizations,
whether nonprofit land trusts or governmental agencies, big or small, local
or international. While conservation organizations have many similarities
and use like tools, the essence of their missions vary. For example, some
organizations seek to protect open space and special iconic landscapes
within a community.14 Others have wildlife conservation as their goal.'
Some set about protecting working landscapes like farms and forestland.l16
The degree of climate change impact on land conservation efforts will vary
depending on the organization's particular mission and geographic focus.
Climate change may have its greatest impact on organizations seek-
ing to protect biodiversity or habitat. As we indicated in Part II above,
scientists predict that climate change will reduce or eliminate important
habitat, shift the distribution of species that comprise that habitat at differ-
ent rates, and present both new threats (such as the spread of invasive spe-
cies) and new stresses (such as increased temperature or reduced precipi-
tation).' '7 According to the Land Trust Alliance's 2015 Land Trust Cen-
sus, the preservation of important natural areas and wildlife habitat is a
114. Id. at 19; see, e.g., Land Matters, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE LAND TR.,
http://www.cdlt.org/land-matters (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); Alyssa S. Navares Myers, Let It Be: The
North Shore Community Land Trust Balances Development and Conservation in the Kawela-Kahuku
Region of O'ahu's North Shore, GREEN (Oct. 12, 2015), https://greenmagazinehawaii.com/let-it-be;
Jason Taylor, Scenic Hudson Honors Land Conservation Groups, SCENIC HUDSON (June 18, 2008),
http://www.scenichudson.org/aboutus/pressroom/061808.
115. See, e.g., About the Wildlife Land Trust, WILDLIFE LAND TR., https://www.wildlifeland-
trust.org.au/index.php/about (last visited Mar. 28, 2018); About World Land Trust, WORLD LAND TR.,
http://www.worldlandtrust.org/about/index (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); Land Protection, DUCKS
UNLIMITED, http://www.ducks.org/conservation/land-protection (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); Places
We Protect, NE. WILDERNESS LAND TR., http://www.newildernesstrust.org/places-we-protect (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018).
116. See, e.g., Land Conservation, CONN. FOREST & PARK Ass'N, https://www.ctwood-
lands.org/land-conservation (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); No Farms No Food, AM. FARMLAND TR.,
https://www.farmland.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); Protected Forever: Forests, Wetlands, Prairies,
Family Farms, SYCAMORE LAND TR., https://sycamorelandtrust.org/protected-land-conservation-for-
est-wetland (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
117. See supra Part II.
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high priority for eighty-eight percent of local and regional land trusts in
the United States."1 8
Many species are at risk of extinction as a result of climate change-
related impacts, including ecosystem shifts, habitat modifications, and in-
troductions of invasive species and diseases.l9 Researchers still struggle
to predict patterns of species dispersal and migration along with rates of
coastal loss.1 20 In the future, programs to protect species and species hab-
itat will need to be flexible to account for multiple future scenarios.12 1 In
a 2004 Nature article, a group of prominent scientists predicted, based on
then-midrange climate warming scenarios for 2050, that fifteen to thirty-
seven percent of species on Earth would be "committed to extinction."l22
While only a couple recent extinctions are directly attributed to climate
change,123 climate change is an obstacle to slowing the already accelerated
extinction rate caused by other human activities such as habitat conver-
sion.124 Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,
prepared by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Working Group II,125 reports with "high confidence" that many species
have already "shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migra-
tion patterns, abundances, and species interactions in response to ongoing
climate change."1 2 6 Many studies support and enrich these findings. For
118. CHANG, supra note 110, at 19.
119. CHRISTOPHER B. FIELD ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 14-15 (2014).
120. See, e.g., Terence P. Dawson et al., Beyond Predictions: Biodiversity Conservation in a
Changing Climate, 332 SCIENCE 53, 54 (2011); Damien A. Fordham et al., Plant Extinction Risk Un-
der Climate Change: Are Forecast Range Shifts Alone a Good Indicator of Species Vulnerability to
Global Warming?, 18 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 1357, 1357-58 (2012).
121. See, e.g., Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-Level Rise and Its Impact on Coastal
Zones, 328 SCIENCE 1517, 1517-19 (2010); Rebecca K. Runting et al., Does More Mean Less? The
Value of Information for Conservation Planning Under Sea Level Rise, 19 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY
352, 352-54 (2013); Sgro et al., supra note 8, at 332-33 (suggesting protecting areas with a range of
habitats, gradients, and refugia, and not focusing solely on connectedness); see also Hannah et al.,
supra note 40, at 137 (objecting to the current mode of fixed protected areas).
122. Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Riskfrom Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 (2004).
123. See id.; Christine Dell'Amore, 7 Species Hit Hard by Climate Change-Including One
That's Already Extinct, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 2, 2014), https://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/news/2014/03/14033 1-global-waiming-climate-change-ipcc-animals-science-environ-
ment (listing the golden toad as extinct due to climate change); Brian Clark Howard, First Mammal
Species Goes Extinct Due to Climate Change, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (June 14, 2016), https://news.na-
tionalgeographic.com/2016/06/first-mammal-extinct-climate-change-bramble-cay-melomys (de-
scribing the Bramble Cay melomys, or mosaic-tailed rat, as extinct due to climate change).
124. See, e.g., Jessica C. Stanton et al., Warning Times for Species Extinctions Due to Climate
Change, 21 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 1066, 1066 (2015); see also, e.g., Michaela Pacifici et al.,
Assessing Species Vulnerability to Climate Change, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 215, 215 (2015).
125. FIELD ET AL., supra note 119. The full report of the working group is nearly 2,000 pages
but the thirty-two-page Summary of Policymakers is more approachable. The IPCC's website has
detailed outlines and links to sections by topics making even this cumbersome document relatively
easy to navigate. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, IPCC,
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
126. FIELD ET AL., supra note 119, at 4.
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example, scientists have already found species that are shifting to higher
latitudes and elevations.127
Climate change also is likely to impact organizations seeking to pro-
tect coastal regions or working lands in agriculture, grazing, or forestry.
Other organizations may fare better. For example, climate change is less
likely to affect organizations seeking to protect open space or structural or
cultural properties in areas that are at low risk of threats from shifting
weather-related conditions.
Despite the differing effects on mission and methods, the large ma-
jority of conservation organizations will need to adapt to climate change.
Successful climate change adaptation is "any adjustment that reduces the
risks associated with climate change, or vulnerability to climate change
impacts, to a predetermined level, without compromising economic, so-
cial, and environmental sustainability."1 28 Adaptation of conservation
strategies seek to make both organizations and the lands they protect more
effective and less vulnerable to change over time. Even more than we
knew, we live in a natural world in motion. It is time for the acquisition
and management priorities of land conservation organizations to adapt to
the new and changiig natural world.
III. THE SIX-STATE STUDY
Few prior studies have examined the landscape context and legal
terms of a diverse selection of conservation easements. To reflect a wide
range of conservation easements in the United States, we examined 269
conservation easements from six states: California, Colorado, Indiana,
New York, South Carolina, and Wisconsin (see Figure 1). We compared
conservation-easement terms and conducted interviews with conservation
employees through a distributed graduate seminar conducted among six
universities in spring 2011.129
127. I-Ching Chen et al., Rapid Range Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate
Warming, 333 SCIENCE 1024, 1024 (2011).
128. Miguel de Franga Doria et al., Using Expert Elicitation to Define Successful Adaptation to
Climate Change, 12 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 810, 810 (2009).
129. Owley & Rissman, supra note 16; Owley & Rissman, supra note 17; Rissman et al., supra
note 17, at 68-69. Interview notes, conservation easement documents, and other materials are on file










Figure 1: Map of Study Regions in the Six-State Study1 3 0
Types of Organizations Number of Ntunber of Number of
Organizations Conservation Interviews
or State Offices Easements
Land Trusts 44 160 44
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 6 49 14
State Agencies 9 40 10
Federal Agencies 4 20 5
Total 63 269 73
Table 1: Organizations and Conservation Easements Included in
the Six-State Study"'
To include diverse land-conservation organizations and conservation
easements, we selected sixty-three land trusts and governmental holders
from twenty-eight regions across six states. We selected regions within
these states for diversity including forest, rangeland, wetland, and coastal
regions. We then selected three primary conservation-easement holders
from each region, including at least one state or federal government
agency and one nonprofit land trust (see Table 1). We acquired four con-
servation easements from each organization: the oldest and newest con-
servation easements, a conservation easement from the middle year be-
tween the oldest and newest conservation easements, and the largest con-
servation easement (by area) held by the organization in the study region.
If the largest conservation easement was also the oldest, middle, or newest
easement, we examined the second largest conservation easement as well.
130. Rissman et al., supra note 17, at 69 fig.1.
131. Id. (Online Supp.), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/downloadSupple-





We selected these conservation easements to maximize the variation in
conservation-easement terms within each organization.
Our Six-State Study found that most conservation organizations are
already aware of the risks of climate change. Over half of the organizations
reported that they thought it likely that climate change will negatively im-
pact the conservation goals of their conservation easements.132 The vast
majority, or eighty-eight percent, were concerned that climate change will
influence the region in which they operate.133 Twenty-two percent of the
organizations stated that climate change is already affecting their conser-
vation easements (see Figure 2). In contrast, only two percent of conser-
vation easements mentioned climate change.134
80
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Conservation easement includes provisions for
climate change
Figure 2: Survey Responses Regarding Importance of Climate
Change Contrasted with Conservation Easements Containing Climate
Change Provisions1
In interviews, organizations reported a variety of potential adverse
impacts. The most frequently mentioned concern was that climate change
would undermine the capacity of current habitat to continue to support na-
tive species. The respondents also reported six other major impacts: the
risk of more frequent, extreme, and lengthier droughts and flood periods;






the long-term viability of agricultural land; sea level rise; species move-
ment; increases in wildfires; and the spread of invasive species.
Not all conservation organizations thought climate change posed a
substantial concern in their regions. A quarter of the employees inter-
viewed thought negative effects of climate change were somewhat to very
unlikely, and another one in five reported they were unsure of the risk to
their conservation efforts.
Awareness of the risks of climate change, moreover, did not appear
to be leading to deep rethinking of how conservation organizations should
approach their missions or write their conservation easements in the face
of new climate threats. Although seventy percent of employees said their
organization prepared (or plans to prepare) for climate change, the changes
put into place as of 2011 were not extensive. Thus, awareness has not yet
led to extensive change. Some conservation organizations, while recog-
nizing the risk, may believe that the risk is too small or too far in the future
to justify significant changes today. Other organizations may feel that
there are more serious issues to address (see Figure 3). While twenty-two
percent of the interviewed organizations reported that climate change was
already affecting their conservation easements, even higher percentages
reported immediate concerns about other threats. For example, fifty-three
percent reported current threats from neighboring land uses; forty-five per-
cent noted that the actions of the underlying landowners are affecting their
conservation easements; and forty-two percent were concerned with local
development pressure. While these other concerns are serious and conser-
vation organizations must prioritize, failure to account for climate change










Ideally, conservation easements should include mechanisms for
adapting to change. Many existing easements, however, do not facilitate
principled adaptation. In the conservation easements we reviewed, we
identified four primary options used for altering land-use restrictions (see
Figure 4): (1) modification through conservation-easement amendment,
(2) management plan revision, (3) approval of changes through discretion-
ary consent, and (4) changes through updating laws and policies refer-
enced in the conservation easement such as forest certification. These op-
tions for future land-use change include terms that could hypothetically
increase development, harvest, or other land uses as well as terms that
could further protect conservation purposes in the face of climate change.
136. Id. at 70 fig.2. The Figure shows the number (and percent) of employees who perceived










Figure 4: Venn Diagram ofProvisions Included for Changing Land
Usesl37
IV. WHAT CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS CAN Do
Climate change poses many challenges for conservation easements.
The vast majority of conservation easements are, by their terms, perma-
nent. The permanence of conservation easements appeals to conservation
organizations for a broad range of reasons. In particular, securing long-
term land protection is the main goal (and strength) of conservation ease-
ments. Creating present-day land restrictions through conservation ease-
ments, however, is challenging in a world in which change is a given. The
conservation community owes.an obligation to its members and its land-
owner partners to do what it can to enhance the effectiveness of land-con-
servation tools in the face of climate change. This Section details ap-
proaches that conservation organizations (both public agencies and entities
as well as private nonprofit land trusts) can take to be more responsive to
climate change. The suggestions vary in their ease of establishment. Fur-
thermore, some are clearly available under current legal regimes and oth-
ers might require more radical system or statutory adjustments. All of them
represent ways to think more critically about permanent land protection
and explore alternative approaches.
A. Education and Research
Climate change resources for conservation were fairly limited at the
time of our study in 2011, but have since expanded. For instance, the Land
137. Figure 4 is modified from Rissman et al., supra note 17, at 71 fig.5. The numbers in the
Venn diagram show the percent of conservation easements with each type of provision.
2018] 753
DENVER LAWREVIEW
Trust Alliance has now created a site with intermediate-level guidance on
climate change, including an analysis of climate impacts on different eco-
system types across diverse regions, case studies of pioneering ap-
proaches, and a self-assessment.1 38
Many conservation organizations mention their work on climate
change adaptation in their annual reports, websites, strategic plans, and
other available documents.139 Several land trusts from our Six-State Study
were early pioneers of climate adaptation, and their documents addressed
climate change in 2011. For example, Big Sur Land Trust (California) spe-
cifically mentioned the desire to "safeguard [its communities] against
flood, fire, and the potential effects of climate change."14 0 Elkhorn Slough
Foundation (California) noted the role that wetlands can play in mitigating
climate change in explaining that one of the reasons that the foundation
targeted the slough for protection is because "[w]etlands also have been
proven to be carbon sequesters-removing and storing greenhouse gases
from the Earth's atmosphere, slowing the onset of global warming."1 41 The
Sempervirens Fund (California), which works to protect redwoods and
other areas, noted that "redwood forests' natural ability to capture carbon
helps fight climate change."l42 The Nature Conservancy's Colorado chap-
ter mentioned the need to protect important places resilient enough to with-
stand climate change.143 In another example from our sample, Peconic
Land Trust (New York) had a strategic goal to "[e]ducate ourselves about
the impact of climate change on the work we do and adapt accordingly."44
Responding to landscape change in response to climate change was
not at the top of any land trust's list of goals (although it may indeed be a
motivating factor for formation or support of the organization). None of
138. About Conservation in a Changing Climate, CONSERVATION IN A CHANGING CLIMATE,
https://climatechange.Ita.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
139. The information in this paragraph is based on information we gleaned from websites and
other materials. The availability of such materials differed by organization. Some organizations had a
well-developed website along with links to strategic plans, annual reports, and other documents. We
read all documents made publicly available in this way to assess each conservation organization's
purpose, goal, and geographical scope before we interviewed a representative from the organization.
It is therefore possible that some organizations had robust climate change policies or programs, but
simply did not publish them. However, our later interviews did not suggest this to be the case.
140. This was on their website in 2011. They also incorporated climate change planning to an-
ticipate changes in sea-level rise, stream flow, fire intensity, and floodplain restoration, and cite to this
for Big Sur. Kirsten Feifel, Adding the Impacts of Climate Change to a Strategic Plan: Big Sur Land
Trust, CLIMATE ADAPTATION KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.cakex.org/case-
studies/adding-impacts-climate-change-strategic-plan-big-sur-land-trust.
141. The Elkhorn Slough Foundation - Clearing the Floodplain, Adapting to Change,
CONSERVATION CHANGING CLIMATE, https://climatechange.Ita.org/case-study/esf ca (last visited
Mar. 8, 2017).
142. Redwoods & Climate, SEMPERVIRENS FUND, https://sempervirens.org/discover-red-
woods/redwoods-climate (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
143. Colorado: Conserving the Most Important Lands, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/colorado/howwework/colo-
rado-conserving-the-most-important-lands.xml (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).




the sixty-five conservation organizations' mission statements that we stud-
ied in 2011 contained any mention of climate or landscape change. Two
of the land trusts in California had scientific research and science-based
stewardship as part of their missions. Three land trusts (two in California
and one in Colorado) mentioned long-term planning or management plans
in their mission statements. In contrast, longevity was common. Eighteen
land trusts used the term forever, perpetual, permanent, or future genera-
tions in their mission statements. Most mission statements simply stated a
desire to protect a certain type of habitat, location, or working landscape
type (e.g., farms, forests).
Our study revealed that land conservation organizations did not al-
ways have good access to information about climate change. This was no-
ticeable in a few ways. First, nineteen percent of interviewees said they
"didn't know" how likely climate change is to negatively impact the con-
servation goals of their conservation easements. This answer was given
even in areas where climate change effects are well-studied or already oc-
curring. Other respondents stated they were unsure where to find infor-
mation and particularly interested in learning about local conditions as op-
posed to broad statements about increasing temperatures and rising sea
levels.
Conservation organizations must start by understanding the potential
implications of climate change for their goals and then make the best de-
cisions they can in light of current information and the uncertainties that
inevitably will accompany that knowledge. There is a growing amount of
climate change information on which the conservation community can
rely.145 The trick is conveying the information to land-conservation organ-
izations and delivering it in a way the organizations find useful. Scientists
in universities, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations around
the world are generating and sharing information about the projected ef-
fects of climate change. Good information about climate change exists
now, and that information will get better in the future.
While we hope that those with climate change data will reach out to
those making on-the-ground decisions through outreach and extension ser-
vices, land-conservation organizations have an obligation to seek out in-
formation about this important issue. Land trusts and other conservation
organizations not currently knowledgeable about climate change science
can approach local universities, government agencies, or large land trusts
to help inform themselves. One place to start for basic information about
climate impacts is The Nature Conservancy's Climate Wizard, which of-
fers information about climate impacts at large spatial scales.14 6 Scientific
145. See, e.g., Meet the Challenges ofa Changing Climate, U.S. CLIMATE RESILIENCE TOOLKIT,
https://toolkit.climate.gov (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).




organizations working on specific landscapes may have more detailed in-
formation about the effects of climate change on a conservation organiza-
tion's particular terrain, including impacts on particular species and eco-
systems. A number of the conservation organizations interviewed in the
Six-State Study, for instance, work directly with local universities to ob-
tain information tailored to their region and to enable them to better un-
derstand the potential impact of climate change on their goals. Other con-
servation organizations have turned to regional organizations as local
Landscape Conservation Cooperatives1 47 to develop information on the
likely local nature and impact of climate change. Scientists are continually
advancing the scientific data on climate change impacts and the method-
ologies that land managers can use to apply that data.
This kind of information will help land conservation organizations to
make informed choices about he best strategies to employ in the future.
Already, place-specific data about the range of effects of climate change
can offer helpful information about likely changes in vegetation, animal
migration, and the availability of water. Projected changes in temperature
and weather extremes can provide key information about what species will
be able to persist and what species will not.
After obtaining the best available information about the impacts of
climate change, conservation organizations must incorporate that infor-
mation into their decision-making processes. Both staff and board mem-
bers, along with the owners of land on which conservation easements are
held, need to understand likely trends in changes to climate and land-
scapes. When information regarding specific lands is available, that infor-
mation should be factored into conservation organizations' decisions
about what lands to acquire and what instrument o use in protecting con-
servation values. For example, when the California chapter of The Nature
Conservancy considers the acquisition of a new conservation easement or
fee, it provides its trustees with information regarding the likely impact of
climate change and how acquisition might help adapt to climate change.
Ideally, land-conservation organizations should make every decision to
purchase property rights with knowledge of the projected climate change
impacts for the property. This includes changes in rainfall, temperature,
species, vegetation, available water, and resident wildlife for the lands they
seek to conserve. Those responsible for drafting conservation easements
need the same information and analyses.
Land conservation organizations should not only avail themselves of
the information produced by others but should help in the efforts to under-
stand climate change and its impacts on the land. To adapt to climate
147. About Landscape Conservation Cooperatives, LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE
NETWORK, http://www.fws.gov/landscape-conservation/Icc.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). Land-
scape Scale Cooperatives seek to provide information and technical expertise to support conservation
planning at landscape scales and promote collaboration on conservation goals. Id.
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change, conservation-easement holders will need to be aware of changes
in the biophysical properties of the land.148 Property-specific responses to
climate change may vary from regional averages. 149 Conservation organi-
zations, therefore, should reassess monitoring provisions. Conservation-
easement holders ought to secure the right to gather information regarding
the biophysical aspects of the land to give them a full picture of how the
landscape and the conservation values are changing. This information will
allow conservation organizations, in cooperation with the landowner, to
manage the property more effectively. In the Six-State Study, ninety-six
percent of the conservation easements specifically grant the holder the
right to monitor for compliance with conservation-easement terms, but
only thirty-five percent specifically allow either ecological monitoring or
scientific research on the property.150 Terms for ecological monitoring,
even if limited to several days per year, are likely to be necessary for de-
tecting change and managing adaptively in response to climate change im-
pacts.
Effective comparisons of changes over time require development of
baseline documentation and detailed characterizations of the land at the
time of the original transaction. Detailed baseline analyses will allow con-
servation organizations to track landscape changes as they emerge and to
show even a skeptical landowner that these changes are taking place. Care-
ful baseline documentation and subsequent monitoring-if shared with
other public and private conservation entities-will also improve general
knowledge about landscape responses to climate change. Land-conserva-
tion organizations should use this baseline information to best understand
their landholdings while acknowledging that in a changing world strict ad-
herence to a baseline may not make ecological sense.'5 '
B. Choosing What Land to Protect
Understanding the projected impacts of climate change ought to shift
acquisition priorities if the likely impacts will affect the ability of a partic-
ular parcel of land to durably meet an institution's conservation goals. In
some cases, organizations may choose different portfolios of land to con-
serve. A conservation organization may decide to avoid working with
lands that are highly susceptible to climate-induced change where it ap-
pears impracticable to sustain conservation targets in the future. Alterna-
tively, a conservation organization may instead seek out lands that will
support the achievement of its goals as climate changes.
148. Environmental monitoring is a cornerstone of climate adaptation. See, e.g., Mawdsley et al.,
supra note 2, at 1085-86.
149. Anhalt-Depies et al., supra note 43, at 995.
150. Rissman et al., supra note 17, at 73.
151. EMMA MARRIS, RAMBUNCTIOUS GARDEN: SAVING NATURE IN A POST-WILD WORLD 14-
15 (2011).
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A number of the biodiversity-focused organizations interviewed in
the Six-State Study reported that the risk of climate change is leading them
to consider acquiring interests in lands as follows:
* Provide migration corridors, including riparian pathways and eleva-
tional gradients, that species can use to move from current to future
locations in response to climate change;
* Are more likely to prove resilient in the face of climate change and
thus serve as important refugia for species;
* Represent habitat types and/or geographic conditions that are un-
derrepresented in current reserve systems; or
* Reflect a representative sample of major ecosystem types.
This does not mean that land trusts and other conservation organiza-
tions should avoid protecting lands subject o potentially significant trans-
formation. Highly vulnerable lands may still be the most important lands
to protect in achieving the conservation goals of the organization and im-
proving the resilience of the landscape. For instance, streambank conser-
vation easements that provide public fishing access and restoration along
trout streams may be important even if there is a possibility of loss of trout
fisheries because warm water fish are likely to persist there.152 And lands
among the few places that support a highly endangered species may need
protection immediately even if they will be marginal or poor habitat in
fifty years. When land trusts and other conservation organizations consider
protecting lands likely to be transformed by climate change, they should
consider how such places fit into a landscape of change and think critically
about how best to protect the values that initially led them to consider pro-
tecting the land.
Conservation organizations should focus on strategic spatial plan-
ning, both to achieve existing conservation goals and to assist with climate
adaptation, such as migration corridors and species refugia, as well as cli-
mate mitigation. They should think carefully about acquiring lands that are
highly susceptible to climate-induced changes that could undermine the
land's future conservation value. The prospect of climate change dimin-
ishes the value of most real estate tools currently used by proponents of
land-conservation transactions. A conservation easement, for example,
binds only the parcel of land described. What scientists know of climate
change suggests a natural world in motion; there is no guarantee that the
things people value on specific parcels will continue to be there in future
decades.
Table 2 includes design considerations for selecting properties. Spa-
tial boundaries that are movable, rather than fixed, may be adaptable under
152. J. Lyons et al., Predicted Effects of Climate Warming on the Distribution of 50 Stream
Fishes in Wisconsin, U.S.A., 77 J. FISH BIOLOGY 1867, 1868-69 (2010).
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climate change, although this may be difficult to achieve in practice. Stra-
tegic targeting of lands could optimize the conservation value gained in
land transactions by considering development and other threats. This gen-
erally means selecting moderately threatened, moderately expensive prop-
erties, rather than low-threat inexpensive properties, or high-threat, very
costly properties.153 Integrating climate change into strategic conservation
involves an expansion of threat assessments and conservation goals. Cli-
mate-adaptation planning integrates threats posed by climate change to en-
sure that conservation properties can serve conservation goals despite sea
level rise and changes in temperature, precipitation, land cover, species
ranges, and economic productivity. Conservation organizations may con-
sider expanding their goals to include carbon sequestration and renewable
energy production, which mitigates climate change by reducing green-
house gas emissions. However, these goals may not be consistent with
other land-conservation goals, so organizations will have to carefully con-
sider the tradeoffs.





Spatial bounda- Narrowly constrained op- Rolling conservation
ries tions for movability to easements; tradeable
enhance conservation conservation ease-
purposes ments
Strategic target- Strategically targeted to Strategic conserva-
ing in general reduce probability of re- tion planning; avoid-
source loss (benefit-loss- ing opportunism
cost optimization)
Strategic target- Locations are selected Connectivity plan-
ing for climate for: Migratory species ning, sea level rise
adaptation corridors, Managed re- planning
treat from sea level rise,
Climate refugia
Strategic target- iLocations are selected Participation in car-
ing for climate for: Carbon sequestration bon offset markets
mitigation and storage; Renewable
energy production
Table 2: Design Considerations for Choosing Where and What to
Protect
153. David Newbum et al., Economics and Land-Use Change in Prioritizing Private Land Con-
servation, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1411, 1415-18 (2005).
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When the current or anticipated holdings of a land conservation or-
ganization are not adequately climate change resilient, the organization
may be able to work in collaboration with other land trusts, public land
agencies, watershed protection authorities, and even land developers to
create larger, regional landscape protection schemes to better advance
their goals. Ninety-two percent of the staff interviewed in the Six-State
Study reported that their organization already coordinates with others, at
least to some degree, to attempt to achieve landscape-scale conservation.
States and the federal government and large private entities, includ-
ing land trusts, are working to create even greater opportunities for land-
trust-to-land-trust and public-private partnerships to coordinate landscape
protection in the face of climate change. For example, the United States
Department of the Interior has established Landscape Conservation Coop-
eratives, designed to provide the science and technical expertise needed to
support conservation planning at landscape scales and to promote collab-
oration among their members in defining shared conservation goals.154
Other entities such as the Southern Sierra Partnership-an alliance of
Audubon California, the Sequoia Riverlands Trust, the Sierra Business
Council, The Nature Conservancy, and the Conservation Biology Insti-
tute-provide lessons in and inspiration for the use of shared infor-
mation.5 5
Cooperation and information come together in the numerous and di-
verse land-conservation i ventory and mapping projects around the coun-
try, now possible thanks to the extraordinary and widely available tools
provided by the Geographic Information System (GIS) revolution.'56 The
more members of the land-conservation community know about what
lands are already protected, the better the community can work together to
purchase connecting areas and develop methods for overall landscape
management. In this regard, the National Conservation Easement Data-
base and the U.S. Protected Areas Database are important resources
on which land trusts and governments can rely and that they should sup-
port.159 Additionally, some state governments are now compiling spatial
154. About Landscape Conservation Cooperatives, supra note 147.
155. The Southern Sierra Partnership, S. SIERRA PARTNERSHIP, http://www.southemsierrapart-
nership.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
156. See Richard G. Lathrop, Jr. & John A. Bognar, Applying GIS and Landscape Ecological
Principles to Evaluate Land Conservation Alternatives, 41 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 27, 27 (1998);
Ted Weber et al., Maryland's Green Infrastructure Assessment: Development ofa Comprehensive
Approach to Land Conservation, 77 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 94, 96 (2006) (describing use of GIS
to coordinate land conservation efforts in Maryland, fostering cooperation with land trusts, public
agencies, and others).
157. About Us, NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, https://www.conservationease-
ment.us/about (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
158. National Gap Analysis Project (GAP): Protected Areas Data Portal, USGS, https://gap-
analysis.usgs.gov/padus (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
159. Adena R. Rissman et al., Public Access to Spatial Data on Private-Land Conservation, 22
ECOLOGY & SOC'Y, no. 2, art. 24 (2017).
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information on conservation holdings. 160 When these tools provide accu-
rate information-and this will be possible if conservation entities will-
ingly share information about their holdings-they can show the way to
large landscape strategies that would otherwise be unimaginable.
C. Choosing the Right Conservation Tool
In the face of climate change, conservation organizations must think
carefully about what conservation tools to use in protecting valued lands.
Conservation organizations have been enamored with conservation ease-
ments, so much so that it is often the first tool they reach for when putting
together a land conservation plan. As the organizations become increas-
ingly comfortable with the workings of conservation easements, their de-
ployment of the tool is as much a work pattern as it is a careful choice. Yet
not every conservation scenario presents an ideal situation for conserva-
tion easements. We counsel land-conservation organizations to consider
expanding their conservation tools beyond perpetual conservation ease-
ments. It is particularly important that the conservation movement develop
and use tools that provide greater flexibility in either the powers that the
organizations enjoy over their lands or in the duration of the protection.
Examples of other tools include fee ownership, option agreements, con-
tractual payments, term conservation easements, moving conservation
easements, tradeable conservation easements, and flexible reserves.
While perpetual conservation easements may still be the tool of
choice in many cases, conservation organizations may wish to consider
using more flexible tools, where available. If the conservation value of
land might change over time, the argument for perpetual conservation
easements is weaker. Operative terms of perpetual conservation ease-
ments, moreover, can be difficult to amend. In light of climate change,
conservation organizations therefore might want to reconsider fee pur-
chase and explore novel approaches to land protection, including those de-
scribed below.
1. Fee Ownership
Owning fee simple title to land may provide more flexibility in how
a conservation organization adapts to climate change. As mentioned
above, federal and state governments own more than a third of the United
States outright. In addition, the 2015 Land Trust Alliance Census indicates
that private land trusts own more than 8 million acres of land in fee simple
absolute.161 These extensive conservation holdings can provide flexibility.
They allow the holder to structure conservation ownership of the land in
160. Only Montana and Massachusetts require GIS data. Amy Wilson Morris, The Changing
Landscape of Conservation Easements: Public Accountability & Evolving Oversight 135-36 (June
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Santa Cruz),
https://search.proquest.com/openview/68648cf48e089 11 f2e6dfa8c2391954.
161. CHANG, supra note 110.
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the way the organization believes best in the face of the uncertainty gen-
erated by climate change. For example, fee simple owners can grant per-
petual and term conservation easements, or enter into conservation leases
to create partnerships regarding specific pieces of land. They may reserve
conservation easements-perpetual or temporary-while transferring the
possessory estate to an owner willing to manage the land subject to con-
servation restrictions. Subject to the limitations imposed by nonprofit sta-
tus, restrictions on charitable gifts they have received, and their own gov-
ernance documents, private conservation organizations may sell land they
hold for conservation purposes and reinvest the proceeds of sale in other
endeavors consistent with their organizational goals.
2. Options
Options to purchase conservation easements have long played a mod-
est but important role in land conservation practice.162 In real estate trans-
actions, an option is the contractual right to purchase or lease something
without the obligation to do so.' 63 With an option to purchase a conserva-
tion easement, the option holder gains the right to purchase a conservation
easement encumbering a specific parcel of land. Such rights can be pur-
chased (or "donated" with nominal consideration), and they give the
holder of the option flexibility in deciding when and whether to enter into
a conservation-easement agreement while preventing destruction of a par-
cel's conservation value during the option period. Currently, many land
trusts use options to gain additional time to generate financing for im-
portant transactions or to assemble the series of parcels needed to achieve
a conservation goal.164 These options to purchase conservation easements
currently rarely seem to last more than two years.165
In a world of substantial uncertainties stemming from climate
change, options can serve strategic purposes.166 For example, if a potential
conservation-easement holder knows valuable species habitat will migrate
over time, but does not know exactly where or when it will migrate, the
162. Federico Cheever & Jessica Owley, Enhancing Conservation Options: An Argument for
Statutory Recognition of Options to Purchase Conservation Easements (OPCES), 40 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
163. See Option, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
164. Telephone Interview with Vanessa Johnson-Hall, Assistant Director of Land Conservation,
Essex Cty. Greenbelt Ass'n. (Dec. 3, 2014); Confidential Telephone Interview with a Land Trust Con-
servation Project Manager (Dec. 12, 2014); Telephone Interview with Karin Marchetti-Ponte, Me.
Coast Heritage Tr. (Dec. 12, 2014). But see E-mail from Ann Taylor Schwing, Of Counsel, Best Best
& Krieger LLP, Board Member, Past President, Land Tr. of Napa Cty. (Dec. 2, 2014) ("There was
one option, extended several times, that lasted over 30 years because there were so many separate
parcels to assemble.").
165. Telephone Interview with Vanessa Johnson-Hall, Assistant Director of Land Conservation,
Essex Cty. Greenbelt Ass'n. (Dec. 3, 2014); Confidential Telephone Interview with a Land Trust Con-
servation Project Manager (Dec. 12, 2014); Telephone Interview with Karin Marchetti-Ponte, Me.
Coast Heritage Tr. (Dec. 12, 2014). But see E-mail from Ann Taylor Schwing, Of Counsel, Best Best
& Krieger LLP, Board Member, Past President, Land Tr. of Napa Cty. (Dec. 2, 2014).
166. Cheever & Owley, supra note 162.
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prospective holder could purchase options along a number of potential mi-
gration pathways intending only to purchase conservation easements along
one pathway as the actual migration pattern emerges. Similarly, a land
trust committed to preserving coastal habitats, aware that sea level will rise
(but unable to determine how far and how storm surge will affect the coast)
might purchase options across a broad zone of potential future shoreline
habitat with the intent to eventually purchase conservation easements to
create new shoreline habitat preserves and storm buffers once she has
learned enough to know where that shoreline will be.
Real estate options generally allow investing parties to mitigate risks
associated with a lack of knowledge about the future by granting the right
to purchase without the requirement to purchase now. In the face of cli-
mate change, options to purchase conservation easements can provide a
variety of potential benefits.
First, options provide conservation organizations time to marshal
funding or arrange government acquisition. If conservation organizations
acquire options in areas where conservation easements might mitigate ex-
treme weather events, land trusts could use post-disaster funding to exer-
cise the options. This would put in place property-based protections to pre-
serve natural resources and protect against future extreme weather events.
Land subject to predictable flooding or fire could be preserved undevel-
oped subject to conservation easements purchased with disaster-relief
money. In particularly disaster-prone areas, funds released after the first
flood or fire could be used to purchase conservation-easement options.
Second, land trusts sometimes purchase conservation easements
preemptively, even when there is no obvious threat of development, but
their ability to control actual development is limited to terms negotiated
before the threat materialized. Options can protect against future threats of
development without these complications. Once the threat emerges, the
option can be exercised with terms that better anticipate the actual devel-
opment threat. Should the land no longer be valuable for conservation, the
organization has no obligation to exercise the option.
Third, land-conservation organizations might use options in conjunc-
tion with conservation leases or fixed-term conservation easements, allow-
ing organizations to determine whether perpetual protection of the land is
warranted during or after the option term. For example, a conservation or-
ganization might lease a parcel of land for fifty years to preserve its habitat
values. In conjunction with the lease, the landowner could grant the organ-
ization an option to purchase a perpetual conservation easement on the
parcel with an option period coterminous with the lease, thus ensuring that
the land is protected for fifty years while reserving the right to determine
whether the land should continue to be protected in perpetuity.
Fourth, options may tip the balance of power in favor of the option
holder and, therefore, can be used to counter misconduct by ostensible
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conservation partners who fail to fulfill their conservation obligations.'67
For example, a county might grant an option to purchase a conservation
easement o a private conservation organization to serve as a deterrent for
government conduct inconsistent with the original conservation pur-
pose.1 68 Rather than sue a public agency for its conduct, the private con-
servation organization could exercise the preexisting option to constrain
the conservation land at a below-market price.
3. Contractual Payments
Rather than acquiring fee title or a conservation easement, conserva-
tion organizations might consider paying landowners for proconservation
management practices uch as habitat restoration or practices to reduce
soil runoff. The central idea behind such contracts is the concept of pay-
ment for ecosystem services. "[E]cosystem services are components of na-
ture, directly enjoyed, consumed, or used to yield human well-being."l 6 9
The environment provides goods (e.g., timber) and services (e.g., water
filtration), and payments can help ensure the continued delivery of those
good and services.
Land-conservation organizations could pay landowners to undertake
proconservation management practices such as removing invasive species,
engaging in techniques to reduce erosion, or protecting a scenic view.1 70
A glance at the text of a standard conservation easement generally shows
a list of ecosystem services that the land is providing-wildlife habitat,
scenic view, water filtration, flood management, etc. While the exact dol-
lar figures are often subject to debate, these services are quantifiable and
conservation organizations could compensate landowners for providing
them. Such payment plans can enable conservation organization to influ-
ence landowner behavior without acquiring a formal interest in the land.
Indeed, the IPCC specifically identifies payments for ecosystem services
as a potential climate change adaptation tool.17 1
167. PATRICIA L. PREGMON & ANDY LOZA, PURCHASE OPTIONS: GAINING THE RIGHT WITHOUT
THE OBLIGATION TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY INTERESTS 14 (2013), http://conservationtools-produc-
tion.s3.amazonaws.com/library itemfiles/1213/1110/CTPurchaseOption l 30429.pdf.
168. Cheever & Owley, supra note 162, at 24-25.
169. James Boyd & Spencer Banzhaf, What Are Ecosystem Services? The Needfor Standardized
Environmental Accounting Units, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 616, 619 (2007).
170. D. EVAN MERCER ET AL., TAKING STOCK: PAYMENTS FOR FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011); Takacs & Owley, supra note 39, at 78-80; Barton H. Thompson Jr.,
EcoFarming: A Realistic Vision for the Future ofAgriculture?, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1167, 1184-85
(2011).
171. FIELD ET AL., supra note 119, at 26.
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture employs this strategy on a large
scale. Its Conservation Reserve Program pays farmers to undertake con-
servation efforts on their land.172 More specifically, farmers receive pay-
ments in exchange for maintaining certain vegetative cover. 173 This pro-
gram focuses on soil conservation and encourages native grasses and other
plantings that reduce soil erosion while supporting healthy ecosystems.
1 7 4
These types of payment plans can enable conservation organizations
to influence landowner behavior without acquiring a formal property in-
terest in the land. The conservation organizations, moreover, can modify
the nature of the requirements or the payments over time to adapt to cli-
mate change. Contracts are more easily changeable than property interests
or even regulations. Thus, conservation organizations might pay landown-
ers to engage in specific management practices that increase the resilience
of their land in the face of climate change or even pay landowners to allow
the conservation organizations to undertake those management practices.
This tool might be particularly helpful in areas where conservation
easements are hard-perhaps where landowners are resistant to encumber-
ing their land or where multiple landowners make a conservation easement
difficult. Unsurprisingly, it is a key conservation tool in countries where
conservation easements are not legally an option.175 It could also be useful
in an area with changing laws or regulations. For example, where a state
law to protect wetlands is pending but not yet in force, land trusts might
choose to pay landowners to protect wetlands for a short period while the
law is put in place. Organizations must remember, however, that such con-
tracts come with similar burdens to conservation easements as the parties
to the contract must be vigilant to ensure compliance with the contract's
terms.
4. Term Conservation Easements
Where a conservation easement is still the tool of choice, a nonper-
petual conservation easement may fit conservation needs better than a per-
manent one. Without a change in the federal tax code, a donation of a term
conservation easement will not qualify for deduction as a charitable con-
tribution.176 State laws, however, generally authorize term conservation
172. Conservation Research Program, NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV.,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/?cid=stelprdbl041269 (last vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2018). For a general description of governmental programs that encourage the protection
of ecosystem services on private agricultural lands, see Thompson, supra note 170, at 1187-92.
173. Thompson, supra note 170, at 1187-89.
174. Conservation Research Program, supra note 172. The Conservation Reserve Program has
also made extensive use of conservation easements.
175. See, e.g., DAVID TAKACS, CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL, FOREST CARBON: LAW +
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2009) (discussing Costa Rica as an early adopter of this approach); James Salz-
man et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309,
323-24 (2001).
176. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2012).
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easements.177 Among the advantages of shorter duration conservation
easement is the opportunity for the holder to be clear at the outset of a
transaction about specific goals without needing to plan for long-term en-
vironmental fluctuations. It also limits the holder's commitment to a piece
of property. A short-term conservation easement may also be available at
a lower price.
Perhaps the ideal situation for the use of a defined-term conservation
easement is a property understood to be important as a transitional habitat,
but not likely to be important after a known term. The longer the term is,
of course, the closer to the cost of a perpetual conservation easement he
price is likely to be.178 A twenty-year term conservation easement, depend-
ing on the discount rate, may cost as much as a permanent conservation
easement. Therefore, cost advantages for defined-term conservation ease-
ments will exist only in specialized situations. But, as stated above, they
nonetheless have the benefit of clearly defining the purposes of the con-
servation easement and the long-term intentions of the holder.179 Addition-
ally, term conservation easements can provide a holder with desirable flex-
ibility to change the restrictions after a certain term of years or to manage
stewardship obligations. Holders can modify their stewardship rights and
responsibilities by negotiating a new term conservation easement, or ter-
minate them by letting the conservation easement expire.
Given the limitations of climate modeling, a defined-term conserva-
tion easement with an option to renew may be a more broadly applicable
variation. If the option to renew can be exercised simply by paying a sum
of money, a defined-term conservation easement with an option to renew
can allow a conservation organization full power to renew or not depend-
ing on ecological need. Landowners may be willing to enter into such con-
servation easements more because they acknowledge that in the face of
changing conditions conservation use of a particular parcel may make
sense for a time, but may eventually not be the best use of the land.so
Landowners will be even more likely to respond favorably to an option
that both the owner and the holder must affirmatively exercise. But if the
land is likely to be under any sort of pressure for development, the land
177. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2007) (provid-
ing that a conservation easement is unlimited in duration "unless the instrument creating it provides
otherwise").
178. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Symposium, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 708-09 (2007).
179. See Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End ofPerpet-
ual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 163-70 (2011) (describing advantages and
drawbacks of renewable term conservation easements).
1 80. Ashley D. Miller et al., Factors Impacting Agricultural Landowners' Willingness to Enter
into Conservation Easements: A Case Study, 24 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 65, 69-70 (2010). But see
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of Future
Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 617-18 (2004) (explaining why landowners who are inter-




trust must consider the possibility that the agreement will prove no more
protective than the length of the existing term.
5. Moving Conservation Easements
Recognizing that the most important land for conservation can
change in response to changes in sea level, habitat, and the like, conserva-
tion organizations might evaluate the possibility of designing conservation
easements that move in response to climate conditions. An example is a
rolling easement along a shoreline that shifts as the high water mark shifts.
A "moving" conservation easement may be possible without chang-
ing state conservation-easement law, and may even preserve federal de-
ductibility. With the agreement of a willing landowner (or owners), all of
the potentially relevant land could be put under conservation easement,
with specific restrictions applicable to the land that presently require such
restrictions to meet specific environmental goals, and broader restrictions
on the rest of the acreage. These broader restrictions would be akin to the
restrictions in an open space agriculture easement ("maintain the land's
suitability for agricultural use" becomes "maintain the land's suitability to
accommodate the ecological purposes now being served by the more spe-
cifically restricted land"). As in other conservation easements, the land-
owner could reserve uses and building envelopes in appropriate locations
as needed on the property so long as such reservations do not interfere with
the suitability of the entire conserved area for the designated federally
qualifying conservation purpose.
With those baseline provisions, the conservation easement could in-
clude a "moving target" provision that allows the holder to apply the spe-
cific restrictions to land subject to the broader restrictions described above
(and revert previously specifically restricted land to the more general re-
striction regime) if ecologically indicated.
The Treasury Department is, for defensible reasons, not enthusiastic
about terms that allow such flexibility. The argument for allowing it is that
the conservation gain-and conservation is the reason that despite the
"partial interest rule" deductions are allowed for conservation ease-
ments-outweighs the administrative burden of allowing such provisions.
Any conservation easement drafted to permit this kind of modification
should address, in its terms, the likely need for an appraisal to document
that no private benefit is conferred when the moving easement provision
is invoked.
As to existing precedent, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in BC Ranch II, L.P. v Commissioner18 1 found that a less exacting provi-
sion than the moving conservation easements described here did not render
181. 867 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2017).
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a conservation easement nondeductible.182 On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit disqualified a conservation easement with an only slightly more
flexible provision in Belk v. Commissioner.183 A key difference in the two
cases is that the Belk conservation easement allowed the modification to
extend beyond the originally protected area, and allowed removal of re-
strictions from land that was originally protected.184 The moving conser-
vation easement we describe above has neither of those problems. All
lands originally restricted remain under restriction. The only change per-
missible is to make some areas that are originally under strict ecologically
based restrictions move into a general restriction status, while generally
restricted lands replace them as more ecologically restricted.
Among the arguments for allowing deductibility of moving conser-
vation easements is that the base restrictions alone meet the federal re-
quirements for a "qualified conservation contribution." One could judge
the moving target provisions just as reserved rights are judged: if the right
can exist consistent with the conservation purpose, and is appropriately
governed, it will not destroy deductibility. In the case of moving target
provisions, governance comprises administration solely by the entity
charged with maintaining the conservation values, an even stricter stand-
ard than the one upheld in BC Ranch II.
6. Tradable Conservation Easements
A related idea is the "tradable conservation easement": conservation
easements that, by agreement from the outset between a landowner and
conservation-easement holder, can be terminated at any point so long as
the assets generated in the process of removing the restrictions are rein-
vested within a defined period in another conservation easement that meets
the same conservation values.'8 ' Tradable conservation easements could
provide greater flexibility when, in the face of climate change, a restricted
parcel ceases to effectively serve the conservation purposes to which the
restrictions were devoted. It may be good policy to make it easier for par-
ties to such a conservation easement o provide in advance for the possi-
bility, in carefully defined circumstances, of recovering the conservation
investment represented by the conservation easement and re-deploying it
a new location that better serves underlying conservation purposes.
182. Id. at 554.
183. 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014); id. at 226.
184. Id. at 223-24.
185. W. William Weeks, A Tradable Conservation Easement for Vulnerable Conservation Ob-
jectives, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 235-36 (2011).
186. Id. at 233-35. An argument can be made for encouraging freely tradable conservation ease-
ments upon advance agreement of the parties in cases in which a tax deduction has not been claimed.
Policing such trading to protect the conservation investment inherent in a federally-deductible conser-
vation investment may be asking too much of an already overburdened IRS.
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Organizations that purchase conservation easements (rather than ac-
cepting them as a gift) may wish negotiate broad flexibility to amend, ex-
tinguish, or trade the conservation easement o respond to climate change
or other changed conditions. A purchaser taking such a negotiating posi-
tion is only limited by (1) what the seller will agree to and (2) any re-
strictions on gifts or appropriations solicited to fund the easement pur-
chase.187
Tradable conservation easements are not a good bet under present
law if a tax deduction is at stake. Indeed, for any drafter of conservation
easements not looking to test the Fourth Circuit's Belk conclusion in a dif-
ferent circuit, tradable conservation easements are a nonstarter because
protecting different land is inherent in the idea of trading. On the other
hand, the current tax regulations make it clear that "the conservation pur-
pose can nonetheless be treated as protected in perpetuity" if it is "impos-
sible or impractical" to achieve the conservation purposes of the conser-
vation easement, the restrictions are "extinguished by judicial proceed-
ing," and the proceeds of a subsequent sale of the unrestricted property are
used "in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original
contribution."'8 8 This cy pres of the tax regulations therefore recognizes
that there are circumstances that fully justify abandoning a site that was
once protected by restrictions "granted in perpetuity."'89 The Internal Rev-
enue Code itself is even friendlier to the concept of tradability. While only
"a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the
real property" is a "qualified real property interest," the purpose of the
conservation-easement deduction is not to protect real property, but to pro-
mote conservation.'9 0 It isn't surprising, therefore, that a characteristic of
a qualified conservation contribution is that it is "exclusively for conser-
vation purposes."l91 And while the Code specifies (whatever the circuit
court in Belk perceived) that the real property subject to the conservation
restriction be protected in perpetuity, it also specifies that a restriction will
be treated as perpetual if the conservation purpose is protected in perpetu-
ity.192
7. Flexible Reserves
Another option might be the creation of large flexible reserves for the
protection of biodiversity.193 One or more conservation organizations
187. Some sellers will argue that the holder of the tradable conservation easement must agree to
protect the specific land originally under conservation easement, despite receiving a fair-market-value
payment for the easement.
188. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (2009).
189. Id. § 1.170A-14(b)(2).
190. S. REP. No. 96-1007, at 8-10 (1980).
191. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(c) (2018).
192. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(a).
193. Lee Hannah & Lara Hansen, Designing Landscapes and Seascapes for Change, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY 329, 338-39 (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah eds., 2005).
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might create a landscape-scale reserve in which the protections afforded
to any particular area is dynamic over time. As conditions change, and
species and habitats move, the level and type of protection applicable to
any portion of the reserve also would change. For example, one area of the
reserve might initially be open to agriculture but then restored to native
habitat in a shifting mosaic of habitat.
New conservation tools such as the habitat credit tradingl94 or reverse
auctions for ecological outcomesl95 are designed to achieve adaptive spa-
tially and temporally significant landscape-scale conservation through
participation from private landowners. Specifically, the Environmental
Defense Fund's (EDF's) Habitat Exchange program allows developers to
offset their impacts on habitat and species by purchasing credits generated
through conservation actions of private landowners.196 The Habitat Ex-
change is performance-based and allows transfer of the habitat credits in
time and space to flexibly meet the ecological outcomes specified at the
onset of the program.197 Similarly, reverse auctions allow for conservation
outcomes to be achieved by private landowners in space and time as
needed.'98 For example, the BirdReturns programl9 uses predictive mod-
els of bird abundances and water availability to pinpoint habitat needs for
migratory birds over the migration season, and uses a reverse auction to
make habitat investments based on the availability, quality, and cost of
habitat offered by farmers through a competitive bidding process on an
annual basis.2 0 0 The BirdReturns program pays farmers to flood their fields
at certain times of the year to provide habitat for migratory birds.20 1 Both
of these programs are temporally and spatially dynamic, incentive-based
approaches that provide economic opportunity for private landowners
while delivering scientifically robust outcomes for conservation.
194. See generally Todd Gartner, Habitat Credit Trading, PERC REP., Spring 2010, at 24, 24-25.
195. See generally Gary Stoneham et al., Auctions for Conservation Contracts: An Empirical
Examination of Victoria's Bush Tender Trial 5 (June 2002) (unpublished paper) (presented at the 46th
Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, Canberra, Aus-
tralia), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/1 74043/2/Stoneham.pdf
196. Habitat Exchanges: How Do They Work?, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/ecosys-
tems/habitat-exchanges-how-do-they-work (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
197. See id.; State of Nevada Conservation Credit System, ENVTL. INCENTIVES PERFORMANCE
PLATFORM, https://www.enviroaccounting.com/NVCreditSystem/Program/Home (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
198. See Stoneham et al., supra note 195.
199. See California: Migratory Birds, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/ourini-
tiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/califomia/howwework/california-migratory-birds.xml (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018). BirdReturns is a partnership between California Rice Commission, Cornell Lab
of Ornithology, Point Blue Conservation Science, and The Nature Conservancy.
200. Id.; Seema Jayachandran, Using the Airbnb Model to Protect the Environment, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/business/economy/airbnb-protect-environ-
ment.html (discussing the BirdReturns program).




D. Enhancing Conservation Easement Terms
While the previous Section highlighted alternatives to conservation
easements, in many situations conservation easements will still be the tool
of choice. Conservation organizations can more thoughtfully draft their
conservation easements though, and this Section outlines some considera-
tions for conservation easement terms.
The specificity of conservation easements has evolved over time.
Thirty years ago, many conservation easements were brief and vague.
Over time, conservation easements have become longer, more detailed,
and more specific about resources protected, remedies in the event of vio-
lation, and dozens of other eventualities.202 Conservation easements have
also become better tailored to the particular land being protected. In our
interviews, a number of conservation organizations reported that the
guidelines of the Land Trust Alliance have encouraged these trends.
Conservation organizations should ensure that the terms of conserva-
tion easements enable the holder to adapt to climate change successfully.
In particular, conservation organizations should incorporate climate
change into their conservation easement purposes; provide for biophysical
monitoring; address the issue of authority to manage for climate risks and
stresses; anticipate and address responses to changed conditions; and au-
thorize appropriate amendments. A provision requiring the preparation of
a management plan with a limited term and a defined protocol for updates
may provide an especially useful means of providing for flexibility over
time.
In the Six-State Study, conservation organizations expressed strong
faith in their existing conservation easements. Over seventy percent of the
interviewees reported that their existing conservation easements have
"enough flexibility to adapt to changing environmental and climatic con-
ditions," while only fourteen percent expressed concern about the flexibil-
ity of their existing conservation easements.2 03 Our review of the specific
terms of conservation easements, however, suggests that conservation or-
ganizations might be overly optimistic and that they could take steps to
provide conservation-oriented options for adaptation.
Over eighty percent of the organizations we interviewed in the Six-
State Study reported that their organization's approach to drafting conser-
vation easements had changed over time. Climate change will require fur-
ther evolution in the development of conservation easements. Table 3 lists
design considerations for conservation easement terms under climate
change.
202. Owley & Rissman, supra note 17, at 83.
203. Rissman et al., supra note 17, at 72.
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Conservation ease- Design approach for balancing durability
ment terms and adaptability
Purposes Broad purposes to ensure permanence, paired
with specific targets to improve fit with goals
and the property
Land use re- Specific restrictions with narrow options for
strictions change that enhance conservation purposes
Biophysical moni- Conservation easement holder has the right to
toring terms and monitor biophysical conditions
baseline documen- ..
Baseline documentation includes biophysical
tation
assessment
Affirmative man- Conservation easement holder has the right to
agement terms conduct limited active management such as in-
vasive species removal
Mechanisms for Amendment term, management plan, excep-
change in general tions with consent, third-party certification, ter-
mination and condemnation clauses
Mechanisms for Management plans are written before land-
change: manage- owner is paid for the conservation easement
ment plans Management plan terms are written to be en-
forceable
Mechanisms for Include an amendment clause that identifies
change: amend- narrow circumstances in which an amendment
ment will be considered, preserves conservation pur-
poses, limits scope of permissible amendments
in cases in which a tax deduction is sought, and
gives holders the right to decline to agree for
any reason or for no stated reason
Table 3: Design Considerations for Conservation-Easement Terms
Under Changing Conditions
1. Purposes
To start, drafters of new conservation easements should incorporate
climate change considerations into the purpose section. Several of the con-
servation easements we studied did so explicitly. One conservation ease-
ment, for example, specifically recognizes that climate change "may sig-
nificantly alter the ecosystems" on the land, and the conservation-ease-
ment documents the intent of the parties "to adapt to changes to the eco-
systems and its associated species over time."204 The purposes of another
204. Conservation easement documents and survey results on file with authors.
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conservation easement in the Study refer to "adjacent public and private
lands" and the role the conserved land is to play in helping those lands
"remain healthy and viable in the face of future changes to the climate or
ecology of the area."205
In many cases, parties to the conservation easement will wish to de-
clare that they intend the encumbrance to remain in place even if the land-
scape changes. Such a provision would be useful if the parties later need
to persuade a court not to extinguish a conservation easement in which the
natural features of the land have been significantly altered or compromised
by climate-related effects.
Purpose-clause drafting could also serve as a forcing mechanism for
a more probing inquiry by the parties into the effect climate change may
have on the conservation-easement's objectives and the parties' conse-
quent intentions. For example, the parties could declare that, whatever the
specific effect of climate change, the terms of the conservation easement
should be interpreted in a way that will most effectively preserve the val-
ues they designed the conservation easement to protect. Conversely, the
parties could specify that if the described conservation values of the con-
servation easement are seriously compromised by changing climate con-
ditions, other named or general conservation objectives will (or will not)
replace the original purposes of the conservation easement.
In addition to specifying their intentions with respect to the principal
conservation objectives, the parties might expand the purpose statement's
recitation of objectives to include a hierarchy of purposes-naming antic-
ipated secondary and tertiary objectives that the conservation easement
should be interpreted to protect if it is impracticable to maintain the prin-
cipal purposes. If it is indeed the parties' view that the land should be de-
voted to conservation generally, whatever ecological changes occur, the
conservation-easement purpose statement should include language that
states that in the event that none of the stated conservation objectives can
be met, the conservation easement should be interpreted to protect any vi-
able conservation purpose, from outdoor recreation and education to open
space. Doing so would be consistent with most or all state laws. The
UCEA, for example, authorizes conservation purposes that are even more
general than those recited in the tax code. UCEA conservation easements
can seek to maintain or enhance air or water quality, or protect "cultural
aspects of real property."206
Sound judgment regarding any broadening of purposes requires
awareness of the implications. Given the expense of monitoring, mainte-
nance, and conservation-easement defense, land trusts with purposes nar-
rower than general conservation may wish to draft purpose clauses that
narrow their monitoring, maintenance, and defense obligations. The
205. Conservation easement documents and survey results on file with authors.
206. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2007).
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drafter of such terms should consider the deductibility risk of too aggres-
sively sidestepping the conservation-easement s ewardship implications of
the broad "any conservation purpose" standard for extinguishment in the
federal tax regulations.2 07
2. Land-Use Restrictions
Well-drafted conservation easements often include specific terms re-
lating to land use and alteration, water management, response to invasive
species, introduction of exotic species, and amendments of the terms of
the conservation easement. In an age of changing climate, good drafting
of conservation easements requires addressing each of those subjects, and
others, with climate change in mind. For example, does a full prohibition
on altering the natural flow of water on the property continue to make
sense when the future may hold fewer but more intense precipitation
events? As species ranges move, what constitutes an exotic species? What
should management erms prescribe when managing new invasive species
may become a concern in an altered climate?
In a world of climate change, tension .between the desire to protect
the values of the land and the desire to protect the enforceability of con-
servation easements is leading conservation organizations to two schools
of thought about how specific new conservation easements' land-use re-
strictions should be. Some conservation organizations asserted that simple
conservation easements with few specific provisions will be sturdier and
more likely enforceable in the face of unpredictable change.208 Others ar-
gue that detailed conservation easements, which allow the land to be man-
aged to prevent threats from change, are, to the extent of the drafter's fore-
-209sight, wiser.
3. Affirmative Management Terms
Climate change adaptation often demands active, affirmative man-
agement by conservation organizations.210 While conservation easements
are generally characterized as negative easements (giving holders the right
to prevent possessory landowners from engaging in certain activities),
state conservation-easement statutes typically do not bar conservation-
easement erms that convey to the conservation-easement holder the right
to actively manage protected land. Among the likely effects of climate
change are increases in disturbances such as new and sometimes invasive
species, plant and animal diseases, insect infestations, extended droughts,
catastrophic weather, windthrow, and fire. Conservation organizations
will often find it valuable to obtain the affirmative right to enter the lands
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) (2009).
208. We conducted seventy-three interviews with land conservation professionals from sixty-
three different land conservation organizations. Interview notes are on file with the authors.
209. Interview notes are on file with the authors.
210. Mawdsley et al., supra note 2, at 1081; Heller & Zavaleta, supra note 8, at 29.
774 [Vol. 95:3
CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES
to remove native and non-native invasive species, to treat plant communi-
ties for disease or insect infestation, and/or to mitigate the effects of ex-
treme weather and disturbance events. Seventy percent of interviewees
said active land management was important for meeting their organiza-
tion's goals. Yet, only fifty percent of the conservation easements re-
viewed in the Six-State Study give the conservation organization the right
to conduct any type of active land management. Furthermore, many of
these were narrowly construed rights, for instance to conduct trail mainte-
nance. With landowner agreement, of course, conservation organizations
could conduct active management even without affirmative rights speci-
fied in the conservation easement itself.
4. Mechanisms for Change in Conservation-Easement Terms
The Six-State study revealed four primary mechanisms for changing
land management in conservation easements: (a) management plans, (b)
amendment erms, (c) exceptions with consent, and (d) third-party certifi-
cation.
a. Management Plans
Conservation easements with enforceable rules to restrict develop-
ment, property subdivision, and other incompatible land uses in a range of
future conditions can be coupled with detailed adaptive resource-manage-
ment plans that authorize land management and can be updated as condi-
tions change.
Resource-management plans with regular updates are the most com-
mon approach to land management on public lands and through private
land-incentive programs. The implementation of land-management plans
varies widely, so they can be informational, regulatory, incentivizing, or
encouraging (as policy carrots, sticks, or sermons).2 11 Provisions of re-
source-management plans are easier to amend than the provisions of con-
servation easements; indeed such plans can incorporate agreements for pe-
riodic revision. Management plans also can more easily incorporate spe-
cific resource-management regimes responsive to landscape changes.
Close to half (forty-six percent) of the conservation easements examined
in the Six-State Study provide for some sort of resource-management
212
plan. Only a handful of these conservation easements, however, provide
for management plans that address land use broadly; most focus on a par-
213
ticular use such as forestry, farming, or grazing. Conservation organiza-
tions should consider providing for broad management plans in future con-
servation easements. Conservation organizations also should consider
211. Vilis Brukas & Ola Salinas, Forest Management Plan as a Policy Instrument: Stick, Carrot
or Sermon?, 29 LAND USE POL'Y 605, 607-08 (2012).




working with landowners to develop resource-management plans even for
conservation easements that currently do not explicitly require such plans.
While management plans can provide valuable flexibility and direc-
tion in the face of climate change, the process for writing, updating, and
enforcing these plans matters. Where appropriate, conservation easements
should incorporate management plans by reference so that everyone (in-
cluding courts, subsequent landowners, and other interested organizations)
is aware of the existence of the plans and the need for periodic revision.
Resource-management plans can sometimes be difficult to finalize,214 so
parties should finalize management plans when drafting conservation
easements or before releasing all funds to the landowner.
However, conservation organizations must avoid using management
plans to delay decision making where parties struggle to agree on conser-
vation-easement terms. In addition, the obvious risk that the parties will
never come to agreement on key points, deferring key conservation-ease-
ment decisions in favor of agreeing to later develop a management plan
can make it hard for members of the public or government entities to un-
derstand the conservation lands in their jurisdiction fully, potentially ham-
pering enforcement or coordinated land-conservation efforts. Even updat-
ing management plans may be challenging in the face of disagreement be-
tween the landowner and the conservation-easement holder. Making a
land-management plan work requires clear guidance on how to resolve
disputes between the landowner and conservation-easement holder, and it
may benefit from ongoing incentives or consequences. Many management
plans do not explicitly say how disagreements will be resolved in the de-
velopment of a plan, so these processes need to be well-explained. In all
cases, the conservation-easement holder should have the right to approve
the management plan, preferably in its sole discretion. Though there seems
to be little reason to doubt the enforceability of a management plan
properly entered into and incorporated by reference in the conservation
easement, the enforceability of an incorporated-by-reference management
plan has not, it appears, been tested yet in court.
b. Amendments
Two-thirds of the conservation easements in the Six-State Study in-
clude an amendment provision, meaning that approximately one-third do
not. On balance, we think conservation easements intended to encumber
property for more than twenty years-and perhaps all conservation ease-
215ments-should include well-drafted amendment clauses. Such clauses
214. Adena R. Rissman, Designing Perpetual Conservation Agreementsfor Land Management,
63 RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 167, 172 (2010).
215. See Rissman et al., supra note 17, at 72. Some drafters have decided not to include amend-
ment clauses on the theory that including them suggests to the owner of the underlying fee that the
restrictions in the conservation easement are perpetually negotiable. The better response to that prob-
lem is to draft an amendment clause that identifies the circumstances in which an amendment will be
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should provide that amendment requires the agreement of both the conser-
vation-easement holder and the landowner. They should also require the
protection of the conservation values, and they should prohibit private ben-
efit. To discourage the owner of the underlying fee-and especially suc-
cessor owners who did not participate in the original transfer and thus are
often less committed to it-from seeking leave to loosen conservation re-
strictions, many drafters make it clear that the conservation-easement
holder may decline a proposed amendment for any reason or no stated rea-
son.
Amendment clauses are essential in real estate instruments designed
to burden property for long periods. The IRS, however, conscious of the
imminent closing of a window of opportunity for protecting the public's
investment in conservation easements (the three-year statute of limitations
for challenging income-tax returns) is paying close attention to amend-
ment provisions in conservation easements. An amendment clause that
would permit abandonment of the conservation commitment to an identi-
fiable parcel of property is likely to result in an IRS declaration that he
donation of the conservation easement does not qualify for deduction as a
charitable contribution.216
Amendment clauses in donated conservation easements, and espe-
cially those intended to qualify for tax deduction, ought to prohibit the
removal of property from the protection of the conservation easement un-
less the achievement of conservation objectives is impossible or impracti-
cable.217 Assuming that the IRS can be persuaded to make it clear that a
well-drafted amendment clause does not automatically disqualify a do-
nated conservation easement from eligibility for deduction,2 18 amend-
ments can be an important tool for providing the flexibility required for
protecting the conservation values a conservation easement is intended to
protect in the face of climate change. An amendment provision, for exam-
ple, could clarify that changes to administrative or management provisions
are allowable where the changes o would enhance protection of the con-
servation values.
considered, and as stated in the body of this Article, gives the holder the clear right to decline to agree
to an amendment for any reason or for no stated reason.
216. See Belk v. Comm'r, 774 F.3d 221, 227-28 (4th Cir. 2014).
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) (2009); see also Carpenter v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH)
1001 (2012), aff'd, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 62 (2013) (deciding on donated easements as restricted gifts);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 414(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000); Belk, 744 F.3d at 225-27.
218. See Treas. Reg. § 170(h)(1)-(2); id § 1.170A-14. Neither the tax code nor the regulations
specifically address amendment clauses in conservation easements. Hard-line opponents of amend-
ments in tax-deductible conservation easements find support in the previously cited requirement that
restrictions in a qualified conservation contribution must be "granted in perpetuity."
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c. Third-Party Certification and References to External Laws
and Policies
One way that conservation organizations can incorporate change into
their conservation easements is to require compliance with external laws,
regulations, or certification programs. Requiring compliance with certain
laws or policies automatically updates conservation-easement require-
ments when legislatures amend those policies.
For example, some of the conservation easements in our Wisconsin
sample required that the landowner have a management plan meeting the
requirements of the state Department of Natural Resources Managed For-
est Law or Forest Crop Law program. Thus, as the state program changes,
the requirements of those conservation easements will be updated. In fact,
the Wisconsin legislature did change the law in 2016 to lessen the require-
ments for public access.219 Duncan Greene encourages the use of similar
terms for agricultural lands, linking conservation-easements erms to reg-
ularly updated external standards instead of prescribing specific agricul-
220tural practices.
A similar approach works for linking conservation-easement terms to
third-party certification programs. This likely works best in the context of
working landscapes where one can require things like organic agricultural
practices or sustainable forestry operations. For example, if a forest land-
owner is required to comply with Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) cer-
tification221 under the terms of the conservation easement, rules governing
the use of the conservation easement will vary if FSC alters its certification
rules. Indeed, some land trusts might be interested in requiring third-party
certification because it may generate another potential monitor of the con-
servation easement. That is, if FSC has to monitor the landscape to ensure
that a working forest is meeting sustainability standards, it may ease the
pressure on land trust staff to make such findings and enable them to forgo
such frequent monitoring.
Tracking a conservation easement o external standards like this has
its benefits in allowing updating of the agreement but also puts terms of
the agreement outside of the control of the conservation-easement
222holder. What happens if an external source lessens its restrictions when
219. Lee Bergquist, Scott Walker Signs Law Changing Managed Forest Program, MILWAUKEE-
Wis. J. SENTINEL (Apr. 14, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/scott-walker-signs-
law-changing-managed-forest-program-b99707014zl-375758221.html.
220. Greene, supra note 12, at 915-16 (also suggesting that a "periodically updated management
or conservation plan-prepared by a qualified agricultural consultant and approved by a conservation
district or advisory board" could meet the needs of dynamic land conservation).
221. Certification, FSC, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/certification (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
222. Adena Rissman et al., Land Management Restrictions and Options for Change in Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 52 ENvTL. MGMT. 277, 278 (2013).
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a conservation easement holder would hope to strengthen them? Conser-
vation organizations must clearly detail what will occur should a conflict
between an external source and internal requirements arise.
CONCLUSION
Climate change poses significant challenges to the conservation com-
munity. To address them successfully, conservation organizations must
begin by understanding the climate change risks to their goals and proper-
ties. Organizations then must use that knowledge to decide which proper-
ties to protect; to build partnerships with other conservation groups; to
choose more effective tools; to write flexible and sustainable conservation
easements; and to conduct active, long-term stewardship of their lands.
With diligence and creativity, the conservation community can success-
fully meet the challenges of climate change.

MooRE v. TEXAS: THE CONTINUED QUEST FOR A
NATIONAL STANDARD
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has long held that certain types of sentences vio-
late the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Throughout the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it has
reiterated that excessive-punishment claims are informed by evolving
standards of decency. When the Court assesses a form of punishment un-
der the Eighth Amendment, it utilizes a two-part proportionality review.
This test requires the Court to first assess whether a national consensus has
formed against a particular type of punishment through an examination of
state legislation. If a national consensus exists, then the Court subjectively
contemplates whether it has reason to disagree with the legislative trend.
Consequently, a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if
the Court agrees with the national consensus.
In 2002, for the first time, the Supreme Court held that using capital
punishment on intellectually disabled offenders constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In its decision, the Court
provided little guidance and left to the states the autonomy to develop
standards for assessing intellectual disability in such cases. However, this
task proved problematic, demonstrated by the Court granting certiorari
twice in the past fifteen years to determine whether state standards adhere
to its 2002 holding.
In Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down Texas's proce-
dural standards for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases. Spe-
cifically, it held that Texas's use of seven evidentiary questions based
upon lay perceptions was unconstitutional because a national consensus
had formed against utilizing this type of subjective indicia to determine
intellectual disability. This Case Comment analyzes the Court's reasoning
behind its invalidation of Texas's standards, as well as the differences in
state procedures for determining intellectual disability. These variations in
state standards indicate that intellectually disabled offenders may be sub-
ject to the death penalty in some states but not in others depending on
where they are tried and sentenced. Finally, through the lens of the incor-
poration and equal protection doctrines, this Comment argues that the
Court should cease its search for national consensus when contemplating
the constitutionality of different state procedures and instead provide a
uniform test for determining intellectual disability in capital cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on its peo-
ple.' The Supreme Court of the United States began to place categorical
bans on certain types of punishment in the early twentieth century.2 These
prohibitions covered a wide array of sentences, such as the denaturaliza-
tion of natural-born citizens and the use of capital punishment for under-
age offenders.3 And while the types of punishments the Court has assessed
vary greatly, the underlying rationale of its analysis has remained stead-
fast: ensuring the government affords every individual the dignity that the
1. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Brittany Glid-
den, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is
Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1815 (2012).
2. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-13 (2002) (providing a broad overview of the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment-Rummel, Solem, and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DUKE L.J. 789,
798-99 (1984) (explaining that the Court first provided an in-depth discussion of the Eighth Amend-
ment in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-80 (1910)).
3. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005) (discussing the prohibition of
capital punishment for underage offenders); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion) (explaining that denaturalization of natural-born citizens is not an appropriate punishment).
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human race deserves.4 As Justice Stewart opined in Robinson v. Califor-
nia,5 "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold."6
In the 1980s, the Court first addressed whether the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the ex-
ecution of intellectually disabled offenders. While the Atkins v. Virginia
Court determined that this class of individuals are inherently less culpable
than those of average intelligence and therefore protected by the Eighth
Amendment, the Court provided each state with the autonomy to create its
own standards for enforcement.9 However, the Court has had to address
various states' chosen methodologies to ensure that they are not executing
the class of individuals the Court intended to protect.10 In Moore v.
Texas," the Court held that the Texas courts utilized an unconstitutional
test for determining intellectual disability in capital cases, effectively nar-
rowing a state's independence in creating its own Atkins standard.12 This
Case Comment first provides an overview of the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the use of capital punish-
ment for intellectually disabled offenders. Next, it provides a synopsis of
the Court's opinion in Moore. Finally, this Comment proposes that the
Court should cease its search for a national consensus on the procedural
standards of an Atkins claim and instead implement a national standard for
assessing intellectual disability in death penalty cases.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the past century, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive punishment has
evolved to reflect societal "standards of decency."'3 The Eighth Amend-
ment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 4 However,
as Justice Stevens noted in Atkins, the Court does not review claims of
excessive punishment "by the standards that prevailed in 1685 .. . or when
4. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
5. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
6. Id. at 667.
7. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
8. 536 U.S. 304.
9. See id at 317, 321; Natalie A. Pifer, The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins
v. Virginia, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1036, 1039 (2016).
10. See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986,
1993 (2014); see also Pifer, supra note 9, at 1036-37.
11. 137 S. Ct. 1039.
12. See id. at 1052-53.
13. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion)).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Justin F. Marceau, Un-incorporating the Bill of Rights: The
Tension Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modern
Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1287-88 (2008) (explaining that
the Court first incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states in Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)).
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the Bill of Rights was adopted."'5 Instead, it judges Eighth Amendment
claims through the lens of current societal standards of moral decency.'6
In the early 1900s, the Court declared "that it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense."7 Utilizing a proportionality review in Weems v. United States,
the Court held that being jailed in irons and forced to perform hard labor
was an excessive punishment for falsifying records.'9 In Weems, the Court
explained that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment continuously
evolves "as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."20
The Court has continued to "appl[y] this proportionality precept" in its
subsequent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.2'
In Trop v. Dulles,22 Chief Justice Warren explained that the "basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man" and that it "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."23 After Trop, the
Court fully articulated its two-part proportionality test for excessive-pun-
ishment claims.24 First, it looks to state legislation to assess whether a con-
sensus has formed in terms of societal values.25 The Court found that the
use of legislative judgment is necessary because "in 'a democratic society
legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and conse-
quently the moral values of the people."'2 6 If the Court determines that a
societal consensus exists, it then subjectively contemplates "whether there
is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators."27
15. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
16. Id. at 311-12.
17. Id. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910)); see Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: "Still in Search of
a Unifying Principle"?, 73 U. PITT. L. REv. 107, 119-20 (2011) (detailing the Court's reasoning in
Weems).
18. 217 U.S. 349.
19. Id. at 357, 366, 382; see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 17, at 118-19; Bruce J. Winick, The
Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the next Frontier,
50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 796 (2009).
20. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378; see Winick, supra note 19.
21. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
22. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
23. Id. at 100-01; Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are Circumvent-
ing Both the Letter and the Spirit of the Court's Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215, 219 (2008)
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01); see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 17, at 122.
24. Barger, supra note 23; see Lyn Entzeroth, Constitutional Prohibition on the Execution of
the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299, 303-04 (2002) (detailing the
Court's application of the two-part proportionality test to the facts of Trop).
25. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
26. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1056-57 (2017) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
175 (1976)).
27. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
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In Furman v. Georgia,28 the Court further narrowed the use of capital
punishment.29 The Court invalidated "the then-existing death penalty stat-
utes in effect around the country" because it found that these statutes vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.30 In
deciding the case, the Court took issue with Texas's discretionary capital
sentencing system, which provided jurors with "unrestricted discretion to
choose between a death sentence and alternative periods of confinement
for convicted capital offenders."31 This forced the Texas legislature to re-
assess its capital punishment statute, and in 1973, it enacted new provi-
sions to help guide jurors in capital cases.32 These new procedures man-
dated separate sentencing hearings where state courts provide the jury with
specific questions to help focus its decision.33
Just three years later in Jurek v. Texas,34 the Court upheld Texas's
post-Furman capital sentencing procedure.35 It explained that states must
allow jurors to perform a particularized assessment of both the crime com-
mitted and the individual defendant.36 Furthermore, the Court noted that
"a capital [punishment] sentencing system must allow the sentencer to
consider [both] mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances" to ensure
appropriately individualized sentencing.37 Because the Texas court al-
lowed juries to consider a wide array of factors when assessing a defend-
ant's potential for future violence, the Court held that the state's capital
sentencing procedures were constitutional.38
In 1986, the Court first declared a categorical ban against executing
certain individuals based on "class-wide characteristics."39 In Ford v.
Wainwright,40 Justice Marshall examined the history of capital punishment
for "insane" offenders, noting that "[t]oday, no State in the Union permits
the execution of the insane."4 1 He further observed that the Court "seri-
ously question[s] the retributive value of executing a person who has no
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 239-40; see Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders'
Post-Atkins Claims of Mental Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 6-7 (2011).
30. Entzeroth, supra note 24, at 304; see Tobolowsky, supra note 29.
31. Tobolowsky, supra note 29.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id.
34. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
35. Id. at 276; Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 9-10.
36. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 9.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 9-10.
39. Jonathan Greenberg, For Every Action There Is a Reaction: The Procedural Pushback
Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 227, 229, 229 n.16 (2012) (providing an over-
view of the Court's subsequent bans based on class-wide characteristics); see Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
40. 477 U.S. 399.
41. Id. at 408-09.
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comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his funda-
mental right to life." 42 Thus, the Court held that executing a mentally in-
sane individual violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment.4 3
Three years after declaring that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of insane offenders, the Court addressed the issue of executing
intellectually disabled criminals for the first time.4 In Penry v. Lynaugh,4
a jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to
death.4 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether
the jury had the opportunity to adequately consider the defendant's intel-
lectual capabilities and (2) whether executing an intellectually disabled of-
fender violated the Eighth Amendment.4 7 The Court overturned the de-
fendant's death sentence because the jury instructions did not clearly con-
vey that the jury could consider the defendant's intellectual disability as a
mitigating factor.48 However, the Court ultimately declined to extend an
Eighth Amendment's categorical ban on capital punishment of those of-
fenders with "mild" or "moderate" intellectual disability.49
Before the Court first addressed the appropriateness of capital pun-
ishment for intellectually disabled offenders in Penry, Georgia's execution
of Jerome Bowden garnered a great deal of public outcry.5 A jury sen-
tenced Bowden to death after he murdered a woman during a robbery.
The state scheduled his execution for June 18, 1986, but a Georgia court
52granted a stay to assess his mental competency. After Bowden underwent
testing, a state-hired psychologist concluded that Bowden's intelligence
quotient (IQ) was 65.5 And while the state psychologist's findings clearly
showed that Bowden suffered from intellectual disability, the Georgia
Board of Pardon and Paroles nevertheless lifted the stay the very same day
42. Id at 409.
43. Id at 409-10; see Greenberg, supra note 39, at 229.
44. See Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 3, 13.
45. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
46. Id. at 310; Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 11; see Mark Alan Ozimek, The Case for a More
Workable Standard in Death Penalty Jurisprudence. Atkins v. Virginia and Categorical Exemptions
Under the Imprudent "Evolving Standards of Decency" Doctrine, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 665-66
(2003).
47. Penry, 492 U.S. at 310; Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 11-13; see Ozimek, supra note 46,
at 666.
48. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 12; see Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reason-
ing: Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L.
REV. 327, 347-48 (2002).
49. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 14; see Pifer, supra note 9, at 1038.
50. Timothy R. Saviello, The Appropriate Standard of Prooffor Determining Intellectual Dis-
ability in Capital Cases: How High Is Too High?, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 168-69 (2015); see,
e.g., Associated Press, Retarded Man, 33, Electrocuted as Plea to High Court Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1986, at Al 6; United Press International, Killer Executed in Georgia; He Had an IQ of 65,
L.A. TIMES (June 24, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-24/news/mn-211961_iq-test.
51. Saviello, supra note 50, at 165-66.
52. Id. at 165.
53. Id.
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the psychologist performed the test.54 The state executed Bowden less than
twenty-four hours later.55 In 1988, Georgia became the first state to ban
the use of capital punishment against intellectually disabled offenders, in
56
part because of the extreme public reaction against Bowden's execution.
Seventeen states followed in Georgia's footsteps over the span of less than
fourteen years, illustrating that a national consensus had formed against
the practice.
A mere thirteen years after Penry, the Supreme Court revisited the
issue of executing intellectually disabled individuals in Atkins.58 In Atkins,
a Virginia state court convicted the defendant of abduction, robbery, and
capital murder.59 He was subsequently sentenced to death, despite the ev-
idence establishing that he had an IQ of 59.60 In reversing the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision, the Court effectively abrogated its decision in
Penry.61 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens first assessed the
trend in state legislation and found that eighteen states had enacted statutes
banning the execution of intellectually disabled individuals within four-
teen years.62 However, Justice Stevens noted that the number of states was
not as important as "the consistency of the direction of [the] change."63 In
weighing the proportionality of the defendant's sentence, the Court found
that executing intellectually disabled offenders does not further the peno-
logical aims of capital punishment.64 Because this class of individuals pos-
sess "diminished capacities to understand and process information,". the
Court reasoned that these offenders are less morally culpable than those
with average intelligence.65 Additionally, the Court reasoned that intellec-
tually disabled offenders have a higher risk of wrongful execution because
of the "possibility of false confessions" and a "lesser ability ... to make a
,,66
persuasive showing of mitigation.
54. Id; see also Brooke Amos, Atkins v. Virginia: Analyzing the Correct Standard and Exam-
ination Practices to Use when Determining Mental Retardation, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 469, 470
(explaining that the psychologist who administered Bowden's IQ test determined that Bowden "was
not mentally retarded enough to deserve clemency" because he had scored six points higher than his
originally measured IQ).
55. Saviello, supra note 50, at 165.
56. Id. at 168.
57. Id. at 169.
58. Hensleigh Crowell, The Writing Is on the Wall: How the Briseno Factors Create an Unac-
ceptable Risk ofExecuting Persons with Intellectual Disability, 94 TEX. L. REV. 743, 743-44 (2016).
59. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002); see Ozimek, supra note 46, at 668-70 (provid-
ing an in-depth discussion of the facts of Atkins).
60. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309; see Ozimek, supra note 46, at 670.
61. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
62. Id. at 314-15; see Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge ofImplement-
ing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adju-
dications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 812 (2007).
63. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; see Crowell, supra note 58, at 745.
64. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (noting that the penological goals of the death penalty include ret-
ribution and deterrence for potential offenders).
65. Id. at 318-19.
66. Id. at 320.
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While the Court's decision in Atkins established a categorical ban, it
left "to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction."67 This task proved problematic, and the Court
was faced with addressing Florida's standards for intellectual disability
twelve years after it decided Atkins. In Hall v. Florida,68 the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.69 Although the
defendant presented evidence of adaptive deficits and had an IQ of 71, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld the defendant's sentence.70
Florida's statutory definition of intellectual disability in capital cases
set a bright-line IQ cutoff of 70, which means that no defendant with an
IQ below 70 was eligible for the death penalty.7 ' Justice Kennedy rejected
Florida's standard, explaining that it did not adequately account for the
"inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test itself." 7 2 The Court held that states
must account for the clinically accepted standard error of measurement
(SEM) when considering an offender's IQ. 73 Although the Court reiterated
that states may implement their own definitions of intellectual disability,
it concluded that those definitions must be "informed by the views of med-
ical experts."74 A mere three years later in Moore, the Court attempted to
provide states with further guidance in crafting their own definitions of
intellectual disability.
II. MOORE V. TEXAS
A. Facts
On April 25, 1980, Bobby James Moore and two friends decided to
rob a supermarket. The group, carrying two of Moore's firearms, entered
the Birdsall Super Market in Houston, Texas.76 They immediately pro-
ceeded to the courtesy booth where two clerks, James McCarble and Edna
Scott, were stationed.77 The men approached the clerks and Moore shot
McCarble in the head, killing him instantly.7 8 Moore fled the scene and
police arrested him ten days later in Louisiana.7 9 After Moore provided
67. Id. at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)).
68. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
69. Id at 1990; Ashley Sachiko Wong, Aligning the Criminal Justice System with the Mental
Health Profession in Response to Hall v. Florida, 94 OR. L. REv. 425, 430-31 (2016).
70. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992; see Crowell, supra note 58, at 757.
71. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
72. Id. at 1995.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1998-2000; Crowell, supra note 58, at 757 (explaining that the Court held in Hall that
"state policies that deviate from clinical definitions of intellectually disability create an unacceptable
risk of executing intellectually disabled individuals and are therefore unconstitutional").
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police with a written statement admitting his involvement in the crime, the
State charged Moore with capital murder.8 0
B. Procedural History
A jury convicted Moore of capital murder and sentenced him to death
a mere two months after his arrest.8' A federal habeas court vacated the
sentence due to ineffective trial counsel and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.82
In 2001, a second jury sentenced Moore to death, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed the jury's decision.83 Moore then chal-
lenged the sentence, seeking state habeas relief and claiming that his intel-
lectual disability precluded him from capital punishment.84
In 2014, the Texas habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Moore qualified as intellectually disabled.85 Moore
presented evidence indicating that he "had significant mental and social
difficulties beginning at an early age."8 6 The state habeas court ultimately
determined that Moore possessed "subaverage intellectual functioning"
based on the results of six IQ tests, the average of which produced a score
87of 70.66. In addition, it concluded that Moore possessed serious adaptive
deficits based on the testimony of several mental health professionals.88
Using current clinical diagnostic standards, the habeas court determined
that Moore qualified as intellectually disabled and therefore his sentence
"violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription of 'cruel and unusual pun-
ishments."'8 9 The habeas court recommended that the CCA either change
Moore's sentence to life in prison or allow for a new trial due to his intel-
lectual disability.90
The CCA declined to adopt the recommendation of the state habeas
court and again affirmed Moore's sentence after utilizing the clinical
standards set forth in the 1992 edition of the American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) and the factors in Ex parte Briseno.9 ' The
CCA created the Briseno factors,92 which includes seven questions to as-
sess intellectual disability based on lay perceptions, to counteract what it
8 0. Id.
81. Id. at 1044 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 1044-45.
83. Id. at 1045; see also Court of Criminal Appeals, TEX. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.txcourts.gov/cca (last visited May 16, 2018) (stating that the CCA is the highest court in
Texas for criminal cases).




88. Id. at 1046.
89. Id. at 1044 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
90. Id at 1046.
91. Id. at 1044, 1046; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1039.
92. The Briseno factors include the following seven evidentiary questions:
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deemed to be the "exceedingly subjective" nature of the adaptive deficit
prong of clinical guidelines.9 3 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to determine whether the CCA's methods for determin-
ing intellectual disability in capital cases adhered to the Eighth Amend-
ment and the Court's precedents.94
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion of the Court.95 Justices Ken-
nedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined her.9 6 The Court vacated the
CCA's ruling, holding that the Briseno factors violate the Eighth Amend-
ment and deviate from the Court's holding in both Atkins and Hall.9 7 JUS-
tice Ginsburg began by reviewing the Court's previous Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, emphasizing that the purpose of the Eighth Amend-
ment "reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons."98 She further explained that, per Atkins, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from taking the life of intellectually disabled offenders be-
cause the practice fails to further the penological aims of capital punish-
ment.9 9 Finally, the majority opinion noted that while "being informed by
the medical community does not demand adherence" to the latest clinical
diagnostic framework, the Court's precedent does not allow states to
simply "disregard . . . current medical standards."100
Justice Ginsburg then examined the CCA's procedures for determin-
ing intellectual disability in capital cases.1 First, she rejected the CCA's
conclusion that two of Moore's IQ scores (74 and 78) proved that he is not
intellectually disabled.10 2 Justice Ginsburg detailed the Court's holding in
Hall, which requires states to account for the SEM when assessing an IQ
"close to, but above, 70."103 She determined that the CCA failed to
(1) Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally retarded at the time, and,
if so, act in accordance with that determination?; (2) Has the person formulated plans and
carried them through or is his conduct impulsive?; (3) Does his conduct show leadership
or does it show that he is led around by others?; (4) Is his conduct in response to external
stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?; (5) Does
he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his re-
sponses wander from subject to subject?; (6) Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in
his own or others' interests?; and (7) Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness ur-
rounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, plan-
ning, and complex execution of purpose?
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9.
93. Id at 8.
94. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048.
95. Id. at 1043.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1053.
98. Id. at 1048 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1049.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1047, 1049.
103. Id. at 1049.
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properly consider Moore's intellectual functioning because, after the re-
quired SEM adjustment, his IQ of 74 produced a range of 69 to 79.104 Fur-
thermore, Justice Ginsburg dismissed the State's assertion that it may dis-
regard part of Moore's IQ range because of his personal circumstances.05
Ultimately, the Court held that a state may not cease its inquiry into an
offender's intellectual disability merely because the offender's IQ score
falls slightly above 70.106
The Court then considered whether the CCA utilized appropriate
methods to determine Moore's adaptive deficits. 0 7 Justice Ginsburg noted
that the CCA's assessment of Moore's adaptive functioning "deviated
from prevailing clinical standards and from the older clinical standards the
court claimed to apply." 0 8 For example, the CCA placed considerable m-
phasis on Moore's perceived adaptive strengths, such as playing pool for
money.109 However, clinical standards focus on adaptive deficits, not
strengths, to determine an individual's overall adaptive functioning."0 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the CCA's deviation from the current med-
ical standards violated the protections afforded to intellectually disabled
individuals.'
Finally, the Court examined the CCA's use of the Briseno evidentiary
factors in assessing Moore's intellectual status.112 Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded that the Briseno factors merely perpetuate the lay stereotypes of
intellectual disability that the medical community seeks to combat."3 Ad-
ditionally, the Court noted that no state legislatures had adopted anything
remotely similar to the Briseno factors to determine an individual's intel-
lectual ability.1 4 The Court ultimately held that "[m]ild levels of intellec-
tual disability, although they may fall outside Texas citizens' consensus,
nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities.""s
D. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
delivered a dissenting opinion."16 Although the Chief Justice agreed that
the Briseno evidentiary factors are inappropriate, he argued that the CCA's
overall determination of Moore's intellectual disability did not violate the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1050.
107. Id. at 1051.
108. Id. at 1050.
109. Id.
110. Id
111. Id. at 1053.
112. Id.at1051-52.
113. Id. at 1052.
114. Id. (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Ap-
peals had adopted the use of the Briseno factors, but neither state legislature had codified the factors).
115. Id. at l051.
116. Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Eighth Amendment or the Court's precedent.'17 Chief Justice Roberts be-
gan by expressing his concern with the majority opinion's emphasis on the
use of prevailing clinical standards."'8 Reiterating the Court's holding in
Atkins, the Chief Justice argued that Texas courts appropriately considered
medical standards when creating the state's definition of intellectual disa-
bility. 119 Furthermore, he asserted that it was within the CCA's discretion
to dismiss the lower end of Moore's IQ range due to mitigating factors.120
Because Moore's IQ did not fall below 70 after the CCA rejected his lower
range of scores, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the state court could not
find Moore intellectually disabled because he failed "one part of the
CCA's three-part test." 2 1
Next, the dissent objected to the majority opinion's departure from
its Eighth Amendment precedent, which Chief Justice Roberts described
as a prohibition of "sentences that our society deems repugnant.",22 He
argued that the majority based its decision solely on clinical standards in-
stead of focusing on any sort of societal moral consensus.12 3 Additionally,
the Chief Justice criticized the majority opinion's ambiguity in addressing
the need to adhere to clinical standards.124 He pointed out that the majority
opinion provided no guidance when it declared that states have "'some
flexibility' but cannot 'disregard' medical standards."2 5 Lastly, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts noted that Moore presented no evidence of a national legisla-
tive consensus and that, more importantly, the majority deviated from its
Eighth Amendment precedent when it failed to address any sort of preva-
lent legislative trend.126
III. ANALYSIS
Moore aptly illustrates the difficulties that states encounter when cre-
ating and implementing a standard for intellectual disability in capital
cases. While the Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Moore, it
failed to provide states with adequate guidance to enforce its ruling in At-
kins. Because of the Court's ambiguity regarding state reliance on medical
standards, Moore will likely lead to additional confusion about he appro-
priate definition of intellectual disability for the purposes of capital pun-
ishment. First, this Case Comment argues that states risk violating the
Eighth Amendment through the doctrine of incorporation and equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment if they continue to employ dif-
fering standards for determining intellectual disability. Next, it asserts that
117. Id
118. Id at 1053-54.
119. Id at 1054.
120. Id. at 1055.
121. Id. at 1055-56.
122. Id. at 1058.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting id at 1049, 1052 (majority opinion)).
126. See id. at 1061.
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while the Court appropriately found a national consensus in Atkins, it
should stop assessing states' procedural processes through such a lens. Fi-
nally, it advocates for a national standard to assess intellectual disability
partially based on widely accepted clinical definitions to avoid these con-
stitutional concerns.
A. Constitutional Considerations for a Uniform Standard of Intellectual
Disability in Capital Cases
The risk that states will unconstitutionally execute intellectually dis-
abled defendants continues with the Court's decision in Moore. The most
apparent risk is that states will violate the Eighth Amendment by utilizing
varying standards for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases. In-
deed, when the Court declares a punishment "cruel and unusual," a state
violates the Eighth Amendment if it practices such punishment.127 Conse-
quently, beginning when the Court deemed the practice of executing intel-
lectually disabled offenders to be "cruel and unusual" in Atkins, any state
that executes an individual who falls within this classification fails to ad-
here to the Eighth Amendment.128 This is not the only constitutional con-
sideration that arises from varying standards of intellectual disability in
capital cases. The Court's failure to provide a uniform standard also in-
creases the risk of states violating the Eighth Amendment through under-
mining the doctrine of selective incorporation and possibly equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment. As demonstrated below, the Court
must provide a standard that, at the very least, serves as a floor to ensure
state adherence to Atkins.
1. Incorporation Considerations
Through the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,129 the Su-
preme Court began to selectively incorporate the fundamental guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the states in the 1960s.13 0 Although the
127. See Marceau, supra note 14.
128. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
129. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEo. L.J. 253, 290-91 (1982)
(providing a detailed history of the selective incorporation doctrine).
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incorporation doctrine remains a hotly contested concept among schol-
ars,131 the doctrine unequivocally provides that the "incorporate[d]" guar-
antees apply equally to both the states and the federal government.132 In-
deed, once the Court determines that a right is incorporated, a state may
not provide "only a 'watered-down, subjective version f the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights."'
1 3 3
While not all of the guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights have
been applied to the states, the Court has incorporated many of the criminal
justice provisions.'34 For instance, in Gideon v. Wainwright,135 the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal prosecutions
applied to the states through Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.136
When the Court decided Gideon, thirty-seven states already had provisions
guaranteeing this right.137 Although eight of the thirteen states without the
statutory right to assistance of counsel had developed the right "without
[the] benefit of any statute or rule of [the] court," 38 the Court's ruling in
Gideon made it unconstitutional for these states not to provide counsel to
indigent criminal offenders facing felony charges.139 And while many
131. See, e.g., Kenneth Katkin, "Incorporation" of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The
View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 398 (2005); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise:
Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation ofthe Bill ofRights in
the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1067-78 (2000).
132. Israel, supra note 130, at 291; Marceau, supra note 14, at 1242.
133. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Easton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 275 (1960) (per curiam)) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
applies to the states); Israel, supra note 130, at 295.
134. Israel, supra note 130, at 253, 253 n.2 (providing a list of the thirteen Bill of Rights guar-
antees that pertain to the "criminal justice process," which include: (1) search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment; (2) grand jury indictment under the Fifth Amendment; (3) double jeopardy under
the Fifth Amendment; (4) Fifth Amendment right to due process; (5) self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment; (6) Sixth Amendment right to a public and speedy trial; (7) Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury; (8) notice under the Sixth Amendment; (9) right to confront opposing witnesses
under the Sixth Amendment; (10) right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; (11)
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process; (12) Eighth Amendment proscription against exces-
sive fines; and (13) Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment).
135. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
136. Id. at 342, 344.
137. Katkin, supra note 131, at 462 (citing Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Four-
teenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" ofan Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
17(1962)).
138. Id.at464.
139. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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scholars have criticized Gideon for a myriad of reasons,14 0 the Court's de-
cision provided a bright-line rule: states must provide counsel to those in-
digent defendants facing felony charges.141
Despite the fact that the Court first began interpreting the Eighth
Amendment during the nineteenth century,142 it did not incorporate the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
until 1962 with its decision in Robinson.14 3 After the Court's decision in
Robinson, its categorical bans against capital punishment in certain situa-
tions or with regard to particular offenders were to apply with equal force
to both states and the federal government.144 For instance, in Roper v. Sim-
mons,145 the Court held that both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
"forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
age of 18 when their crimes were committed."l46 Through the doctrine of
incorporation, this categorical ban against executing juvenile offenders
equally extends to the federal government and those states that continue to
utilize capital punishment.147 Thus, the Court must provide a uniform def-
inition of intellectual disability as it did with juvenile offenders in Roper
to ensure the categorical ban announced in Atkins does not lend itself to
violations of the Eighth Amendment.
2. Equal Protection Considerations
Not only do differing standards for determining intellectual disability
risk undermining selective incorporation but they also perhaps violate the
equal protection clause. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o
140. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem ofPolitical Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694,
2698 (2013) (criticizing the Court for "remain[ing] crucially silent on the quality and scope of services
that constitutionally sufficient counsel must provide or on the appropriate mechanisms for the funding,
appointment, training, or supervision of such counsel"); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's
Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (noting that the Court's decision in Gideon "left
open the critical question of how states might develop a coherent system of representation for indigent
individuals charged with crimes").
141. Timothy P. O'Neill, "Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again ": The Failure of Illinois Ap-
pellate Courts to Protect Their Criminal Decisions from United States Supreme Court Review, 36
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 893, 894 n.13 (2005).
142. Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment's Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Cen-
tury, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405, 414-16 (2016).
143. Robinson v. Wainwright, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Marceau, supra note 14, at 1287..
144. See Marceau, supra note 14, at 1287 (explaining that the Court's decision in Robinson in-
corporated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
145. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
146. Id. at 578.
147. See id at 560 (stating that the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that the Court's ruling applies to both the federal government and
the states); see also Catherine B. Pober, The Eighth Amendment's Proscription Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Requires a Categorical Rejection of the Death Penalty as Imposed on Juvenile
Offenders Under the Age of Eighteen: Roper v. Simmons, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 121, 124 n.31 (2005).
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State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." 48 Each state's standards for determining intellectual dis-
ability for the purpose of capital punishment also should be assessed
through an equal protection lens to ensure adherence to Atkins.
The crux of an equal protection analysis lies in the level of scrutiny
applied by the Court based on the class of individuals a law purportedly
discriminates against.149 If an equal protection claim involves a "suspect
class," meaning a law that discriminates on the basis of national origin or
race,15 0 the Court applies a "strict scrutiny" standard of review where the
government must show its classification is "narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest."'5 ' However, short of a government ac-
tion involving a suspect classification, the Court applies more lenient
standards of review.152
If a governmental action purportedly discriminates against a "quasi-
suspect" classification, the Court uses heightened scrutiny, a standard
which is more deferential to the government's interest than strict scru-
tiny. 5 3 The Court utilizes several factors to determine if a classification is
quasi-suspect and thus entitled to some form of heightened scrutiny, which
include: a history of pervasive discrimination against the group, the
group's immutable characteristics, the group's "ability to contribute to so-
ciety," the classification reflecting "deep-seated prejudice," and the
group's general political powerlessness.154 However, if a court determines
the group is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, it applies the extremely
deferential "rational-basis review" where the law will be upheld if the gov-
ernment can show a "rational relationship" to a "legitimate government
purpose."55
For an Atkins claim, the analysis hinges on the rights of intellectually
disabled offenders to be free from state infliction of capital punishment.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. David J. Shannon, "No Pass, No Play ": Equal Protection Analysis Under the Federal and
State Constitutions, 63 IND. L.J. 161, 163 (1987).
150. Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application ofHeightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2772 (2005).
151. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997); see also Smith, supra note 150; Stacey
L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn't Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal Protection Analysis for
Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 500 (2015).
152. Smith, supra note 150, at 2772-73.
153. 1d. at 2773.
154. Sobel, supra note 151, at 501 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)
(acknowledging a pervasive history of sex discrimination)); see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986) (noting close relatives do not share immutable characteristics "that define them as a discrete
group"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41, 445 (1985) (discussing the
ability of those with intellectual disabilities to contribute to society and their political power); Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (discussing the deep-seated prejudice against illegal aliens).
155. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
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However, the Court has refused to recognize those with intellectual disa-
bilities as a suspect, or even quasi-suspect, class.'56 Despite finding that
intellectual disability is an immutable characteristic and that those individ-
uals with intellectual disability have a history of experiencing discrimina-
tion, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,157 the Court found that
intellectually disabled individuals are not a suspect class because they are
not politically powerless.'5 8 Consequently, the Court only afforded the
class rational basis review to assess the zoning ordinance at issue in
Cleburne.'59 However, unlike most of the laws that have overcome rational
basis review in an equal protection analysis, the Court held that the city's
interests for the zoning ordinance were not legitimate.160 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court reasoned that he government's stated interest of
preventing the negative attitudes of neighbors was not a legitimate reason
for denying the permit and that the government did not properly justify its
position that the living center would be overcrowded.161 Although the
Court purported to use rational basis, many scholars have argued that the
outcome of Cleburne denoted a slightly higher standard than traditional
rational basis review.'62 What is more, the dissent noted that the "ordi-
nance surely would be valid under the traditional rational-basis test."'1
63
Differing state standards of assessing intellectual disability for capital
punishment alone will not trigger an equal protection violation. However,
the clinical childhood-onset requirement that many states employ which
requires individuals to show their below average IQ and adaptive deficits
were present before the age of eighteen could be considered unconstitu-
tional.164 As Professor Steven Mulroy has explained, the childhood-onset
156. Clebuene, 473 U.S. at 442; see Heller, 509 U.S. at 321; see also Laura L. Rovner, Disability,
Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1071 (2004) (providing an in-depth analysis of
Cleburne).
157. 473 U.S. 432.
158. Id. at 443-45 (finding that the state and federal legislative responses to protecting intellec-
tually disabled individuals illustrate that the class is not politically powerless); see Steven J. Mulroy,
Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and Constitutional Problems with the "Childhood Onset" Re-
quirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT. L. REV. 591, 631 (2013).
159. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
160. Id. at 448; see Mulroy, supra note 158, at 631-32 (explaining the Court's rejection of the
city's various justifications for the ordinance).
161. Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name,
62 IND. L.J. 779, 794 (1987).
162. See, e.g., Mulroy, supra note 158, at 632; Pettinga, supra note 161 (observing that the
Court's "ensuing review [in Cleburne] was more exacting than the traditional rational basis test").
163. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Pettinga,
supra note 161.
164. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)(3) (2017);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (2017); see also AM. ASS'N OF INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY]; AM.




prong of an intellectual disability determination could plausibly fail a tra-
ditional rational basis analysis.1 6 5 He argues that this prong likely fails be-
cause a state's justification for using the age requirement to assess intel-
lectual disability in capital cases does not rationally relate to any sort of
penological purpose.166 Indeed, individuals who experience some form of
trauma after their eighteenth birthday that results in intellectual and adap-
tive deficits similar to those of someone who has been medically diag-
nosed as intellectually disabled will still be eligible for the death penalty
in a state that requires a showing of childhood onset.'67 Consequently,
states that employ the clinical childhood-onset requirement arguably risk
violating the equal protection clause under a traditional rational basis anal-
ysis because those individuals who are similarly situated will be treated
differently merely because the trauma occurred after a certain age. 168 The
Court should provide states with a uniform standard for assessing intellec-
tual disability in capital cases because the variations in state procedures
for an Atkins claim may violate the equal protection clause if some states
continue to utilize a childhood-onset requirement.
B. The Difficulty of Finding a National Consensus in the Procedures for
Determining Intellectual Disability
The proscription against executing intellectually disabled offenders
was realized through a national consensus that formed against the prac-
tice.169 If the Court continues to consider the national moral consensus
when providing procedural guidelines, it risks nullifying the original ban
it announced in Atkins. Thus, the Court should instead provide the states
with a standard for determining intellectual disability in capital cases to
serve, at the very least, as a floor to avoid the potential constitutional prob-
lems discussed above.
1. The Substantive Ban Against Executing Intellectually Disabled
Offenders
In Atkins, the Court conducted an Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis to assess whether a national consensus had formed regarding the
lesser moral culpability of intellectually disabled offenders.17 0 Ultimately,
165. Mulroy, supra note 158, at 644-45.
166. Id. at 651. The use of the age of onset requirement for intellectual disability in capital cases
is analogous to the policy of executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old adolescents, but not fifteen-
year-old adolescents, because of the penological interests involved. See Michael J. Spillane, The Exe-
cution of Juvenile Offenders: Constitutional and International Law Objections, 60 UMKC L. REV.
113, 124-25 (1991) (explaining that Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Stanford v. Kentucky,
noted that "if the fact that death penalty for juvenile offenders truly serves no legitimate penological
function is proven scientifically, then the juvenile death penalty should be invalidated under the Equal
Protection Clause as irrational").
167. Mulroy, supra note 158, at 595.
168. Id. at 628-29.
169. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
170. Id.
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it determined that "our society views mentally retarded offenders as cate-
gorically less culpable than the average criminal" based on the trend in
state legislation banning the practice of executing intellectually disabled
offenders.171 Indeed, the Court noted that in the fourteen years between
Penry and Atkins, eighteen states and the federal government enacted stat-
utes banning the practice.172 While the number of states with such a ban
bolstered the notion of a national consensus, the Court recognized that "[i]t
is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the con-
,,173sistency of the direction of change. What is more, no states passed leg-
islation reinstating the practice of executing intellectually disabled offend-
ers during that period. 174
While the Court found that a national consensus had formed against
the practice, it noted that the states still disagreed about what occurs when
"determining which offenders are in fact retarded."'7 5 Despite acknowl-
edging the likelihood of conflicting interpretations, the Court nevertheless
provided states with the autonomy to develop their own standards for de-
termining intellectual disability in capital cases.17 6 The only guidance it
provided was that the standards states employ must protect individuals
whose intellectual disability places them within the group of those offend-
ers that society has "deemed to have lesser culpability and a greater risk
of wrongful [capital] conviction and/or execution." 77 Allowing this
amount of discretion will likely lead to variations in state procedures and
thus lend itself to the very thing that the Court prohibited in Atkins: the
execution of intellectually disabled defendants.
2. The Court Should Cease Searching for a National Consensus to
Determine the Adequacy of State Procedures
Although the Court determined that a national consensus had formed
against the practice of executing intellectually disabled individuals, it con-
tinues to search for national consensus in the state procedures used to as-
sess an Atkins claim.'78 In the first case that it assessed after Atkins, the
Court invalidated Florida's bright-line IQ cutoff of 70 after finding that
many states do not employ such a standard.'79 In reaching its determina-
tion, the Court stated that "[a] significant majority of States implement the
protections of Atkins by taking the SEM into account."'80 The Court then
171. Id. at 314-16; see Crowell, supra note 58, at 745.
172. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
173. Id. at 315.
174. Id. at 315-16.
175. Id. at 317.
176. Id.
177. Barger, supra note 23, at 226.
178. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052-53 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986,
1996-97 (2014).
179. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.
180. Id. at 1996.
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went on to detail the practices of each state, concluding that "[t]he rejec-
tion of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of States and the 'con-
sistency in the trend' toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence
of [a] consensus."18
In Moore, the Court utilized the national consensus framework when
determining whether Texas's use of the Briseno factors to assess intellec-
tual disability in capital cases violated Atkins.'8 2 While the Court rejected
the CCA's dismissal of an offender's various IQ scores and its assessment
of adaptive functioning, it purported to do so because the procedures did
not adhere to generally accepted clinical standards, not under the pretext
of a lack of national consensus.183 However, the Court's decision arguably
implicitly relied on its interpretation of national consensus in its evaluation
of the CCA's IQ determination because it cited to Hall when it rejected
the CCA's conclusion that Moore's IQ scores showed he was not intellec-
tually disabled.184 While Justice Ginsburg made no mention of consensus
in this portion of the opinion, her reliance on Hall seemingly incorporates
a search for a national consensus because the Court's holding in Hall was
based on the finding of such a consensus.'ss
The Court may have shied away from outwardly relying on the na-
tional consensus analysis in its evaluation of the CCA's IQ and adaptive
function standards, but it did explicitly employ the analysis when it con-
cluded that the Briseno factors violate the Eighth Amendment.'8 6 It rea-
soned that Texas's use of the Briseno factors "[is] an outlier, in compari-
son . . . to other States' handling of intellectual-disability."' The Court
found that "[n]o state legislature has approved the use of the Briseno fac-
tors or anything similar."'88 But the Court did not need to employ such an
analysis in determining whether the Briseno factors risked executing those
offenders whose intellectual disability renders them categorically less cul-
pable than the average criminal. Instead, Justice Ginsburg should have uti-
lized the same analysis as with her evaluation of the CCA's IQ determina-
tion and its assessment of adaptive functioning.
Indeed, such an analysis would have allowed the Court to quickly
dismiss the Briseno factors due to their lack of clinical basis. The Court
recognized that the Briseno factors are not rooted in "any authority, med-
ical or judicial."' 89 The lack of clinical reliability in these factors is bol-
181. Id. at 1998 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005)).
182. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052.
183. Id. at 1049-50.
184. Id at 1049.
185. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.
186. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052-53.
187. Id. at 1052.
188. Id
189. Id at 1046.
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stered by the fact that the factors are based on a work of fiction-specifi-
cally the character Lennie in John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men-a point
that the opinion wholly fails to recognize.190 What is more, the Briseno
court provided no reason as to why Lennie's adaptive functioning was an
appropriate measure for intellectual disability, besides stating that Lennie
has a "lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills."l 9' Further, it is un-
likely that Lennie himself would have been spared from execution if a
court weighed his crime against the Briseno factors.'92
Not only are the Briseno factors based on a piece of fiction that is
nearly a century old but they also readily lend themselves to the perpetua-
tion of lay stereotypes concerning intellectual disability, such as the com-
mon misconception that all intellectually disabled people are essentially
identical to one another.'9 3 While the Court ignored the roots of the
Briseno factors, it did recognize that the factors perpetuate the very stere-
otypes that the medical community seeks to curtail.194 Justice Ginsburg
observed: "Those stereotypes, much more than medical and clinical ap-
praisals, should spark skepticism [in the use of the factors]."l95 Instead of
hinging its rejection of the factors on a lack of national consensus toward
their use, the Court should have based its decision on the incredulity of
determining whether an offender lives or dies based on nothing more than
mere stereotypes and fiction.
The procedures employed by the CCA demonstrate that no true na-
tional consensus exists regarding which intellectually disabled offenders
are "categorically less culpable than the average criminal." 96 As of 2016,
the United States estimated its population to be around 300 million peo-
ple.' 9 7 Nineteen states have abolished the death penalty, and four addi-
tional states have fully suspended its use through gubernatorial morato-
ria.198 Thus, these states, which comprise more than thirty seven percent
190. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046; see also Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039.
191. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6; Hannah Brewer, The Briseno Factors: How Literary Guid-
ance Outsteps the Bounds ofAtkins in the Post-Hall Landscape, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 240, 251 (2017).
192. Julia Barton, Judging Steinbeck's Lennie, LIFE L. (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2013/09/judging-steinbeck-lennie (noting that Professor John Blume of
Cornell Law opines that Lennie himself would have been executed under the Briseno factors, stating,
"I mean, after he accidentally strangles the young woman, he tries to cover it up. That's one of the
factors the Briseno opinion cites as evidence that somebody doesn't have mental retardation. They
would look into the fact, 'well, he worked. He worked as a farm hand. He was gainfully employed."').
193. Brief of Amici Curiae, The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Dis-
abilities (AAIDD), and The Arc of the United States as Amici Curiae, in Support of Petitioner at 9,
Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151447, at *9.
194. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051-52.
195. Id. at 1052.
196. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
197. US. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
198. Wong, supra note 69, at 438; see States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Mar.
801
DENVER LAWREVIEW
of the entire U.S. population,199 do not believe that the death penalty is an
acceptable form of punishment, regardless of the crime committed. While
Moore's intellectual disability would have been relevant for sentencing
purposes in twenty-seven states, it would have been a null issue had he
murdered McCarble in at least twenty-three different states.200 Conse-
quently, a mere change in venue could completely reshape the terms of
Moore's punishment despite the details of Moore's crime and his intellec-
tual ability remaining the same. This variation in what each state considers
an "appropriate sentence" indicates the lack of national consensus on the
morality of capital punishment.20 1
In addition to the differences between the states that continue to em-
ploy capital punishment and those that don't, significant variation remains
in intellectual disability standards in those states that still use the death
penalty.2 02 In fact, the parameters for assessing intellectual disability in
capital cases differ vastly among those twenty-seven states that continue
to utilize capital punishment, creating a problematic tension.between se-
lective incorporation and states' rights.203 Many of these states have
adopted the same general three-part framework for determining intellec-
tual disability recommended in the American Association on Intellectual
and Developmental Disability (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric As-
sociation's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
204(APA). This definition includes three equally weighted components:
subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations in adaptive functioning,
205and an "onset of [these] deficits" during adolescence.
What is even more concerning is the large variation in how states
206interpret and assess each of these elements. For instance, Texas uses the
25, 2018) (stating as of November 9, 2016, the states without the death penalty include: Alaska, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Those with gubernatorial moratoria include: Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington).
199. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2017 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/nation-total.html (based on 2016 estimates of
population of the following states: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
200. Moore's intellectual disability would not have been a factor for sentencing in those states
that do not employ the death penalty. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 198.
201. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305.
202. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996-98 (2014).
203. See Barger, supra note 23, at 227-29.
204. Id. at 226.
205. Saviello, supra note 50, at 181; see Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 (2017) (quoting
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995) (explaining that subaverage intellectual functioning is generally "indicated
by an IQ score 'approximately two standard deviations below the mean'-i.e., a score of roughly 70");
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (defining adaptive deficits as "the inability to learn basic skills and adjust
behavior to changing circumstances"); AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 164; DSM-5,
supra note 164.
206. Barger, supra note 23, at 227-29.
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clinical definition of intellectual disability found in the 1992 edition of the
AAMR. 2 07 This version is similar to the AAIDD's three-part definition;
however, individuals must also provide evidence that their adaptive defi-
cits are related to subaverage intellectual functioning.208 While the latest
version of the APA definition also has a relatedness component, the cur-
209rent version of the AAIDD abandoned this requirement.
Furthermore, Texas used the Briseno evidentiary factors to determine
the relatedness of an offender's intellectual functioning and adaptive func-
tioning, with a particular focus on the offender's adaptive strengths.210
These factors, which were not attributed to clinical authority, required a
jury to answer seven questions based upon lay perceptions of intellectual
disability.2 11 For example, juries in Texas were asked to consider whether
those who knew the defendant during adolescence thought the defendant
was "mentally retarded."212 However, the Court noted in Moore that no
other state legislatures have adopted the Briseno factors, or anything re-
motely similar, since its decision in Atkins.213 Had Moore murdered
McCarble in any other state, the jury would not have had to consider if the
people that knew Moore personally believed he was intellectually disa-
bled. Indeed, other states that continue to condone capital punishment do
not seem to believe that purely subjective factors help a jury to determine
the overall culpability of an intellectually disabled defendant.2 14
Additionally, a variation exists in the way states utilize an offender's
215IQ scores to determine intellectual disability in capital cases.21 Before the
Hall Court decreed that states must account for the SEM of an individual's
IQ, nine states utilized standards that "could be interpreted to provide a
216
bright-line cutoff' for intellectual functioning. Of those nine states,
Kentucky, Florida, and Virginia adopted legislation that explicitly man-
dated a "fixed score cutoff." 217 While the Court held that fixed score cut-
207. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1052 n.9 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 1051-53; Crowell, supra note 58, at 750.
212. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051-53 (quoting Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004)); Crowell, supra note 58, at 750.
213. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052.
214. Id. (noting that no other state employs standards even remotely similar to the subjective
Briseno factors).
215. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996-97 (2014).
216. Id. (explaining that Arizona, Kansas, Washington, North Carolina, and Delaware have stat-
utes in which courts may interpret the standards to require an IQ below a fixed point before assessing
the defendant's adaptive deficits).
217. Id. at 1996; see FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2017) (defining "significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning" as "performance [on an IQ test] that is two or more standard deviations from
the mean score on a standardized intelligence test"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (West 2017)
(defining "[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" as "an intelligence quotient
(I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (2017) (providing a nearly
identical definition to Florida's statutory definition).
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offs are unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, these partic-
ular state legislatures had previously determined that individuals with an
IQ above a certain point were just as categorically culpable as the average
criminal.218 These differences in standards illustrate that states utilizing
capital punishment have not reached a consensus on which offenders fall
into this particular categorical ban.
Even more telling is that some states cannot reach a legislative con-
sensus on an appropriate standard for intellectual disability. In 1989, the
Texas legislature first considered banning the execution of such individu-
als.219 While the legislature proposed multiple iterations of the ban be-
tween 1989 and 2000, none of these proposals ever came to fruition.220
After twelve years, both houses of the Texas legislature finally approved
procedures to determine if an individual qualifies as intellectually disa-
bled, but the Governor subsequently vetoed the bill. 2 2 ' Even after the
Court's decision in Atkins, Texas has been unable to reach a legislative
consensus, instead relying on the courts to provide an appropriate interim
standard.222 Indeed, the Texas legislature has attempted to promulgate
fourteen separate bills since the Court first decided Atkins.22 3 While the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence dictates that the most
appropriate "objective evidence of contemporary values" is found in state
224
legislators, Texas cannot seem to reach a consensus regarding the moral
compass of its own citizenry.
These differences among various states and even the lawmakers in a
single state illustrate that a national consensus on the procedures for im-
plementing Atkins is more of a myth than a reality. Such lack of uniformity
reveals that Moore's crime would not have been treated equally in all
states for the purposes of death penalty eligibility. 22 5 The Court is grasping
to create a uniform picture of contemporary values that will never truly
218. As the statutes in Kentucky, Florida, and Virginia illustrate, these particular states deter-
mined that an offender with an IQ above 70 remain eligible for the death penalty. See Noah Cyr Engel-
hart, Matching the Trajectory of the Supreme Court on Intellectual Disability Defense: A Recommen-
dation for the States, 79 ALB. L. REV. 567, 576 (2015).
219. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 23-24 (detailing Texas's extensive legislative history in con-
sidering the implementation of such a ban).
220. Id.; see Sarah Gail Tuthill, The Texas-Size Struggle to Implement Atkins v. Virginia, 14
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 145, 148 (2007).
221. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 32; Crowell, supra note 58, at 745.
222. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 32-35 (detailing the intellectual disability standards that the
Texas legislature proposed at least four times since Atkins, all of which failed to pass both legislative
houses); Crowell, supra note 58, at 745-46.
223. Tuthill, supra note 220.
224. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (explaining the methods of determining if a
national consensus has formed for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment).
225. Although criminal sentencing generally varies greatly from state to state, a variation in
death penalty eligibility in the context of intellectually disabled offenders is problematic. This is pri-
marily because when the Court held that executing intellectually disabled offenders violates the Con-
stitution, the doctrine of selective incorporation mandates that those guarantees apply equally to both
the states and the federal government. See supra Section III.A. I.
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exist. Instead of attempting to cobble together a common standard of so-
cietal decency, the Court must use its own judgment to determine the ap-
propriate procedures for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases or
it risks violating the Eighth Amendment by undermining the doctrine of
incorporation, and perhaps even violating equal protection.
C. Creating a Uniform Standard
Both Moore and Hall demonstrate the discrepancies in what states
consider to be the "best" methods to assess intellectual disability in capital
cases. The differences in state definitions, compounded by the Court's
vagueness when addressing such standards, have left the states with little
guidance in creating an appropriate test to satisfy the constitutional ban
against executing intellectually disabled criminals. Over the past fifteen
years, the Court has consistently held that states may create their own def-
initions of intellectual disability.226 However, the Court continuously re-
quires states to be informed by widely accepted medical standards when
crafting these definitions.227 Additionally, the Court attempted to narrow
the scope of state discretion when it held that states must consider the SEM
of an offender's IQ score.228 Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Moore
failed to provide states with additional guidance. Justice Ginsburg re-
mained vague in the majority opinion, claiming that clinical guidelines
need not fully dictate state standards, all the while focusing heavily on
Texas's deviation from medical consensus.22 9
1. The Parallels to Roper v. Simmons
In Roper, the Court held that executing those offenders who commit-
ted a capital crime before the age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.230 The decision, which was announced only three years after Atkins,
drew several parallels between defendants under the age of eighteen and
intellectually disabled offenders.231 As in Atkins, the Roper Court con-
cluded that a national consensus had formed against the practice of exe-
cuting juveniles, showing that individuals under the age of eighteen are
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal."2 32 However, dis-
tinct from the ban announced in Atkins, the Roper Court provided the states
with a clear rule: no state nor the federal government may execute an of-
fender under the age of eighteen.233
While one can categorize the Court's holding in Roper as a bright-
line rule, it can likewise be described as providing the states with a floor.
226. Id. at 317.
227. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014).
228. Id. at 1995.
229. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
230. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
231. Id. at 570-72.
232. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
233. Id. at 574.
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In fact, the Court included several appendixes detailing states' definition
of adulthood for various activities.234 Most notable are some of the age-of-
adulthood laws in Mississippi, which continues to employ the death pen-
alty, where an individual must be twenty-one to qualify for jury service235
but can marry before the age of eighteen.236 However, Mississippi law con-
tinues to treat age as merely a mitigating factor that a jury may consider
when determining capital sentencing (although it cannot execute anyone
under the age of eighteen after the Court's decision in Roper).237 Indeed,
in many states juveniles, who likely do not enjoy the full rights of adult-
hood in other respects, may be charged as an adult far before their eight-
238eenth birthday. Consequently, one could plausibly argue that the Court's
holding in Roper acts more as a floor than as a bright-line rule, permitting
states to increase the age for death penalty eligibility or even abolish the
practice altogether. This is to say that the similarities in the Court's assess-
ment of the culpability ofjuveniles and of intellectually disabled offenders
merely bolster the call for the Court to provide states with a uniform defi-
nition of intellectual disability. This would merely require states to abide
by the Court's standard for determining death penalty eligibility for intel-
lectually disabled defenders while still leaving them free to craft a more
protective standard for defendants or to employ more lenient standards in
other respects, such as length of sentencing.
2. Utilizing Widely Accepted Clinical Standards
To avoid Eighth Amendment and equal protection clause challenges,
the Court should provide states with a legal definition of intellectual disa-
bility in capital cases. The Court's decision in Moore indicates that states
may not consider factors that have no medical basis, like the Briseno evi-
dentiary questions.2 3 9 The Court's holding is appropriate because lay per-
ceptions of intellectual disability may perpetuate the stereotypes that the
medical community seeks to combat.24 0 In fact, lay witnesses who provide
testimony regarding a defendant's intellectual and adaptive functioning
may be presenting their own biases or an inaccurate perception of the dis-
ability.24 1 The use of this sort of testimony will likely increase the risk of
234. Id. at 579-87 (listing state statutes in Appendices A-D establishing the age of majority for
the death penalty, voting, jury service, and marriage).
235. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2018).
236. Id. § 93-1-5 (providing that males must be at least seventeen years of age to legally marry,
whereas females must be at least fifteen years of age).
237. Id. § 99-19-101(6)(g).
238. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(a) (2017) (requiring mandatory transfer for
certain crimes at the age of fifteen); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(1) (2017) (allowing for discretionary
transfer at the age of twelve); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) (West 2017) (requiring
mandatory transfer for certain crimes at the age of sixteen).
239. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051-52 (2017).
240. Id. at 1052.
241. Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 76.
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a court inaccurately deciding whether a defendant is intellectually disa-
bled.
For example, both Utah's and Kansas's tests for adaptive functioning
should theoretically be invalidated by the Court's holding in Moore be-
cause they "have little or no relation to the clinically defined disability of
mental retardation."242 As Chief Justice Roberts opined in Moore, the ma-
jority bases its decision from a purely clinical point of view but assures the
reader "that it is not requiring-adherence 'to everything stated in the latest
medical guide."' 24 3 The Court's continuing ambiguity regarding medical
standards leaves states with little direction when creating an appropriate
test for intellectual disability.
The variances in state standards increase the risk that the Court's
mandate will be violated. As Justice Ginsburg stated in Moore, "[s]tates
may not execute anyone in 'the entire category of [intellectually disabled]
offenders."'2 44 So long as states continue to employ different means of de-
termining intellectual disability, the likelihood of executing an individual
who falls within the categorical ban articulated in Atkins remains high.
Thus, the Court should provide a conclusive definition, along with an ap-
propriate test, to assess whether an individual accused of a capital crime
qualifies as intellectually disabled.
This proposed national standard should be informed by clinical
guidelines' first two prongs of intellectual disability. However, as noted
by the majority opinion in Hall, clinical definitions may prove problematic
at times.245 These problems include the evolving nature of clinical defini-
tions to reflect new medical breakthroughs and the potential imprecision
of scientific measurement and analysis.24 6 However, lay witnesses and per-
ceptions are likely far more subjective than medical standards. Crafting a
standard informed by clinical definitions of intellectual disability will al-
low individuals with disabilities who have been convicted of capital
crimes to be assessed on a level playing field, regardless of the state where
they stand trial.
And while bias and misunderstanding may understandably color jury
perceptions, a clearly articulated standard informed by widely accepted
clinical definitions will help combat the prejudices that often permit the
execution of intellectually disabled defendants. Therefore, the Court
242. Barger, supra note 23, at 229 (explaining how the assessment of adaptive deficits allow
states to consider both an offender's culpability and the "insufficient connection to the penological
theories of deterrence and retribution").
243. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1049 (majority opin-
ion)).
244. Id. at 1051 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005)).
245. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014) (explaining that states must assess an IQ's
SEM in part because of the "inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test itself").
246. See Saviello, supra note 50, at 182-92 (detailing the imprecision of the tests for both intel-
lectual disability and adaptive deficits).
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should provide a clear and concise definition to ensure that each state ad-
heres to the categorical ban against executing intellectually disabled of-
fenders as mandated in Atkins.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Moore served as little more than a
lackluster attempt to provide states with guidance in creating a standard
for determining intellectual disability for the purposes of capital punish-
ment. While the Court attempted to narrow the leniency it provided to
states with its holdings in both Moore and Hall, it has likely done nothing
more than cause confusion as states attempt to create legislation that ad-
heres to the Court's mandates. The Court's refusal to provide states with a
functional definition of intellectual disability in capital cases might seem
merely frustrating at first glance, but it is also potentially unconstitu-
tional-arguably violating both the Eighth Amendment and the equal pro-
tection clause. What is more, as each state creates its own test for deter-
mining intellectual disability, the states increase their risk of violating the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Thus,
the Court should provide the states with a definition to avoid these pressing
constitutional concerns.
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PERA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: A CRITICAL, BUT
INCOMPLETE, STEP IN THE NEVER-ENDING WAR ON
RACIAL BIAS
ABSTRACT
The realization of America's oft-cited promise of equality and justice
for all has long been inhibited by the pervasive racism that permeates all
aspects of American life. For centuries, courts and legislatures have
worked to eliminate racial bias and its crippling effects from the nation's
laws and courts. However, one place where racial bias has largely been
left to flourish unchecked is within the realm of juries and their delibera-
tions. Until quite recently, jurors nationwide were free to convict criminal
defendants with near impunity based solely on prejudicial notions about
who a defendant is because of the color of the defendant's skin.
Since the nation's earliest days, a legal principle called the "no-im-
peachment rule" largely barred using the content of jury deliberations to
challenge a criminal conviction. In Peha-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Su-
preme Court finally held that when a criminal defendant's guilty verdict is
likely the result of a juror's overt racism, the Sixth Amendment supersedes
the no-impeachment rule and allows defendants to challenge the validity
of their guilty verdicts using that juror's racist comments. This was a
groundbreaking and long overdue ruling. But the ruling was also reserved,
modest, and incomplete.
This Case Comment first argues that the Supreme Court correctly de-
cided Pefia-Rodriguez. Statistics and the experiences of people of color
show that racial bias within the criminal justice system is a massive, tow-
ering, and disruptive force. These same things also show that existing safe-
guards designed to protect criminal defendants from racism are exception-
ally ineffective and that the critical importance of attacking racism from
all angles ranks paramount to the policy goals underlying a strict no-im-
peachment rule. However, this Comment also argues that the Court's de-
cision in Pefia-Rodriguez will be largely meaningless without a corre-
sponding mechanism that puts jurors on notice about the consequences of
using racism to convict criminal defendants. To best maximize the impact
of the no-impeachment rule's new racial bias exception, the exception
should be coupled with jury instructions that let all within the courtroom
know that basing a criminal conviction on racism is both forbidden and
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INTRODUCTION
Three black defendants are convicted of drug trafficking.' Days after
the conviction is entered, a juror comes forward with shocking news-
while carpooling to the trial, a fellow juror remarked that "[t]he niggers2
are guilty" and "[a]ll the niggers should hang."3 The trial court is aware of
the allegations.4 But the conviction stands.5 A man of Middle Eastern de-
scent is convicted on money laundering and wire fraud charges.6 A week
later, a juror runs into one of the lawyers at the grocery store and remarks
that, while deliberating, another juror argued that the defendants were
guilty because "[a]ll Arabs are liars, are thieves."7 This accusation too is
1. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. While drafting this Comment, I went back and forth on whether writing out the racial slurs
used by these jurors added anything of value to my work or whether including the actual slurs only
added hurt without improving the substance. But one of the reasons that he United States still has
such a large problem with racism is our collective refusal to have meaningful conversations about race
because those conversations make us uncomfortable. Including the word "nigger" in this Comment
makes me uncomfortable. And that's precisely why I included it. If we, as a nation, truly want to
eliminate racism, we must be willing to engage in conversations that make us uncomfortable. It would
be hypocritical of me to not do the same here.
3. Henley, 238 F.3d at 1113-14.
4. Id. at 1113.
5. Id. at 1114.
6. United States v. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2012).
7. Id. at 203.
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brought to the trial court's attention.8 The conviction stands.9 A Hispanic
defendant is convicted of sexual harassment.10 Minutes later, a juror in-
forms defense counsel that during jury deliberations, a juror stated that
Mexican men "take whatever they want" and "believe they [can] do what-
ever they want[] with women."" Defense counsel informs the trial court
12 1 3about this alleged blatant racism. Yet still the conviction stands.
To the lay person, and even many lawyers, it would seem that state-
ments as racist as these, made by ajuror while deciding a defendant's fate,
would be automatic grounds for reversal.14 How could jurors possibly
make such biased remarks about criminal defendants and not violate the
right to an impartial jury? 5 But until March 2017, ajuror could do exactly
that without violating the Constitution in the slightest.'6
Throughout history, the jury has been referred to as "a tangible im-
plementation of the principle that the law comes from the people";7 "the
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held
to the principles of its constitution"; and "[the most] gratuitous public
school ever open, in which every juror learns to exercise [his or her]
rights . . . and becomes practically acquainted" with the nation's laws.19
But what all those glowing quotes gloss over is that, despite the constitu-
tional guarantees of fairness and impartiality,20 the system of trial by jury
has never been fair or impartial, particularly when it comes to race.21 And
for more than 230 years, criminal verdicts that resulted from a juror's ex-
pressed racism could not be challenged because of a legal principle known
22
as the no-impeachment rule.
In Peha-Rodriguez v. Colorado,2 3 the Supreme Court finally held that
the Sixth Amendment mandates an exception to the no-impeachment rule
when a criminal verdict is found to have been based strongly on a juror's
racist beliefs.24 But as monumental and critically important as this decision
8. Id.
9. Id. at 203-04.
10. Pefa-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
11. Id. at 861-62.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 862.
14. Mark Joseph Stem, Read Anthony Kennedy's Stirring Denunciation of Racially Biased Ju-
ries, SLATE: THE SLATEST (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slat-
est/2017/03/06/readanthonykennedy_s_stirringopinioninpe a rodriguez v colorado.html.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. See Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 855, 869.
17. Id. at 860.
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), https://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0259.
19. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 315 (Henry Reeve trans., The Pa.
State Univ. 2002) (1835).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. See Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868-69.
22. See id at 863, 869.
23. 137 S. Ct. 855.
24. Id. at 869.
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is, it may be just another ineffective step in the war on racial bias if the
decision is not coupled with efforts to put jurors on notice that there is no
place for racism in the black box.
The United States has a damaging and enduring history with racism
that continues to prevent whole fulfillment of the nation's guarantees of a
251fair trial and due process for all. Based strongly on that history, this Com-
ment will argue that Peiha-Rodriguez was correctly, if only modestly, de-
cided. Part I of this Comment will review the legal background of the no-
impeachment rule and its limited exceptions. Part II will examine and sum-
marize the Court's decision in Peila-Rodriguez. Part III will discuss why
a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule is necessary and sug-
gest one way to maximize the exception's impact. Part III's analysis will
proceed in several sections. It first discusses the entrenched racism that
exists and flourishes throughout the criminal justice system. It then exam-
ines why existing safeguards against racial bias are ineffective and why
the public policy behind a strict no-impeachment rule is misplaced in the
face of overt racism. Last, it provides a set of model jury instructions that
could be utilized by courts to deter juror racial bias and encourage jurors
to report such bias when it seeps into their deliberations.
I. BACKGROUND
The right to a fair and impartial jury is a critical piece of the U.S.
criminal justice system.26 It is a right that has long been considered "a fun-
damental safeguard of individual liberty" and a right that was deemed im-
portant enough by the framers to be one of a limited number enshrined in
the Constitution.27 And yet, for more than two centuries, there was no uni-
form legal remedy available to criminal defendants whose convictions re-
sulted from a juror's racial bias.2 8 This contradiction and grave injustice
stemmed from an eighteenth century legal principle called the no-im-
peachment rule.29
The original no-impeachment rule holds that after a verdict has been
entered, juror testimony about a jury's deliberations cannot be used to
challenge the validity of a final verdict, even if that testimony alleges grave
misconduct or blatant racial bias on the part of a juror.3 0 This rule first
emerged in the 1785 English case of Vaise v. Delaval,31 where an English
court refused to allow a verdict to be challenged based on juror affidavits
25. See id. at 867-68.
26. Id. at 860.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 867.
29. Id. at 861.
30. See Impeachment of Verdict, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Stem, supra note
14.
31. (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (KB).
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alleging that the verdict was determined through a game of chance.32 This
ruling stemmed from a strong belief that jurors were not competent o tes-
tify about their own verdicts and deliberations because any testimony
about juror misconduct that came from a juror would be unreliable.33
Following the ruling in Vaise, a strict ban on using any juror testi-
mony to challenge the validity of jury verdicts took hold first in England
and then in the United States.34 However, by the mid-nineteenth century,
various state and federal courts within the United States began to modify
the Vaise rule's ultrastrict bar on postverdict testimony.35 In 1852, in
United States v. Reid,3 6 the Supreme Court barred a verdict from being
challenged after receiving juror testimony that a newspaper was sent to
37and read by a juror. Yet in dicta the Court noted that here may be cases
"in which it would be impossible to refuse [uror testimony] without vio-
lating the plainest principles of justice."38 Less than twenty years later, in
a direct rebuke of the English no-impeachment rule, the Supreme Court of
Iowa held in Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co. 3 9 that juror
affidavits alleging that a damages award was calculated by averaging the
individual suggestions of the jurors could be used to challenge the validity
of the final verdict.40
The decision in Wright quickly became known as the "Iowa Rule."4 '
Under the Iowa Rule, while jurors could not testify about "subjective be-
liefs, thoughts, or motives," they could testify about "objective facts and
events" that occurred during deliberations.42 The nation took a strong lik-
ing to the Wright approach, with a dozen states and several federal district
32. Colin Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why Application of the Anti-Jury Impeachment
Rule to Allegations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates the Right to Present a Defense, 61
BAYLOR L. REV. 872, 880-81 (2009) (describing the facts and holding of Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944).
33. Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the
Broad Exclusionary Principle ofRule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 513 (1988); Miller,
supra note 32. Before Vaise, courts in England had occasionally and very cautiously allowed post-
trial juror testimony to challenge the validity of verdicts. Miller, supra note 32. The ruling in Vaise
eliminated that practice. Id.
34. Miller, supra note 32, at 881.
35. Id. at 881-82.
36. 53 U.S. 361 (1851), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
37. Id. at 361-62, 367. In Reid, the newspaper in question contained a report about the evidence
in the case that the juror was deciding. Id. at 362. According to the juror, he only read the report to
refresh his memory and the report had "no influence on his verdict" as "he had made up his mind
before he read [the paper]." Id.
38. Id. at 366.
39. 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
40. Miller, supra note 32, at 881-82 (describing the facts and holding of Wright, 20 Iowa at
197, 210, 212, 215).
41. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017).
42. Id. The Iowa Rule as stated in Wright expressly allowed juror testimony to show that "a
juror was approached by a party"; a verdict was reached by "the drawing of lots"; the verdict was a
quotient verdict; and extraneous facts not in evidence were presented to the jury. Jessica L. West, 12
Racist Men: Post- Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 172
(2011) (citing Wright, 20 Iowa at 210). Not admissible was "any matter which does not essentially
inhere in the verdict itself," including testimony that a juror did not agree with the verdict, had misun-
derstood the jury instructions, or was "unduly influenced" by other jurors' statements. Id (quoting
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courts adopting Iowa's loosened interpretation of the no-impeachment
rule.43 Another modification to the no-impeachment rule, coined as the
"federal approach," emerged in the early twentieth century.4 4 Under the
federal approach, jurors were only allowed to testify about events that
were "extraneous to the deliberative process" such as "reliance on outside
evidence4 5 or personal investigation of the facts."46 All testimony about
deliberations, even if that testimony was about objective facts and events,
was barred.4 7
The Supreme Court's early decisions failed to establish a clear pref-
erence for either version of the no-impeachment rule.48 But in 1915, the
Court explicitly rejected the Iowa Rule, holding in McDonald v. Pless49
that "juror testimony about objective events in the jury room" could not
be used to challenge a verdict.5 0 However, the Court again qualified its
ruling by reiterating that in the "gravest and most important cases" it may
be impossible to exclude juror testimony "without 'violating the plainest
principles of justice.'"
The no-impeachment rule's development peaked in 1975 when Con-
gress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 2 Initially, the House of Rep-
resentatives sought to adopt a no-impeachment rule similar to the Iowa
Rule, fearing that a strict rule would promote injustice.53 But the Senate
disagreed due to concerns that adopting the Iowa Rule would destroy the
Wright, 20 Iowa at 210). "The line the court drew, essentially, was between evidence of 'the mental
processes ofjurors,' which was inadmissible, and of 'overt acts,' which was admissible." Id. (quoting
Jack Pope, The Mental Operations ofJurors, 40 TEX. L. REv. 849, 851 (1962)).
43. Crump, supra note 33, at 516 n.51.
44. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2014).
45. Outside evidence under the federal approach included newspapers, dictionaries, and state-
ments made to or in the presence ofjurors about facts not in evidence. See Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct.
at 863; 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6071, 432-33 (2d ed. 2007).
46. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
47. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987). Under the federal approach, jurors were
deemed incompetent to testify about "a compromise verdict, a quotient verdict, speculation as to in-
surance coverage, misinterpretation of instructions, misuse of evidence, mistake in returning a verdict,
and misinterpretation of the guilty plea." 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45.
48. Sometimes the Court endorsed the Iowa Rule. See Mattox v. United States, 146.U.S. 140,
148-49 (1892) (holding that juror testimony alleging that a prejudicial newspaper and a bailiffs com-
ments about the defendant had influenced the jury could be admitted to challenge the verdict). Other
times, the Court held more narrowly that juror testimony should rarely be admissible to challenge a
verdict. See United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851).
49. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
50. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864 (summarizing the facts of McDonald, wherein the Court
held that evidence of a quotient verdict was inadmissible).
51. Id. (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269).
52. Id.
53. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Prelim-
inary Draft ofProposed Rules ofEvidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46
F.R.D. 161, 290 (1969) ("The familiar rubric that a juror may not impeach his own verdict, dating
from Lord Mansfield's time, is a gross oversimplification. ... [S]imply putting verdicts beyond effec-
tive reach can only promote irregularity and injustice."); Miller, supra note 32, at 887.
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54
confidentiality of deliberations and encourage litigants to harass jurors.
Instead, the Senate proposed a narrower rule similar to the federal ap-
proach. The Senate's version won and was signed into law becoming
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
Rule 606(b) created a strict no-impeachment rule with very few ex-
ceptions.5 7 Under Rule 606(b), jurors cannot testify about and the court
cannot receive affidavits or evidence on "any statement made or incident
that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that
juror or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning
the verdict or indictment."5 8 This strict bar on postverdict testimony is sub-
ject to three narrow exceptions.5 9 These three exceptions allow jurors to
testify about (1) extraneous prejudicial information, (2) outside influence,
and (3) mistakes made in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.60 Fol-
lowing the federal passage of Rule 606(b), most states followed suit by
enacting their own no-impeachment rules that strongly mirrored the exact
terms and exceptions of the federal rule.6 '
But something glaring was missing from this new rule. Despite the
nation's evinced belief in and insistence on juries rendering fair and im-
partial verdicts, Rule 606(b) and its state counterparts had completely for-
gotten to account for allegations of juror racial bias in the text of their no-
impeachment rules.62 The legal precedent surrounding these codified no-
impeachment rules also shied away from addressing the question of
54. See Crump, supra note 33, at 521 n.86; see also S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), as
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7060 (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267) ("[L]et it once be
established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside
on the testimony of those who took part ... and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed
by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would
be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure . . . evidence of facts which
might . . . set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to
make . . . private deliberation[s] the constant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference."); 117 CONG. REC. 33,645 (1971) (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1999) (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("The mischief in [the House rule] ought to be plain for all
to see. . . . Were it possible to overturn a decision because ... it was not based on precedent, but bias,
and this was an issue that could be litigated, it would indeed be brought before the courts. .. . I do not
believe it would be possible to conduct trials . .. if every verdict were followed by a post-trial hearing
into the conduct of the juror's deliberations.").
55. Peiha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864.
56. Id at 864-65.
57. Id.
58. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
59. Id. 606(b)(2).
60. Id. Broadly speaking, Rule 606(b) bars the admission ofjuror testimony to demonstrate that
jurors compromised, misunderstood the law or evidence, were strapped for time, were under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol, hurled expletives at each other, or threw chairs. THOMAS A. MAUET &
WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE 48 (5th ed. 2011). In contrast, Rule 606(b) does allow jurors
to testify about statements made by bailiffs, prejudicial newspaper stories or unadmitted documents
that found their way into the jury room, and whether jurors visited the crime scene or conducted ex-
periments with the exhibits. Id.
61. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, at § 6071; Miller, supra note 32, at 890.
62. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, at § 6071 nn.60-75.
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whether Rule 606(b) effectively allowed jury verdicts tainted by racism to
stand.6 3
The Supreme Court's initial decisions about Rule 606(b) also failed
64to address this question. After the rule's enactment, the Supreme Court
interpreted its exceptions in two cases, repeatedly holding that Rule 606(b)
prohibits challenging verdicts with juror testimony that relates to "the in-
ternal, mental processes by which the verdict was reached."65 In Tanner v.
United States,66 the Court barred the use of juror testimony alleging jurors
were drunk and high during the trial from challenging the final verdict,
holding that voluntarily ingested substances were an internal, not external,
67 6influence. And in Warger v. Shauers, the Court held that juror testi-
mony alleging that another juror lied during voir dire about improper sym-
pathies towards a party was also barred because personal beliefs are inter-
-69
nal, not external, information.
While stating in Warger that "[t]here may be cases of juror bias so
extreme that . .. the jury trial right has been abridged," the Court neglected
to clarify what those cases might be and whether cases involving racist
jurors were covered.70 In fact, the Court almost implied the opposite by
repeatedly holding in both Tanner and Warger that Rule 606(b)'s near to-
tal ban on using juror testimony to challenge verdicts did not violate the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 71 because preexisting safe-
guards-specifically voir dire and courtroom oversight-sufficiently pro-
tect that right.72 Despite a history of confronting racial animus within the
jury,7 3 the Supreme Court had little to say about Rule 606(b) and its im-
plied bar on challenging jury verdicts after learning of a juror's alleged
racism.74
63. See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017). It was generally accepted by
state and federal courts that racial bias was neither extraneous information or outside influence and
thus did not fit into one of the three exceptions written into Rule 606(b). See Andrew D. Leipold,
Objective Tests and Subjective Bias. Some Problems ofDiscriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73
CHI-KENT L. REV. 559, 581 (1998). And until the Supreme Court's decision in Peia-Rodriguez, the
federal Courts of Appeal were split on whether the Constitution required a separate racial bias excep-
tion, while only sixteen states recognized such an exception. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865.
64. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866-67.
65. Id. at 866; STEPHEN GOODE & OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON
FEDERAL EVIDENCE 371 (2016).
66. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
67. Id. at 116-17, 122.
68. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
69. Id. at 529.
70. Pelia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866-67.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529; Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
73. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (holding that litigants may not
exclude a prospective juror because of race); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (hold-
ing that the Constitution sometimes requires defendants be allowed to voir dire on racial bias); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1880) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
excluding a juror because of his or her race), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
74. See Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
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But perhaps it was just waiting for the right case. On April 4, 2016,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear Peila-Rodriguez,7 5 which asked the pre-
cise question that the courts had dodged for so many years: whether the
no-impeachment rule could constitutionally bar "evidence of racial bias
offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury." 76 The Court's precedent on Rule 606(b) indicated the answer was
likely yes because the Court strongly believed that existing safeguards
were enough to guarantee impartiality, even in cases of racial bias.77 How-
ever, the Court's repeated insistence that in some cases it would be impos-
sible to exclude certain juror testimony without "violating the plainest
principles of justice" provided an opening for the Court to find a racial
bias exception to the no-impeachment rule.7 8 In Peila-Rodriguez, the Court
finally embraced that dicta.79
II.PERA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO
A. Facts
Miguel Pefia-Rodriguez was charged with unlawful sexual contact
and harassment after he allegedly sexually assaulted two young girls at a
race track.80 During voir dire, potential jurors were repeatedly asked if they
could be impartial and not a single juror indicated any inability to be fair
"based on rac[ial] or any other bias."8 1 But immediately following Pefla-
Rodriguez's conviction, two jurors contacted defense counsel and alleged
that another juror had expressed vitriolic anti-Hispanic sentiment towards
Pefia-Rodriguez.82 According to sworn affidavits taken from both jurors,83
during deliberations Juror H.C. commented that Pefia-Rodriguez was
guilty because "[Pefa-Rodriguez was] Mexican and Mexican men take
whatever they want"; "Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to
believe they could do whatever they wanted with women"; and "nine times
out of ten Mexicans were guilty of being aggressive towards women."84
B. Procedural History
Based on Juror H.C.'s statements, Pefia-Rodriguez moved for a new
trial. The Colorado trial court denied the motion, holding that testimony
75. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari of the
case ofPefia-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 297 (Colo. 2015)).
76. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Peila-Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 1513 (No. 15-606), 2015
WL 7008801, at *7-8.
77. See Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529; Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
78. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851), overruledin part by Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467 (1918).
79. Peria-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
80. Id. at 861.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 861-62.
83. Id. at 861.




about jury deliberations is inadmissible under Colorado Rule of Evidence
606(b) which, like its federal counterpart, bars the use ofjury testimony to
challenge a verdict unless the testimony is about extraneous information,
outside influence, or a verdict form mistake.86 The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, stating that Juror H.C.'s statements did not fall within an
exception to Rule 606(b) and were inadmissible.87 The Colorado Supreme
Court also affirmed, relying heavily on the Court's decisions in both Tan-
ner and Warger.88 The United States Supreme Court then granted certio-
rari.89
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy authored the opinion of the Court.90 Justices Gins-
burg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy's full opin-
ion.91 The Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling, holding
that the Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no-impeachment
rule when jurors overtly rely on racial bias to convict a criminal defend-
ant.92 Justice Kennedy began by discussing the vital importance of jury
trials, as well as the important policy considerations behind the no-im-
peachment rule, reiterating the Court's long held belief that while juror
misconduct is extremely troubling, the jury system would likely not sur-
vive efforts to eliminate every instance of improper behavior.93 However,
Justice Kennedy quickly noted that such policy concerns are not para-
mount in instances of racism, "a familiar and recurring evil that ... risk[s]
systematic injury to the administration of justice."94
Justice Kennedy then distinguished Peila-Rodriguez from Tanner
and Warger, stating that racial bias within the jury system is different from
mere juror misbehavior because the jury is "a criminal defendant's funda-
mental 'protection of life and liberty against' racial prejudice."9 5 Although
86. Id. Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) states that
[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial in-
formation was improperly brought to the jurors' attention, (2) whether any outside influ-
ence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in
entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying.
COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
87. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 862-63.
90. Id. at 860.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 869.
93. Id. at 860-61, 868.
94. Id. at 868.
95. Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987)).
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sympathetic to concerns about harming the jury system through efforts to
make it infallible, Justice Kennedy dismissed those concerns, stating that
efforts to eliminate racism from the black box were not efforts to perfect
the jury but instead efforts to ensure that the jury comes "ever closer to the
promise of equal treatment under the law."
96
The majority opinion then asserted that the existing safeguards cited
to so vociferously in Tanner and Warger97 are insufficient at preventing
racial bias from infiltrating a jury.98 General questions about a juror's im-
partiality may fail to expose specific biases, while more targeted questions
can exacerbate xisting prejudices without exposing racist beliefs.99 And
the stigma attached to racial bias can make it difficult for jurors to report
biased statements before rendering a verdict because it is hard to call a
fellow juror a bigot. 00 While noting that this ineffectiveness alone is not
dispositive, Justice Kennedy asserted that the nation's long history with
racism provided a sound basis to treat such bias with extra caution.o 0
Based solidly on the repeated and extremely damaging impact that
racial bias has on the promise of equal treatment and impartial juries, the
Court held that the Constitution requires a racial bias exception to the no-
impeachment rule.1 02 More specifically, when a juror evinces a reliance on
racial bias in convicting a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial juryl03 requires that juror testimony about such alleged bias
be admissible to challenge the validity of the resulting verdict and any de-
nial of the defendant's right to a jury trial.104 However, for this exception
to apply, a juror's biased statement(s) must exhibit "overt racial bias that
cast[s] serious doubt [up]on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's de-
liberations and [final] verdict."10 5 And the statement must strongly show
that racial bias was "a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to
convict."l 06
Justice Kennedy then concluded by acknowledging that the Court's
decision was merely a single stride in the nation's ongoing efforts to "over-
come race-based iscrimination" and that much more would be required,
96. Id.
97. The existing safeguards that the Court relied on when deciding both Tanner and Warger
were voir dire, courtroom oversight, and preverdict juror reporting of racist statements. Id. at 866.
98. Id. at 868-69.
99. Id. at 869.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 868-69.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
104. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868-69.
105. Id. at 869.
106. Id. How significant of a factor this bias must be was a question that the Supreme Court
declined to answer, instead leaving the determination of when a statement is racist enough for the
racial bias exception to apply to the discretion of the trial courts. Id. at 870. The Court also entrusted
the trial courts with the development of the exact nuances of the racial bias exception, including any
local rules or jury instructions that might be helpful or applicable. Id. at 870-71.
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perhaps in the form of local rules or jury instructions,107 to effectuate the
decision's full potential.os
D. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,
authored the main dissent. 109 Justice Alito's dissent focused heavily on the
public policy considerations surrounding the confidentiality of the jury
process, asserting that such policy concerns outweighed the injury in-
curred by litigants whose convictions were the result of racial bias.1 10 In
addition to this balancing, Justice Alito also asserted that the Sixth Amend-
ment and its corresponding precedent do not require a racial bias exception
to the no-impeachment rule because nothing in the amendment's text or
history suggests that the right to an impartial jury depends on the type of
bias exhibited by a juror.1
To justify his balancing, Justice Alito asserted that juries "occupy a
unique place in our justice system" because they-unlike judges and law-
yers-deliberate in largely unregulated spaces and "debate, argue, and
make decisions" as ordinary people do.1 12 According to Justice Alito, al-
lowing the jury room door to be pried open by a racial bias exception
would destroy the confidentiality that jury deliberations thrive on and
could easily lead to negative ramifications. 113 These ramifications, includ-
ing unwilling and harassed jurors, are all consequences that could break
the jury system beyond repair.l14
Justice Alito also based his balancing on the belief that existing safe-
guards do adequately prevent racial bias from infiltrating juries because
lawyers can carefully frame voir dire questions to elicit bias and use per-
emptory strikes to remove suspicious jurors. " And even if jurors are too
hesitant to call out racism,. Justice Alito argued that he policy supporting
the no-impeachment rule still reigns supreme because postverdict report-
ing is particularly disruptive to the legal system.'16
107. Id. at 871. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy specifically stated that strategically
crafted jury instructions can be vital in both explaining ajuror's duty to deliberate in a bias-free manner
and limiting the use of the racial bias exception to rare cases. Id. at 871. 1 agree and also believe that
such instructions can best maximize the racial bias exception's impact on the jury trial system. See
infra Section III.D.
108. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871.
109. Id. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
110. Id.; see infra Section IlI.C. for a broader discussion of these public policy concerns.
I11. Pehia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882-83 ("What the Sixth Amendment protects is the right to
an 'impartial jury.' Nothing in the text or history of the Amendment .. . suggests that the extent of the
protection provided ... depends on the nature ofa jury's partiality or bias.... Nor .. . [does] the Sixth
Amendment recognize[] . . . [a] hierarchy of partiality or bias.").
112. Id. at 874.
113. See id. at 874-75, 884-85.
114. See id. at 884-85.
115. Id at 878, 880.
116. Id at 882.
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E. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas authored a separate dissent to explain why an
originalist reading of the Constitution bars finding a racial bias exception
to the no-impeachment rule." 7 When the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were ratified, jurors were not allowed to supply any evidence of
misconduct to challenge a verdict.'18 According to Justice Thomas, be-
cause common law held that criminal verdicts could not be challenged
with juror testimony alleging juror misconduct, there was no legal basis
for a racial bias exception to the rule.'1 9 While Justice Thomas noted that
there may be valid reasons to modify or even eliminate the no-impeach-
ment rule, he adamantly asserted that such a decision be left to the political
process.120
III. ANALYSIS
In Peiha-Rodriguez, the Court finally gave teeth to its long line of
dicta stating that there may be cases where juror testimony cannot be ex-
cluded "without violating the plainest principles ofjustice."l 2 1 By holding
that the Constitution demands an exception to the no-impeachment rule
when a juror's overt racial bias influences a vote to convict,122 the Court
took a critically needed step towards further limiting the havoc that racial
bias can wreak within the legal system. However, that step was incom-
plete.
This Part will first examine the intricate ways in which racial bias
continues to permeate the criminal justice system and deeply inhibits he
promise of "equal treatment under the law."' 23 This Part will then argue
that the legal system's current safeguards against racial bias are woefully
ineffective at preventing jurors from relying on racism when convicting a
criminal defendant. Next, this Part proposes that the public policy ration-
ales frequently advanced in support of a strict no-impeachment rule pale
in comparison to the need to limit racial bias's devastating effects. Last,
this Part acknowledges the limitations of Peiia-Rodriguez and asserts that
the racial bias exception's maximum impact will only be realized if the
exception is coupled with strategically crafted, race-conscious jury in-
structions.
117. Id. at 871 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 872-74 ("Our common-law history does not establish that-in either 1791 (when the
Sixth Amendment was ratified) or in 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified)-a defend-
ant had the right to impeach a verdict with juror testimony of juror misconduct. In fact, it strongly
suggests that such evidence was prohibited.").
119. Id. at 874.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851), overruledin part by Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467 (1918).
122. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
123. Id. at 868.
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A. Despite the Judiciary's Many Efforts, the Criminal Justice and Jury
Trial Systems Remain Deeply Racist Institutions
In Peila-Rodriguez, Justice Kennedy remarked on the criminal justice
system's long history with racism and the Court's perennial role in trying
to eradicate that bias. 124 In enacting the Civil War Amendments, the nation
sought to "purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice."1 25
And by continually ruling that racial discrimination in all areas of public
life is impermissible, the judicial system worked to advance this same
goal.12 6 But history has deftly shown that adding a bar on racial discrimi-
nation to the Constitution and using the legal system to enforce that bar
has not been enough to eliminate racial bias.127
Immediately after the passage of the Civil War Amendments, states
across the nation sought to circumvent those amendments, and the juris-
prudence accompanying them, by passing laws and enacting practices that
relegated racial minorities to a permanent status as second-class citi-
zens.128 These actions extended to the jury system with many Southern
states refising to select minorities as jurors, a practice that soon led to all-
white juries overwhelmingly voting to convict people of color while sim-
ultaneously voting to acquit white defendants charged with crimes against
minorities.129 "Whether it was freeing the white defendants who murdered
Emmett Till 130 or convicting black defendants who were falsely ac-
cused,'3 1 history is littered with ugly incidents of juries using their power
124. Id. at 867.
125. Id
126. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1986) (holding that excluding a prospective
juror from the jury solely because of race violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that statutes that prohibit interracial
marriage violate the qual protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation within public schools vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
127. See Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence ofDenial and
Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1323-29 (1991) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment's legal
ineffectiveness in eliminating racial bias from the nation's laws and policies).
128. See id. at 1326-28.
129. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867 (describing a year in Texas where all-white juries decided
500 prosecutions of white defendants who had been charged with murdering black people and acquit-
ted every single white defendant); see also, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-85 (1986) (holding that liti-
gants may not exclude a prospective juror because of race); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527
(1973) (holding that the Constitution sometimes requires defendants be allowed to voir dire on racial
bias); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits excluding a juror because of his or her race), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
130. See The Murder of Enmitt Till, LIBR. CONGRESS: C.R. HIST. PROJECT,
https://www.loc.gov/collections/civil-rights-history-project/articles-and-essays/murder-of-emmett-
till (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
131. See Jacey Fortin, Florida Apologizes for 'Gross Injustices' to Four Black Men, Decades
Later, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/us/groveland-four-apology-
florida.html; see also GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE (2012) (recounting the wrongful convic-
tions of the Groveland Boys, a group of four black men falsely accused of rape by a white woman).
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to disadvantage minorities."l32 While Congressl33 and the Court 34 have
both spent decades trying to confront and minimize racial bias within the
legal system, such bias-including within the jury trial system-still ex-
It.131ists.
The criminal justice system thrives on discretion.136 Police cannot ar-
rest everyone who breaks the law.'37 Prosecutors have "enormous leeway
in deciding whom and what to charge," as well as immense control over
plea bargaining.13 8 And juries have near total discretion in reaching ver-
dicts, the review of which is often highly deferential to the jury's initial
finding.' 39 Discretion allows the criminal justice system to best use and
prioritize its limited resources, while giving its actors-jurors included-
the power to make sure that the punishment fits the crime.140 It is highly
unlikely that the criminal justice system would remain workable without
this discretion and the flexibility and resourcefulness it provides. 141
However, racial bias also thrives on this same discretion.142 Despite
its benefits, discretion within the criminal justice system is arbitrary and
lacks a mechanism for public accountability.143 These flaws give racism a
friendly place to breed, develop, and grow.144 Racial bias within the legal
system effectively "hides behind discretion" and since every part of the
legal process incorporates discretion to some extent, opportunities for rac-
ism to alter a defendant's life exist at every stage. 14 Minorities are more
likely to be stopped by the police than whites.146 Minorities are also ar-
rested and incarcerated at numbers highly disproportionate to their per-
centage of the population.147 And minorities are overwhelmingly un-
derrepresented in jury pools.1 48
132. Leipold, supra note 63, at 579 (footnote omitted).
133. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
134. Id.; see also supra notes 73, 126 and accompanying text.
135. See Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861-62.
136. Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race. The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 20, 27 (1998).
140. See id at 20.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 21; Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
143. See Davis, supra note 139, at 20-21.
144. See id at 21.
145. Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
146. See id at 565.
147. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC JUSTICE IN
STATE PRISONS 4 (2016); Arrests by Race 2014, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-43 (last visited Sept. 11,
2017).
148. Leipold, supra note 63, at 579 n.82.
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Studies continually show that black, Latino, and Hispanic drivers are
more likely to be stopped and searched by police than their white counter-
parts.149 A 2011 Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that thirteen per-
cent of black drivers were stopped by police, compared to only ten percent
of white drivers.15 0 And a 2017 study by Stanford University found strik-
ingly similar results: black and Latino drivers were stopped and searched
at least twice as frequently as whites. That same study also concluded
that black and Latino drivers were stopped and searched "on the basis of
far less evidence" than white drivers,152 and that those same minority driv-
ers were over twenty percent more likely than whites to receive a ticket.153
Statistics also repeatedly show that people of color are arrested at
percentages highly disproportionate to their total population.15 4 According
to the 2010 U.S. Census, black people make up 13.6% of the U.S. popula-
tion, Hispanics and Latinos 16.3%,156 and whites 74.8%.'15 But some-
how, in 2014, black people were nearly twenty-eight percent of those ar-
rested for crimes, while another eighteen percent of those arrested were
Hispanics and Latinos.158 In addition to being arrested at higher percent-
ages, people of color are also incarcerated at greater rates than whites.15 9
A 2016 report by the Sentencing Project found that black people were "in-
carcerated in state prisons at a rate . . . 5.1 times the imprisonment of
whites."'60 And despite making up barely sixteen percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation, twenty-one percent of those incarcerated in state prisons were His-
panic.161 Despite the benefits that discretion provides to the criminal jus-
tice system, these statistics vividly demonstrate that this broad discretion
149. Traffic Stops, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017); Richard Winton, Black and Latino Drivers Are Searched Based on Less Evi-
dence and Are More Likely to Be Arrested, Stanford Researchers Find, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2017,
11:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-stanford-minority-drive-disparties-
20170619-story.html.
150. Traffic Stops, supra note 149; see also Winton, supra note 149 (describing the results of a
2017 study which found that "[fjor every 100 black drivers, about 15 were pulled over, compared with
10 stops for every 100 white and Latino driver[s]").
151. Winton, supra note 149. Specifically, this study found that for every one hundred stops,
black drivers were searched six times, Latino drivers were searched four times, and white drivers were
only searched two times. Id.
152. Id.
153. Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017).
154. Leipold, supra note 63, at 561 n.9.
155. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011).
156. SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011).
157. LINDSAY HIXSON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011).
158. See Arrests by Race 2014, supra note 147.
159. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 147, at 3.
160. Id.
161. ENNIS ET AL., supra note 156; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 147.
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also provides state actors with "a nearly uninterrupted chance to make il-
legitimate judgments based on race."'62
Trial by jury also thrives on discretion, allowing the influence of ra-
cial bias to further seep into the legal system's decision-making process.163
State- and city-level studies show that people of color are frequently un-
derrepresented on juries, even in cities where minorities make up large
chunks of the total population.1 6 4 In Caddo Parish, Louisiana, a 2015 study
found that while forty-eight percent of the parish's population was black,
"the typical 12-member criminal jury [often] had fewer than four blacks
on it.',165 In 2011, a study ofjuries in New York state found nearly identical
results: People of color were continually "underrepresented in many coun-
ties where they constitute[d] more than 10 percent of the adult over-18
population."l66 And during a six-month span in 2016, public defenders in
San Francisco, California, "counted at least six trials in which not one pro-
spective juror was African American."l67
A wealth of research has also found that juries are more likely to con-
vict people of color than whites, even when the facts in two separate cases
are identical.168 In a 1982 mock juror study, white students read transcripts
of four different crimes (rape, murder, drug sale, and burglary) and then
rated a hypothetical defendant's likelihood of guilt.' 69 The race of the de-
fendant was systematically varied while the facts of the case remained
static.170 In seven out of eight instances, the participants' "estimated prob-
ability of guilt was higher for the black defendant than the white defend-
ant.""'7 A 1983 study involving Hispanic defendants came to the same
conclusion: white jurors were more likely than their Hispanic counterparts
162. Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
163. See id.
164. See, e.g., Vivian Ho, For SF's Black Defendants, It's Hard to Find Jury of Peers, S.F.
CHRON. (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/For-SF-s-black-
defendants-it-s-hard-to-find-10977625.php; Adam Liptak, Exclusion ofBlacks From Juries Raises
Renewed Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/ex-
clusion-of-blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html; Dan Rivoli, In N.Y Jury Pools, Blacks
and Hispanics Underrepresented: Report, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011, 6:34 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/ny-jury-pools-blacks-hispanics-underrepresented-report-380828.
165. Liptak, supra note 164. The article also noted that "[m]uch of the gap had nothing to do
with peremptory strikes. Of the 8,318 potential jurors in the study, which reviewed 332 trials from
2003 to 2012, only 35 percent were black." Id.
166. Rivoli, supra note 164. More specifically, black residents in Erie County (home to Buffalo,
NY) made up twelve percent of the population but only seven percent of jurors; black people were
underrepresented by thirty percent in Staten Island juries; and Hispanics were unrepresented in jury
pools for every single borough of New York City. Id.
167. Ho, supra note 164.
168. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1625-
26(1985).





to attribute guilt to a hypothetical Hispanic defendant. 172 And more re-
cently, a 2012 empirical study of Florida juries found that when no black
jurors were in a case's jury pool, "black defendants [were] convicted at an
81 percent rate" compared to white defendants, who were only convicted
at a 66 percent rate.173 In the same study, the researchers also found that
the conviction rate equalizes-seventy-one percent conviction rate for
black defendants, compared to a seventy-three percent conviction rate for
whites-when the jury pool includes at least one black potential juror.174
As this data demonstrates, the jury system is a very effective conduit
for racism, allowing it to flow into and throughout voir dire, deliberations,
and the final verdict. Again, one of the key reasons for this is the immense
amount of discretion invested in the jury system.175 The potential for racial
bias to tinge a decision is strongly exacerbated when "decisions are made
outside [of] the public eye."'7 6 This is precisely where juries deliberate.17 7
And much of that deliberation occurs without oversight, allowing a juror's
racial bias to easily stay secret. Moreover, racism's ability to co-opt the
jury-in addition to its effects on the criminal defendant in question-fur-
ther compounds the impact that racial bias exerts at the earlier stages of
the criminal justice process.179
While allowing jurors to deliberate in private and express candid
views is important, so is preventing criminal defendants from being con-
victed because of their race. And failing to provide defendants with a rem-
edy when their conviction is based on blatant racial bias is antithetical to
the criminal justice system's basic guarantees of fairness and impartial-
ity. so Our current system of trial by jury provides jurors with a nearly un-
fettered ability to convict defendants based on racist beliefs, which jurors
routinely do.'8 ' Such a fallacy sharply demonstrates why the Court's deci-
sion in Peiha-Rodriguez was a necessary step in the nation's continual ef-
forts to "overcome race-based discrimination."'82 And the correctness of
this decision is further evidenced by the fact that existing safeguards alone
172. Id. at 1629. These same white jurors were also more likely to think that the Hispanic de-
fendant was unintelligent and dishonest. Id.
173. Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact ofJury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017,
1019 (2012).
174. Id.




179. Id. at 582.
180. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965) ("In essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure
to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process." (quoting Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).
181. See generally id
182. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017).
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are never enough to bar racial bias's entrance into the black box and in-
stead often further insulate racism from attack.183
B. The Existing Safeguards Provided by Voir Dire and Courtroom Over-
sight Are Not Enough to Protect Criminal Defendants from Juror Ra-
cial Bias
The legal system relies on "juries to be the primary backstop against
race-based behavior."'84 But current safeguards designed to ensure that ra-
cial bias cannot infiltrate the jury, including voir dire and courtroom over-
sight, are extremely ineffective at keeping racism out of the courtroom and
evince the need for something more.18 5 In no place can the woeful inade-
quacy of these safeguards be seen more intensely than in the experiences
of many criminal defendants of color, whose guilty verdicts were irrepa-
rably tainted by a juror's overt racial bias.
Peila-Rodriguez is but a single example of how existing safeguards
routinely fail to weed out racially biased jurors. 18 In United States v. Hen-
ley,18 7 a jury convicted three black men on drug trafficking charges.'88
During voir dire, the jurors were directly asked if racial bias would affect
their ability to be impartial.189 No jurors indicated any concerns about pos-
sible bias.'90 Yet after the defendants were convicted, it came to the court's
attention that while carpooling to the courthouse a juror had allegedly re-
marked to his fellow jurors that "[a]ll the niggers should hang" and "[t]he
niggers are guilty."'91
In Benally v. United States,192 a jury convicted an American Indian
man of assault with a deadly weapon.193 A day after the verdict was ren-
dered, a juror came forward alleging that during deliberations the jury
foreman had said that "[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk" and
that "when they get drunk, they get violent."' 94 These comments were ac-
companied by a larger group sentiment of needing to convict the defendant
to "send a message back to the reservation."9 5 Again, the jurors in Benally
were asked about their ability to be impartial on race and not a single juror
raised any concerns of bias.196
183. Id. at 868-69.
184. Leipold, supra note 63, at 588.
185. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868-69.
186. Id. at 861-62.
187. 238 F.3d 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
188. Id
189. Id at 1121.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1113-14.
192. 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
193. Id.
194. Id. (alteration in original).
195. Id. at 1231-32.
196: Id. at 1231.
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Finally, in United States v. Shalhout,'97 two men of Middle Eastern
descent were convicted on wire fraud and money laundering charges.198
At trial the defendants sought to voir dire potential jurors on racial bias,
only to have that request denied by the trial court judge who was "not con-
vinced that the questions were necessary."l99 But a week after the guilty
verdict was entered an alternate juror came forward alleging that during
deliberations the other alternate juror had stated "[y]ou know they [sic]
guilty, right? They [sic] lying. All Arabs are liars, are thieves[,]" a senti-
ment reportedly shared by the jurors responsible for deciding the case.200
In Henley, Benally, and Shalhout, neither voir dire nor courtroom
oversight could catch the racial bias pervading the jury until a verdict had
been entered and it was too late to stop the conviction.20' And not a single
juror in any of these three cases disclosed this bias until after the trial was
over.202
In all three cases, the existing safeguards cited to so enthusiastically
in the Court's previous decisions on the no-impeachment rule did nothing
to prevent racial bias from effortlessly sauntering into the jury room and
influencing the conviction of numerous criminal defendants of color. And
these few examples are but a small sampling of the many cases where ex-
isting safeguards failed to uncover racial bias.03 Courts rely on juries to
204
serve as the legal system's final barrier against racism. Yet as the above
examples demonstrate, voir dire and courtroom oversight alone are rou-
tinely incapable of ensuring that jurors do not make illegitimate judgments
based on race, thereby denying criminal defendants the right to a fair trial
205and an impartial jury.
The above examples also show that it is far too easy for jurors to lie
about and hide their racial bias, even when directly asked about hose bi-
ases. Unlike intoxication or falling asleep, overt bias is nearly impossible
197. 507 F. App'x 201 (3d Cir. 2012).
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting the district court).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 202-04; Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231-32; United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1111-
12 (9th Cir. 2001).
202. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x at 202-04; Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231-32; Henley, 238 F.3d at 1112.
In Henley, a juror did go to the defendant's house while the trial was ongoing to tell him about the
alleged misconduct, as part of a ploy to acquire a job with the Los Angeles Rams. Henley, 238 F.3d at
1112-13. However, the facts of the case do not indicate that either defense counsel or the judge knew
about the misconduct until that same juror was deposed by defense counsel after the trial. Id. at 1113.
203. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 63, at 579-81; Miller, supra note 32, at 876-77, 897; see also
United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (juror remarked during deliberations that "I
guess we're profiling but [Hispanics] cause all the trouble"); Shillcut v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156
(7th Cir. 1987) (juror stated during deliberations, "[1]et's be logical. He's black and he sees a seven-
teen-year-old white girl-I know the type."); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir.
1981) (juror commented during deliberations that the appellant "'should be taught a lesson' for hiring
Mexican nationals").
204. Leipold, supra note 63, at 588.
205. Peila-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868-69 (2017).
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for judges, attorneys, and others to catch during a trial because such bias
cannot be readily detected through silent observation.206 Voir dire is also
highly ineffective at eliciting implicit bias, which research shows is now
racism's most prevalent form.207 And although a juror's bias may not play
a role in the actual trial, once jurors have made their way to the jury room
and begun engaging in deliberations it becomes easy for both implicit and
explicit biases to creep out and direct a juror's vote.208 These biases, un-
caught by either voir dire or courtroom oversight, are then allowed to dras-
tically influence and undermine the jury's final verdict.2 09
Additionally, "the Supreme Court has virtually eliminated any con-
stitutional right to question jurors [about] racial prejudice."210 Defendants
are only entitled to voir dire on racial bias in two narrow instances: when
a "capital defendant is accused of an interracial crime" and "when the facts
in a case are such that it would be a violation of due process to deny ques-
tioning on the issue of racial bias."211 In all other cases, allowing race-
relevant voir dire is left to the discretion of the judge, who may easily fail
to realize when such voir dire is needed.212 The purposes of voir dire-to
elicit bias and strike biased jurors for cause-cannot be fulfilled if most
defendants of color are not allowed to conduct effective voir dire.2 13 And
if the purposes of voir dire are so limited in the majority of cases involving
nonwhite defendants, then it is undeniable that voir dire alone cannot pre-
vent racial bias from slipping into the jury room.
The cases cited above also give credence to Justice Kennedy's argu-
ment that jurors are unlikely to come forward during a trial with allega-
tions of racial bias,214 as not a single juror addressed the racial bias on their
206. Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room ... But Should
It? A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule ofEvidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV.
262, 282 (2012).
207. Johnson, supra note 168, at 1675. ("[S]uperficial questions concerning whether the jurors
harbor prejudice against blacks that would prevent them from being impartial are extremely unlikely
to provoke disclosure of such bias. General questions do not reach hidden inconsistent atti-
tudes... . Asking a general question about impartiality and race is like asking whether one believes in
equality for blacks; jurors may sincerely answer yes, they believe in equality and yes, they can be
impartial, yet oppose interracial marriage and believe that blacks are more prone to violence.").
208. See id at 1675-76.
209. Id.; Wolin, supra note 206, at 288.
210. Johnson, supra note 168, at 1670.
211. Peter A. Joy, Race Matters in Jury Selection, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 180, 182-83
(2015); see, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525, 527 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the trial court to voir dire on racial bias in a case where a well-known black civil
rights activist who was charged with possession of marijuana asserted that law enforcement officials
had framed him to deter his civil rights work).
212. United States v. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x 201, 202-05 (3d Cir. 2012); Joy, supra note 211,
at 183.
213. Johnson, supra note 168, at 1670.




respective juries until the trial was over. This may be, as Justice Ken-
nedy stated in Peia-Rodriguez, because jurors are afraid to call fellow ju-
rors racist.216 But the failure of other jurors to tell the court about a fellow
juror's racism may also stem from the legal system's own hesitancy to talk
about racial bias. If the topic of racial bias is not sufficiently addressed
during voir dire, or jurors are not instructed on it prior to deliberations,
jurors may not know that they can, and should, report a fellow juror's
bias.217 Without hearing or knowing anything to the contrary, some jurors
may even assume racial bias is allowed since any biased jurors who make
218it to deliberations were deemed acceptable to the court during voir dire.
Even in Benally, where the Tenth Circuit held that the right to a jury
trial was not infringed by a juror's alleged racism, the court noted that
existing safeguards are fallible in cases of racial bias because "[t]he judge
will probably not be able to identify racist jurors based on trial con-
duct . . . and voir dire might be a feeble protection if a juror is determined
to lie."219 Because precedent and history show that current safeguards are
an ineffective way to limit racial bias's influence on a jury's verdict,220 an
additional safeguard is necessary to provide defendants with a remedy
when their guilt is determined by such bias. The racial bias exception to
the no-impeachment rule is an effective first step in doing just that. But
unless jurors know about the exception and are encouraged to report ra-
cially charged misconduct, it is dangerously likely that Peiha-Rodriguez's
racial bias exception may merely be an exception in name and not in prac-
tice.
C. The Severe Effects of Racial Bias Supersede the Public Policy Argu-
ments Advanced in Support a Strict No-Impeachment Rule
Despite the high prevalence and devastating effects of racial bias
within the criminal justice system, the mere existence of racism on its own
is not enough to justify a complete upheaval of the no-impeachment rule.
The strict no-impeachment rule that existed pre-Peiha-Rodriguez (without
any exceptions for a juror's racial bias) is supported by many public policy
arguments that courts have long found convincing and that the creation of
a new exception to the rule must be balanced against. However, despite
the validity of these policy goals, a thorough analysis of what the goals
really mean and do reveals that modifying the no-impeachment rule to in-
clude a racial bias exception would barely change the way that the rule
215. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x at 203; United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
2008), abrogated by Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855; United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, I112
(9th Cir. 2001).
216. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
217. Wolin, supra note 206, at 282-83.
218. Id.
219. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240.
220. If racial bias is ever to be fully eliminated from the criminal justice system, voir dire also
must be modified to better elicit racial bias from potential jurors. See infra note 283.
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operates. And the ever-existing concerns of racial bias, as well as the dan-
ger of denying access to a fair trial, provide an additional rationale for
finding that adding a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule out-
weighs the rule's general policy objectives.
Three main policy rationales for a strict no-impeachment rule are
continually advanced by the rule's supporters and have been repeatedly
relied on and endorsed by the Supreme Court.221 According to those who
support a strict no-impeachment rule, a strict rule is necessary because it
(1) prevents jurors from being harassed by limiting exposure to postverdict
pressure;222 (2) encourages free and open jury deliberation because jurors
need not worry about reprisal;223 and (3) promotes the need for finality by
224
giving legal matters an end point.
These policy goals do have a degree of validity. A strict no-impeach-
ment rule-with very few exceptions-would, at least minimally, prevent
jurors from being harassed about verdicts and deliberations following a
225trial. By making almost any information learned from jurors about their
deliberations inadmissible, litigants are likely to be deterred from wasting
valuable time obtaining essentially worthless te timony.226 A strict no-im-
peachment rule also encourages free and open jury deliberations, a critical
piece of the jury trial.227 Keeping deliberations confidential allows jurors
to candidly express their views, "without fear of embarrassment or re-
prisal,"228 which in turn permits ideas to be freely exchanged, prejudices
to be revealed, and well-reasoned arguments o prevail.229 It is not un-
founded to say that allowing jurors to be questioned about their delibera-
tions could chill the conversations jurors have230 and cause them to become
overly concerned with public reprisal.231 Last, a strict no-impeachment
221. James W. Diehm, Impeachment ofJury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 394-95 (1991); see, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 124 (1987)
("Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness requires that absolute privacy be
preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts.
Jurors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post-trial
litigation." (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7060)); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915) (stating that allowing jurors to impeach verdicts
through testimony about deliberations "would open the door to the most pernicious arts and tampering
with jurors," that "[i]t would lead to the grossest fraud and abuse," and that "no verdict would be
safe").
222. Diehm, supra note 221.
223. Id. at 399-400.
224. Id. at 402.
225. Id at 395.
226. Id.
227. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 874-75 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
228. Diehm, supra note 221, at 399.
229. Id. at 399-400.
230. Id. at 400.
231. Id. Diehm goes on to argue that, were jury deliberations not protected from public scrutiny,
"meritorious, but unpopular, views would be repressed, the timid would not speak, and ... the parties
would not have the benefit of open deliberations. Even worse, jurors may feel pressured to render
popular, rather than fair, verdicts." Id.
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rule supports the need for a verdict to be the final say in a trial. 232 By pre-
venting juror testimony from challenging verdicts, the legal system's in-
terest in finality is promoted,233 cases are decided when evidence is still
fresh and witnesses are readily available,2 34 and public confidence in the
legal system is maintained.23 5 But despite the validity of these policy ra-
tionales, they are still an insufficient basis for justifying a total bar on the
use of juror testimony to challenge verdicts tainted in blatant racism.
Protecting jurors from postverdict harassment is a noble goal. But
concerns over jurors being harassed are misplaced.236 This is because Rule
606(b)'s exceptions for outside influence and extraneous information al-
ready allow jurors to be harassed and pressured after a trial.237 The vague-
ness surrounding exactly what either of those exceptions mean has "pro-
vided losing counsel ample room to fish for potentially admissible testi-
mony concerning juror misconduct."238 And with high hopes that they
might uncover information that falls within an exception and allows a ver-
dict to be challenged, litigants eagerly take advantage of this freedom to
talk with jurors about their deliberations.239 Because Rule 606(b) already
allows parties to harass jurors, using that same concern to argue against a
racial bias exception to the rule makes little sense.240 Such an exception
merely creates one more topic of conversation for litigants to probe jurors
on, who are already questioned with gusto after most trials.241
Encouraging free and open jury deliberations is also an important
goal. But this goal too falters in the face of racial bias. First, to some de-
gree, jurors already expect hat the statements they make during delibera-
tions will be disclosed to others outside of the courtroom.24 2 Rule 606(b)
232. Id. at 402.
233. Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence ofJury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and the Con-
ditions for Legitimate Decision Making, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 77 (1993); Diehm, supra note 221,
at 402.
234. Diehm, supra note 221, at 402 ("It is well recognized that, unlike fine wine, steaks, and
cheeses, lawsuits do not improve with age.").
235. Id. ("[A]t some point, litigation must end, and ... the community must be able to rely on
court decisions as final. Destructive uncertainty may develop if courts are viewed as indecisive, and
verdicts can be attacked months or even years after the litigation has ended.").
236. Pefia-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 297 (Colo. 2015) (Marquez, J., dissenting), rev'd,
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
237. Id.
238. Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a Verdict Was the Product ofRacial Bias, 9
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 131 (1993).
239. See Peha-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 297 (Mirquez, J., dissenting); Gold, supra note 238, at
131, 131 n.28 ("Since the [no-impeachment] rule has numerous exceptions, and in criminal cases in-
quiries into constitutional violations might be appropriate despite the language of the rule, the rule
does not eliminate the need for the conscientious lawyer to interview jurors to assess whether the jurors
have committed misconduct and whether this particular type of misconduct is susceptible to juror
testimony.").
240. See Peha-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 297 (Mdrquez, ., dissenting).
241. See id.; Gold, supra note 238, at 131 n.28.
242. Peha-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 297 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting); see Wolin, supra note 206, at
294-95 (explaining that it is known to many jurors that other jurors often conduct postverdict inter-
views with the press and even write books about their jury experiences, leading to an implied under-
standing that juror statements made during deliberations are not confidential).
832 [Vol. 95:3
2018] A CRITICAL BUT INCOMPLETE STEP 833
does not prohibit jurors from talking about their verdicts, it only bars using
that testimony to challenge verdicts.24 3 And jurors routinely and voluntar-
ily reveal details of their deliberations to friends, family, and even the me-
dia.244 Knowing that the contents of jury deliberations may become public
knowledge does not appear to overly chill deliberations, and it is unlikely
that deliberations would be hampered any further if allegations of racial
bias were admissible to challenge verdicts.245
Moreover, even if allowing testimony about juror racism to challenge
verdicts does chill some deliberations, that is not enough to justify the total
lack of a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule. While chilling
jury deliberations even a little is an extraordinary measure, racism is an
246
extraordinary problem that has done anything but fade over time. Rac-
ism within the criminal justice and jury trial systems is a stark and severe
problem24 7 that requires an extreme solution, and we should be willing to
chill jury deliberations slightly to prevent criminal defendants from being
convicted largely or solely on the basis of race.
We expect jurors to be neutral decision makers and even use jury in-
structions to tell jurors that racial bias has no place in the courtroom.248
243. Wolin, supra note 206, at 294-95.
244. Id. at 295.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, Third Noose in a Week Found in the District, This Time in South-
east, WASH. POST (June 3, 2017), https://www.wasbingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/third-noose-
in-a-week-found-in-dc-this-time-in-southeast/2017/06/03/e79fdc2a-4868-ll e7 98cd-
af64b4fe2dfcstory.btml (describing a span of time where multiple nooses were found throughout
Washington, D.C., including near an elementary school and outside of the National Museum of Afri-
can American History and Culture); Sarah Posner, After Charlottesville Rally Ends in Violence, Alt-
Right Vows to Return, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/poli-
tics/news/charlottesville-white-supremacist-rally-erupts-in-violence-w497446 (recounting a day in
August 2017, where white supremacists rioted in Charlottesville, Virginia and chanted various racially
charged phrases including "white lives matter," "you will not replace us," and the Nazi slogan "blood
and soil"); Janell Ross, From Mexican Rapists to Bad Hombres, the Trump Campaign in Two Mo-
ments, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapists-to-bad-hombres-the-trump-campaign-in-two-moments
(noting that during then-candidate Donald Trump's presidential announcement speech he stated that
"[w]hen Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best .... They're sending people that have
lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bring-
ing crime. They're rapists.").
247. In their respective dissents in Peha-Rodriguez, Justices Thomas and Alito assert that the
majority's concerns about racial bias are admirable but overstated, particularly when weighed against
public policy concerns. See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 874 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("In its attempt to stimulate a 'thoughtful, rational dialogue' on race relations, the Court
today ... imposes a uniform, national rule. The Constitution does not require such a rule." (citation
omitted) (quoting id. at 871 (majority opinion)); id at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court is surely
correct that even a tincture of racial bias can inflict great damage on [the jury] system . . . . But until
today, the argument that the Court now finds convincing has not been thought to be sufficient to over-
come confidentiality rules .... ). However, as this Comment demonstrates throughout, racial bias is
still very much a problem and by minimizing its impact on the judicial system, the dissenting justices
merely demonstrate a failure to see racial bias's true specter. See supra notes 126-32 and accompany-
ing text.
248. See CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: TENTH CIRCUIT § 1.04 (2011) ("It is also
your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy. That was the
promise you made and the oath you took.").
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Enforcing this expectation through the racial bias exception simply makes
logical sense. And while allowing jurors to deliberate without fear of re-
proach is important, freedom to deliberate in a manner that effectively al-
lows "the majority [to use] its values to demean the rights of minorities"
should not be given carte blanche.249 Racial bias, both generally and more
specifically within the judicial system, is widespread and devastating
enough to sacrifice some modicum of free deliberation to better ensure that
criminal defendants are not convicted because of immutable characteris-
tics.
Finally, while the interest in finality is another important goal, this
interest too is not enough to justify a no-impeachment rule without a racial
bias exception. The interest in finality and verdict stability has long been
weighed against competing interests of fairness and accuracy, and the in-
terest in finality has not always been deemed more important.25 This is
particularly true in the case ofjury deliberations.2 5 1 When juries reach ver-
dicts by way of an improper procedure-such as racial bias-the resulting
verdict can easily be one that is "so fundamentally unfair . . . [that] there
252is little reason to protect [it]" simply because of the interest in finality.
And due process "contemplates that [jury] decisions be based on a rational
evaluation of the evidence," meaning that "where [a] jury employs an ir-
rational procedure to reach a verdict" finality can easily be outweighed by
the competing value of fairness.25 3 While ensuring an end to litigation is
crucial to the stability of the judicial system, ensuring that that end point
is reached at the expense of a fair and accurate verdict, including verdicts
that were the result of racial bias, can do just as much (if not more) to
damage the judicial system as allowing verdicts to be challenged can.254
249. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072. Allowing jurors to use racial bias to decide
cases also arguably allows verdicts to be decided based on facts not in evidence, thus violating a basic
tenet of the right to a fair trial. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) ("The require-
ment that ajury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at trial' goes to the fundamental
integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.. .. In the constitutional
sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the evidence developed
against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial
protection of the defendant's right of conform, of cross-examination, and of counsel."); Bennett L.
Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem ofJuror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 331
(2005).
250. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072; Gold, supra note 238, at 131-32. In fact, recent
Supreme Court decisions even suggest "a trend focusing on truth and accuracy as the predominant
considerations in evaluating the role of the jury." 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072 n.54;
see, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 334 (1980) ("'The basic purpose of a trial is the determi-
nation of truth,' and it is the jury to whom we have entrusted the responsibility for making this deter-
mination... . Any practice that threatens the jury's ability properly to perform that function poses a
similar threat to the truth-determining process itself." (citation omitted) (quoting Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (holding
that a five-person jury was unconstitutional because such a small jury could promote "inaccurate and
possibly biased decision making").
251. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072 n.54.
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Moreover, the importance of finality has been superseded by con-
cerns for accuracy and due process in the past, most notably when it comes
to the use of newly acquired DNA evidence to overturn criminal ver-
dicts. 25 5 In the case of DNA, interests of fairness and accuracy, specifically
the use of accurate evidence and a desire to protect innocent defendants
from a prison sentence, were held to be more important than the competing
interest in finality. 25 6 Similarly, when it comes to racial bias, the interest
of finality within the judicial system "does not outweigh the more im-
portant goal" of ensuring that criminal defendants are convicted based on
257the evidence, not the racially charged feelings of jurors.
As with the other public policy reasons underlying a strict no-im-
peachment rule, the interest in finality does not justify allowing verdicts
based in racial bias to be unimpeachable. However, just because the inter-
ests in fairness and accuracy are more important han finality here does not
mean that jurors should be able to challenge verdicts years or decades after
they were rendered. Unlike DNA evidence, juror testimony about deliber-
ations loses accuracy over time, thus allowing concerns of finality to
weigh more heavily against those of accuracy as the months and years
pass.258 But the solution to this problem is simple: impose a reasonable
statute of limitations on when jurors can come forward with evidence to
impeach a verdict.
259
The public policy behind the no-impeachment rule provides valid and
compelling arguments for the rule's application. But those rationales are
not expansive enough to justify a bar on using juror testimony to challenge
racist verdicts. The "cumulative effect" of a strict no-impeachment rule-
without an exception for racial bias-is that a defendant can be arrested,
charged, convicted, and sentenced directly because of racism and without
a single inquiry into the decision maker's state of mind.260 Encouraging
free deliberation, promoting finality, and limiting juror harassment are all
important policy goals. But because of the nation's long and ongoing battle
with racism and the critical importance of fairness and accuracy, minimiz-
ing racial bias's impact on judicial decision making is paramount to the
admirable policy goals behind a strict no-impeachment rule.
255. See Sophia S. Chang, Protecting the Innocent: Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration,
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 300 (2009); Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2919, 2952-53 (2010).
256. Chang, supra note 255; Garret, supra note 255.
257. Chang, supra note 255.
258. Diehm, supra note 221, at 402.
259. See infra Section III.D.
260. Leipold, supra note 63, at 582.
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D. To Truly Limit Racial Bias's Influence on Jury Verdicts, the Racial
Bias Exception Must Be Coupled with Improved Jury Instructions
In Peiha-Rodriguez, the Court took an important step forward in the
fight against racism when it ruled that the Constitution mandates an ex-
ception to the no-impeachment rule in cases of juror racial bias.2 61 How-
ever, in making that decision the Court declined to establish procedural
rules for handling accusations of a juror's racial bias or draw a dividing
line for when racially charged comments are offensive enough to mandate
impeachment.262 Leaving these decisions to the discretion of the trial
courts was a wise choice.263 Prior to the decision in Peiha-Rodriguez,
barely a third of states recognized a racial bias exception to their no-im-
peachment rules.264 Formulating broad rules on the procedural require-
ments or the right amount of racism based on the experiences of so few
states may well have been a foolhardy endeavor carrying with it a large
risk of getting the rules wrong. Before such rules can be crafted, a strong
line of precedent on the racial bias exception, at both the state and federal
level, must develop.2 65
But this line of precedent will never develop ifjurors are unsure about
whether they should speak out when racial bias finds its way into jury de-
liberations. Implementing universal jury instructions that encourage jurors
to report instances of bias after the conclusion of a trial is one way to en-
sure that this critical line of precedent develops. As Justice Kennedy noted,
it can be hard to call someone out, particularly a stranger, for displaying
racial bias.266 But if jurors knew that they could do just that after the con-
261. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
262. Id at 870.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. To date, only a handful of cases have relied on Peha-Rodriguez in determining whether a
verdict should be impeached because of a juror's racial bias. See, e.g., Richardson v. Kornegay, No.
5:16-HC-2115-FL, 2017 WL 1133289, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2017) (finding that Peha-Rodriguez
was inapplicable when a black male juror was asked by another juror whether the black juror was
voting not guilty because the juror was a black man like the defendant); see also, e.g., Tharpe v. War-
den, No. 17-14027-P, 2017 WL 4250413, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017) (holding that Peha-Rodri-
guez did not mandate a stay of the defendant's execution even though a juror later made racially
charged statements about the defendant in a postverdict affidavit), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545 (2018) (per curium) (holding that the juror's statement "presents a
strong factual basis for the argument that Tharpe's race affected [the juror's] vote for a death verdict").
More specifically, the juror in Tharpe stated in an affidavit taken several years after the verdict was
rendered that "I felt [the defendant], who wasn't in the good black folks category in my book, should
get the electric chair" and "[a]fter studying the Bible, I have wondered if black people even have
souls." Dakin Andone, Questions of Racial Bias Surround Black Man's Imminent Execution, CNN
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/24/us/keith-tharpe-georgia-execution/index.html.
Despite the judicial system's slow application of Peha-Rodriguez, instances of juror racial bias im-
pacting verdicts continue to come to light. See Mike Mullen, Juror: St. Paul Man 's 'Got to Be Guilty'
Because He's a 'Banger from the Hood,' CITY PAGES (Dec. 21, 2017),
http://www.citypages.com/news/juror-st-paul-mans-got-to-be-guilty-because-hes-a-banger-from-the-
hood/465660583.
266. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
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clusion of a trial and with a guarantee of secrecy, more jurors may be will-
ing to come forward with such allegations. In the short-term, this would
allow the criminal justice system to ensure that defendants are not being
convicted simply because of their race or ethnicity. And in the long-term,
this would allow a critical line of precedent to develop, which would then
aid the judicial system in formulating the narrowly tailored procedural and
substantive rules that the Supreme Court declined to create.
"For a juror to-affirmatively report ... biased statements requires that
[he or she] recognize the expression of bias, believe the expression is in-
appropriate, and be sufficiently motivated to report the incident."267 While
helping one recognize the expression of bias is not something strategically
crafted jury instructions can do, such instructions can inform jurors that
the expression of overt racial bias is improper and that jurors who hear
fellow jurors make racist remarks in connection with a trial have a positive
obligation to report that information.
The success of the Court's newly crafted racial bias exception de-
pends in part on jurors knowing that they can, and should, report instances
of bias that occur during deliberations. Jury instructions should be crafted
to tell jurors just that. While instructing jurors about the bar on using racial
bias to reach a verdict and the ability to later impeach racist verdicts is a
"minimal gesture,"2 68 it is a gesture that would do more to combat racial
bias in jury deliberations than most courts do now.269 Furthermore, jury
instructions put more than just jurors on notice that racial bias will not be
tolerated. Parties, attorneys, and even lay people merely observing a trial
will all hear these instructions and become aware of the new racial bias
267. West, supra note 42, at 186.
268. Edward Swaine, Pre-Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and Juror
Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187,201 (1988).
269. See id at 202 ("Not only does the bulk of jury instruction occur after trial, but it tends to
pay little attention to the prospect ofjuror misconduct, particularly misconduct which does not involve
extraneous information or outside influences." (footnote omitted)).Race-conscious jury instructions
have also been shown to result in fairer verdicts. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Re-
search, 78 Cli-KENT L. REv. 997, 1015-16 (2003). Studies have repeatedly shown that individuals
are less likely to exhibit racial bias when race is made a salient issue in a case. Id. at 1012-16 (de-
scribing several studies where, once white mock jurors were made aware of the racial dynamics at
play, those same mock jurors then rendered unbiased decisions). And at least one study has shown that
jury instructions can help create this racial salience. Id. at 1007 (summarizing a study where mock
jurors who received jury instructions about racial prejudice evinced no racial bias when assigning guilt
ratings to hypothetical black and white defendants). But see JENNIFER K. ELEK & PAULA HANNAFORD-
AGOR, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CAN EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS REDUCE EXPRESSIONS OF
IMPLICIT BIAS? (2014) (finding that specialized jury instructions about race did not appear to signifi-
cantly influence the mock jurors' preference, confidence, or sentence severity).
Based on these studies, it is possible that using race conscious jury instructions to encourage jurors to
report racial bias might also stop jurors from relying on bias in the first place. See Pefia-Rodriguez,
137 S. Ct. at 871 (noting the role that jury instructions can play in limiting the use of the racial bias
exception to rare cases by encouraging jurors to confront "the flawed nature of reasoning that is
prompted or influenced by improper biases"); West, supra note 42, at 193. But see Johnson, supra
note 168, at 1678-79 (arguing that jury instructions would do little to limit racial bias because jurors
often do not understand jury instructions, racial bias is too subconscious, and drawing attention to bias
can place even greater emphasis on that characteristic).
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exception, as well as the more general prohibition on determining a de-
fendant's guilt based on race. The more people who are aware of and un-
derstand the racial bias exception, the broader and stronger the exception's
impact on decreasing juror racial bias will be.
Support for informing jurors about their ability to report instances of
misconduct dates all the way back to the codification of Rule 606(b) in
1975.270 Although the Advisory Conference chose the Senate's broader
no-impeachment rule over the House's narrow option, in doing so, the Ad-
visory Conference also remarked that "[t]he Conferees believe that jurors
should be encouraged to be conscientious in promptly reporting to the
court misconduct that occurs during jury deliberations."271 Although this
comment was likely directed at encouraging jurors to report instances of
misconduct prior to returning a verdict,272 as the rule that the Advisory
Conference was adopting would effectively bar most post-deliberation re-
273porting, this comment can still be read as giving support for the broader
proposition that juries should be informed about their ability and duty to
report instances of juror misbehavior, including racial bias.
Many state and federal courts already include a line about bias in their
27
model jury instructions. 2 The Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions promul-
gated for the District Courts within the Tenth Circuit inform jurors that
"[i]t is ... your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without
prejudice or sympathy."2 7 5 The Ninth Circuit goes further by telling jurors
that "[y]ou must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law and
must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, preju-
dices, or sympathy."276 And the model jury instructions for the trial courts
within the Seventh Circuit go further yet by encouraging judges to add a
line to their instructions telling jurors not to "let any person's race, color,
religion, national ancestry, or gender influence you," when the facts of a
277
case make such an instruction appropriate.
Some states are even more explicit.278 California's model jury in-
structions make a specific reference to racial bias, stating, "[d]o not let
bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision. Bias
270. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD,supra note 45, § 6074.
271. H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7102, 1974 WL 11681, at *7102 (emphasis added).
272. Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting).
273. H.R. REP.NO. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7102, 1974 WL 11681, at *7102.
274. See, e.g., 9TH ClR. MANUAL MODEL JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 3.1 (2010); 10TH CIR. CRIM.
PATTERN JURY INSTR. § 1.04 (2011); ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIMINAL § 1.01 (2018); MASS.
CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTR. § 2.200 (2009).
275. 10TH CIR. CRIM. PATTERN JURY INSTR. § 1.04 (2011).
276. 9TH CIR. MANUAL MODEL JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 3.1 (2010).
277. 7TH CIR. FED. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 1.01 (2012).
278. See, e.g., JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 200 (2017); 1-II CRIM. JURY INSTR. FOR
D.C., INSTRUCTION 2.102 (2017); see also infra note 280 and accompanying text.
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includes, but is not limited to, bias ... based on disability, gender, nation-
ality, national origin, race or ethnicity, religion, gender identity, sexual
orientation, age, [or] socioeconomic status."279 And Washington, D.C.'s
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions also warn jurors about reaching a ver-
dict based on race: "You should determine the facts without prejudice,
fear, sympathy, or favoritism. You should not be improperly influenced
by anyone's race, ethnic origin, or gender."280
It is clear from the model jury instructions relied on by legal profes-
sionals nationwide that many courts have concluded that instructing juries
on racial bias is entirely acceptable and even encouraged. Based on this,
modifying jury instructions to inform jurors that they are forbidden from
relying on racial bias when convicting a criminal defendant seems easily
achievable. So does informing jurors that a verdict can be overturned if a
juror relies on overt racial bias in voting to convict a criminal defendant.
Ajury instruction informing jurors about the racial bias exception will also
need to stress that any reporting will be entirely confidential so that jurors
need not worry about harassment hat might result from their decision to
come forward. And to best protect the legal system's interest in finality,
this jury instruction should be coupled with a statute of limitations on
when juror racial bias can be reported.28 1
A model jury instruction considering these various dynamics might
look like this:
Juror Misconduct
It is your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without
relying on prejudice or bias. You should not allow bias or any kind of
prejudice based upon race or ethnicity to influence your decision. If
you find that another juror is relying on racial bias to determine
279. JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 200 (2017) (emphasis added). California's Model
Criminal Jury Instructions also allow the judge to "insert any other impermissible basis for bias as
appropriate," in the event that the listed bases are insufficient. Id.
280. 1-II CRIM. JURY INSTR. FOR D.C. INSTRUCTION 2.102 (2017) (emphasis added); see also
ARIz. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM., PCI 2 (4th ed. 2016) ("In deciding this case, you are not to be
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.
Race, color, religion, national ancestry, gender or sexual orientation should not influence you.");
MASS. CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTR. § 2.200 (2009) ("Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence
developed at trial. It would be improper for you to consider any personal feelings about the defendant's
race, religion, national origin, sex or age." (supplemental instruction for relevant cases)); ILL.
PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIMINAL § 1.01 (2018) ("You should not be influenced by any person's race,
color, religion, national ancestry, gender, or sexual orientation." (supplemental instruction for relevant
cases)).
281. This reasonable statute of limitations could be quite short. In most cases where jurors have
reported racial bias, that reporting happened within days or, at the most, a few weeks after the conclu-
sion of the trial. See, e.g., Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017) (jurors mentioned
racist statements to defense counsel minutes after trial ended); United States v. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x
201, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (juror contacted defense counsel one week after verdict was entered); United
States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (juror contacted defense counsel one day after
verdict was entered), abrogated by Pehia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855. Based on this, a reasonable statute
of limitations need not be any longer a few months.
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whether the defendant is guilty, you are obligated to report that mis-
conduct to either the judge or an attorney. If you report another juror
for this misconduct, your identity and what you said will remain con-
fidential.
This misconduct can be reported after a verdict has been entered, so
long as it is reported within a reasonable time. If, after further evalua-
tion, the racial bias in question is found to be both severe enough and
directly linked to the juror's vote to convict, the verdict can be chal-
lenged and even overturned.
An instruction like the one proposed here could be invaluable in both
helping jurors check their racial bias at the courtroom door282 and ensuring
that the racial bias exception has the furthest reaching and greatest impact
possible. And while jury instructions alone will not solve the problem of
racial bias,2 83 notifying jurors that the sanctity of the nation's legal system
depends on them saying something when racial bias becomes the thir-
teenth juror could be an effective way to continue marching towards a
more racially just legal system.
CONCLUSION
In Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule when a criminal
284
defendant's verdict is the result of overt racial bias2. Although modest,
this was the correct ruling, both because racial bias remains incredibly en-
trenched in our nation and because existing safeguards of voir dire and
courtroom oversight alone are not enough to prevent racial bias from in-
filtrating a jury.
"Race is an issue ... this nation cannot afford to ignore right now." 285
The Court's decision in Peila-Rodriguez was a vital step in acknowledging
and combatting racism's continued presence in and strong grip on the
criminal justice system. But this new racial bias exception will remain as
ineffective a safeguard as voir dire and courtroom oversight are if jurors
do not know that the use of racial bias in convicting a criminal defendant
is barred and thatjurors have an obligation to report such misconduct, even
282. See Peiha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
283. As briefly mentioned above, see supra note 220 and accompanying text, the current safe-
guards that exist to uncover racial bias before a trial begins, specifically voir dire, need to be modified
to better elicit bias from potential jurors. Modifying how we draw jury pools, and ensuring that juries
are representative of the communities they adjudicate, could also help eliminate racial bias's impact
on jury verdicts. If jury instructions like the one proposed here were implemented nationwide and
coupled with race-conscious voir dire and venire selection, racism within the criminal justice system
could be strategically attacked from a variety of angles. Such a multi-faceted approach would help
mitigate the effects of racial bias on the judicial system much faster and more aggressively than any
of these single approaches could do alone.
284. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
285. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Fear of a Black President, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2012), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/09/fear-of-a-black-president/309064 (quoting a speech by then-
presidential candidate Barack Obama about race-relations in the United States).
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after a trial has ended. If the racial bias exception is coupled with jury
instructions encouraging jurors to report racial bias when it enters their
deliberations, the exception could have a real, measurable impact on the
eradication of racial bias from both our legal system and our nation.
While racism will likely "never be solved, only managed,"2t 6 that
does not mean that we should not strive for a nation wholly free from the
ills of racial animus. The racial bias exception and a set of corresponding
jury instructions could be instrumental in doing just that.
Natalie A. Spiess
286. Leipold, supra note 63, at 603.
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